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Notes
Chappell 2022: 157.
Ibid.: 272.
Ibid.: 98.
“But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee.” (Luke 10:30-35)
Chappell 2022: 11.
Chappell characterizes the central aspects of epiphanies but warns at the same time for the messiness of the category and refuses to talk of sufficient or necessary conditions. She describes ‘epiphany’ as a focal-case concept (after Owen 1969). The concept includes focal cases that include all the nine characteristics but even so, there are significant examples of epiphanies that will not answer all conditions. And that is not a problem: ‘There are no non-stipulative necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being a mountain, either, and the category of the mountainous typically fades out around its edges into literally small-scale phenomena. That does not stop the geologist from studying mountains, nor the alpinist from climbing then.’ (Ibid.: 9).
Chappell 2022.:114.
Ibid.: 115.
Ibid.: 61
The point here is not that these acts are not congruent with the principle of charity, which they obviously are. The point is that the principle as such does not explicitly promote searching for someone, bringing someone home, etc. Nor does the moral judgment ‘I have showed myself lacking in all charity’
I do not want to imply a hard metaphysical distinction between experience and action here. One could perfectly argue that watching in awe, being silent and being humble are actions, as they are patterns of intentional publicly observable behavior. I do not see a problem in in that characterization. Another way to verbalize the distinction is to say that watching in awe is more on the ‘experiential side’ of action and bringing a man to his house is more on the ‘active’ side of action.
Chappell 2022: 229.
see, e.g., Murdoch 2001: 4-8.
Ibid.: 5.
1992: 115.
1966: 50.
Weil 2002: 119.
Chappell 2022: 233.
Murdoch 2001: 38.
The complex relation between the passive and the active might not be paradoxical or problematic, but a criticism on a clear-cut contrast: ‘Murdoch rejected what she thought of as a "dualism" of active and passive elements in the soul. What we are confronted with, in an apparently passive sort of way, in any actual case, may reflect earlier activity; thus, e.g., my now having, quite unreflectively, an inclination to do such-and-such for someone might come from my having earlier tried to see that person as someone genuinely independent of me and my needs. There isn't, in Murdoch's approach, a rejection of the contrast between active and passive, but rather the idea that the application of the contrast is extremely complex.’ (Diamond 2010: 82)
Chappell 2022: 112.
Ibid: 112.
see Ibid:: 233.
Ibid.: 233-234.
Chappell herself mentions the example of creativity research: Friedrick Kékulé who, while dozing in front of the fireplace, visualized a snake with its tail in its mouth with led him to the discovery of the benzene molecule structure. She reveals that she is ‘interested, in the end, in both wow-moments and aha-moments; but at least to begin with, I am more focused on the wows.’ (2022: 16)
Rubin, cited in Csikszentmihalyi 2013: 4.
Cleese 2020: 14-15.
Fermor 1986: 196, cited in Chappell 2014: 51.
see Chappell 2014: 55-58.
Holton, cited in Csikszentmihalyi 2013: 62.
Maybe it does not even make sense to attribute the creativity in this example solely to the father and sons. As Chappell remarked herself, creativity can be an attribute of different people, and can be displayed corporately. (2022: 345)
See also Mark Johnson (1993: ch. 1) on the pervasiveness of what he calls ‘Moral Law Theory’ and how this rests on a deep dualistic picture (impure/pure; high/low body/soul; passion/reason) of human nature. For Chappell’s criticism on moral theory’s systematicity, see Chappell 2014, ch. 1 and 2022: ch. 2.
Chappell 2022: 117.
Chappell 2022: 61.
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Ratajczyk, Y. Epiphanies and Moral Creativity. J Value Inquiry 57, 185–195 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09928-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09928-z