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Contradiction, Negation, and the Catuṣkoṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka

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Abstract

Using logic-laden terms to translate and interpret what the ancient Indian Buddhist thinkers said when we are not sure what they spoke about when they spoke about ‘contradictions’, etc. in natural languages can sometimes make things frustrating. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s exhortation, “don’t think, but look!”, I approach the issues of contradiction, negation, and the catuṣkoṭi via case-by-case study on several pertinent passages in Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun. The following are some interrelated observations which should not be overgeneralized, especially considering the limited scope of this study and its methodological considerations. First, there is an implicit rule of non-opposition and there could be no real oppositions for apparent oppositions because of implicit qualifications. Moreover, these are not new since or after Dignāga. Second, Dharmapāla and his contemporaries are familiar with the two negative usages, and prasajya-pratiṣedha is used for negating the opponents’ theses and is related to the no-thesis view. It’s not a good idea to assign truth values to sentences using prasajya-pratiṣedha or to a thesis in which the terms have no real objects. And Dharmapāla’s theses are just therapeutic tools. Third, in Dharmapāla’s discussion of the negative catuṣkoṭi, one can see the rule of non-opposition, the strategy of qualifications, and the two negative usages. Although the four positions in the catuṣkoṭi are regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, they are jointly exhaustive in pragmatic context, and are mutually exclusive under some interpretations, but not all. My tentative suggestion is that the catuṣkoṭi is a loosely term-based way of categorization. Last but not least, in the text discussed, I do not see Buddhist thinkers endorsing any contradictions.

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Notes

  1. For the introduction to the life and works of Dharmapāla, see Tillemans (2008, pp. 8–13).

  2. There is another commentary by Candrakīrti, which is extant in Tibetan. For the introduction to the past studies (before 1990) on Catuḥśataka and its commentaries, see Tillemans (2008, pp. 1–5).

  3. There are two English translations of the final chapter of DGS. Keenan’s (1997) covers the whole chapter, Hoornaert’s (2004) covers only part of it. In this paper, I provide my own translation of the pertinent passages with consulting the two previous translations.

  4. See Keenan (1997) and Hoornaert (2004).

  5. The example is from Nyāyapraveśa, henceforth abbreviated as NP. For the English translation of NP, see Tachikawa (1971).

  6. The example is from Nyāyamukha, henceforth abbreviated as NMu.

  7. There are other three special types which are omitted here for convenience.

  8. The example is from NP.

  9. The example is from NP.

  10. NMu 《因明正理門論本》卷1: 「然俱可得一義相違, 不容有故, 是猶豫因。又於此中現教力勝, 故應依此思求決定。」(CBETA, T32, no. 1628, p. 2, b22-24).

    Following Katsura’s reading at his special lectures on Nyāyamukha, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 2017, my rendering of the compound “現教” (*pratyakṣa-āgama) is “scripture based on perception”. See also Katsura (1979, pp. 77–78). Tucci has a different rendering of the compound: “perception and scripture.” (Tucci, 1930, p. 35) I opt for the first rendering because there are only two pramāṇas (perception and inference) recognized by Dignāga. However, the second rendering is not necessarily incompatible with the first if the scripture/verbal testimony is given by an authority with better/veridical perception or is consistent with perception.

  11. I use the term of “rule” (or rule of thumb) instead of “law” not only because there is not a general law explicitly stated but also because, as we can see in the following, very often they would resort to examples to show the correctness or the factuality of this rule. If it were a “law”, it would go without saying that a contradiction is simply false.

    I use the term of “opposition” instead of “contradiction” because it seems that viruddha is used for contradictory cases and also for contrary cases, and furthermore it’s not clear whether it is sentence-based or term-based (it could go either way).

  12. In this case, it seems that the usage of viruddha here is more term-based than sentence-based. However, we should not generalize too much.

  13. NMu 《因明正理門論本》卷1: 「若所立無, 說名異品, 非與同品相違 … 若相違者, 應唯簡別。」(CBETA, T32, no. 1628, p. 2, a1-3)

    Katsura’s reading of the beginning of this sentence is “Asapakṣa consists of those things in which the [property] to be proved is absent (abhāva) and which are neither incompatible (viruddha) with … sapakṣa” and it is related to the different meanings of the negative particle in Indian grammatical tradition. (Katsura, 2004, p. 124ff.) See also Katsura (1978, p. 123ff.), Tucci (1930, pp. 22–23).

  14. In this case, terms like ‘opposite’, ‘factually incompatible’ could also be used.

  15. “B” for Bhāviveka. This part might be his position or other Mādhyamikas’ before him.

  16. “D” for Dharmapāla. This part might be his position or other Yogācārins’ before him.

  17. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「[B:] 世俗非無 …。[D:] 應問: 世俗非諦實耶?[B:] 彼答: 不然, 隨世俗量是實有故, 亦名諦實。[D:] 如何可說一法、一時, 有、無相違, 俱名諦實?!生等亦爾, 一法、一時, 有生、無生 … 有去、無去, 乃至廣說, 更互相違, 如何可言俱是諦實?![B:]彼作是說: 一法、一時, 無義為真、有義為俗, 義差別故, 互不相違。… …」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 246, b15-22)

  18. See also DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「世俗諸法雖稱俗情而事是虛, 故非諦實。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 247, a5)

  19. We may also call this kind of strategy as parameterization. But this term also refers to quantification in addition to qualification.

  20. bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇam ubhayaṁ yadi / bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca mokṣas tac ca na yujyate //

    In this paper, the Sanskrit verses in MMK are from Siderits and Katsura (2013). See also MMK 25.14 below and Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī: “For the same thing cannot be now non-existent, now existent.” (Bhattacharya, 1998, p. 129) In short, it is not the case that there is only “one instance” (Priest, 2018, p. 84), but more than one.

  21. Even if Piṅgala’s commentary is revised by Kumārajīva in the process of translation, the year of translation is still before Dignāga.

  22. Bold words are emphasized by the author.

  23. 《中論》卷4〈25 觀涅槃品〉: 「有、無二事相違故, 云何一處有?」(CBETA, T30, no. 1564, p. 35, b22-23).

  24. bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇa ubhayaṁ katham / tayor abhāvo hy ekatra prakāśatamasor iva //.

  25. 《中論》卷4〈25 觀涅槃品〉: 「有、無相違一處不可得, 如明、暗不俱。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1564, p. 35, c6-7).

  26. Please note that there are other passages of non-opposition in Piṅgala’s commentary, that is to say, there are at least several obvious examples of non-opposition although I use just one here. It is clear from the above discussion that there are instances of non-opposition in Nāgārjuna’s texts and in the pre-Dignāga commentaries, and in the discussion below there are instances of qualifications in the pre-Dignāga commentaries. Therefore, it is not the case that because only “after Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, most Indo-Tibet Buddhist thinkers did accept the Principle of Non-Contradiction”, “no further significant developments concerning the catuṣkoṭi occur in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism” (Priest, 2018, p. 85).

  27. sarvam tathyam na vā tathyam tathyam cātathyam eva ca / naivātathyam naiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanam //.

  28. Actually, “[i]n MMK xxvii.17 and 25, … …Nāgārjuna alludes to and rejects an interpretation of the third position that distributes the terms of the conjunction by using the words ekadeśaḥ … ekadeśaḥ (= aṁśena … aṁśena) ‘part(ly) … part(ly).’ ” (Ruegg, 2010, p. 66) However, “there seems to be no clear evidence for regular logical distribution and quantification in our sources.” (ibid. : 67).

  29. 《中論》卷3〈18 觀法品〉: 「『一切實』者, 推求諸法實性, 皆入第一義平等一相, 所謂無相, 如諸流異色、異味入於大海則一色、一味。『一切不實』者, 諸法未入實相時, 各各分別觀皆無有實, 但眾緣合故有。『一切實、不實』者, 眾生有三品, 有上、中、下, 上者觀諸法相非實非不實; 中者觀諸法相一切實一切不實; 下者智力淺故, 觀諸法相少實、少不實, 觀涅槃無為法不壞故實, 觀生死有為法虛偽故不實。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1564, p. 25, a18-27).

  30. For the dialetheist way of interpretation of the catuṣkoṭi with paraconsistent logic, see Priest (2010, 2018). In addition to the catuṣkoṭi, there are other examples of contradiction (at least apparently) in Buddhist texts. See Deguchi et al. (2008) for various examples and the view that “Buddhisms of certain kinds are committed to dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are true.” (2008, p. 401)

  31. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「夫立空理, 翻對不空, 不空若無, 空亦非有, 如何可立諸法皆空?」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 243, c16-17).

  32. It seems that the opponent's view is that the opposite of an existent must exist, which is similar to the view that to be negated is to be, which is discussed in the next section.

  33. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「又, 所立空專為遣執, 不必對有, 方立於空。如: 為遣常說無常教, 雖常非有, 而立無常。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 243, c24-26).

  34. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「又, 汝此中不應疑難, 翻對在有, 不在於空。有事非無, 有翻有對; 空理非有, 何對何翻!」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 243, c26-28).

  35. One probable Sanskrit correlate is viparyaya. But what matters here is to look at the instances applied to by the term.

  36. 《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷1〈1 分別界品〉: 「可稱名重, 翻(viparyaya)此為輕。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 2, c25-26); 卷18〈4 分別業品〉: 「此業最重, 翻此最輕, 除此中間非最輕、重。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 97, a1-2); 卷16〈4 分別業品〉: 「惡身、語、意業, 說名三惡行 … 三妙行翻(viparyaya)此。 … 此行即惡, 故名惡行。三妙行者, 翻此應知。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 84, a28-b10); 卷17〈4 分別業品〉: 「染業不應作, … 應作業翻此, 俱相違第三」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 92, a11-12) ; 卷25〈6 分別賢聖品〉: 「即此樂、苦二通行中, 鈍根名遲, 利根名速, 二行於境通達稽遲故名遲通, 翻此名速。或, 遲鈍者所起通行名遲通行, 速此相違。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 132, a24-27) The underlined instances literally do not have Sanskrit correlates, and they are probably Xuanzang’s paraphrases but fit well in the contexts. As the translator of DGS, Xuanzang’s usage of the term still matters to us.

  37. 《大乘掌珍論》卷2: 「非有為故說名『無為』, 翻對有為是無為義。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, p. 273, c4-5).

  38. The example, “Do not make a sound” is also discussed in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī and it is related to Nāgārjuna’s position that he has no thesis. For the translation, see Bhattacharya (1998, pp. 97–99, 110–114).

  39. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「若遮餘法別有所詮, 是遮表言。遮餘法已, 表餘共相, 如非眾生、非黃門等。若遮餘法無別所詮, 是唯遮言。遮所遮已, 其力斯竭, 如勿食肉、勿飲酒等。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 245, b25-28).

  40. There are also other textual evidences, as Ruegg points out, “the explanations offered by the exegetical tradition of the Madhyamaka do not appear to suggest the existence of any correlation of the syntactically variant forms of negation mentioned above—viz. nominally bound term-negation and verbally bound predicate-negation—with the logical differentiation between implicitly affirming (presuppositional or choice) negation and denying (non-presuppositional or exclusion) negation.” (Ruegg, 2010, pp. 42–43).

  41. Actually, according to Dharmapāla, people, whether they are intelligent or not, all understand the two usages and that prasajya-pratiṣedha is used for negating the conventional things or the conventional truths. With respect to the issue of the catuṣkoṭi, Ruegg (2010, p. 65) also points out that “Bhā(va)viveka and Candrakīti, have taken the negation of the four positions to be of the prasajya or absolute kind. … … This point has been emphasized by the Mādhyamikas at least since the sixth century, the time of Bhā(va)viveka.”.

  42. 《大乘掌珍論》卷1: 「此『非有』言, 是遮詮義, 汝執此言表彰為勝, 我說此言遮止為勝。此『非有』言, 唯遮有性功能斯盡, 無有勢力更詮餘義。如世間說: 『非白絹』言, 不可即執此言詮黑, 與能說者作立宗過。 『非白絹』言, 唯遮白絹功能斯盡, 更無餘力詮表黑絹、赤絹、黃絹。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, p. 270, c10-15).

  43. For the problems of contemporary formulations, see Priest (2010, pp. 27–30, 2018, pp. 18–22).

  44. For more details, see the next section.

  45. Here my rendering of “zhan-zhuan” (展轉) is “mutually”. Other possible renderings are “indirectly” or “in turn”, but it would be not clear why when one affirms one thesis, he must simultaneously negate all the other three. Besides, “zhan-zhuan” in Xuanzang’s translation of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā-vṛtti also has the meaning of “mutual”. For example, see 《唯識二十論》卷1: 「以諸有情自他相續, 諸識展轉 (mithaḥ) 為增上緣, 隨其所應, 二識決定。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1590, p. 76, c19-20).

  46. 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「[Opponent:] 遮所遮故, 建立能遮。所遮若無, 能遮豈有!如言『非雨』故說名『冬』, 冬時所遮, 雨時必有, 空遮有故, 有定非無。[Reply:] 此亦不然!因不定故。一等四論展轉相遮, 皆應是真, 是所遮故。… 汝見何愆!捨三執一。故不可說實有所遮。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 244, a21-26).

  47. There is a similar argument by the opponent in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī: “It is only an existent object that is negated, not a non-existent one. For instance, when it is said: ‘There is no pot in the house’, it is an existent pot that is negated, not a non-existent one. … … the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is not valid.” (Bhattacharya, 1998, p. 102).

  48. There are other textual evidences. For example, the negative catuṣkoṭi is used for “showing that all the dharmas held by the world are not real, and showing that [the dharmas] held by the non-Buddhist schools are different.” DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈破邊執品6〉: 「為顯世間所執諸法皆非真實, 及顯外道所執不同」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 234, c8-9); “Although the types of the non-Buddhist schools are many, the existent dharmas held by them are just four kinds.” CWSL 《成唯識論》卷1: 「然諸外道品類雖多, 所執有法不過四種。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 3, c13-14).

  49. For example, the negation in “unhappy” or “non-happy” is paryudāsa, the negation of “neither … nor …” is prasajya-pratiṣedha. Therefore, this fourth koṭi is indeed different from the third. For this way of interpretation of catuṣkoṭi in Nāgārjuna’s MMK, see Westerhoff (2009, pp. 67–90).

    In this kind of interpretation, please note that there would be an issue needed to be addressed if we’d like to take a further step to negate this koṭi, that is, to negate, cancel or deny what has been negated, cancelled or denied even granted that prasajya-pratiṣedha does not obey the law of double negation. See footnote 68 below.

  50. The verse on which Dharmapāla commentates is the verse 21 of chapter 14 of Catuḥśataka: DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「有、非有、俱、非, 一、非一、雙、泯, 隨次應配屬, 智者達非真」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 234, c10-11) The Sanskrit reconstruction and its translation is as follows.

    sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramaḥ / eṣa prayojyo vidvadbhir ekatvādiṣu nityaśaḥ //

    “Existent, inexistent, both existent and inexistent, neither existent nor inexistent, that is the method which the learned should always use with regard oneness and other such [theses].” (Tillemans, 2008, p. 72)

    For the very short brief of Candrakīrti commentary on this verse, see Ruegg (2010, pp. 49–50). From this verse and other texts, Tillemans thinks that “there is solid evidence … that the essence of the Madhyamaka method is that the rejection of the four lemmas in the tetralemma is and must be generalizable, and that is the way a Mādhyamika should always proceed in criticizing philosophical positions.” (Tillemans, 2016, p. 75).

  51. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「數論外道執有等性與諸法一」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 234, c14-15).

  52. If one regards Being as a dharma, then “all other dharmas” would be used instead. However, it seems not like this. At least it’s not identified as an issue in the text.

  53. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「勝論外道說有等性與法非一」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 234, c23-24).

  54. By “shameless” it means “naked”, and the non-Buddhists here are probably the Jainas.

  55. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「無慚外道執有等性與彼諸法亦一亦異」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a4-5)

  56. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「邪命外道執有等性與彼諸法非一非異」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a15-16).

  57. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「一切法與有性一, 應如有性其體皆同。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 234, c20-21); 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「若執諸法與其有性定為一者, 法則成一。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 249, c23-24).

  58. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「一切法非有性者, 應如兔角, 其體本無。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 234, c27-28); 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「定為異者, 法則成無。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 249, c24).

  59. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「若有等性與色等一, 同數論過; 與色等異, 同勝論失」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a6-7).

  60. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「一、異二種, 性相相違而言體同, 理不成立。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a7-8); 「一法二相, 互相乖違, 俱言是真, 必不應理。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a13-14).

  61. This is an implicit rule but not a law because in this passage Dharmapāla uses the reductio argument to show its unreasonableness. See CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a8-12.

  62. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「若謂一法待對不同, 名一、異者, 即應一、異, 二竝非真, 或隨一假」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a12-13).

  63. The Jainas might not be unhappy with this because “[t]heir main argument was intended to show the multi-faceted nature of reality as well as its ever elusive character such that whatever is revealed to any observer at any given point of time and at any given place, would be only partially and conditionally right, ready to be falsified by a different revelation to a different observer at a different place and time.” (Matilal, 1991, p. 12) They emphasize “the conditionality and limitedness of the human power and human vision”. (Ibid.: 7).

  64. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「若有等性與法非一, 同勝論過; 與法非異, 同數論失。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a17-18).

  65. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「又一、異相, 世共知有, 汝獨撥無, 違世間失。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a18-19).

  66. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「汝執諸法性相非空, 而說雙非, 但為避過, 此雙非語亦不應論, 違汝所宗法性相故。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a22-23)

    There is a parallel passage in CWSL. 《成唯識論》卷1: 「又, 非一、異, 違世共知有一、異物, 亦違自宗色等有法決定實有。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 4, a4-5).

  67. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「又, 汝所說『非一、異』言, 為但是遮、為偏有表?若偏有表, 應不雙非; 若但是遮, 應無所執; 有遮、有表, 理互相違; 無表、無遮, 言成戲論。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a19-21).

  68. Granted that the opponent does have a thesis, the opponent should not have used the negation of prasajya-pratiṣedha because there would be a contradiction. Dharmapāla’s reply uses the reductio argument. Although there might be a formal issue of double prasajya-pratiṣedha (iteration) (Priest, 2010, p. 30, 2018, p. 22), it seems that in practice there is no problem for Dharmapāla, using prasajya-pratiṣedha, to deny or to negate iv.3.2., in which prasajya-pratiṣedha is also used, because by reductio argument it shows that the opponent is not consistent if the opponent uses prasajya-pratiṣedha, i.e. the opponent should not have used it. The case in iv.2. can be similar. In short, the problem is in our formulations rather than in their practice.

  69. On the other hand, the textual evidence is not so explicit in Nāgārjuna’s works, still we could find the implicitly philosophical use of prasajya-pratiṣedha, which is related to the no-thesis view. See footnote 38.

  70. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈破邊執品 6〉: 「若諸法性一一俱非, 此俱非言亦不應說, 舉言必有俱非性故。是則汝曹應常結舌, 發言便壞自論所宗。默亦不成, 以俱非故。語、默俱失。一何苦哉?誰有智人而不悲愍!故彼所執決定非真。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 235, a23-28).

  71. For the pertinent issue of silence or ineffability, in another chapter Dharmapāla raises an objection: “If it is ineffable, how can one say that it is real? If one can say that it is real, then it is effable.” See DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷5〈破時品 3〉: 「若不可說, 如何言實?若可言實, 即應可說。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 215, a29).

  72. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷8〈6 破邊執品〉: 「一切世間色等句義、名言所表、心慧所知、情執不同, 略有四種, 謂: 有、非有、俱許、俱非。隨次應知, 配四邪執, 謂: 一、非一、雙許、雙非。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 234, c12-14).

  73. There are at least three kinds of interpretations of Nāgārjuna’s no-thesis view: “the semantic, argumentational, and transcendent interpretations.” see Westerhoff (2009, pp. 186–187) The most interesting interpretation for the passages discussed in this paper is the semantic one though we could more or less find elements of the other two in Dharmapāla’s works. Westerhoff’s summary of the semantic interpretation is: “What Nāgārjuna means when he says that he ‘has no thesis’ is that none of his theoretical statements (including the claim of universal emptiness) is to be interpreted according to a semantics based on the standard picture. For the Mādhyamika no assertion is to be taken to refer to a ready-made world of mind-independent objects, nor can he assume that there is a structural similarity linking word and world which is independent of human conceptual activity.” (Westerhoff, 2009, p. 198) In other words, Nāgārjuna “does not hold … any thesis which is to be supplied with a realist semantics that spells out meaning and truth in terms of correspondence with a mind-independent reality.” (Westerhoff, 2010, p. 12).

  74. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「若爾, 空論但有虛言, 空、無我名, 無實義故。如是!如是!誠如所言, 空、無我名, 是假非實, 為破他執, 假立自宗, 他執既除, 自宗隨遣。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 243, b15-18).

  75. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷10〈8 教誡弟子品〉: 「如世有良醫, 妙藥救眾病, 諸佛亦如是, 為物說唯心」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 249, b8-9).

  76. DGS 《大乘廣百論釋論》卷5〈3 破時品〉: 「我如良醫應病與藥, 諸有所說皆隨所宜, 故所發言不應定執。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1571, p. 212, c24-26).

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Acknowledgements

I’m grateful to the anonymous reviewers for the valuable comments. This paper was completed within Project “Buddhism, Dialetheism and Paraconsistent Logic” (MOST 105-2911-I-010 -511) under “New Partnership Program for the Connection to the Top Labs in the World”, sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan. I’m grateful to Wen-fang Wang and Chi-yen Liu for their help in the project. I deeply appreciate all the kindness from and discussions with Yasuo Deguchi, Takuro Onishi, and other friends during my stay in Kyoto University. Thanks to Chen-kuo Lin, Ching Keng, Chien-hsing Ho, Graham Priest, Robert Sharf for their comments on earlier drafts. Many thanks to Ernest Brewster for proofreading. I’m greatly indebted to Jay Garfield for reading and providing comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.

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Hu, Cc. Contradiction, Negation, and the Catuṣkoṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka. J Indian Philos 52, 1–20 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4

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