Abstract
The dualist Śaiva doctrine considers that mala is that which obstructs the true nature of the self and sets in motion the operation of bondage. Though many dualist Śaiva tantras discuss the concept of mala, only the Pauṣkara presents a detailed exposition supported by numerous arguments. This article aims to closely report those arguments and to search within the Pauṣkara for answers to certain questions that the concept provokes.
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Notes
Svāyaṃbhuva 2.1–2.2; 2.4–2.7; 2.22; Mataṅga vidyāpāda 6.80–6.87; 8.19–8.52; Mṛgendra vidyāpāda 7th paṭala; Kiraṇa 2nd prakaraṇa; 3.1–3.4; Parākhya 1.51–1.60; 4.158–4.168, etc.
For the dates of Umāpati and Jñānaprakāśa, see Colas-Chauhan 2007: 1–4 and 7–8.
Pauṣkara 4.1b–4.2a: yasmāt svadṛkkriyāśālī kalāhīno ’py anīśvaraḥ // vyāpakaś cinmayas sūkṣmaś śivavat saṃvyavasthitaḥ.
Pauṣkara 1.12: paśuḥ paśutvasaṃruddhadṛkkriyāprasaraḥ sadā.
The term mala is generally translated as ‘stain’ or ‘impurity’. But since the essential characteristic of mala is obstruction, the word mala should perhaps be derived from the verb malinīkṛ in the sense of 'to make obscure' rather than ‘to make dirty, soil, stain.’ See, for example, Jñānaprakāśa (on Pauṣkara 4.114a): malinīkaroti jñānakriyācchādam ayatīti malaḥ. ‘It obscures, spreads a cover on knowledge and action, thus mala.’; and Sadyojyoti (on Svāyaṃbhuva 2.1): malinīkaroti dṛkkriyātmakaṃ tejaḥ pracchādayatīti malaḥ. ‘It obscures, conceals consciousness made up of knowledge and action, thus mala.’
Pauṣkara 4.114a: niruddhaṃ yena sārvajñyaṃ sa malaḥ paripaṭhyate; Pauṣkara 4.124: tasmād yenātmano jñānaṃ balinā vastunā sadā / viruddhenaiva bādhyaṃ syāt tan malākhyam itīṣyatāṃ; Pauṣkara 4.137a: mala evaṃ samuddiṣṭaḥ puṃsāṃ sārvajñyabādhakaḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.18b–4.19a: sakalās tu kalāyogāt sūkṣmā sthūlā ca sā dvidhā // pratipunniyatan tatvaṃ kalādyavanipaścimam; Pauṣkara 3.60b–3.62a: māyāto dvividhā sṛṣṭiḥ sthūlā sūkṣmātmikety api // dṛkchaktivyaṃjikā sūkṣmā sthitā tatvātmanātmani / sthūlā bhuvanarūpeṇa śarīrādyātmanā sthitā // sūkṣmāḥ kalādayaḥ pūrvaṃ sthūlā badhnanty aṇūṃs tataḥ. The subtle creation, consisting of kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati, is said to be the bonds (pāśa) of the self. Yet it is indispensable for the bound self because it helps the self to escape, though temporarily and partially, the obstruction produced by mala. Thus kalā and vidyā respectively restore the capacities of the self to act and know; rāga rehabilitates the self's passion in order that it engages in worldly experience which is a means to exhaust its karma; while kāla determines the time of fruition of the self's karma, niyati oversees that the self obtains the fruits of its past acts. The rest of the creation is the gross creation of māyā that provides the self with psycho-physical body and objects of experience.
Pauṣkara 4.3b-4.6a: maloparuddhadṛkchaktis tat prasṛtyai kalādimān // bhogāya karmasaṃbandhaḥ sakalaḥ paripaṭhyate / prāgvan niruddhadṛkchaktiḥ karmapākāt kalojjhitaḥ // karmaṇaiṣyatkalāyogyo yaḥ sa ca pralayākalaḥ / maloparuddhaśaktitvāc chūnyakalpasvadṛkkriyaḥ // tṛtīyaḥ paṭhyate tantre nāmnā vijñānakevalaḥ; 4.7b: vijñānakevalāṇūnāṃ bandhas tu mala eva hi; 4.14b: mala eko'vaśiṣṭas syāt tasmād vijñānakevalāḥ.
The realm created out of the very subtle matter (bindu) is named pure (śuddha) because the experience of selves in it is unmixed with misery (Pauṣkara 2.55a: śuddhādhvani sukhātmaiva bhoga evaṃ sa ca smṛtaḥ). This is in contrast to the realm created out of gross matter (māyā) where experience consists of both happines and misery and is, therefore, called impure (aśuddha).
Here the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) beween the reason (hetu) and the thing to be proved (sādhya) cannot be of positive type (anvayi), namely "because that which has the reason (‘limited knowledge’), has the thing to be proved (‘obstructed by mala’)". Since all sentient beings consitute the subject of the inference (pakṣa) (‘the self’), the inference would be devoid of an example to illustrate its invariable connection. Therefore, the Pauṣkara employs a ‘purely negative concomitance’ (kevalavyatireki): "the one who does not have limited knowledge is indeed the one who is not obstructed by mala". Śiva, in whom the absence of limited knowledge and the absence of obstruction are found invariably connected, illustrates this ‘purely negative concomitance’.
Pauṣkara 4.125–4.126a: ātmā malāvṛtas sarvajñatve kiñcijjñatā yataḥ / na kiñcijjñas tu yas so'yaṃ malenāpi na saṃvṛtaḥ // yathā śivas tathā nāyaṃ malenaiva samāvṛtaḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.126b: kiñcāyaṃ malino no cet saktir bhoge kathaṃ bhavet. Jñānaprakāśa rephrases this argument as an inference with a negative reason (hetu): ātmā malāvṛtaḥ bhogāsaktitvāt na yas tathā na sa tathā śivo yathā. ‘The self is obstructed by mala; because it is eager to experience objects; the one who is not so (not eager to experience objects) is not so (not obstructed by mala); like Śiva’. The postulation of the existence of mala in the self, from the fact of its eagerness to experience, is a common argument in the dualist tantras. See, for example, the Svāyaṃbhuva (2.4–2.5) and the Parākhya (1.52b–1.53a).
Pauṣkara 4.127a: yadi sā nirmale'pi syān muktātmasv api sā bhavet.
Pauṣkara 4.127b: rāgo 'sti kāraṇaṃ sakter iti cet kiṃ malena tu.
Rāga signifies four different entities in the Pauṣkara. The first is a mental state (rāga-pratyaya) which makes the bound self experience in the world (Pauṣkara 6.50). The second is a subtle creation of māyā (rāga-tattva) which restores the self's ability to feel passion by temporarily lifting the obstruction to that ability produced by mala (Pauṣkara 5.27, Pauṣkara 5.32a). The third is the intense desire towards liberation (śiva-rāga) which is a passion but not a bond (Pauṣkara 5.45). The fourth (rāga-mala) is one of the seven kinds of mala (Pauṣkara 4.137b–4.138).
Pauṣkara 5.29: yo'yaṃ buddhigato rāgas saṃproktaḥ pratyayātmakaḥ / sa syād anena raktasya nāraktasya kadācana.
Pauṣkara 4.128–4.129a: satyaṃ rāgo'sti taddhetur na sa kiñcitkaro 'male / amale 'pi sa cet saktyai syān mukte'py aviśeṣataḥ // na hi muktaḥ śivo vāpi bhogāsaktaḥ kadācana.
Pauṣkara 6.42a: guṇatatvāt parā buddhir abhavan munipuṃgavāḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.129b–4.130: kiñcāyaṃ pratyayātmokto rāgo bauddho yatas tataḥ // buddhiś ca prakṛtes siddhā tasmād eṣa vinaśvaraḥ / cicchakter nityasiddhāyās saṃbhaved bādhakaḥ katham. According to Jñānaprakāśa, this argument refutes the thesis of the Sāṃkhya school.
Pauṣkara 7.82: dṛśyamānam asārvajñyaṃ kalpayet svopapādakaṃ / paśutvākhyaṃ paśuṣv eva sārvajñye śāstrataḥ sthite.
Umāpati explains that the purpose of proving that mala is a substance is also to reject the thesis of Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara and others who hold that the obstructor to consciousness is the absence of knowledge (jñānābhāvavādins), etc.
Pauṣkara 4.114b: tac ca dravyaṃ yataḥ karmanirvartyaṃ paṭalādivat.
Pauṣkara 4.115a: kiñca dravyaṃ malo 'nekaśaktimatvād yathānalaḥ. According to Jñānaprakāśa a second reason is presented because the first could be charged with the defect of interdependence namely, mala is matter because it is removable by action, because mala is removable by action, it is matter.
Pauṣkara 4.115b–4.116a: tad ihājñānamātraṃ cet jñānābhāvaḥ kim ajñatā // anyathāpratibhāso vā gatir anyā na vidyate.
Pauṣkara 4.116b–4.117: jñānābhāvo na cājñānaṃ tasyākiñcitkaratvataḥ // na hy abhāvo ghaṭasyeha alam āharati kvacit / jñānasya prāgabhāvaś cet jñānotpattiḥ prasajyate.
Pauṣkara 4.118: nāpy etad anyathājñānaṃ tasyāpy anudayāt svataḥ / śuktikārajatajñānaṃ na bhavet paṭalaṃ vinā.
Pauṣkara 4.119: kiñcaitad anyathājñānam āgantukam athetarat / āgantukañ cec cicchakter bādhakan na kadācana.
Pauṣkara 4.120: yady anāgantukaṃ tarhi nānyathājñānam eva tat / anityam eva tat jñeyaṃ rajatajñānavad dvijāḥ. Jñānaprakāśa, who sees this as an inference, supplies the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the inference: ‘whatever is otherwise, is non-eternal’: yatra viparītatvaṃ tatrānityatvam iti vyāpteḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.121: kiñcaitad anyathājñānan na samyagjñānabādhakaṃ / na dṛṣṭaṃ śuktikājñānaṃ rajatajñānabādhakam.
Pauṣkara 4.122–4.123: atha cen nityasiddhas tu tayos saṃbandha ucyate / tathāpi bādhakan naitat jñānasyehānyathātmakam // pratyuta jñānasādhyaṃ syān nityam apy anyathātmakam / cirakālasthito dīpaś cirakālatamopahaḥ.
Corresponding perhaps to the three connotations of the word karma: a religious or mundane act, the retributive force of an act and finally, a specific notion admitted in the Śaiva dualist doctrine.
Jñānaprakāśa, in his commentary on Pauṣkara 4.131, considers that this rejects the thesis of the Jainas (kṣapaṇaka) who believe that the all-pervasive and eternal karma is the concealer of the true nature of the self and that mala need not be admitted as the obstructor: karmaiva svāpepy astīty āvaraṇatvena kliptikalitaṃ kiṃ maleneti kṣapaṇakāḥ. tad ayuktam ity āha.
Pauṣkara 4.131: karmaṇāpi na ca jñānabādhas saṃbhavati dvijāḥ / sādhyatvāt karmaṇaḥ puṃsas sādhakatvena saṃsthiteḥ. The two commentators interpret this verse differently. Umāpati comments that the self aspires to do good actions (dharma) because this is the means to welfare. Thus karma cannot also function as an obstructor. Jñānaprakāśa, on this verse, explains that karma and the self are connected by the relation of ‘to be realised-the realiser’ (sādhyasādhakasaṃbandha) which arises only after the self has partially escaped mala-obstruction through māyā products consisting of instruments (like kalā, etc.) that help the self to know and act, though in a limited way. Since the self is already obstructed by mala before it becomes aware of karma as something to be realised, karma cannot be mala: ayam āśayaḥ. āvaraṇanivṛttidvārā cidabhivyaktikārakakalādiyogād anantaraṃ karmapuruṣayos sādhyasādhakasaṃbandhād iti.
Pauṣkara 4.132: kiñca bhogaikahetus tat kathaṃ bhogasya bādhakam / yato jñānātmako bhogo na hi tena tadāvṛtiḥ; 4.136a: kiñcābhivyañjakaṃ karma cicchakter bādhakaṃ katham.
Pauṣkara 4.133: dharmādharmātmakaṃ karma tau ca bauddhau vyavasthitau / vyāptyabhāvāt tayor ūrdhvaṃ bandhakau sarvataḥ katham.
Pauṣkara 4.134–4.135: kiñca bhogapravṛttau tau vyāpriyete kathaṃ vṛtau / anyatrāpi pravṛttasya yady apy atrāpi hetutā // anekatatvasaṃkḷptiḥ kāryabhedād vihanyate / tasmān na karma cicchakter bādhakaṃ saṃvyavasthitam.
According to Jñānaprakāśa, this rejects the theory of those, foremost among whom are the Pāśupatas, who believe that māyā is mala, the obstructor of conciousness (māyāmalavādin) : māyāmalavādinaḥ pāśupatapramukhāḥ ... taduktiṃ tiraskaroti.
Pauṣkara 3.51–3.52: na ca māyā malas tasmād yataḥ kāryāt prakāśikā / kāryāt prakāśakaṃ yat tu svātmanājanakan na tat // yathā prakāśakau dṛṣṭau vahnidīpāv ubhāv api / na dīpakāraṇaṃ vahniḥ kvacid apy aprakāśakaḥ. See Kiraṇa 2.12b: māyā no mohinī proktā yataḥ kāryāt prakāśikā. The editorial choice of the reading svataḥ (instead of yataḥ which is the first word of the hetu of the inference and which is supported by the commentary) is unfortunate. Firstly, it demolishes the structure of the Kiraṇa inference. Secondly, it renders irrelevant the following Kiraṇa inference (2.13–2.14a) which is intended to demonstrate that the reason (hetu) of the inference in Kiraṇa 2.12b is not unestablished (asiddha) (compare Pauṣkara 3.53–3.54a; see below).
The fallacy of reason named asiddhi arises when there is the uncertainty of the presence of the reason (hetu) in the subject (pakṣa). See Pauṣkara 7.50b: asiddhiḥ prathamo hetoḥ pakṣavṛtter aniścaye.
Pauṣkara 3.53–3.54a: na ca māyā svarūpeṇa puṃsāṃ kāryakarī sthitā / kāryair aṇūpakāritvād yad itthan tan na cātmanā // yathā tantus svakāryeṇa paṭenaiva na cātmanā.
Pauṣkara 4.137b–4.138: malo ’pi saptadhā jñeyo mohaś cāpi madas tathā // rāgo 'nyaś ca viṣādākhyas tāpaś śoṣaś ca saptamam / vaicitryam api sarveṣāṃ malinānāṃ prakīrtitam.
Pauṣkara 4.148a: ete malavatāṃ puṃsāṃ dharmās sapta sahoditāḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.146b: saptaite sahajāḥ proktā malā malavatān nṛṇām.
Pauṣkara 4.147: male sati kalādīnāṃ yathā saṃbandha iṣyate / evam eṣv api satsv eva bandhayanti kalādayaḥ.
A notion also found in the Mataṅga vidyāpāda 6.103b–6.104 : moho madaś ca rāgaś ca viṣādaḥ śoṣa eva ca // vaicitryaṃ caiva harṣākhyaḥ saptaite sahajā malāḥ / satsv eteṣv api ye pāśā māyātaḥ kṣuritāḥ kalāḥ // tadudbalitavīryo 'ṇur bhuṅkte prakṛtijān guṇān; Mataṅga vidyāpāda 8.51b–8.52a: satsv eteṣu paśoḥ pāśā māyātaḥ kṣuritāḥ sadā // nānyathā prākṛtān bhogān bhoktuṃ śaknoti pudgalaḥ and Mataṅga vidyāpāda 8.31b–8.52a. See also Suprabheda paśusṛṣṭipaṭala 6.
Umāpati introducing verse 4.137b declares that the division of mala into seven is metaphorical and due to the varieties of its effects: malasya kāryabhedaupādhikaṃ bhedaṃ darśayati; Jñānaprakāśa on verses 4.139–4.140 states that these are figuratively named mala because they function as mala in the production of bondage of a self: kalādyutpattau teṣān nimittatvena malaguṇatulyatvāt malaguṇatvena copacaryate. The commentators of other dualist tantras concur, as do the manuals. For example, Rāmakaṇṭha states that moha made up of māyā has the moha made up of mala as its cause. (Mataṅgavṛtti on 8.33b–8.38a malātmakān mohād anyo māyāmohas tannimittaka ityarthaḥ). But he does not seem to accept the above seven varieties to be varieties of mala. See also Bhogakārikā 140b–145, which clearly refutes the thesis that these seven are modes (vṛtti) of mala and declares them only to be the modes of sattva and other guṇas.
Pauṣkara 4.38: tasyāṃ patitamātrāyāṃ malasyādhoniyāmikā / śaktir nivartate tasyāṃ nivṛttāyāṃ mahātmanaḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.52b: patikṛtyādhikāreṣu pravṛttāḥ patyur icchayā; 4.11b–4.12a: tadvartino na sakalāḥ kintu vijñānakevalāḥ // adhikāramalopetā śivecchānumatās sadā.
Pauṣkara 4.148b–4.149a: jaḍenājaḍarūpasya tiraskāro na yujyate // āvṛtiś ca na yuktāsya vyāpakatvena hetunā. Mataṅga vidyāpāda 8.21–8.22a adds the absence of independence of mala as the third point raised by the opponent as to why mala cannot obstruct the self.
Pauṣkara 4.149b–4.150a: anādikālasaṃrūḍhān malākhyād vāsitād aṇoḥ // ajaḍāpi tirobhūtā śaktir nityā jaḍātmanaḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.150b–4.151: kiñcājaḍaṃ jaḍenaiva bādhyate nājaḍena tu // sajātīyatvato hetor nāṇūnām īśvaro yathā / yathābhibhūtagandhasya nimbatvak candanasya tu. Umāpati states that the intended inference is: cetanācchādakamidaṃ dravyaṃ cetanasajātīyaṃ na bhavati cetanabādhakatvāt. ‘This consciousness-obstructing matter cannot be one of the same kind as consciousness; because it obstructs consciousness.'
The translation follows Umāpati, who considers this as a positive example. Margosa, which is dissimilar to sandal, obstructs sandal and renders it non-fragrant (yathā candanasya niṃbatvak bādhikā ... surabhicandanaṃ vijātīyaniṃbatvacā ācchāditaṃ sat abhibhūtasaurabhyaṃ bhavati). But it is generally believed that margosa bark paste re-enhances the fragrance of sandal paste which is diminished by water. So perhaps this half-verse should be understood, following Jñānaprakāśa, as ‘just as the margosa bark paste (being of a different nature, namely, non-fragrant) (obstructs) the suppressed fragrance of the sandal paste, (so also) the margosa bark paste does not again suppress the fragrance of sandal which has already been suppressed by water, which is of a different kind, but removes sandal's adventitious state of absence of fragrance and reveals its fragrance' (yathābhibhūtagandhasya vijātīyajalādinā tirobhūtasurabheś candanasya niṃbatvak na bhūyas surabhin tiraskaroti kintv aupādhikanissurabhitvan nirasya surabhitvaṃ vyañjayati).
Pauṣkara 4.152: kiñcājaḍaṃ jaḍān no cet bādhyaṃ tat kena bādhyate / ajaḍaṃ vā jaḍaṃ vāpi dvayaṃ vastu viniścitaṃ. Umāpati designates the inference as pariśeṣa (inference by elimination) and states that the intended inference is, cetanaḥ jaḍabādhyaḥ jaḍādanyādabādhyatve sati bādhyāt: ‘The sentient is obstructed by the insentient; because it is obstructed while being that which cannot be obstructed by anything other than the insentient’.
Pauṣkara 4.153–4.154a: ātmā nātmāntarād bādhyo vināśād bādhakātmanaḥ / tan nāśam antarā yasmān muktir na syāc cidātmanaḥ // jaḍenaivājaḍan tasmād bādhyam abhyupagamyatām.
Pauṣkara 4.154b–4.157a: anādir api saṃbandhaḥ prokto yadi malātmanoḥ // malāt kiṃ kriyate tatra śakter āvaraṇan tu vā / aprakāśīkṛtir vāpi tatrādyas tu na śobhate // tasyāś cābhinnarūpatvād ātmano 'pi prasaṃgataḥ / nāpy aprakāśīkaraṇaṃ vināśitvaprasaṃgataḥ // prakāśasyāprakāśo 'pi nāśān no nāśa iṣyate.
Pauṣkara 4.158: na cāvṛtir maleneṣṭā cicchakter vyāpakatvataḥ / nāpy aprakāśīkaraṇaṃ kintu kāryāpravartanam.
Pauṣkara 4.159–4.160: kriyate ’gnigatā śaktir mantraśaktitirohitā / naiva sphoṭakarī sadyaḥ prajvalaty api pāvake // atirohitabhāvo 'pi malenaiva svaśaktibhiḥ / tirohito hi kāryeṣu na cāṇus saṃpravartate.
Pauṣkara 4.161–4.163a: dṛkkriyārūpiṇī śaktiḥ kathitā parameśvara / te ca vijñeyakartavyavirahe na kadācana // na hi yasmāt paraṃ kāryaṃ jñatṛkartṛtvarūpataḥ / śaktikārye tirodhānaṃ malena kathitaṃ katham // śaktir nārthāntaraṃ yasmāt kāryāt tad vada śaṃkara.
Here the Pauṣkara makes a distinction between the potential and the active aspects of consciousness, the former considered as its nature and the latter as its function.
Pauṣkara 4.163b: śaktir eva na kartavyaṃ śaktidṛkkriyayor yataḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.164b–4.166: pratyartham api saṃbandhas tatkāryam itarat tu yat // padārthamātrasaṃvartirūpan tac chakti saṃjñitam / sahajan tasya tat jñeyan tan malena niruddhyate // tasmin niruddhe tat kāryaṃ pratyarthaṃ vedanātmakaṃ / na jāyate tataḥ kāryatirodhānaṃ malāt sthitam.
Pauṣkara 4.168–4.169: yathā cakṣus tamobandhāt sattvarūpam api sphuṭam / viṣayābhimukhañ cāpi svaniṣṭhaṃ vyavatiṣṭhate // evañ cicchaktir apy eṣā malaśaktyā vidūṣitā / svaniṣṭhā viṣayajñānakāryākartrī vyavasthitā.
Manifestation of the true nature of a self, namely omniscience and omnipotence.
Pauṣkara 1.51: yojitā layatatve ye te muktā nāparatra ca / bhogādhikāratatvasthā vyaktacinmātraśaktayaḥ.
Pauṣkara 1.16: layabhogādhikārāṇāṃ na bhedo vāstavaḥ śive / kintu bindor aṇūnāñ ca vāstavā eva te matāḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.1b–4.2a: yasmāt svadṛkkriyāśālī kalāhīno ’py anīśvaraḥ // vyāpakaś cinmayas sūkṣmaś śivavat saṃvyavasthitaḥ.
Pauṣkara 1.14a: bhuktimuktivyaktiphalā kriyā dīkṣāhvayā parā. According to the commentators, the difference between the true nature (śivatva) of the released self (also named śiva) and that of Śiva is that the śivahood of the released self, which is beginninglessly obstructed by mala, becomes manifest with the help of Śiva. The śivahood of Śiva is never obstructed and has no beginning because He is forever released.
Pauṣkara 1.90: na mokṣaṃ yānti puruṣāḥ svasāmarthyāt kadācana / muktvā prasādaṃ devasya śivasyāśivahāriṇaḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.10: vijñānakevalās sākṣāt ta eva munipuṃgavāḥ / śuddhādhvavartinaḥ paścāt bhaviṣyanti śivecchayā; Pauṣkara 2.53: svecchayaivādhikāreṣu vicitreṣu niyojayet / svecchaiva kāraṇan tatra vaicitrye karma na dvijāḥ; Pauṣkara 4.49–4.50a: icchayaivānugṛhyādau śivo vijñānakevalān / malapākam apekṣyaiva kāṃścic chuddhādhvagocare // yojayaty adhikāreṣu kṛtvā dṛkkriyayotkaṭān.
Pauṣkara 2.56: karmādinairapekṣyeṇa malapākānusārataḥ / anugṛhṇāti vijñānakevalān aparān api.
Pauṣkara 2.47b–2.48a: na karma bhogavaicitrye kāraṇaṃ śuddhavartmani // malasya paripāko yo vicitras so ’tra kāraṇam.
Pauṣkara 2.50a: bhaved eva malasyāsya paripāko bhavet svataḥ.
Pauṣkara 2.51a: vijñānayogasaṃnyāsaiḥ bhogād vā karmaṇaḥ kṣaye; Pauṣkara 4.13: kalātatvāntaśodhinyā dīkṣayā jñānato ’pi vā / yogena bhogato vāpi sannyāsād vā parikṣayaḥ.
Pauṣkara 2.51b–2.52a: tatkarmāyattadehādeḥ kṣayāt tadbhoktṛtākṣayaḥ // malo ’pi pakva eṣo ’smāt sahakārivaśād dvijāḥ.
The controversy about this topic, which attracted the attention of many authors (ancient and modern), is beyond the scope of this article.
The Pauṣkara does not mention the nature of contrariety of karmas that come to simultaneous fruition. But see Umāpati (on Pauṣkara 4.24): karmasāmyaṃ viruddhayoḥ karmaṇoḥ yugapat phalaunmukhyaṃ. Jñānaprakāśa's commentary (on Pauṣkara 4.20) is nearer to the conception of the Pauṣkara: karmasamatve pākena bhogyakālasāmye.
Pauṣkara 4.23: sarvatra karmasāmyasya yady anugrahahetutā / vijñānakevalānān tu bhavet katham anugrahaḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.20b–4.22: karmasāmyaṃ ca bhogena katham eṣām anugrahaḥ // samatvaṃ karmaṇān nātra nimittan tadanugrahe / paripāko malasyaiva kiṃtv anugrahakāraṇam // kiñcaiṣyadbhogahetūni santi yeṣām anugrahe / na te śivasya viṣayāḥ kintu pakvās tu karmaṇā.
Pauṣkara 4.24a: sakalānān tu sarvatra karmasāṃyan na kāraṇam.
Which would ultimately be destroyed by Śiva’s power.
Pauṣkara 4.24b–4.25a: yataḥ karmasamatve ’pi tadanyeṣāṃ tu karmaṇāṃ / apāke parameśājñāviruddhānyapradā sthitā. Though Jñānaprakāśa has the reading viruddha, both the commentators concur that equality of karma draws Śiva's power which makes karmas give out their fruits and perish; it does not fetch grace. Thus Umāpati commenting on the above verses: karmasāmyasya svavināśakaśaktinipātanahetutvepi dīkṣāhetubhūteśvarānugrahe na hetutvam iti bhāvaḥ; Jñānaprakāśa on the same verses: śivaśaktiḥ kimanugrāhikā patati netyāha ... bhogasākalyadātrī punar atha pralayakaivalyadātrī sthitā.
Pauṣkara 4.25b–4.26a: karmaṇo ’py asya sāmye ’pi pakve taditare ’pi ca // taṃ praty evaiśvarīśaktir upasarpati tacchide.
Pauṣkara 4.26b: anugrahe tato neṣṭaṃ tatsāmyaṃ munipuṃgavāḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.27: karmeha trividhaṃ dṛṣṭādṛṣṭajanmopabhogyakaṃ / tathāniyatakālopabhogyañ ceti samāsataḥ.
Pauṣkara 4.31b–4.33a: dvayor aihikayos tulyabalayos saṃbhave sati // klaibyāklaibyātmanos tatra patitā śaktir aiśvarī / karmāntaraṃ samuccitya balād anyatarasya tu // tadā tad balavad bhogyam anyat kālāntare bhavet.
Pauṣkara 4.33b–4.34: tathāmuṣmikayor aśvamedhadvijavadhātmanoḥ // yugapat saṃbhave śaktir dvayor api vināśinī / anyat karmāsamaṃ bhogyaṃ vidhatte puruṣasya sā.
Pauṣkara 4.35: tatrāniyatayos sadyaḥ saṃbhave paripakvayoḥ / viruddhayoś ca sā śaktis tannāśenānyabhogadā.
Pauṣkara 4.36: yadānyatkarma sarvañ ca saman tasya vināśinī / tadā vijñānakaivalyaṃ puṃsas syāt karmanāśataḥ. It is emphasized that the sakala self whose karma is destroyed becomes a vijñānakevala, because its connection with māyā ends when its karma is destroyed.
According to Umāpati, here the Pauṣkara (3.54–3.58) responds to a faction of materialists (svabhāvavādin) who question the infallibility of karma, as in the case of two karmas of equal strength with contrary results about to fructify simultaneously. According to him, the Pauṣkara, in its discussions on the fructification of karma, agrees that two such equally powerful karmas cannot be experienced at the same time, and because they are of equal strength, one of the two does not have priority over the other to fructify first. But Śiva can break the stalemate by rearranging their fruition or by destroying them. Also, the rule that karma cannot perish unless it bears its fruits, is respected because the ultimate objective of karmas, namely the delivery of their fruits, is said to be fulfilled when Śiva wills that karmas be destroyed.
Pauṣkara 3.54b–3.55a : ekasmin bhujyamāne tu karmaṇy anyad upasthitam // bādhakaṃ prabalan tac ced avirodhe samuccayaḥ; Pauṣkara 3.56b : aviruddhād aghaprāptir yadi tatra samuccayaḥ.
Pauṣkara 3.57–3.58 : ārabdham apy anārabdhaṃ balena tu samaṃ yadi / ārabdham eva bhogyaṃ syād rodhayitryā nirodhanāt // viruddhayor yadāraṃbhaḥ karmaṇos samayor balāt / tadaiva śaktipātena nāśa eva tayor bhavet.
Pauṣkara 5.80b–5.81a: karmaṇām ārjitānāṃ tu phalāpaharaṇe sati // tadvināśe pravṛtte 'yan niyatiś śivaśāsane; Pauṣkara 5.25: asāmañjasya rodhena karmaṇo ’py upakāritā / kālo ’pi niyatis tadvat kalābhogye yadātmanaḥ.
Pauṣkara 5.85b–5.86: atha cec chāṃkarīśaktir yā saiva syān niyāmikā // satyaṃ na sā svataḥ kintu niyativyavadhānataḥ / tatsaṃbandhād vimucyeran saiva cen niyatir yadi.
Pauṣkara 2.45b: nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭiśatair api.
Which are knowledge, yoga, renunciation, initiation or experience. See Pauṣkara 2.51a and Pauṣkara 4.13 cited above.
Pauṣkara 4.37–4.40a: karmanāśān malasyāpi vipāke sahakāriṇaḥ / pataty unmīlinī śaktis tadanugraharūpiṇī // tasyāṃ patitamātrāyāṃ malasyādhoniyāmikā / śaktir nivartate tasyāṃ nivṛttāyāṃ mahātmanaḥ // vairāgyaṃ jāyate kṣipraṃ saṃsārād duḥkhasāgarāt / didṛkṣā jāyate śaṃbhōḥ pādapaṅkajayor api // kadā drakṣyāmi deveśaṃ mokṣye 'haṃ bandhataḥ kadā. Umāpati considers that verse 4.37 refers to initiation that imposes duties – sādhikāra.
Pauṣkara 4.41–4.43a: evaṃ saṃsārato bhītam anugṛhṇāti ceśvaraḥ / tadyogyatānusāreṇa karuṇāgarbhayā dṛśā // punāti sādhikāreṇa yaṃ vāpi parameśvaraḥ / tayānugraharūpiṇyā śakter gatinirodhikā // malasya kṣīyate śaktis sā dīkṣā śāṃbhavī kriyā. According to Umāpati, here the word yogyatā refers to the maturity of mala. He also considers that verse 41 describes a kind of initiation performed directly by Śiva without the intermediary of a human preceptor and which does not impose duties (niradhikaraṇa-adhikārāprāpika), while verses 42–43a describe the same initiation which imposes duties (niradhikaraṇa-adhikāraprāpika). Jñānaprakāśa, who interprets yogyatā as dispassion, etc., does not find any reference to initiation in these verses, because he explains the word adhikāra as the qualification to serve as preceptor.
śivatva in the Pauṣkara does not always mean the nature of Śiva. It also refers to the quality of being conscious (śiva). For instance, māyā is said to be aśiva (inert) (see Pauṣkara 3.2a).
Pauṣkara 4.47b–4.48: dīkṣaiva mocayet pāśān śivatvaṃ ca dadāty aṇoḥ // dānan nāma svasattaiva yā sā jñānakriyātmikā / na tu sthānāntarādānād apy utpattiḥ kadācana. The notion that omniscience and omnipotence are transferred to the self from another place or that they are produced in the self, form the basis of the saṃkrāntivāda and utpattivāda respectively, which came to be discussed extensively in the commentaries of the main tantras (including those of the Pauṣkara) and in dualist Śaiva manuals. The Pauṣkara thesis that the own nature of the self becomes manifest at liberation may be considered as the abhivyaktivāda.
Pauṣkara 4.49–4.50a: icchayaivānugṛhyādau śivo vijñānakevalān / malapākam apekṣyaiva kāṃścic chuddhādhvagocare // yojayaty adhikāreṣu kṛtvā dṛkkriyayotkaṭān. Umāpati explains that this details the niradhikāradīkṣā mentioned in verse 42.
Pauṣkara 4.56–4.57a: eteṣāṃ yasya vairāgyam upajātaṃ mahātmanaḥ / kim etenādhikāreṇa śreyasaḥ paripanthinā // iti taṃ parameśāno malapākam apekṣya saḥ. Though the vijñānakevala self is free of the bonds produced by karma and māyā in the impure realm, it is said to be obstructed in the pure realm by an aspect of mala which imposes certain responsibilities like creation, governance, etc. (adhikāramala). See Pauṣkara 4.12a, cited above.
Pauṣkara 4.57b: icchayaivānugṛhṇāti muktivyaktyarthayā dṛśā. Umāpati comments that the purpose of this grace is liberation and manifestation of omniscience, whereas the earlier graces concerned duties. Jñānaprakāśa explains svecchayā (his reading instead of Umāpati’s icchayā) as having no support other than His own power (niradhikaraṇasvaśaktyaiva).
It is however comparable to the Jaina school, one of the three non-orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, which holds that bondage is produced by matter which they name karma. The nature and function of the bondage-producing matter are similar in Jaina theories and the Śaiva doctrine described in the Pauṣkara, as are their explanations of the interaction between matter and consciousness, temporary escape from bondage to know and act, the different stages of spiritual development, etc.
Mataṅga vidyāpāda 8.21: aṇuś cicchaktimāṃś caitanmalāt sūkṣmataraḥ sthitaḥ / malaḥ pradhvastacaitanyaḥ sthūlaḥ svātantryavarjitaḥ.
Commentaries on dualist Śaiva tantras and manuals admit this characteristic of mala but do not seem to discuss the exact nature of the materiality of mala. For example, Rāmakaṇṭha (Mataṅgavṛtti vidyāpāda 3.14a) argues that since bondage is produced by mala which is matter (dravya), liberation can only be achieved by the removal of that matter, just as a cataract is removed by an act of surgery.
Pauṣkara 1.15: ṣaṭsv eteṣu padārtheṣu śivādyavanipaścimaṃ / sarvam antargataṃ yasmāt parīkṣyante ta eva te; Pauṣkara 1.8: patiḥ kuṇḍalinī māyā paśuḥ pāśaś ca kārakaḥ / iti proktāḥ padārthāṣ ṣaṭ śaivatantre samāsataḥ.
Interestingly, Śrīkumāra states that mala, like karma, is a product of māyā although ultimately it is beginningless like karma (Tattvaprakāśatātparyadīpikā on 17: nanu māyākāryatvād malakarmaṇor ...). This stand is contrary to Śaiva dualist doctrine. See for example Svāyaṃbhuva 2.22: anādiḥ pauruṣī kārā muktyantāvikṛtā nijā / māyeyā kārmikī naiva muktyantāpi vidharmataḥ.
Mala is beginningless because it is beginninglessly connected with the self, which is eternal. Pauṣkara 1.12a: paśuḥ paśutvasaṃruddhadṛkkriyāprasaraḥ sadā; Pauṣkara 4.154b: anādir api saṃbandhaḥ prokto yadi malātmanoḥ. It is all-pervasive. Pauṣkara 4.8a: malasya vyāpakatvena māyānte saṃsthitiḥ katham.
Unlike some tantras (for example, Mataṅga vidyāpāda 6.81a and Kiraṇa 1.19b: sahaja; Svāyaṃbhuva 2.22a: nijā), the Pauṣkara does not declare the consciousness-obstructing mala to be natural to the self. Only the seven kinds of mala, delusion, etc. are described as natural (sahaja, Pauṣkara 4.146b) and innate (sahodita, Pauṣkara 4.148a).
Pauṣkara 4.170b-4.171a: anenaivābhiyuktatvāt paśutvena sahāsya ca // gaṇanā coditā caiva paśur evaṃ vibodhitaḥ.
Pauṣkara 6.6: prākṛto yas tv avidyādiḥ puṃsāṃ puṃstvamalas smṛtaḥ / tadākrāntaḥ kalādyāḍhyaḥ puruṣas tena saṃmataḥ.
Pauṣkara 6.1–6.3: śruṇudhvam atha puṃstatvaṃ yathāvan munipuṃgavāḥ / pañcakañcukasaṃyuktaḥ prakṛtiṃ bhoktum udyataḥ // avidyādisamāyuktaḥ puruṣaḥ parikīrtitaḥ / na vijñānākalas tena nāpi pralayakevalaḥ // puruṣākhyāṃ labhed yasmān nāvidyādivivarjitaḥ / tasmāt sakala evāṇur labhate puruṣāhvayaṃ.
Pauṣkara 1.13: kalādikṣitiparyantā sthitā tātvikasaṃhatiḥ / pāśātmakaḥ padārtho ’yaṃ pañcamaḥ paripaṭhyate.
According to Umāpati, the above Pauṣkara definition of pāśa refers only to the bonds arising from māyā. It does not exclude mala, karma and pure realm from the definition because these are considered in the discussion of paśu, māyā and bindu respectively: na ca malakarmaśuddhādhvādiṣu avyāptiḥ. malasya paśau karmaṇo māyāyāṃ śuddhādhvanaḥ kuṇḍalinyāṃ nirūpitatvāc ca. avaśiṣṭakalādyavaniparyantamāyeyapāśasyaiva atra lakṣitatvāt.
Pauṣkara 4.19a: pratipunniyatan tatvaṃ kalādyavanipaścimam. Pauṣkara 4.1: paśuḥ paśutvasaṃyogāt.
Pauṣkara 3.2a: nityaikā vyāpinī vasturūpā karmāśrayāśivā. Pauṣkara 6.271a: māyā tu paramāmūrtā nityānityasya kāraṇaṃ. The beginninglessness of karma, like that of mala, is proved from the fact that the self, which is eternal, is beginninglessly connected with them.
Pauṣkara 3.60a: māyāyām eva tāny asmin saṃsthitāni dvijarṣabhāḥ.
Pauṣkara 3.31–3.32a: aviśiṣṭe tu bhoktṛtve bhuñjate divi kecana / kecanāvīcimukhyeṣu na syād etad ahetukaṃ // yat tatra hetuḥ karmeti mantavyaṃ munipuṃgavāḥ.
Pauṣkara 6.123–6.124a; iti dharmādayo bhāvā buddhisthā vāsanātmanā / krameṇa pratyayātmānaḥ proktās tad vṛttibhedataḥ // pratyāyayanti kṣetrajñan tena te pratyayās smṛtāḥ.
Pauṣkara 3.53: na ca māyā svarūpeṇa puṃsāṃ kāryakarī sthitā / kāryair aṇūpakāritvād yad itthaṃ tan na cātmanā; Pauṣkara 3.60a–3.62a: māyāto dvividhā sṛṣṭiḥ sthūlā sūkṣmātmikety api // dṛkchaktivyaṃjikā sūkṣmā sthitā tatvātmanātmani / sthūlā bhuvanarūpeṇa śarīrādyātmanā sthitā // sūkṣmāḥ kalādayaḥ pūrvaṃ sthūlā badhnanty aṇūṃs tataḥ.
For example, Mataṅgavṛtti on 4.43: duḥkhādihetutvād duḥkhādīni karmāṇy ucyante; Kiraṇavṛtti on 1.13: māyāpi pāśayonitvāt pāśaḥ. Tattvaprakāśavṛtti on 17: malakarmarūpāvevātra malakarmajāv iti kāryakāraṇayor abhedenopacārād ucyate.
For example, the absence of true cognition, etc. which are the manifestations of prakṛti, are termed puṃstvamala. See for example, Pauṣkara 6.6a: prākṛto yas tv avidyādiḥ puṃsāṃ puṃstvamalas smṛtaḥ.
Umāpati (on Pauṣkara 4.37) compares the maturity of mala with a particular state of fruits like badara (vipāke badaraphalādāv ivāvasthāviśeṣe). This perhaps suggests that, just as a ripe and withered fruit falls off the tree, so mala detaches itself from the self when its obstructing powers are rendered inefficacious by the absence of karma and māyā in the self. See also Umāpati (on Pauṣkara 4.21): ‘readiness for fruition’ (phalaunmukhyam); Jñānaprakāśa (on Pauṣkara 4.57): ‘readiness for extinction’ (malakṣayaunmukhyatva). Commentators on other tantras do not define malapāka either, they merely describe it, see for example, ‘loss of ability to produce effects’ (Kiraṇavṛtti on 5.7: kāryaṃ praty asāmarthyaṃ).
Pauṣkara 4.147a: male sati kalādīnāṃ yathā saṃbandha iṣyate.
Pauṣkara 2.47b–2.48a: na karma bhogavaicitrye kāraṇaṃ śuddhavartmani // malasya paripāko yo vicitraḥ so ’tra kāraṇam.
Unless it is presumed that karma remains as a disposition in the semi-liberated self or that a pure karma exists, just as pure time, etc. are said to exist in the pure realm. See Pauṣkara 2.58: atrāpi kālamukhyāni santi tatvāny adho yathā / kintu tāny atra śuddhāni baindavāni dvijottamāḥ.
The doctrinal part of the Pauṣkara alludes to certain of its ritual discussions (in 6.7a, 1.45b, etc.) but does not touch upon the relationship between mala and ritual. See Colas-Chauhan 2007: 8–9 for a brief discussion on the existence of the kriyā- and caryā-pādas of the Pauṣkara.
Pauṣkara 4.149b: anādikālasaṃrūḍhān malākhyād vāsitād aṇoḥ.
As the Jaina doctrine maintains.
The Pauṣkara does not mention the kind of liberation that is obtained while still in the physical body (jīvanmukti), a state in which the self, though free of mala, lives in the world waiting for the depletion of its karma that has started operating. It is apparently admitted by the Kiraṇa (6.19) and Suprabheda (paśusṛṣṭipaṭala 24).
Pauṣkara 6.18a: tad avyaktam iti proktaṃ kṣobhyaṃ śrīkaṇṭhavikramaiḥ.
Pauṣkara 3.50a: kāraṇan tac ca karmaiva tad apīśvaracoditam.
The destruction of karma by Śiva's power, variously justified by the commentators of the Pauṣkara and other tantras, can only be symbolic, for it is contrary to the rule that a karma does not disappear until it has borne its fruits. Pauṣkara 2.45b: nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭiśatair api. Knowledge revealed by initiation, awareness of liberation also arise from within the self; they are not acquired from Śiva or His powers.
Pauṣkara 1.35a: tathā sannidhimātreṇa vidadhāty akhilaṃ śivaḥ; Pauṣkara 1.30a: śivas saṃkalpamātreṇa bindukṣobhakaras sadā.
The Pauṣkara refers to Śiva's power of repression (rodhayitri) which is said to control selves in the universe in dissolution and the impure realm (Pauṣkara 1.75b–1.76a). But it does not claim Śiva's power to be a bond (pāśa) as asserted by the Mṛgendra (Mṛgendra vidyāpāda 2.7: prāvṛtīśabale karma māyākāryaṃ caturvidhaṃ / pāśajālaṃ samāsena dharmā nāmnaiva kīrtitāh), which, however, states that Śiva's power is only figuratively called a bond (Mṛgendra vidyāpāda 7.11: tāsāṃ māheśvarī śaktis sarvānugrāhikā śivā / dharmānuvartanād eva pāśa ityupacaryate).
See for example, Mataṅgavṛtti on 3.14a; Kiraṇavṛtti on 1.22a; Tattvatrayanirṇayavṛtti on 8.
Thus eliciting the discussion of Śiva's independence in dualist śaivatantra commentaries and manuals.
Pauṣkara 1.90: na mokṣaṃ yānti puruṣāḥ svasāmarthyāt kadācana / muktvā prasādaṃ devasya śivasyāśivahāriṇaḥ. This frequently cited Pauṣkara verse concludes an argument which is based on three theistic presumptions: that the world is created by a sentient being, that a liberated self cannot be the creator and that Śiva is the creator. But since all activity invariably implies change on the part of the actor, the Pauṣkara also declares, in order to safeguard Śiva's immutability, that Śiva is merely an instigator or a creator by His mere presence or through His will or that He acts through His assistants.
References
Sanskrit works
Aṣṭaprakaraṇa, ed. by Vrajavallabha Dvivedi, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Yogatantragranthamālā 12, 1988.
Bhogakārikā of Sadyojoti with Aghoraśiva’s commentary. In Aṣṭaprakaraṇa, pp. 203–238.
Kiraṇa: Bhaṭta Rāmakaṇṭha’s Commentary on the Kiraṇatantra, vol. I : chapters 1–6, ed. and transl. by D. Goodall, Pondichéry : Institut français de Pondichéry et École française d’Extrême-Orient, Publications du Département d’Indologie 86.1, 1998.
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Colas-Chauhan, U. Mala according to the Pauṣkaratantra: nature, function and elimination. J Indian Philos 49, 975–998 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09490-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09490-1