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Dealing with the temporal domain of regime effectiveness: A further conceptual development of the Oslo-Potsdam solution

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Abstract

This paper develops the Oslo-Potsdam solution to measuring regime effectiveness further conceptually. I argue that the temporal domain of regime effectiveness is not adequately dealt with by the current measurement concepts and develop three amendments to the Oslo-Potsdam solution. First, I suggest to measure effectiveness over the time interval the regime is in operation in order to capture welfare gains over time. Second, I propose an amendment that takes the pre-regime phase into account and I suggest a way to assess the loss of potential welfare brought about by delays in negotiating the regime. Third, I take temporal externalities of regime policies into account. Dealing with these three aspects of the temporal domain of regime effectiveness is important for obtaining complete and unbiased measurements. Achieving this is important in itself but also for comparative research, the assessment of regime dynamics, and ultimately for advising on policy.

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Notes

  1. Variables such as power, interests, domestic veto players, but to some extent also institutional variables such as the forum chosen for negotiation, the number of participants, the type of participants or leadership.

  2. The bias I refer to here is a type of measurement bias. It is important to note that such a measurement bias is related to regime effects over time rather than regime effects at a particular point in time. For the latter assessment, the OPS produces to the best of my knowledge unbiased measurements.

  3. For a more detailed example of assessing the technical optimum, see Underdal (2001: 53), and for more details on assessing a global cost minimum, see Helm and Sprinz (2000).

  4. I use the term “present” in the text since this makes the argument more intuitive; however, the reasoning applies more generally to any other point of measurement that lies between (C) and (E).

  5. This is based on the vertical distances at point t n .

  6. Hasenclever et al. (1997) actually distinguish three broad approaches: a behavioral, a cognitive, and a formal approach. I ignore the cognitive approach since it does not impact on my argument.

  7. For a detailed review of the advantages and disadvantages of formal, behavioral, and other approaches to regimes, see Hasenclever et al. (1997): 14–20.

  8. See footnote 2.

  9. It is, of course, possible that parties decide at a later time that there was no reason for action and disband the regime. In that case, there is no “potential effectiveness” that was lost.

  10. Conceptually and empirically, it is important to note that only the externalities created as a consequence of the actual regime policy (AP) should be included in the assessment. With regard to climate change, for example, only part of the damage that will occur in the future is a temporal externality of the AP; in fact, only pollution since 1992 can be included.

  11. The arguments for and against a 0 rate of pure time preference are well rehearsed; see for example Lind 1995, Schelling 1995, Nordhaus 2007, Weitzman 2007. I do not advocate a normative position on this issue; I am solely interested in the implications of different rates of pure time preference for the assessment of “sustained effectiveness”.

  12. The rate of pure time preference cannot be directly observed, though. It can, however, be inferred; see Weitzman 2007, Nordhaus 2007, 2008.

  13. It is worth emphasizing that this argument does not necessarily apply to assessments made specifically to give policy advice.

Abbreviations

OPS:

Oslo-Potsdam solution to measuring regime effectiveness

AP:

Actual policy

CO:

Collective optimum

NR:

No-regime counterfactual

CLRTAP:

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution

OSPAR:

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic

DICE:

Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy

BAU:

Business as usual

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Jon Hovi, Detelf Sprinz, Arild Underdal, and Hugh Ward for comments on earlier versions. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for their comments.

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  1. School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, UK

    Frank Grundig

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Grundig, F. Dealing with the temporal domain of regime effectiveness: A further conceptual development of the Oslo-Potsdam solution. Int Environ Agreements 12, 111–127 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-011-9156-8

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