Abstract
As one of the most pivotal thinkers in the history Mahāyāna Buddhism, the writings of Nāgārjuna have long attracted the attention of scholars aiming to interpret in declarative terms the meaning of the arguments contained therein. However, the very aim of such an endeavor that seeks to ascribe to Nāgārjuna a philosophical position is fundamentally at odds with the unwaveringly critical nature of his project. In order to illustrate the singular character of Nāgārjuna’s methodology, this article seeks to clarify three crucial points concerning his thought: (1) the central concept in his philosophical works, dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), ironically denotes the non-origination (anutpāda) of any entity (bhāva) whatsoever and is universal in scope; (2) emptiness (śūnyatā) is not a meaningful predicate of any entity, meaning that no entity exists that can be identified as being empty; and (3) the Two Truths (satyadvaya) are not a philosophically significant device for Nāgārjuna and subsequently do not provide a means by which to mitigate the radical consequences of his arguments. As a result, we can understand Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no postulative thesis (pratijñā) as a statement that he predicates no quality (dharma) of any subject (dharmin), and that his methodology is strictly critical, offering us no constructive theory by which to make sense of reality.
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Introduction
The writings of Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE) present one of the most complete rejections of constructive metaphysics and epistemology in the history of Indian and Buddhist philosophy. His project is entirely critical, illustrating that no entity (bhāva) is not subsumed by the principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), and as such, no entity is not essenceless (niḥsvabhāva), and therefore, none is not empty (śūnya). His position, accordingly, is often encapsulated both by its defenders and its detractors with such statements as “all entities are empty” (śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ) and “all entities lack an intrinsic nature” (niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ).Footnote 1 However, the interpretation of declarative statements such as these that posit a subject and predicate is complicated by Nāgārjuna’s famous claim in the Vigrahavyāvartanī to maintain no postulative thesis (pratijñā),Footnote 2 meaning that, in accordance with the normative definition of a thesis in a classical Indian context, we are not to understand these statements as positing a quality (dharma), such as emptiness, being predicated of a putative subject (dharmin). As I shall attempt to demonstrate in what follows, Nāgārjuna’s statements do not amount to a postulative thesis because for him, there can be no subject to be predicated of qualities such as emptiness, and even when such subjects are hypothetically posited, notions such as emptiness, paradoxically, cannot serve as meaningful predicates precisely in virtue of their universality. As a result, Nāgārjuna’s project forecloses the possibility of all meaningful metaphysical speculation while offering no metaphysical theory of its own.
In order to elucidate the peculiar nature of Nāgārjuna’s project, this paper will be concerned with defending three separate yet interrelated points. First, the central concept in Nāgārjuna’s thought is not emptiness as many have argued,Footnote 3 but rather dependent origination, which is deployed in an entirely ironic fashion by precisely denoting non-origination (anutpāda). In other words, for Nāgārjuna, to illustrate that an entity arises in a relationship of mutual conditionship with other such entities is simply to illustrate that it does not arise at all. Second, the notion of emptiness renders itself null and void precisely in its universal applicability, for given that emptiness is only meaningful in juxtaposition to non-emptiness in accordance with the principle of dependent origination, in the absence of any entity existing in virtue of an intrinsic nature (svabhāva), there can be no such thing as an entity existing without an intrinsic nature. Third, the Two Truths (satyadvaya) are not a philosophically significant device in Nāgārjuna’s project, meaning that we should not understand the object of his critique as merely being the rarified items of metaphysical speculation in contradistinction to the items of conventional discourse, but rather any entity however construed. Moreover, the Two Truths do not provide a buttress against Nāgārjuna’s claim to maintain no thesis, and as such, we should understand Nāgārjuna’s arguments as having no referent.
Dependent Origination as the Ironic Crux of Nāgārjuna’s Thought
As is evidenced by the benedictory verses to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā as well as the first chapter on the category of conditions (pratyaya), the central topic of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka is dependent origination. While dependent origination is famously identified by Nāgārjuna with emptiness (śūnyatā) in verse 24.18 of this text and elsewhere,Footnote 4 given that the emptiness of entities is a specific consequence of their lack of an intrinsic nature, which is itself a result of their status as arising in dependence,Footnote 5 it is important to keep the senses of these concepts separate even if their meaning is ultimately the same. It scarcely needs to be stated that Nāgārjuna is drawing upon a deep legacy in Buddhist doctrine in forefronting dependent origination as the central teaching of the Buddha, and is strictly in line with mainstream Buddhist texts in identifying it with the Middle Way (Skt. madhyamā pratipat, P. majjhimā paṭipadā) between eternalism (Skt. śāśvatavāda, P. sassatavāda) and annihilationism (ucchedavāda), and hence as the correct understanding of Buddhist practice.Footnote 6 However, as Shulman (2008) illustrates, the doctrine of dependent origination in the suttas strictly refers to the 12-fold chain of dependent origination beginning with ignorance (Skt. avidyā, P. avijjā) and culminating in aging and death (jarāmaraṇa), and functions not as a general metaphysical or ontological theory, but as an account of experience and rebirth in the absence of an Upaniṣadic self (ātman). Nonetheless, the notion of dependent origination comes to take on much broader implications in Nāgārjuna’s writings, and can be seen as referring to any relation of dependence. This novel deployment of dependent origination, along with the consequences resulting thereof, more than anything else contributes to the distinctive flavor of Nāgārjuna’s methodology, meaning an accurate understanding of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka must begin with an accurate understanding of his unique application of dependent origination.
The first point to note concerning dependent origination in the thought of Nāgārjuna is its universality. In addition to the type of one-to-one causality exemplified by the 12-fold chain of dependent origination (idaṃpratyayatā), the concept comes to denote any relation of dependence, such as that between agent and object,Footnote 7 appropriator and appropriated,Footnote 8 coupled opposites, and so forth. The complete generality of dependent origination for Nāgārjuna is vividly evidenced in a set of verses from the Acintyastava:
11. svatve sati paratvaṃ syāt paratve svatvam iṣyate |
āpekṣikī tayoḥ siddhiḥ pārāvāram ivoditā ||
There would be otherness only if there were identity, and identity is acknowledged only if there is otherness. These two are established relative to each other, like the near and far shores.
12. yadā nāpekṣate kiṃcit kutaḥ kiṃcit tadā bhavet |
yadā nāpekṣate dīrghaṃ kuto hrasvādikaṃ tadā ||
When something is not relative to anything else, then how could there be anything at all? How could something be short and the like without being relative to what is long?
13. astitve sati nāstitvaṃ dīrghe hrasvaṃ tathā sati |
nāstitve sati cāstitvaṃ yat tasmād ubhayaṃ na sat ||
There would be nonexistence only if there were existence in the same way that there would be something short only if there were something long. Since there would be existence only if there were nonexistence, neither is real.Footnote 9
While dependent origination is not explicitly mentioned, given that the Acintyastava begins with a praise of the Buddha “who proclaimed the essencelessness of entities that arise dependently” (pratītyajānāṃ bhāvānāṃ naiḥsvābhāvyaṃ jagāda yaḥ), it is clear that these verses reflect Nāgārjuna’s understanding of dependent origination. As such, in a way that parallels the expansion of the traditional notion of not-self (Skt. anātman, P. anatta) into the theory of universal emptiness exemplified in the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) texts, Nāgārjuna expands the notion of dependent origination to apply to all relations that can be construed as reflecting some sort of relativity.
In addition to expanding the scope of dependent origination, what is perhaps even more distinctive in Nāgārjuna’s appropriation of the concept is the pointedly ironic manner in which he uses it.Footnote 10 Far from offering a constructive account of how entities arise in relations of mutual conditionship, it is rather mobilized by Nāgārjuna to illustrate specifically how no such entity arises whatsoever. Therefore, in serving as a general principle that provides the only viable account of how entities arise in relations of interdependence, dependent origination, in fact, is an ironic anti-principle that does not offer an explanation of its putative object, namely finite and relative states of existence, but rather illustrates how its putative object is incoherent and warrants no such explanation. It is worth recalling the aforementioned benedictory verses with which Nāgārjuna begins his magnum opus:
anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam |
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam ||
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam |
deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam ||
I pay homage to the best of speakers, the Fully Awakened One, who taught dependent origination, which is the quelling of rampant conceptuality, ultimate bliss, without cessation, without arising, without annihilation, without eternity, without singularity, without multiplicity, without coming, and without going.
Dependent origination is thus explicitly identified with non-origination at the outset of the text, and while it might be objected that this refers to the non-arising of entities specifically construed as existing in virtue of an intrinsic nature, this objection is nullified by the following verse which rejects the possibility of any entity (bhāva) arising in any manner whatsoever.Footnote 11 In addition to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna is clear in his other works as well that to arise in a relationship of dependence, and hence to lack an intrinsic nature, is to not arise at all. As he states in verse 19 of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā:
tat tat prāpya yad utpannaṃ notpannaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ |
yat svabhāvena notpannam utpannaṃ nāma tat katham ||
That which arises depending on this or that is not arisen with an intrinsic nature. And how is that which is not arisen with an intrinsic nature arisen at all?Footnote 12
In addition, while much has been made of the fact that Nāgārjuna offers a positive rather than critical account of the 12-fold chain of dependent origination in chapter 26 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,Footnote 13 this critique is provided elsewhere in the Śūnyatāsaptati:
10. | de med phyin ci log bzhi las || skyes pa’i ma rig mi srid la |
| de med ‘du byed mi ‘byung zhing || lhag ma rnams kyang de bzhin no |
Since misapprehension (viparyāsa) does not exist, ignorance (avidyā) that arises from the four types of misapprehension is impossible, and since ignorance does not exist, formations (saṃskāra) do not arise, and so on and so forth for the rest of the twelve links.
11. | ma rig ‘du byed med mi ‘byung || de med ‘du byed mi ‘byung zhin |
| phan tshun rgyu phyir de gnyis ni || rang bzhin gyis ni ma grub yin |
Ignorance does not arise without formations, and formations do not arise without ignorance. Because these two are the cause (hetu) of each other, they are not established with their own intrinsic nature (svabhāva).
12. | gang zhig bdag nyid rang bzhin gyis || ma grub de gzhan ji ltar bskyed |
| de phyir gzhan las grub pa yi || rkyen gzhan dag ni skyed byed min |
And how can that which is not itself established with its own intrinsic nature give rise to something else? Hence, conditions established from something else cannot, in turn, produce other things.
13. | pha ni bu min bu pha min || de gnyis phan tshun med min la |
| de gnyis cig car yang min ltar || yan lag bcu gnyis de bzhin no |
A father is not his son, and a son is not his father, and yet, these two do not exist without the other, nor do they occur simultaneously. This is also the case for the twelve links of dependent origination.Footnote 14
Nāgārjuna’s critique of causality is therefore complete and uncompromising. Thus, there can be no doubt that Nāgārjuna deploys the central Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination and demonstrates its universality for the explicit purpose of illustrating how no entity whatsoever can arise.
In summation, we can accurately characterize Nāgārjuna’s use of dependent origination as fully ironic. Far from providing a rational account of how experience and reality unfolds in a complex web of causality, it rather provides an exhaustive account of how they, in fact, do not.Footnote 15 While such a line of argument may be considered by some to run counter to the very foundations of Buddhist thought and practice, it is worth considering that his distinctively ironic approach is very much in line with the discursive tenor of Buddhism in the broader history of South Asian religion. As Pollock (2006, pp. 51–59) highlights, much of the key vocabulary of early Buddhism, such as the concepts of karman, dharma, ārya, and so forth, is adopted from the Vedic cultural order in a way that both subverts the original context in which they were deployed, namely that of animal sacrifice, and lends legitimacy and prestige to the heterodox Buddhist order. The sharp irony exemplified by Nāgārjuna’s distinctive deployment of dependent origination may thus been seen as another manner in which he is participating in what, in a Buddhist context, is a particularly persuasive mode of expression.
Emptiness as the Removal of All Views
Nāgārjuna consistently warns his audience throughout his corpus of the dangers of hypostatizing emptiness as a philosophical view (dṛṣṭi). One of the most pointed examples comes from verse 13.8 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā:
śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ |
yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire ||
Emptiness was taught by the Victors as the removal of all views. But those who maintain emptiness as a view are said to be incurable.
The notion of emptiness therefore serves as a means to undermine all philosophical views while not functioning as a philosophical view itself. In order to understand how this works in detail, however, we must consider the issue of philosophical views in tandem with Nāgārjuna’s claim to maintain no thesis.
Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no thesis, found in verse 29 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī,Footnote 16 is perhaps one of his most cryptic, and has accordingly attracted much scholarly attention.Footnote 17 What is usually lacking in these treatments, however, is a clear and unambiguous statement of what a “thesis” (pratijñā) actually is in a classical Indian context. According to Nyāyasūtra 1.1.33 along with its commentary by Vātsyāyana (fl. 5th century), a “thesis” is an “indication of what is to be established” (sādhyanirdeśa) wherein a particular quality (dharma) is predicated of some subject (dharmin), such as the well-known example, “sound is impermanent.”Footnote 18 We have already seen that for Nāgārjuna, no subject can be posited, for whatever putative subject is put forth is subsumed by the principle of dependent origination, and as such is without an intrinsic nature and subsequently does not arise at all. Hence, there is no dharmin to be predicated of any dharma, meaning Nāgārjuna cannot be said to maintain a thesis in accordance with the normative definition.Footnote 19
Nāgārjuna is often understood both by his supporters and opponents as propounding a theory of universal emptiness, wherein “all entities lack an intrinsic nature” and “all entities are empty.” While such declarative statements are more often than not made in the voices of his opponents or commentators, it cannot be denied that Nāgārjuna does sometimes seem to positively predicate qualities such as “essencelessness”Footnote 20 of entities. Nonetheless, his preference is typically to formulate such assertions in the negative, so that rather than saying “all entities are empty,” he would rather state, “no entity is not empty.” This is evidenced in MMK 24.19:
apratītyasamutpanno dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate |
yasmāt tasmād aśūnyo ‘pi dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate ||
No phenomenon exists that arises independently, for which reason no phenomenon that is not empty exists either.Footnote 21
Nāgārjuna demonstrates in great detail in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and elsewhere that any putative entity is only intelligible as such in relations of interdependence with other such entities, meaning it lacks an intrinsic nature and as such is empty. But we run into difficulty in trying to formulate this as a demonstration to the effect that such entities are positively empty, as there simply is no entity to be predicated of emptiness since, lacking any independent existence, it cannot be isolated as an entity to subsequently be so described.Footnote 22 Therefore, Nāgārjuna’s demonstration, rather than a positive illustration of universal emptiness, is entirely negative, and a demonstration that nothing that is not empty can exist. However, it cannot be stressed enough that this should not be reinterpreted to mean that all entities are empty, for in the absence of any viable example of something that is not empty and endowed with an intrinsic nature, in accordance with the principle of dependent origination, there similarly can be nothing meaningfully qualified as empty. This point is made explicitly in MMK 13.7:
yady aśūnyaṃ bhavet kiṃcit syāc chūnyam api kiṃcana |
na kiṃcid asty aśūnyaṃ ca kutaḥ śūnyaṃ bhaviṣyati ||
If there were something that was not empty, then there would also be something that is empty. But there is nothing that is not empty. So how could anything be empty?
Just like dichotomies such as long and short, or existence and nonexistence, emptiness and non-emptiness form a dependent pair such that without one member, the other does not obtain. Since anything at all is subsumed by dependent origination and hence is without essence and therefore empty, nothing is not empty. But since the notion of non-emptiness does not obtain, neither does that of emptiness.Footnote 23
This clues us into another distinctive feature of Nāgārjuna’s methodology rooted in the principle of dependent origination. Given that any putative entity or predicate is only established as such in dependence upon its opposite, if anything can be shown to be universal in scope, such as emptiness, then since it loses that opposite upon which it depends precisely in virtue of its universality, it too vanishes in the same breadth. The exact same logic can be seen to be at work in MMK 5.6:
avidyamāne bhāve ca kasyābhāvo bhaviṣyati |
bhāvābhāvavidharmā ca bhāvābhāvāv avaiti kaḥ ||
If there is no entity, of what could there be an absence? And who, devoid of the qualities of being an entity or an absence, could conceive of an entity or its absence?
In other words, since nonexistence is only intelligible in juxtaposition to existence, if it can be demonstrated that nothing exists, it is meaningless to say that some entity does not exist, for it begs the question of what, exactly, does not exist. This means that Nāgārjuna’s project does not amount to a sort of nihilism in which nothing exists precisely for the reason that nothing exists to not exist. There is absolutely nothing to be predicated of being absent in the thought of Nāgārjuna.Footnote 24
Returning to emptiness, I would suggest that the logic seen in verse 13.7 represents a feat of great philosophical elegance and economy, for the logic of dependent origination qua emptiness can be seen to fold in upon and dissolve itself in precisely the same manner as it dissolves everything else in a way that does not undermine Nāgārjuna’s dialectic of emptiness, but rather brings it to its perfect completion. In contrast to another cherished piece of Buddhist doctrine, when impermanence (Skt. anityatā, P. aniccatā) is applied to itself in the same manner as it is applied to conditioned phenomena (Skt. saṃskāra, P. saṅkhāra), it seems to undermine its own universality, for if the truth of impermanence is itself impermanent, then this would mean there are times at which the truth of impermanence does not hold, thereby resulting in a contradiction in positing its universality. However, when the tool Nāgārjuna uses to demonstrate that any putative entity is empty, namely dependent origination, is applied in the same manner to emptiness itself, which it should be remembered is merely a reformulation of dependent origination, it does not result in the undesired consequence that there are entities that are not empty, but rather in the conclusion that neither emptiness nor non-emptiness are genuine qualities of any entity. In the philosophical domain, Nāgārjuna theory of universal emptiness is therefore akin to a black hole. It destroys anything with which it comes into contact leaving no trace, and yet at its core, it itself is a singularity that has collapsed under its own weight, only discernable in its interactions with other systems. It thus represents the pinnacle of critical thought.
In summation, Nāgārjuna’s supposed assertion that all entities are empty could not more perfectly fail to meet the prescriptive definition of a thesis in a classical Indian context, for due to the implications of the universality of dependent origination, neither an entity to qualify as a subject (dharmin) can exist, nor can a quality such as emptiness (dharma) be coherently predicated of it. The peculiar quality of Nāgārjuna’s methodology is precisely this logic that folds in on itself to render the apparent thesis that “all entities lack an intrinsic nature” a non-thesis that just as well says, “there is no entity that lacks an intrinsic nature,” and thus precludes the possibility of any constructive philosophy while leaving nothing in its place. This, I believe, is the most straightforward sense in which we are to understand Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no thesis, and why emptiness is itself not a philosophical view, but precisely the annihilation of all possible constructive philosophy.
The Role of the Two Truths in Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka
The Two Truths, being the worldly conventional truth (lokasaṃvṛtisatya) and the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) respectively, have proven to be an especially fruitful, enduring, and yet contentious device in the exegesis of Madhyamaka thought in South Asia, East Asia, and Tibet.Footnote 25 The impact of this commentarial legacy on modern scholarship has naturally been considerable. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, for instance, previously identified the Two Truths as a problem of great importance not just for Mahāyāna Buddhism, but also for Vedānta, for Indian philosophy more broadly, and indeed for world philosophy in general.Footnote 26 Somewhat more recently, Jay Garfield has stated that it is Nāgārjuna’s treatment of the Two Truths “as a vehicle for understanding Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology” that in fact represents his ”greatest philosophical contribution” (1994, p. 219). Nonetheless, Ye Shaoyong (2017) has argued to the contrary that the Two Truths are not a critical feature of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of the Middle Way, and that we can identify Bhāviveka (c. 500–570) as the first to utilize the Two Truths not simply as a pedagogical device, but as expressing two modes of discourse each demanding separate philosophical treatment. In this section, I would like to present my own argument in favor of Ye’s assessment and clarify two points. First, the target of Nāgārjuna’s critique is not limited the rarified items of metaphysical speculation, namely, entities construed as existing with intrinsic nature, but includes any entity and any form of reality whatsoever. Second, given that the distinction between the Two Truths does not provide a buttress against Nāgārjuna’s critique, his claim to have no thesis should also be taken at face value to reflect the fact that his statements to the effect that “all entities are empty” have no definitive content.
Before assessing the role of the Two Truths in the thought of Nāgārjuna, it is first necessary to understand to what end they are forefronted in modern scholarship on Madhyamaka. Garfield offers a particularly clear and robust theory of the Two Truths throughout his many works wherein the distinction between the Two Truths is advanced in order to avert the dangers of total nihilism wherein all phenomena would be completely nonexistent. As he states,
Nāgārjuna relentlessly analyzes phenomena or processes that appear to exist independently and argues that they cannot so exist, and yet, though lacking the inherent existence imputed to them either by naive common sense or by sophisticated, realistic philosophical theory, these phenomena are not nonexistent—they are, he argues, conventionally real (1994, p. 219).
And elsewhere,
If, on the other hand, one regards things as dependent merely on conditions, one regards them as merely conventionally existent. And to regard something as merely conventionally existent is to regard it as without essence and without power. And this is to regard it as existing dependently. This provides a coherent mundane understanding of phenomena as an alternative to the metaphysics of reification Nāgārjuna criticizes (2002, p. 30).
According to Garfield, Nāgārjuna’s critique of phenomena is not a statement that they simply do not exist, but rather a demonstration that the manner in which they exist is not as independent entities endowed with their own intrinsic existence, but rather as interdependent and constituted as such by our discursive conventions. We can immediately see that this interpretation does not hold in the context of Nāgārjuna’s writings, for as was illustrated above, to exist interdependently is simply to not exist, since dependent origination ironically denotes non-origination. Moreover, Nāgārjuna explicitly states that entities lacking an intrinsic nature do not exist, as seen in MMK 13.3:
bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam anyathābhāvadarśanāt |
nāsvabhāvaś ca bhāvo ‘sti bhāvānāṃ śūnyatā yataḥ ||
Because we observe their alteration, entities lack an intrinsic nature. And due to the emptiness of entities, there does not exist an entity lacking an intrinsic nature.
This verse is undoubtedly one of the most difficult in Nāgārjuna’s corpus, as is reflected by its radically different treatments in the various commentarial traditions. While the commentary preserved in the Chinese Zhonglun 中論 presents this verse in Nāgārjuna’s voice,Footnote 27 those commentaries preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan, including the Akutobhayā, the Buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛtti, the Prajñāpradīpa, and the Prasannapadā all present it as an objection from Nāgārjuna’s hypothetical opponent. However, while I would not claim to have a complete interpretation of this verse, I believe we can be confident that Nāgārjuna is presenting it as his own assertionFootnote 28 simply based on the deployment of the key terms of art niḥsvabhāvatva and śūnyatā. While Nāgārjuna is extremely consistent in using these terms to refer to the lack of an intrinsic nature, those commentaries which present the verse in the voice of a hypothetical opponent are each forced to reinterpret them as referring to other forms of insubstantiality in Buddhist doctrine, such as the selflessness of persons (pudgalanairātmya) in the case of the Akutobhayā,Footnote 29 and impermanence in those of Buddhapālita (c. 470–540),Footnote 30 Bhāviveka,Footnote 31 and Candrakīrti (c. 600–650).Footnote 32 While the notion of emptiness is sometimes used in other Buddhist sources to refer to the doctrines of not-selfFootnote 33 and impermanence,Footnote 34 the use of the term niḥsvabhāva and its derivatives is extremely uncommon, if not unattested, prior to Nāgārjuna, meaning it is likely in his writings that the term comes to take on the meaning with which we generally understand it.Footnote 35 As a result, if this verse were presented by Nāgārjuna as an objection, not only would it likely represent the only use of these terms in the voice of the hypothetical opponent as anything but an object of critique, but the nature of the objection itself would be extremely ironic when such moves are usually reserved for Nāgārjuna himself in his own voice, and a deliberate attempt to redefine his own distinctive terminology in a more conservative sense when one of these terms was just used by Nāgārjuna in his own voice in the preceding verse.Footnote 36 Understood as an objection where “emptiness” and “essencelessness” are redefined in terms of not-self or impermanence, this verse would thus be highly strained and unnatural simply given the terms in which it is framed. It is therefore far more parsimonious to take this as Nāgārjuna’s own assertion, and hence as an explicit denial of the existence of essenceless entities, namely, those that Garfield takes to be the entities the existence of which Nāgārjuna is defending. This, in addition to the ample evidence presented above, supports the conclusion that the manner in which Garfield evokes the distinction between the Two Truths, namely as a means to preserve the existence of conventional entities lacking an intrinsic nature, does not hold in the context of Nāgārjuna’s writings.
In his interpretation of Vigrahavyāvartanī 29, Jan Westerhoff (2010, pp. 61–65) also evokes what may be taken as an interpretation of the Two Truths in making sense of Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no thesis. Specifically, he evokes a distinction between two standards of veridicality parallel to the Two Truths, namely, the realist semantics of Nyāya that deems sentences true or false based on their correspondence, or lack thereof, to a mind-independent reality, and a convention-based semantics the standards of which are merely those of human agreement. Westerhoff claims that although Nāgārjuna does not offer us an account of what such a convention-based semantics would look like, it is precisely in such a system in which we can understand Nāgārjuna as making substantive claims that may be true or false. In a way that parallels Siderits’s claim that “the ultimate truth…is that there is no ultimate truth” (2016, p. 43), Westerhoff argues that the way we should understand Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no thesis is as a rejection of this hierarchy of theories of truth, and that all statements, in fact, are only meaningful and capable of being true or false in a convention-based semantics, since in his words, “the very existence of such a realist semantics is ruled out by the Madhyamaka theory of emptiness” (2010, p. 65). Westerhoff therefore claims that Nāgārjuna is not asserting in Vigrahavyāvartanī 29 that he has no theses whatsoever, but rather that he does not offer a thesis to be interpreted according to the realist assumptions underpinning Nyaiyāyika philosophy. While it is trivially the case that Nāgārjuna makes no claims grounded in any realist presuppositions, the particular metaphysics of Nyāya are not relevant in the purely formalistic matter of what constitutes a proper thesis, which as stated above is any declarative statement predicating a subject (dharmin) with some quality (dharma). What this means is that statements such as “all entities are empty of intrinsic nature” that clearly posit a subject and predicate do not represent Nāgārjuna’s position.Footnote 37 While Nāgārjuna makes many assertions throughout his texts, it is a gross mistake to interpret these as being anything but critical. Nāgārjuna offers us no theory of how reality works and illustrates how no such theory is possible. While it cannot be denied that Nāgārjuna’s statements are endowed with a certain semantic content, the difficulty in blunting Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no thesis, as Westerhoff does in distinguishing between two semantic theories, is that it fails to deal with the ironic paradoxesFootnote 38 implicit within Nāgārjuna’s chief terms of art, dependent origination and emptiness, as illustrated above. We can lay out with logical precision how the position that all entities arise in dependence entails the conclusion that no entity arises in dependence, and that when it is the case that all entities are empty and lack an intrinsic nature, none is empty or lacks an intrinsic nature. As stated previously, the same argumentative tools that Nāgārjuna uses to undermine the assumptions of his opponents apply just as much to his own methodology as they do their other objects of critique. Nāgārjuna has no theory of emptiness, but merely presents us with a critical methodology rooted in the application of dependent origination. Hence, when Nāgārjuna says that he has no thesis, I believe we should understand that that is exactly what he means. In summation, Garfield’s and Westerhoff’s respective interpretations of Nāgārjuna, each rooted in an application of the theory of the Two Truths, while no doubt philosophically viable in another context, do not hold water when examining Nāgārjuna’s writings from either an ontological or epistemological perspective. As a result, we should be skeptical of any interpretation of Nāgārjuna that forefronts the Two Truths as a central feature.
In addition to the interpretive difficulties one encounters in basing one’s reading of Nāgārjuna on the Two Truths, the strongest piece of evidence that the Two Truths do not serve a major philosophical role in the thought of Nāgārjuna is the simple fact that he scarcely mentions them. Of the nearly 450 verses comprising the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, only threeFootnote 39 directly address the Two Truths. Moreover, while allusions to the Two Truths can be found in Nāgārjuna’s other works,Footnote 40 simply based on the relative scarcity with which they are mentioned, it is manifestly not the case that they represent a major focus of his methodology. In contradistinction to a Mādhyamika like Bhāviveka who employs a rigorous theory of the Two Truths and qualifies, according to Iida (1980, p. ii), “every argument” as to whether it is from the perspective of the conventional or ultimate truth, Nāgārjuna scarcely ever qualifies his relentless critique of all manner of putative entities in any respect. Nāgārjuna’s consistency in not qualifying his arguments forces us to conclude that he does not spare the items of conventional discourse in his critique of reality. As Ye states, “Nāgārjuna explicitly denies the world perceived as such…without restricting the context by the two truths theory. Such an attitude can be called an unconditional rejection of the content of the conventional truth” (2017, p. 155). Nāgārjuna, therefore, does not simply critique entities construed as existing ultimately and endowed with intrinsic nature in juxtaposition to the unhypostatized items of conventional truth, but rather any form of existence whatsoever however understood.
In conclusion, the Two Truths do not serve a major philosophical function in the thought of Nāgārjuna. We are therefore better off understanding the few occurrences of the Two Truths in Nāgārjuna’s writings simply as a pedagogical device reflecting their mainstream use in Buddhist literature, that is, as a means of relativizing the items of conventional discourse, famously the self, precisely so that they can be critiqued and shown to actually be false. For Nāgārjuna, as well as his disciple Āryadeva (c. 170–270), the relationship between the Two Truths is simply one of a means to an end and nothing more.Footnote 41 While the Two Truths are no doubt an item of great philosophical significance for Madhyamaka exegesis in later centuries, we must consider the specific factors that led exegetes to elevate them to this role before uncritically assuming that the importance they ascribe to the Two Truths represents an unadulterated reflection of Nāgārjuna’s thought.
Conclusions
The goal of this article has been to try and clarify some key features of Nāgārjuna’s project that, in my opinion, are frequently misunderstood by scholars of Madhyamaka who sometimes attempt the blunt the truly radical and perhaps unsettling consequences of Nāgārjuna’s arguments. However, I believe we can be confident that for Nāgārjuna, (1) dependent origination ironically denotes non-origination and precludes the possibility of any entity existing whatsoever, (2) emptiness is not a theory that ascribes to entities a quality such as being empty, lacking an intrinsic nature, etc., but is a critical methodology that applies as much to itself as anything else, and (3) the Two Truths, while no doubt a key feature of Buddhist pedagogy and praxis, are not endowed with genuine philosophical significance, and do not provide a tool with which to mitigate the consequences of Nāgārjuna’s critique. I do not claim that all of these observations are strictly my own. I am especially indebted to the writings of Eviatar Shulman, Claus Oetke, Ye Shaoyong, and many more in arriving at these conclusions, and I hope that in synthesizing some of their findings along with my own that this article may provide more solid footing on which to study the history and thought of Madhyamaka across Asia and beyond.
One crucial question that emerges concerning the thought of Nāgārjuna is how his ruthless critique of existence is to be understood against the backdrop of his committed stance as a Mahāyāna Buddhist. As the author of the Ratnāvalī,Footnote 42 Nāgārjuna’s shows himself to be a personally dedicated defender of Mahāyāna Buddhism at a time when it was not widely accepted in the Indian subcontinent.Footnote 43 He additionally shows himself to be an enthusiastic advocate of mainstream Buddhist virtues and an ardent proponent of the bodhisattva path. Understanding how these ethical commitments line up with his unsparingly critical outlook is necessary in order to have a complete picture of Nāgārjuna’s thought, but any effort to paint such a picture must first come to terms with his eviscerating rejection of reality in any form.
The final point I would like to stress is the need to distinguish the writings of later Madhyamaka exegetes from the thought of Nāgārjuna. Many of the alleged misunderstandings I have tried to highlight obviously do not result not from scholars’ lack of insight and erudition, but rather from too much of it, as their understandings often appear colored by their equal expertise in the thought of later figures like Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, Tsong kha pa, and so forth. While each of these thinkers is worthy of dedicated study in their own right, it should be remembered that they were each operating in a discursive climate that was already centuries removed from that of Nāgārjuna, and each was pursuing entirely different ends in their writings. As alluded to above, especially significant in the transformation of Madhyamaka in India in particular is Bhāviveka’s forefronting of the Two Truths in order to meaningfully participate in the shared debate culture of mid-first millennium India.Footnote 44 This does not make figures like Bhāviveka any less a Mādhyamika, but it does mean that their Madhyamaka should be treated separately from that of Nāgārjuna. While Madhyamaka as a school of thought does begin with Nāgārjuna, it is simply stubborn fundamentalism to assume that all Madhyamaka must be in accordance with that of Nāgārjuna. It is rather, I believe, by recognizing the differences in approaches to Madhyamaka exegesis and the distinct brilliance of each by which the richness and value of this most fascinating of Buddhist scholastic traditions can be most clearly appreciated.
Notes
These statements are found frequently in the commentary to the Vigrahavyāvartanī. The prior is found in the commentaries to verses 1–6, 14, 17, and 28, while the latter is found in those to verses 7–9, 11, 13, 17, 19, 20, 25, and 64. It is worth noting that the majority of occurrences are found in the voice of Nāgārjuna’s hypothetical opponent.
Vigrahavyāvartanī 29:
yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ |
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ ||
Were I to have a thesis, then the error would be mine. But I have no thesis, for which reason there is no error at all on my part.
(The Sanskrit of the Vigrahavyāvartanī is cited from Yonezawa, 2008 and Bhattacharya, 1978.) Note all translations presented here are my own.
MMK 24.18:
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe |
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā ||
We declare that dependent origination is emptiness. Emptiness is dependent designation. Emptiness itself is the Middle Way.
[The Sanskrit text of the MMK is cited from Ye (2011), which incorporates the emendations suggested in MacDonald (2007).] Other examples of the identification of emptiness with dependent origination can be found in the final verse of the Vigrahavyāvartanī, Lokātītastava 22, and Acintyastava 40.
The logical relationship between the lack of intrinsic nature and emptiness is clarified by Shulman (2007 [2009], p. 151).
It is worth bearing in mind that “eternalism” and “annihilationism” in this early context refer specifically to the belief in the perpetual continuity and eventual destruction of the self respectively.
E.g., MMK Chapter 10, for which see Arnold (2010).
Sanskrit cited from Lindtner (1982).
Eckel (1987, pp. 43–49) helpfully clarifies the central role of irony vis-à-vis dialectic and paradox in the thought of the later Mādhyamika exegete Jñānagarbha (c. 8th century), stating that while Jñānagarbha is not a comic writer per se, the ironically humorous aspects of his writings nonetheless represent an “exquisitely learned humor of a mind that perceives in each affirmation about the nature of things the presence of its opposite and senses in that irony and ambiguity of things a freedom from the bondage of ordinary conceptuality.” Much the same, I believe, also holds for Nāgārjuna. For some comments on the playful and humorous aspects of Nāgārjuna’s writings, see Shulman (2010, pp. 407–408).
MMK 1.1:
na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ |
utapannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana ||
Nowhere does any entity whatsoever ever arise from itself, from another, from both, or without a cause.
For an argument that the object of Nāgārjuna’s critique is the notion of bhāva rather than specifically svabhāva, see Shulman (2007 [2009]).
The text of the Yuktiṣaṣtikākārikā is cited from Li and Ye (2014).
E.g., Garfield (1995, p. 335).
The Tibetan text of the Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā is cited from Lindtner (1982).
On this point, I am largely in agreement with Ye who says that for Nāgārjuna, “dependent origination refers no more to a principle of origination…but to voidness of origination” (2019, p. 763). However, I would still argue that the logical priority is found in dependent origination rather than emptiness as Ye claims, for not only is the universal emptiness of all phenomena a consequence of dependent origination, but, as I argue below, emptiness annihilates itself as a universal property precisely in virtue of its universality, meaning Nāgārjuna’s so-called “position” is ultimately not one of universal emptiness, as there is no such property to be predicated of entities. Nāgārjuna offers us no position, but merely presents us with the ironic consequences of his arguments rooted in the logic of dependent origination. Nonetheless, while I believe that describing Nāgārjuna’s methodology as “nihilistic” is misleading in attributing to him a static position, I do think we can accurately describe his method as wholly “negative,” so long as this is understood to be a dynamic negativity that only comes to rest in the annihilation of itself.
See footnote 2.
Nyāyasūtra 1.1.33 and bhāṣya:
sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā ||
prajñāpanīyena dharmeṇa dharmiṇo viśiṣṭasya parigrahavacanaṃ pratijñā sādhyanirdeśaḥ anityaḥ śabda iti ||
(Cited from Taranatha, 1936–1944.) It is worth noting that the example “sound is impermanent” is essentially identical in form to Nāgārjuna’s alleged position that “entities are empty/lack an intrinsic nature,” in that the predicate functions as a denial, namely of permanence in the case of the prior and svabhāva in the case of the latter. Thus, the position that “all entities are empty” can formally be treated as a pratijñā without issue, meaning we should not understand such formulations as straightforwardly expressing Nāgārjuna’s thought if we take his claim to have no pratijñā seriously.
In forefronting the Nyāyasūtras in order to have a clear definition of a “thesis,” I am not suggesting that Nāgārjuna had this exact sūtra or any other such formal metric on his mind in Vigrahavyāvartanī 29, though such a possibility cannot be rejected out of hand. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that such a definition of a “thesis” and its elaboration in the later commentary by Vātsyāyana reflect a shared conception among learned users of Sanskrit, to which category Nāgārjuna obviously belonged, concerning what the term pratijñā denotes, meaning they shed invaluable light on what Nāgārjuna meant by the deployment of this term as well.
E.g., MMK 1.10, Acintyastava 1, etc.
The concessive particle api in the third quarter is philosophically significant, for it suggests that it is already a foregone conclusion that empty entities, i.e., those that arise in virtue of dependent origination, do not exist.
This, interestingly, is the critique levelled by Candrakīrti’s (c. 600–650) hypothetical opponent in the commentary on MMK 13.3 who attempts to present emptiness, understood as a form of impermanence, as a genuine quality (dharma) of entities. He writes,
yo hy asvabhāvo bhāvaḥ sa nāsti | bhāvānāṃ ca śūnyatā dharma iṣyate | na ca asati dharmiṇi tadāśrito dharma upapadyate | na hi asati vandhyātanaye tacchāmatopapadyata iti | tasmād asty eva bhāvānāṃ svabhāva iti ||
Certainly, an entity that lacks an intrinsic nature does not exist, and it is acknowledged that emptiness is a quality of entities. When a subject does not exist, moreover, it is unreasonable that there be a quality predicated upon that, for it does not make sense that the son of a barren woman, who after all does not exist, have dark skin. Therefore, there does indeed exist the intrinsic nature of entities.
(The Sanskrit text of the Prasannapadā is cited from de la Vallée Poussin, 1970, p. 240.9–11 in consultation with de Jong, 1978.) Hence, Candrakīrti presents the opinion that emptiness is a true quality of entities in the voice of his hypothetical opponent who subsequently affirms that such a position necessitates that entities exist endowed with intrinsic nature. While Candrakīrti’s comments are indeed useful in appreciating the issues at stake in whether emptiness is truly a quality of entities or not, we have, I believe, good reason to believe that MMK 13.3 is, contrary to the Indo-Tibetan commentarial legacy, best understood as representing Nāgārjuna’s own voice, as I shall argue below.
Candrakīrti’s comments on this verse are, I believe, especially helpful (de la Vallée Poussin, 1970, p. 246.1–5 and de Jong, 1978, p. 55):
yadi śūnyatā nāma kācit syāt tadāśrayo bhāvasvabhāvaḥ syāt | na tv evam | iha hi śūnyatānātmatā sarvadharmāṇāṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam ity abhyupagamād aśūnyadharmābhāvād aśūnyataiva nāsti | yadā cāśūnyāḥ padārthā na santi | aśūnyatā ca nāsti | tadā pratipakṣanirapekṣatvāc chūnyatāpi khaphuṣpamālāvan nāstīty avasīyatām | yadā ca śūnyatā nāsti tadā tadāśrayā api padārthā na santīti sthitam avikalam ||
If there were something called emptiness, then there would be the intrinsic nature of entities predicated upon that. But this is not the case. For since, in this context, it is acknowledged that seflessness qua emptiness is the general characteristic of all phenomena, there is absolutely no such thing as non-emptiness because of the nonexistence of any phenomenon that is not empty. Furthermore, when there are no non-empty verbal referents, and therefore no such thing as non-emptiness, then because it does not have recourse to its opposite, it should be concluded that emptiness too, like a garland of flowers in the sky, does not exist. When there is no such thing as emptiness, then it is established with certainty that verbal referents predicated upon that also do not exist.
This reasoning is also reflected in Candrakīrti’s comments on MMK 24.18, where he explains why dependent origination qua emptiness, which both denote non-origination in virtue of an intrinsic nature (svabhāvenānutpādaḥ), is itself (eva) the Middle Way (de la Vallée Poussin, 1970, p. 504.11–14):
saiva svabhāvānutpattilakṣaṇā śūnyatā madhyamā pratipad iti vyavasthāpyate | yasya hi svabhāvenānutpattiḥ tasyāstitvābhāvaḥ | svabhāvena cānutpannasya vigamābhāvān nāstitvābhāva iti | ato bhāvābhāvāntadvayarahitatvāt sarvasvabhāvānutpattilakṣaṇā śūnyatā madhyamā pratipat madhyamo mārga ity ucyate ||
It is established that this very emptiness, characterized as non-origination in virtue of an intrinsic nature, is the Middle Way, for what does not originate in virtue of an intrinsic nature is without existence, and because what does not originate in virtue of an intrinsic nature does not cease to exist, its nonexistence also does not exist. Hence, because it is devoid of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence, it is said that emptiness characterized as the complete non-origination of anything in virtue of an intrinsic nature is the Middle Way, that is, the Middle Path.
This line of argument demands that we think of the Middle Way in the thought of Nāgārjuna not as some sort of balance between existence and nonexistence, but as the negative dialectic of dependent origination seen through to the full annihilation of itself. Emptiness is not a qualified version of nonexistence, but an even more radical one that negates even the existence of itself. To say that something is empty is to say that is does not even not exist.
This is clearly evidenced by the number of independent treatises on the Two Truths. In East Asia, there is, for instance, The Meaning of the Two Truths (Ch. Erdi yi 二諦義, T no. 1854) by the prolific Chinese exegete Jizang 吉藏 (549–623), while in South Asia, there is, for instance, Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaṅga (T. Bden pa gnyis rnam par ‘byed pa), treated by Eckel (1987), as well as Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra (T. Bden pa gnyis la ‘jug pa), treated by Lindtner (1981).
“L’importance du problème des deux vérités, vérité de saṃvṛti ou d’apparence, vérité de paramārtha ou vérité absolue, est grande dans le Grande Véhicule, dans le Vedānta, dans la spéculation indienne en général, et, ou peut dire, dans la philosophie universelle.” This quote is cited from Lindtner (1981, p. 161).
T no. 1564, vol. 30, p. 18a27–b8 (Takakusu and Watanabe, 1924-1935).
It has also been argued that this verse should be understood as Nāgārjuna’s own assertion by Shulman (2007 [2009], p. 150n29).
For the Tibetan text, see Huntington (1986, pp. 373–374).
For an English translation and Tibetan text, see Saito (1984, Part I, p. 181 and Part II, pp. 180–181).
Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 57, pp. 1169–1170 (Krung go'i bod rig pa zhib 'jug lte gnas kyi bka' bstan dpe sdur khang, 2003).
See, for instance, the Suññatalokasutta (Saṃyuttanikāya IV 54), which contains the following recurring formula: cakkhuṃ kho ānanda suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā. rūpā suññā attena vā attaniyena vā. “The visual faculty, Ānanda, is empty of self and what belongs to the self. Material forms are empty of self and what belongs to the self,” and so forth. (The Pali text is cited from Feer, 1884-1898.)
The suññakathā in the yuganaddhavaggo of the Paṭisambhidāmagga contains a description of what is called vipariṇāmasuñña, which is elaborated as follows: jātaṃ rūpaṃ sabhāvena suññaṃ. vigataṃ rūpaṃ vipariṇatañ ceva suññañ ca. “Material form that has been produced is empty of intrinsic nature. Material form that has disappeared has transformed and is empty,” and so forth for the rest of the aggregates. (The Pali text is cited from Taylor, 1905-1907.)
The term niḥsvabhāva and its derivatives are almost nonexistent in the early Prajñāpāramitā texts, and do not seem to occur at all, for instance, in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā based on the text presented by Vaidya (1960). Its Pali equivalents, nissabhāva, etc., seem to occur not once in the entire Pali tipiṭaka, and I have managed to find only a few occurrences of the terms in any of the comparatively late commentarial literature. If the term was not Nāgārjuna’s own invention, then he would at least seem to be the one of the first to use it consistently and popularize its usage.
MMK 13.2:
tan mṛṣā moṣadharmaṃ yad yadi kiṃ tatra muṣyate |
etat tūktaṃ bhavagatā śūnyatāparidīpakam ||
If that which is deceptive is false, then concerning what are we deceived?
However, this was stated by the Blessed One in order to elucidate emptiness.
As illustrated in note 18, that the predicate of such a statement functions as a negation does not have an impact on whether such a statement formally qualifies as a thesis. Nāgārjuna, moreover, understands himself as rejecting or denying nothing, as demonstrated by Vigrahavyāvartanī 63:
pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na kiṃcit |
tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eva tvayā kriyate ||
I reject nothing, and there is nothing to be rejected. Hence, this very charge that “you make a rejection” is brought by yourself.
This verse further bolsters the argument that statements such as “all entities lack an intrinsic nature,” wherein the predicate serves to reject the very notion of intrinsic nature, do not represent Nāgārjuna’s position.
It should be remembered that Nāgārjuna does not embrace dialetheism, as demonstrated by Robinson (1957).
These are, of course, verses 8–10 in chapter 24 of the MMK on the Four Noble Truths:
8. dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ ||
The buddhas’ teaching of the Dharma relies upon Two Truths: the truth of worldly conventions and the truth that is so ultimately.
9. ye ‘nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ |
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīre buddhaśāsane ||
Those who do not perceive the distinction between the Two Truths do not perceive the reality in the profound teachings of the buddhas.
10. vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate |
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate ||
Without taking recourse to conventional discourse, the ultimate is not taught, and without arriving at the ultimate, nirvāṇa is not reached.
Much has been made of these verses both in the traditional commentarial literature and in modern scholarship that I cannot treat adequately here. However, as the reader likely knows, these verses occur at the outset of Nāgārjuna’s response to the charges of a hypothetical opponent that Nāgārjuna’s supposed theory of emptiness undermines the viability of the Four Noble Truths, and hence the very goals of Buddhist practice. Nāgārjuna’s response, however, is not to qualify his position and spare the Four Noble Truths his critique, but to place the Four Noble Truths squarely in his crosshairs by identifying them as only conventionally true. Nāgārjuna goes on to show that his hypothetical opponent, who maintains that entities such as suffering, etc. exist with intrinsic nature, does not have a coherent account of the Four Noble Truths, but we should not understand Nāgārjuna as providing his own alternative account based on the doctrine of dependent origination that would preserve the Four Noble Truths given that for Nāgārjuna, precisely because entities only arise in dependence, nothing arises and nothing ceases. Like nearly every other chapter in the MMK, chapter 24 is first and foremost is a critique. Hence, the last verse of the chapter that states that one who “sees” (paśyati) dependent origination “sees” suffering, its arising, its cessation, and the path, should be understood as fully ironic. One who sees dependent origination does not see the Four Noble Truths. Bhāviveka provides a more explicit critique of the Four Noble Truths from a Madhyamaka perspective in the Tarkajvālā, for which see Eckel (2008, pp. 189–198).
Iida (1980, pp. 255–256) highlights some noteworthy allusions to the Two Truths in the Ratnāvalī. However, Nāgārjuna’s general attitude toward the Two Truths is concisely illustrated in the first verse of the Śūnyatāsaptati:
| gnas pa’am skye ‘jig yod med dam || dman pa’am mnyam dang khyad par can |
| sangs rgyas ‘jig rten snyad dbang gis || gsung gi yang dag dbang gis min |
Although the Buddha spoke of the distinctions of arising (utpāda), persisting (sthiti), and dissolution (bhaṅga); of existence (astitā) and nonexistence (nāstitā); and of the inferior (hīna), middling (sama), and excellent (uttama) in accordance with worldly conventions (lokavyavahāravaśena), he did not do so in accordance with reality (tattvavaśena).
For more on this verse and Nāgārjuna’s attitude toward the Two Truths, see Shulman (2007 [2009], pp. 156–158).
See Lindtner (1981, p. 161).
See Schopen (2005, Chap. I).
See Ye (2017, p. 172).
Abbreviations
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Alexander von Rospatt, Federico Squarcini, and Dan Arnold for their invaluable feedback on earlier versions of this article, and I am especially grateful toward Nir Feinberg, Robert Sharf, and Howard Mu for their patience in reading multiple drafts.
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Macor, J.C. Not Even Absent: Dependent Origination, Emptiness, and the Two Truths in the Thought of Nāgārjuna. J Indian Philos 52, 161–179 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-024-09563-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-024-09563-x