Abstract
This essay offers a fresh interpretation of Bhartr̥hari’s concept of “insight” (pratibhā), and of its identification as the object of a sentence (vākyārtha) in the second kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya. Earlier scholars dealing with this topic disagreed on three main points: (1) whether an epistemologically rigorous concept of insight can be found in Bhartr̥hari’s work, or if the notion remains irrevocably vague and equivocal; (2) whether the concept of pratibhā primarily belongs to linguistics (that “flash” of understanding immediately taking place after hearing a sentence), or to action theory; (3) whether Bhartr̥hari’s identification of insight as the object of a sentence should be taken literally or figuratively. Starting from a close analysis of all passages in Bhartr̥hari’s work mentioning pratibhā, I identify, first of all, a univocal understanding of insight, valid throughout the Vākyapadīya, as immediate cognition informed by verbal transmission, in other words as a form of practical knowledge, non-representational yet essentially productive and dynamic. Showing, on this basis, how Bhartr̥hari’s understanding of language at the level of sentences is pragmatic rather than referential, I demonstrate, against the view prevalent in the late grammatical tradition, that a literal interpretation of his provocative statement on pratibhā as vākyārtha remains perfectly plausible. This thesis is further corroborated by the consideration of post-Bhartr̥hari philosophical sources elaborating on his ideas (Dignāga, Maṇḍana Miśra), which allow us better to understand in what sense pratibhā can legitimately be thought of as cognition “without an object” (nirviṣaya).
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Notes
Abhinavabhāratī on Nāṭyaśāstra 6.31 (prose portion). Text in Gnoli (1968, pp. 12–13) and David (2016, p. 128). For a detailed discussion of the passage in question, see Pollock (2010) and David (2016). The same portion of Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Bharata’s rasasūtra is taken up in Ollett (2016), for the most part a defence and expansion of Pollock’s interpretation of this passage in the light of Kumārila’s theory of “effectuation” (bhāvanā).
adhikaivopāttakālatiraskāreṇaiva āsai pradadānītyādirūpā saṃkramaṇādisvabhāvā yathādarśanaṃ pratibhābhāvanāvidhyudyogādibhāṣābhir vyavahr̥tā pratipattiḥ. Text: David (2016, p. 128), different from the text included in Gnoli (1968, pp. 12–13). For reasons I explain below, I do not accept R. Gnoli’s emendation of the reading pratibhābhāvanā°, found in most printed editions of the text, into bhāvanā° alone. The reading °udyoga°, found in all manuscripts of the text I could access, is also preferred to Gnoli’s reading °niyoga°, borrowed from R. Kavi’s first edition, on the assumption that Abhinavagupta is drawing from Jayanta’s list of “sentence-objects” (vākyārtha) in the Nyāyamañjarī. For a detailed discussion of this point, see David (2016, pp. 132–135, especially note 35) and below.
See Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya on A 2.3.46: yad atrādhikyaṃ vākyārthaḥ saḥ; “What is in excess here [= in the sentence vīraḥ puruṣaḥ, ‘The man is brave’] is the object of the sentence” (vol. 1 p. 462, l. 4–5); also Bhartr̥hari’s Vākyapadīya 2.42: saṃbandhe sati yat tv anyad ādhikyam upajāyate | vākyārtham eva taṃ prāhur anekapadasaṃśrayam ||; “But what is in excess [and] different [from the object of individual words], produced when [words] are put together, is precisely what they call the ‘object of the sentence’, and it depends on more than one word”. In Patañjali’s (and Bhartr̥hari’s) words, “excess” refers to what is conveyed by the sentence taken as a whole, but not by any particular constitutive lexical item, in the present example the relation of qualification (viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva) connecting the man and the quality of being brave. On “excess” as a possible definition of the object of a sentence in the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition, see David (2017a, p. 30).
See David (2016, p. 132–135).
See Nyāyamañjarī vol. 2, p. 135.5–142.19.
Nyāyamañjarī vol. 2, p. 141.17–18: pratibhā khalu vijñānaṃ tac ca śabdena janyate | na tu śabdasya viṣayo rūpadhīr iva cakṣuṣaḥ ||
See Nyāyamañjarī vol. 2, p. 141.19: bāhyasya viṣayasyābhāvāt saiva viṣaya iti cet (…); “If one were to argue that [insight] itself is the content [of the cognition born from hearing a sentence], because there is no external object, (…)”.
See Nyāyamañjarī vol. 2, p. 142.1–2: yo ’pi ‘vyāghra āyātaḥ’ ity ukte śūrakātarādhikaraṇanānākārakāryotpādaḥ (…); “Even the production of instigations of varying forms for a courageous man or a coward upon hearing [the sentence] ‘A tiger has come’ (…)”.
See Nyāyamañjarī vol. 2, p. 142.4: arthas tadānīṃ nāstīti cet (…); “If one were to object that the object does not exist at the time [of the utterance], (…)”.
During the presentation of this essay in Vienna in December, 2018, I became aware thanks to my Japanese colleagues that a paper on the topic of pratibhā in Bhartr̥hari’s Vākyapadīya had been presented by Hideyo Ogawa at a conference in Matsumoto in 2012 (Ogawa 2012a). This article, of which I could obtain a copy in the form of a handout distributed at the Matsumoto conference, is to this date still unpublished, and it is not impossible that its author would have liked to produce a revised version of it before publication. However, the views presented therein appear to be coherent with Ogawa’s published work on the topic of vākyārtha (see especially Ogawa 2004–2005, 2012b, 2012c), and are too radically opposed to those advocated here to be simply ignored. In Ogawa’s opinion, Bhartr̥hari never held the view that pratibhā is identical with the object of a sentence. According to him, that wrong identification would be the work of later authors and commentators on the Vākyapadīya, first among whom Puṇyarāja, the second-millennium commentator on the second kāṇḍa, who “fails to grasp the concept of pratibhā as conceived by Bhartr̥hari”, and by whom most modern interpreters of his thought would have been misled (pp. 1–2). According to Ogawa, “the pratibhā is a sentence meaning (sic) and a sentence meaning is simply a fusion (saṃsarga) from which the elements of word meanings (padārtha) are abstracted (apoddhāra)” (ibid.). Thus, the view of pratibhā as the object of the sentence would have been held neither by Bhartr̥hari nor by his 10th-century commentator Helārāja, as “either in the extant Vr̥tti or in the Prakāśa of Helārāja (…) there is no indication that a sentence meaning is a pratibhā” (p. 1). The detail of Ogawa’s arguments in support of this view will be discussed in the course of this article, on the occasion of the discussion of particular text-passages.
On Patañjali’s notion of ādhikya, taken up by Bhartr̥hari in VP 2.42, see above n. 4.
Needless to say, this tentative (and, no doubt, somewhat artificial) identification of a separate “section” of the second kāṇḍa dealing with the definition of the vākyārtha does not conform to Puṇyarāja’s understanding of the structure of the text, and rather follows the lead provided by Bhartr̥hari’s auto-commentary, unfortunately missing for the portion VP 2.77-151 (only one fragment of the SV on VP 2.87 appears to have survived). According to Puṇyarāja, k. 2.41-48 would deal with a specific variety of the so-called saṃghātapakṣa (“view of the aggregate”), anachronistically connected to Kumārila’s views on the sentence: idānīm abhihitānvayapakṣasamāśrayaṇena saṃghātapakṣasya pradarśanāyāha (…); “Now, in order to expose the ‘view of the aggregate’ (saṃghātapakṣa) by relying on the view of the connection of [objects] that have [already] been expressed (abhihitānvayapakṣa), he says: (…)” (VP-Ṭīkā p. 19.17; introduction to VP 2.41-42). In other words, following Puṇyarāja, Bhartr̥hari would not be reiterating the ancient Pāṇinīyas’ distinction between padārtha and vākyārtha before starting his own investigation on the topic; he would rather be discussing the second in the list of eight sentence-definitions given in VP 2.1-2, according to which the sentence is “an aggregate of lexical units” (śabdasaṃghāta—VP 2.1a). This difference of interpretation should, of course, not deter us from trying to understand Bhartr̥hari’s text in its own terms, but it gives us a measure of the kind of difficulty we face when trying to apprehend the complex structure of the second kāṇḍa.
vicchedagrahaṇe ’rthānāṃ pratibhānyaiva jāyate | vākyārtha iti tām āhuḥ padārthair upapāditam || 2.143 || idaṃ tad iti sānyeṣām anākhyeyā kathaṃ cana | pratyātmavr̥ttisiddhā <em: °vr̥tti siddhā Rau> sā kartrāpi na nirūpyate || 2.144 || upaśleṣam ivārthānāṃ sā karoty avicāritā | sārvarūpyam ivāpannā viṣayatvena vartate || 2.145 ||. All quotations of VP-kārikās follow the text of their critical edition by W. Rau (1977). Numeration of verses follows the edition of K.A. Subramania Iyer, with Rau’s numeration given in brackets whenever different. The whole section of the second kāṇḍa on pratibhā (VP 2.143-151/152) has been translated in Biardeau (1964b, pp. 316–317), Iyer (1977, pp. 60–63), Akamatsu (1998) and Rau (2000, pp. 74–76), and discussed in Raja (1963, pp. 224–227), Gonda (1963, pp. 339–340), Biardeau (1964b, pp. 315–329), Iyer (1969, pp. 86–93 and 187), Aklujkar (1989b, pp. 155–156), Tola & Dragonetti (1990), Akamatsu (1994), Prasad (2010) and Ogawa (2012a). Torella (2013, p. 465) briefly mentions this passage, which he quotes in Iyer’s English translation. Despite differences in the rendering of Bhartr̥hari’s sometimes elliptical expressions, my translation essentially agrees with Iyer and Rau’s understanding of the text. The interpretation of the passage proposed by Ogawa (2012a), on the other hand, largely differs from that of his predecessors: “When [different] things have been separately understood, there arises a pratibhā as something totally different [from the understanding of the things]. Since the pratibhā is explained in terms of the meanings of words, they speak of it as a ‘sentence meaning’. (2.143) (…) The [pratibhā], without being considered, appears as if it brought about the integration of [different] things. It occurs as an object (viṣaya – HD) since it appears as if it had all forms [of the things]. (2.145)” (p. 3; italics indicate passages where Ogawa’s interpretation significantly differs from earlier ones).
Iyer (1969, pp. 86–87): “When we have understood the meaning of the words of a sentence, a flash of understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence takes place. It is quite different from the meanings of the individual words” (identical statement p. 187). This is, of course, essentially a paraphrase of VP 2.143. Iyer’s expression “flash of understanding” to describe pratibhā, possibly borrowed from K.K. Raja (1963, p. 225), is taken up inter alia by Akamatsu (1994), Ferrante (2014) and, with considerable emphasis, by Tola & Dragonetti (1990, p. 110) and Prasad (2010).
See also the first lines of VPSV 1.123 (= Rau 1.131), referring back to VPSV 1.14 and further clarifying the connection of pratibhā with kṣema (“satisfaction”, “happiness”) in the framework of Bhartr̥hari’s doctrine of liberation through śabdapūrvayoga: śabdapūrvakaṃ yogam adhigamya pratibhāṃ (…) samyag avabudhya niyatā kṣemaprāptir iti (VPSV 1.123 [p. 202.1–3]).
Ferrante (2014, p. 174): “Just as on a linguistic level the meaning of the sentence is grasped instantaneously with a flash of understanding (…), similarly the cognition of the ultimate reality, on a metaphysical plane, is instantaneous and allows one to discard all unreal differentiations.”
This statement is essentially based on Ogawa’s interpretation (p. 7) of the expression pratibhopasaṃhāra in VPSV 1.24-26 (p. 67.4), which shall be discussed later on (Section 3).
Laghumañjuṣā p. 417.1.
Laghumañjuṣā p. 417.4–5.
This, quite evidently, is the case in commands, advice, etc., but is it also the case elsewhere?
See for instance Iyer (1969, pp. 87–88), who insists on the fact that the concept of pratibhā in Bhartr̥hari is “very comprehensive”.
The word pratibhā does not occur in the third kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya. Its usage by Helārāja, the 10th-century Kashmiri commentator, is also very limited, and need not concern us here.
As appears clearly from the above list of occurrences, the topic of pratibhā is not discussed by Bhartr̥hari after k. 2.152 of the VP. The topic of “insight”, quite pervasive in the beginning of the work, does not seem to play any significant role after that point.
I am not convinced by Rau’s reading °varaṇa° (“choice”, “Wünschen” according to his translation of the verse in Rau [2000, p. 76]) instead of °caraṇa°, found in all preceding editions of the text. Not only does °varaṇa° contradict the Svavr̥tti on VP 2.152 (caraṇanimittā kā cit pratibhā – p. 222.5 [= M p. 90.7–8]), admittedly known to us through a single modern devanāgarī transcript (= M); it also goes against Śrīvr̥ṣabha’s recapitulation of this verse while commenting on VPSV 1.123 (svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsādibhyo ’pi sā jāyate—Sphuṭākṣarā p. 202.12–13), as well as against the testimony of Bhartr̥hari himself in VPSV 1.30, a passage to which, as we shall see, he implicitly refers back in VP(SV) 2.152 (see below). On the same basis, I find Iyer’s emendation of caraṇa into ācaraṇa in VPSV 2.152 (p. 222.5) not only unnecessary, but also quite implausible.
VP 2.152: svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsayogādr̥ṣṭopapāditām | viśiṣṭopahitāṃ ceti pratibhāṃ ṣaḍvidhāṃ viduḥ || For reasons stated above (see preceding note), I do not accept Rau’s reading °varaṇa° in the first pāda, and maintain the reading °caraṇa° from Iyer’s 1983 edition of the text.
See Puṇyarāja’s Ṭīkā on VP 2.152: svabhāvena yathā kapiḥ. caraṇādiṣūdāharaṇāny ūhyāni; “‘By nature’, like a monkey; examples of the other cases, beginning with ‘[appropriate moral] conduct’ can be guessed” (p. 68.4). The example of the monkey (kapi) is puzzling, although taken at face value by Raghunātha Śarmā (Ambākartrī vol. 2 p. 228: yathā kapeḥ śākhāplavanādiṣu) and Iyer (1969, p. 88 and 1977, p. 63). If Puṇyarāja wanted to illustrate animal instinctual behaviour, he could have chosen among half a dozen examples given by Bhartr̥hari himself in the preceding kārikās (cuckoos, spiders, etc.); why the monkey? I find it quite possible that the reading kapiḥ, found in all three editions of Puṇyarāja’s Ṭīkā, is actually a misreading for kaviḥ (or kaveḥ) due to the common confusion between pa and va in several Indian scripts (especially South Indian ones). If this were correct, Puṇyarāja would refer to the insight of poets allowing literary creation, “natural” in the sense that it does not depend on education (vyutpatti) but is entirely innate. See for instance Rājaśekhara’s Kāvyamīmāṃsā: pratibhāvyutpattimāṃś ca kaviḥ kavir ity ucyate; “If a poet has both insight and education, he is [really] a poet” (p. 17.5). Among early Ālaṃkārikas, Bhāmaha (Kāvyālaṃkāra 1.5) already speaks of kāvya as belonging “to him who has insight” (pratibhāvataḥ) and similarly Daṇḍin (Kāvyādarśa 1.103) of “insight, which is innate” (naisargikī pratibhā) as “the cause of success in poetry” (kāraṇaṃ kāvyasaṃpadaḥ). Other references in Gonda (1963, pp. 323–334), also Prasad (2010). It is quite possible that Puṇyarāja, not taking into account (or not understanding) Bhartr̥hari’s rather obscure explanation of svabhāva in the Svavr̥tti, would be referring here to the old idea of pratibhā as the innate source of poetic creation.
See Iyer (1969, p. 88 and 1977, p. 63). As noted above, k. 2.152 is the first kārikā to be transmitted along with the Svavr̥tti after a long interruption, spanning over nearly a hundred kārikās; it is likely that the first folio after the gap suffered extensive damage in the original Malayalam palm-leaf manuscript, from which our only surviving testimony for the first half of the second kāṇḍa (M) was copied. This could perhaps explain the fragmentary state of the vr̥tti on this verse.
A notable exception is Raghunātha Śarmā, who seems to presuppose at least some of these parallels in his explanation of the vr̥tti on this verse in the second volume of the Ambākartrī (pp. 228–229). See also Iyer (1969, pp. 88–89), who sketches a few promising comparisons between the two kāṇḍas.
The text as it is transmitted in M reads as follows: kā cit svābhāvikī pratibhā, tad yathā parasyāḥ <+++++++>thamaṃ sattālakṣaṇam ātmānaṃ mahāntaṃ praty ānuguṇyam, suṣuptāvasthasyeva prabodhānuguṇyaṃ phalasattāmātraṃ nidrāyāḥ (M p. 90, l. 4-7—each sign ‘+’ stands for the space of one akṣara). The conjecture parasyāḥ <prakr̥teḥ pra>thamaṃ filling the initial lacuna was apparently proposed for the first time in 1968 by Raghunātha Śarmā, as it is not found in Cārudeva Śāstrī’s first edition of the text of the Svavr̥tti (Ed1939/40); it is taken up by all subsequent editors of the text.
In the electronic draft of his edition of the Svavr̥tti (AD), A. Aklujkar proposes to conjecture suṣuptāvasthasya vā instead of suṣuptāvasthasyeva, the reading found in M and all printed editions. This conjecture would make awakening a second example for svabhāva, instead of a comparison as suggested by iva. I find it unlikely, however, that Bhartr̥hari attributes our ordinary capacity to wake up from sleep to an “insight”, especially one of the first kind (at least, he never says such a thing). Besides, the succession of sleep and awakening (svapnaprabodhavr̥tti) already appears, in the Svavr̥tti on VP 1.110 (= Rau 1.122; p. 181.3-4) and VP 1.137 (= Rau 1.173; p. 226.3–5), as a metaphor for stages in the manifestation of the universe by “the great cause, the substance of speech” (mahati […] vāktattve kāraṇe – p. 181.4) / the “sempiternal cause” (nityaṃ kāraṇam – p. 226.3–4). Incidentally or not, these are precisely the two passages in the latter half of the first kāṇḍa where this kind of trans-individual, “metaphysical” pratibhā is discussed, in the form of pratibhātman (VP 1.110c and VPSV 1.137, p. 226.5). Sure enough, neither of the two texts connects the image of awakening with pratibhā directly; nor is pratibhā explicitly identified there as the supreme cause. Still, all these passages are closely related, and together suggest that sleep and awakening are generally used as a metaphor by Bhartr̥hari, and that they also play this role in our passage of the second kāṇḍa.
Sphuṭākṣarā p. 48.17: sattayā sarvabhāvavikārạm lakṣayati. Śrīvr̥ṣabha’s expression bhāvavikāra refers, of course, to the six modifications of being—birth, existence, change, growth, etc.—in Yāska’s Nirukta (1.2), alluded to in VP 1.3cd (janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ). See Biardeau (1964a, p. 30, n. 1). The reason for Śrīvr̥ṣabha’s equation of sattā with bhāvavikāra is almost certainly Bhartr̥hari’s statement in VPSV 1.123 defining pratibhā as “existence, the origin of the modifications of being” (pratibhāṃ (…) bhāvavikāraprakr̥tiṃ sattām—p. 202.2). I cannot see any easy solution to the apparent contradiction in Bhartr̥hari’s statements qualifying pratibhā as sattānuguṇya in VPSV 1.14, and as sattā in VPSV 1.123 or sattālakṣaṇa in VPSV 1.137.
See p. 228 in the Ambākartrī, where the expression mahāntam ātmānam praty ānuguṇyam is glossed in Sāṃkhya terms as sattāmātrasvarūpam ātmānaṃ buddhim mahāntaṃ mahattattvaṃ praty ānuguṇyam; “The propensity [of the Supreme Prakr̥ti to evolve] into mahat, i.e. the essence (tattva) mahat, which is none other than the Self, i.e. the intellect (buddhi), consisting only of sattā [i.e. sattvaguṇa—HD].” Unfortunately, Raghunātha Śarmā does not discuss further his interpretation of sattā as the first of Sāṃkhya’s three qualities (guṇa), and how it might match Bhartr̥hari’s interpretation of pratibhā as sattānuguṇyamātra in VPSV 1.14, a passage he obviously had in mind for this must be the source of his idea that VPSV 2.152 refers to “the Great Prakr̥ti” (mahāprakr̥tiḥ). R. Śarmā’s brief gloss of Bhartr̥hari’s expression sattānuguṇyamātrāt in VPSV 1.14 by sattayopalakṣitā in the first volume of the Ambākartrī (p. 37) is too vague to determine whether he refers there also to the first of Sāṃkhya’s three guṇas (sattva, rajas and tamas).
See Sphuṭākṣarā p. 48.15: pratibhām iti. yeyaṃ samastaśabdārthakāraṇabhūtā buddhiḥ, yāṃ paśyantīty āhuḥ; “‘[he reaches] insight’, i.e. that cognition (buddhi) which is the cause of all speech-elements and their referents, [and] that they call paśyantī (‘the Seer’)”. Although Bhartr̥hari never formally equates paśyantī with pratibhā, the latter’s power of differentiation brings it close to descriptions of paśyantī in VPSV 1.134 (= Rau 1.159): pratisaṃhr̥takramā saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī; “paśyantī has its sequence entirely withdrawn and, even though it is undifferentiated, it is possessed with a power [to produce] sequence” (p. 214.4). Bhartr̥hari’s claim that paśyantī, which stands “beyond the realm of worldly experience” (lokavyavahārātīta—p. 216.2), can be reached by a process of purification defined as the discrimination of what is correct and what is corrupt in speech, as well as by śabdapūrvayoga, is also entirely coherent with Bhartr̥hari’s claim in the Svavr̥tti on VP 1.123 that the experience of pratibhā depends on “the removal of any polluting contact with corrupt forms” (apabhraṃśopaghātāpagam[aḥ]—pp. 201.8–202.1) and on śabdapūrvayoga (p. 202.1). So, despite the objections voiced against it by Biardeau (1964b, p. 322), I do not see any good reason to reject Śrīvr̥ṣabha’s tentative identification of “natural” pratibhā with the highest level of speech.
See, for instance, the last pāda of the untraced verse quoted by Bhartr̥hari in the Svavr̥tti on VP 1.118 (= Rau 1.134): vāg eva prakr̥tiḥ parā; “The Supreme Prakr̥ti is Vāc alone” (p. 194.2).
It is beyond my intention here to solve the enigma of the expression śabdapūrvayoga, on which already much ink has been spilt. For a summary of existing positions, see Ferrante (2014, pp. 166–174).
More precisely, in many respects VP(SV) 2.152 appears as the putting together, under the aegis of pratibhā, of several cases dealt with in the first kāṇḍa, with sometimes significantly distinct nuances. This might explain the rather disparate and heterogeneous nature of the list of “causes” (nimitta) of pratibhā given by Bhartr̥hari in the second kāṇḍa.
On Bhartr̥hari’s concept of āgama, see Aklujkar (1989a, pp. 17–18).
Svavr̥tti on VP 2.152: evaṃ pratibhā bahuvidhāpi sarvaivāgamikavākyanibandhanā vākyapratipādyā (p. 222.10–11). I translate the text with Cārudeva Śāstrī’s emendation of the reading evaṃ pratibhā bahu(.) pratibhāpi found in M (p. 90.14–15) into evaṃ pratibhā bahuvidhāpi (Ed1939/40 p. 83.1), adopted by all subsequent editors. The same idea is found in VP 2.151, in the particular context of Bhartr̥hari’s explanation of instinctual behaviour in animals (VP 2.149-150): bhāvanānugatād etad āgamād eva jāyate | āsattiviprakarṣābhyām āgamas tu viśiṣyate ||; “This all [happens] because of transmission, followed by traces; but transmission can be of different kinds: either close or far away.”
On the interpretation of this compound, cf. VP 1.37a, where a similar compound āvirbhūtaprakāśa (“in whom a particular light has shown”) is used to qualify the “learned ones” (śiṣṭa).
The reading caraṇena is Raghunātha Śarma’s emendation of an original reading kāraṇena, found in M (p. 90.8) and the Lahore edition (Ed1939/40 p. 82.20–21). The reading of the manuscript does not seem to fit the context, but caraṇena also appears somewhat redundant in the sentence, so it is still tentative. Other emendations were attempted by Iyer (ācaraṇena – Ed1983 p. 222.5–6) and Aklujkar (antaḥkaraṇena [AD]), none of which appears particularly convincing.
Aklujkar’s emendation (AD) of the aberrant reading kūpataṭākādīnām (“of wells, ponds, etc.”?), found in M (p. 90.10), into rūpatarkādīnām (“of experts in currencies, etc.”) appears necessary, and must be based on a comparison with VPSV 1.35 (p. 93.3: na hi rūpatarkādayaḥ sūkṣmān aprasiddhavijñānapadān…), where a similar observation is made by Bhartr̥hari. Other attempts to “freely” correct the text like Raghunātha Śarmā’s kūpataṭākakhanakādīnām (“of diggers of wells, ponds, etc.”—Ed1968 p. 229.1), adopted by Iyer (Ed1983 p. 222.7; see also Iyer [1969, p. 89] and Iyer [1977, p. 63]), are much less convincing, since the example of well-diggers does not come up anywhere else in the VP.
Bhartr̥hari is alluding here to the extraordinary vision of Sañjaya, Dhr̥tarāṣṭra’s charioteer in the Mahābhārata, allowing him to witness the great war of the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas. According to the epic narrative, this capacity was, indeed, granted to him by Kr̥ṣṇa Dvaipāyana.
caraṇanimittā kā cit pratibhā, tad yathā caraṇenaivāvadhr̥taprakāśaviśeṣāṇāṃ vasiṣṭhādīnām. abhyāsanimittā kā cit, tad yathā rūpatarkādīnām. yoganimittā kā cit, tad yathā yoginām avyabhicāreṇa parābhiprāyajñānādiṣu. tathā kā cid adr̥ṣṭanimittā, tad yathā rakṣaḥpitr̥piśācādīnāṃ parāveśāntardhānādiṣu. kā cid viśiṣṭair upahitā, tad yathā sañjayādīnāṃ kr̥ṣṇadvaipāyanādibhiḥ (M p. 90.7–14). Modifications of the text of the manuscript are underlined; variant readings found in printed editions and tentative conjectures are too many to be all reported here. Sources for our three emendations are as follows: caraṇena conj (Raghunātha Śarmā): kāraṇena M; vasiṣṭhādīnām conj (Cārudeva Śāstrī): vasi… M; rūpatarkādīnām conj (Aklujkar): kūpataṭākādīnām M.
See Iyer (1969, p. 88) and Iyer (1977, p. 63), where caraṇa is translated as the “adherence to one’s own Veda”. Raghunātha Śarmā, in the Ambākartrī (vol. 2, p. 229), glosses caraṇa as sadācāra (“good conduct”) or śāstravihitaṃ tapaḥsvādhyāyādikaṃ (“austerities, recitation for oneself, etc. as they are prescribed in the Veda”), and it is not impossible that Iyer tried to match the second meaning by giving caraṇa its meaning of “Vedic school”. Yet it is clear that, in all other occurrences of the word caraṇa in Bhartr̥hari’s work, what prevails is not the idea of the adherence to one’s Veda, but rather the diversity of traditions within a single, unbroken Vedic tradition, which makes Iyer’s interpretation rather forced.
Biardeau (1964a, p. 75): “qui supposent un savoir et une conduite extraordinaires”; Iyer (1965, p. 43): “who have adopted a particular mode of intellectual and spiritual life”. Śrīvr̥ṣabha, commenting on the word caraṇa, first glosses it as caryā (“conduct”), then proposes two possible interpretations of caryā as ācāra (“moral conduct”) or as siddhānta (“thought conduct”, hence “view”). See Sphuṭākṣarā pp. 86.27–87.7. Needless to say, he is also perfectly aware of the other meaning of caraṇa, which he glosses with sāmādi (“The Sāma[veda], etc.”) in his commentary on VPSV 1.5 (p. 26.17).
See, for instance Yogasūtra 3.16 (atītānāgatajñāna) and 3.24 (sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakr̥ṣṭajñāna) and Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 45.5–9 (on yogipratyakṣa). Note that the perception of past and future is not included by Praśastapāda among objects of perception of yogins, but among those of a separate category he calls—in words very close indeed to Bhartr̥hari’s—“the knowledge of the Ṛṣis” (r̥ṣīṇāṃ […] jñānam) (p. 57.9–15), also qualified as prātibha (“intuitive”). In spite of this difference, the broad distinction between the knowledge of Ṛṣis, which is mainly about dharma, and the perception of yogins, less directly relevant for religious duty (if by no means less extraordinary), is similar in both sources. On pratibhā/prātibha in the Yoga and Vaiśeṣika contexts, see Kaviraj (1923/24) and Isaacson (1993); for a comparison with Bhartr̥hari, see Ferrante (2016, pp. 51–55).
See VPSV 1.36: (…) adr̥ṣṭaśaktim acintyāṃ hitvā nānyāni sādhanāny ākhyātuṃ śakyante; “(…) except for the unthinkable power of the unseen factor, one cannot state any further cause” (p. 94.3–4).
See VP 1.37cd: atītānāgatajñānaṃ pratyakṣān na viśiṣyate; “[their] cognition of the past and the future does not differ from a perception”; VPSV 1.37: (…) śiṣṭāḥ pratibimbakalpena pratyakṣam iva svāsu khyātiṣu saṃkrāntākāraparigraham avyabhicaritaṃ sarvaṃ paśyanti; “(…) the learned ones see everything (sarvaṃ paśyanti) without fail as if it were directly perceived, its shape being transferred to their cognition like a reflection [in a mirror]” (p. 95.2–3).
See VP 1.30: r̥ṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam ||; “Even the knowledge of the Ṛṣis is preceded by [scriptural] transmission.”
[VP:] pareṣām asamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate | maṇirūpyādivijñānaṃ tadvidāṃ nānumānikam || [SV:] na hi rūpatarkādayaḥ sūkṣmān aprasiddhasaṃvijñānapadān kārṣāpaṇādīnāṃ kalpayitvāpi samadhigamahetūn parebhya ākhyātuṃ śaknuvanti. ṣaḍjar̥ṣabhagāndhāradhaivatādibhedaṃ vā pratyakṣapramāṇaviṣayam apy abhyāsam antareṇābhiyuktāḥ praṇidhānavanto ’pi na pratipadyante (p. 93.1-6—reading and numeration of the verse are identical in Rau [1977]). The second example, that of musical notes, is taken up again in VP 1.111 (= Rau 1.123) and the Svavr̥tti. On these passages, see also Ogawa (2009, pp. 417–421).
See, for instance, the very “Bhartr̥harian” passage from Vācaspati’s Bhāmatī (1.1.1) quoted in David (2020, pp. 59–60), where the 10th-century Vedāntic philosopher speaks, in the case of musical expertise, of a “perfection granted by one’s training in the knowledge of the object of musical treatises” (gāndharvaśāstrārthajñānābhyāsāhitasaṃskāra).
See Sphuṭākṣarā on VPSV 1.1: abhyāsaḥ punaḥ punar utpattiḥ; “training is the repeated arising [of a cognition] (p. 5.7); on VPSV 1.14: āvr̥ttir abhyāsaḥ; “training amounts to repetition” (p. 48.19).
Svavr̥tti on VP 1.111 (= Rau 1.123): saṃvijñānapadanibandhano hi sarvo ’rthaḥ (…) vyavahāram avatarati (p. 182.3–4). On the interpretation of the compound saṃvijñānapada, see Ogawa (2009).
See Svavr̥tti on VP 1.111 (= Rau 1.123): ṣaḍjar̥ṣabhagāndhāradhaivataniṣādapañcamamadhyamānāṃ cānavasthitāprasiddhasaṃvijñānapadānāṃ viśeṣo ’vadhāraṇanibandhanapadapratyayam antareṇa nāvadhāryate; “The difference between [the seven musical notes] ṣaḍja r̥ṣabha gāndhāra dhaivata niṣāda pañcama and madhyama cannot be ascertained without a cognition of the [corresponding] words, which are the basis for that ascertainment” (p. 182.4–6—slightly modified; I do not understand Iyer’s text for the passage viśeṣo(ṣā?)’vadhāraṇā nibandhana°, and therefore prefer to keep the reading found in the Lahore edition of the first kāṇḍa; see Biardeau [1964a, p. 152]).
This definition, although itself quite general, seeks to avoid a purely negative characterisation of pratibhā as “immediate cognition produced by any other cause than the cause of perception”, which would also be perfectly adequate, though considerably less explicative.
abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ sarvaḥ śabdo ’paraiḥ smr̥taḥ | bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ ca yathārthapratipādane || 2.117 || anāgamaś ca so ’bhyāsaḥ samayaḥ kaiś cid iṣyate | anantaram idaṃ kāryam asmād ity upadarśakaḥ || 2.118 ||. It is noteworthy that the later tradition generally quotes k. 2.117 with a reading samāsataḥ instead of ’paraiḥ smr̥taḥ in pāda b. See for instance Vidhiviveka (S pp. 118–119), Tattvasaṃgraha 892 (TSK) / 891 (TSD) and Sucarita Miśra’s Kāśikā (vol. 1 p. 66.18–19), which only quotes k. 2.118ab and 2.117ab in that order. In any case, the attribution of this view to Bhartr̥hari appears to be coherent with the immediate context of these verses in the second kāṇḍa (at least, for what we can guess in the absence of the Svavr̥tti), since VP 2.116 gives a generic statement on the multiplicity of opinions regarding the object of a sentence, not a particular view which could be contrasted with the present one as belonging to “others”. Thus, unless otherwise proved, I do not consider that Bhartr̥hari is referring here to the opinion of any thinker other than himself.
On this process, see also Kamalaśīla’s explanation while commenting on VP 2.117 / Tattvasaṃgraha 892 (TSK) / 891 (TSD): yathaiva hy aṅkuśābhighātādayo hastyādīnām arthapratipattau kriyamāṇāyāṃ <kriyamāṇāyām TSPK: kriyamāṇāyā TSPD> pratibhāhetavo bhavanti, tathā sarve ’rthavatsaṃmatā vr̥kṣādayaḥ śabdā yathābhyāsaṃ pratibhāmātropasaṃhārahetavo bhavanti, na tv arthaṃ sākṣāt pratipādayanti. anyathā hi kathaṃ parasparaparāhatāḥ < parasparaparāhatāḥ TSPK: paraspasparāhatāḥ TSPD> pravacanabhedā utpādyakathāprabandhāś ca svavikalpoparacitapadārthabhedadyotakāḥ syur iti; “Just as the stroke of a hook, etc. is the cause of an insight in the elephant, etc. when we produce in it the cognition of an object, so all speech[-units] like vr̥kṣa, etc., commonly believed to have an object (arthavatsaṃmata) are the cause for bringing in (upasaṃhāra) an insight, and nothing else; they do not directly convey any object. Otherwise, how could particular utterances which are mutually contradictory take place, or fictional narrative compositions, manifesting entities that are the fruit of one’s imagination?” (Tattvasaṃgrapañjikā 892/891 [TSPK p. 286.15–19 / TSPD p. 353.13–17]).
For a good formulation of this issue, see Śrīvr̥ṣabha’s comments on VPSV 1.114: yady apīdam idaṃ ca sthānaṃ vyāpārayety upadiśyate bālānām, tathāpi pratibhodghāṭanamātram eva śabdāḥ kurvanti, yatas te ’py upadeśaśabdā bālasyāprasiddhasaṃbandhā eva. tata upadeśaḥ pūrvaśabdabhāvanābījavr̥ttilābham eva karotīti; “Even if children are taught to operate this or that place of articulation, such words [pronounced by an adult] merely trigger (°udghāṭanamātraṃ kurvanti) their insight, for a child is not yet familiar with the relation of these very words of teaching [with their object]. Therefore, teaching is responsible only for the activation of those seeds of impulses left by past verbal units” (Sphuṭākṣarā p. 188.10–13).
On the equivalence of abhyāsa and (śabda)bhāvanā, see for instance Śrīvr̥ṣabha’s Sphuṭākṣarā on VPSV 1.113: bhāvanā abhyāsaḥ; “‘Impulse’ means ‘habit’” (p. 187.8). The equation of anādi and anāgama is more difficult to establish, in the absence of an early commentary on VP 2.118. However, it is strongly suggested by Bhartr̥hari’s use of the compound anāgamāpāgama (“Without coming or going”) in VPSV 2.33 (p. 207.14–15), as an elaboration of nitya (“permanent, eternal”), qualifying the essence of speech and reality (śabdārthatattva). After Bhartr̥hari, the equivalence between anāgama and anādi is accepted, at least, by Vācaspati Miśra, commenting on VP 2.118 (as quoted by Maṇḍana) in the Nyāyakaṇikā: āgamyate prāpyate ’smād iti kāraṇam āgamaḥ, avidyamāna āgamo yasminn asāv anāgamaḥ, anādir ity arthaḥ; “āgama (‘origin’) means kāraṇa (‘cause’), for it is that from which something comes (āgamyate), i.e. by which it is produced (prāpyate); when there is no āgama in something, it is said to be anāgama (‘without an origin’), that is to say beginning-less (anādi)” (S p. 120.3–4). Puṇyarāja’s (presumably later) gloss, though less precise, goes in the same direction: sa cābhyāso ’nāgama idānīntano na bhavati. na hi bālasya tadaivopadiṣṭaṃ kena cid iti janmāntarabhāvy eva; “Such a training is anāgama, i.e. it does not take place in the present time, for the infant is not taught by anybody at the time [when he begins to act], so it must pertain to a former birth” (Ṭīkā p. 58.1–2). In view of this evidence, I do not see any good reason to understand anāgama in the exact reverse sense, i.e. as “not something inherited from previous lives”, as is done by Ogawa (2012a, p. 6).
In her translation of this passage, M. Biardeau (1964a, p. 63) interprets the compound pratibhopasaṃhāra as a locative compound (“ramassée dans une intuition”). The same option is taken by Ogawa (2012a, p. 7) (“drawn into a pratibhā”), and it is true that nothing in Bhartr̥hari’s text or Vr̥ṣabha’s commentary forbids such an interpretation. However, it seems to me that this sense of upasaṃ-√hr̥ as “drawing together into x” is not the most frequent in the VP. Consider, for instance, in the very same portion of the Svavr̥tti, Bhartr̥hari’s statement that “unless a word [denoting] an action is brought in, it is impossible to represent objects grasped by [individual] speech[-units]” (anupasaṃhr̥te […] kriyāpade śabdopagrahāṇām arthātmanāṃ nirūpaṇaṃ na vidyate—p. 66.1; Biardeau [ibid.] translates here “si l’on n’ajoute pas un verbe (…)”). In fact, it seems the idea of “bringing in (the word expressing) the action” accounts for a good proportion of usages of upasaṃ-√hr̥ in the Svavr̥tti: upasaṃhr̥takriyam atra padam… (p. 68.1), kriyāpadopasaṃhāre tu… (VPSV 2.424—p. 309.19), kriyāpadopasaṃhāreṇa tu vinā… (ibid.—p. 309.20). Although the case of pratibhā is different, I do not see any good reason to think Bhartr̥hari suddenly deviates from this well-established usage in our passage.
See Sphuṭākṣarā p. 67.25-26: pratibhopasaṃhārakāla iti. arthakriyākāle ’bhinnapratibhopasaṃhārāt.
Svavr̥tti on VP 1.24-26: sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaṃ hi vastu saṃsargiṇīnāṃ mātrāṇāṃ kalāpaṃ yaugapadyenaikasyā buddher viṣayatām āpannam uttarakālam icchan buddhyantaraiḥ pravibhajate. pravibhaktasyāpi cānusaṃdhānam antareṇārthakriyaviṣayā pratibhā notpadyata iti punaḥ saṃsargarūpam eva pratyavamr̥śati (p. 75.2-5).
On Nāgeśa’s interpretation of pratibhā, see above, Section 2.
The full list of VP-quotes in these sections is as follows: on ViV 2—VP 2.117-118ab; on ViV 29 (prose introduction)—VP 1.114 (= Rau 1.130), 2.145-147, 2.149-150. I have been unable so far to locate any indisputable allusion to the Svavr̥tti in the ViV, although such allusions might very well exist. A systematic comparison of the prose introduction to ViV 29, in particular, and selected passages from the Svavr̥tti of the first kāṇḍa shall be carried out in a further study.
On Maṇḍana’s polemics against the grammatical interpretation of injunctive suffixes, the main topic of the ViV, see David (2013). Numerous examples of anti-grammatical—and even specifically anti-Bhartr̥harian—polemics could easily be found in the ViV’s “twin”-treatise, the Bhāvanāviveka, which still awaits a proper historical and philosophical study.
I say lato sensu because the injunctive nature of a sentence is not coextensive, in Mīmāṃsā, with the utterance of explicitly injunctive morphemes, like suffixes of the imperative, etc.
See BSi p. 19.1-2: vākyārthaḥ saṃsargaḥ, na saṃsargivyatirekeṇa kaś cit; “The object of a sentence is an association, [and] it is not anything distinct from things that are related.”
As a token of this similarity, compare, for instance, Maṇḍana’s formulation śaṅkhaśabdāt pravartitavyam in the ViV with Bhartr̥hari’s anantaram idaṃ kāryam asmāt in VP 2.118cd. The parallel between this last expression and Maṇḍana’s description of pratibhā as a cognition having the form idam ittham anena kartavyam in the prose introduction to ViV 29 (translated below) has been rightly pointed out by Ogawa (2012a, p. 5).
At first sight, this objection looks logically flawed: what was said before by Maṇḍana is that all causes requiring the preliminary cognition of their (causal) power in order to produce their effect are ipso facto causes of knowledge (jñāpakahetu); but this rule clearly does not imply the reverse, namely that all causes of knowledge require such a cognition; the eye, for instance, does not, and this causes no harm to the initial claim. I think the argument starts to make better sense if we assume that the objector’s point is precisely to contest the intuitive equivalence between “cause of knowledge” (jñāpaka) and “cause for the production of knowledge” (jñānakāraka), posed by Maṇḍana in the preceding lines. What is proposed by the objector, then, is to take the problem the other way around by considering the absence of a preliminary cognition to be a universal mark for efficient causes (kāraka). The eye, which does not require such a cognition, therefore qualifies as a kāraka, but language does not, since it requires a prior cognition of language’s expressive power. Perhaps it is correct, so the argument goes, to call language a jñāpaka; but, in any case, it cannot be a kāraka.
ViV 2 (vr̥tti): yo ’py āha abhidheyavijñānaṃ prati kārakahetur api śabdo yathā śaktijñānam apekṣate, tathā pravr̥ttiśaktisaṃvidam apīti, tenāpi na jñāpakād anyatra jñānāpekṣā pradarśyate, jñānakārakasyaiva jñāpaka ity ākhyānāt. nanu jñānakārako ’pi cakṣurādir na śaktijñānam apekṣate. kim ataḥ? śabdasyākārakatvaprasaṅgaḥ. ayam aparo ’sya doṣaḥ. kutas tarhy arthāvabodhaḥ? abhyāsāt, kaśāṅkuśābhighātavat. uktaṃ ca: “abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ…” (S pp. 109.1-120.1).
For a relatively detailed analysis of the initial portion of the ViV’s siddhānta, see David (2013).
The interpretation of the word pratipatti in this definition is disputable, and constitutes a serious challenge to a proper understanding of Maṇḍana’s concept of pratibhā. In his translation of this passage of the ViV, Ogawa (2012a) interprets pratipatti in its usual sense of “understanding”, an interpretation that finds clear support in Vācaspati’s paraphrase: (…) kriyāyāḥ pratipattāv anukūlāṃ tatpratipattyā kārye ’nuṣṭhānalakṣaṇe kartavye sahakāriṇīm (…) prajñāṃ pratibhām adhyagīṣmahe (Nyāyakaṇikā G p. 176.7-9 [sahakāriṇo corrected to sahakāriṇīm following SD]). The whole definition is therefore translated as follows by Ogawa: “The pratibhā is the cognition which leads to the understanding of an action that is qualified by specific sādhanas” (p. 4). This interpretation sounds implausible to me for several reasons, the first being that it makes the definition redundant: if both prajñā and pratipatti mean something like “cognition”, how can we make sense of the idea that pratibhā is “a cognition conducive to a cognition [of the action, etc.]”? Moreover, such an interpretation appears to contradict the reformulation of the same definition by Maṇḍana himself in the BSi, where pratibhā is said to be “conducive to an activity or the cessation of it” (pravr̥ttinivr̥ttyanuguṇa – p. 18.23), anuguṇa being of course an exact synonym of anukūla. I strongly incline to take pratipatti in the ViV as a quasi-synonym of pravr̥tti, all the more since that usage of pratipatti, admittedly less common in general Sanskrit parlance, is well attested in Bhartr̥hari’s work. Consider, for instance, VP 1.114 (= Rau 1.130), where it is said that “a child undertakes activities” (bālaḥ […] pratipadyate […] itikartavyatā[m]) because of verbal impulses coming from his previous lives or, in the corresponding Svavr̥tti, the consideration of children’s “undertaking this or that activity” (tāsu tāsv arthakriyāsu […] pratipattiḥ [p. 187.1-2]). Clearly, Bhartr̥hari is not speaking here of children having the cognition of an action—a case for which, to my knowledge, he would always use the word kriyā, never the word itikartavyatā –, but of the child’s engaging in certain activities (uttering sounds, etc.) because of past traces, etc. Admitting, as I do, that this is also the sense of pratipatti for Maṇḍana in his definition of pratibhā allows us to avoid, I think, our two main difficulties, since the definition is not redundant anymore (a cognition leads to an activity, not to another cognition), and since it also becomes virtually identical to that of the BSi.
ViV 29 (prose introduction): nanu kartavyam iti pratipatteḥ pravr̥ttiḥ. kathaṃ hi tathā pratipadyamāno na pravarteta? yo hi svarṇam upalabhya mr̥ttikety āha kas tasyottaraṃ dadāti <dadāti SD: dadyāt G>? kaḥ punar ayam arthaḥ kartavyam iti?—na kaś cit. pratibhā. kā punar iyam? niyatasādhanāvacchinnakriyāpratipattyanukūlā prajñā pratibhā.a sā ca pravr̥ttihetuḥ.b na hīdam ittham anena kartavyam ity anupajātapratibhābhedaḥ pravartate pratyakṣādyavagate ’py arthe. tatra hi pramāṇakāryasamāptiḥ. pratibhānetro hi loka itikartavyatāsu samīhate (text as in SD; the text found in G [pp. 174.2-176.3] is identical except for the mentioned variant and for two sentences inserted in points a and b which, following E. Stern, I consider to belong to the Nyāyakaṇikā). Parts of the same passage are translated by Ogawa (2012a, pp. 4–5), who follows the text of G.
TSPK 892 (p. 286.12-13) / TSPD 891 (p. 353.9): niyatasādhanāvacchinnakriyāpratipattyanukūlā prajñā pratibhā.
Cf. for instance VP 2.47ab: niyataṃ sādhane sādhyaṃ kriyā niyatasādhanā |; “A process is regularly connected to factors, and factors are regularly connected to an action”. Compared to this grammatical (possibly Bhartr̥harian) description of the action, Maṇḍana’s final formula idam ittham anena kartavyam is, in turn, clearly indebted to Kumārila’s theory of “effectuation” (bhāvanā) and its three members (aṃśa): what is to be accomplished (sādhya), the instrument (karaṇa) and the procedure / auxiliary (itikartavyatā). It is indeed remarkable that Vācaspati, glossing Maṇḍana’s expression niyatasādhanāvacchinna as sādhyasādhanetikartavyatāvacchinna (“circumscribed by something to be accomplished, a means and a procedure”; Nyāyakaṇikā G p. 176.7 [text identical in SD]), resorts to exactly the same Kumārilan (rather than Bhartr̥harian) background.
Nyāyakaṇikā on ViV 29 (prose introduction): evaṃ tarhi kriyaivāsyā viṣaya iti na nirviṣayety ata āha—pratibhā. kriyāviṣayatve hi kriyāpratītiḥ <°pratītiḥ SD: °pratītiḥ syāt G>. sā ca traikālyāvacchinnakriyāgocarā, yathā pacati pakṣyati apakṣīd iti. iyaṃ punar atītānāgatavartamānānām anyatamenāpy anavacchinnam anubhūtārtham <anubhūtārtham SD: adbhutārtham G> iva pratibhāsayantī prajñā (G p. 176.9-13; text identical in SD, except for the two given variants).
ViV 29 (vr̥tti) G p. 186.1.
tatra na tāvad vidhiniṣedhau bhūte pravr̥ttinivr̥ttī, na ca vartamāne, na bhaviṣyantau, apakṣīt pacati pakṣyatīty aviśeṣaprasaṅgāt. tasmāt pravr̥ttinivr̥ttyanuguṇam avastukaṃ pratibhāmātraṃ vidhiḥ <vidhiḥ em(HD): vidhi° Ed> niṣedhaś ca syātām (BSi p. 18.20-24).
On Maṇḍana’s view of existence as presence, see David (2017b) and David (Forthcoming).
See ViV 12 (vr̥tti): yad api pramāṇāntarāṇāṃ kālaviparivr̥ttyarthaviṣayatvāt kurv iti tadaparāmarśād ananyagocaratvam, tad yadi śabdataḥ, ghaṭādāv api prasaṅgaḥ. na hi ghaṭādiśrutayo ’pi bhūtādīnām anyatamam āmr̥śanti. athārthataḥ, atyantāsattvaṃ khapuṣpādivat, tallakṣaṇatvād atyantāsattāyāḥ; “Now, as to [the view] that means of knowledge other [than Scripture] are about [entities] evolving in time, but that in kuru (‘do!’) there is no such [notion], and that therefore no other means of knowledge can be about [the commandment expressed by this verb], [we make the following distinction:] if this [absence of relation to time] is considered verbally (śabdataḥ), then even pots, etc. [would be similar to commandments], for words like ghaṭa (‘pot’) do not evoke any of [the three aspects of time], the past and the like. If it is with regards to the object (arthataḥ), then [the commandment] would essentially be non-existent (atyantāsat), like a sky-flower, for such is precisely the character of entirely non-existent things [that they do not exist in time]” (S pp. 327.1—328.3).
See ViV 29 (vr̥tti): nanu pratibhālambanasya svarūpato ’niṣpatteḥ śabdajñānākāreṇaiva nirūpaṇā; “[Objection:] but, since the external referent of insight [i.e. an action, delimited by factors] always needs to be produced (aniṣpatteḥ), that [cognition] can only take form under the aspect of verbal knowledge (śabdajñānākāreṇa)” (G p. 203.1-2—text identical in SD).
I am following here the recent critical edition of the apoha-section of the Ślokavārttika by Kataoka & Taber (2021). Earlier editions of the text read vākyārthapratibhā as a compound, sometimes interpreted by translators as a tatpuruṣa with underlying genitive relation, as in G. Jhā’s translation of this verse: “a cognition (…) of the meaning of a sentence” (Jhā [1985, p. 302]). This interpretation, however, is clearly invalidated by the occurrence of the same compound vākyārthapratibhā in Dignāga’s auto-commentary on Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.46 (Pind [20151, p. 56]), as an equivalent of the expression vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyaḥ in the corresponding verse (translated below). If one adopts the reading of earlier editions, the compound would therefore have to be read as a karmadhāraya in Kumārila’s verse as well which, as we shall see, mostly relies on Dignāga.
Slokavārttika (apoha°) k. 40: asaty api ca bāhye ’rthe vākyārthaḥ pratibhā yathā | padārtho ’pi tathaiva syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate || (Text: Taber & Kataoka [2021, p. 24]).
Kāśikā on Ślokavārttika (apoha°) k. 40: vākyārtho na kiṃ cid bahir <na kiṃ cid bahir var: na bahir Ed> astīti vākyādhikaraṇapūrvapakṣe vakṣyate. tadabhāvāc ca pratibhaiva saṃsargavicchedapratibhāsā vākyārtha ity ākṣiptam (Text: Kataoka [2015, p. 432[73]]).
Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.47: yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate | svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā || (Text: Pind [20151, p. 57]). Similar translations in Hattori (1979, p. 65) and Pind (20152, p. 172). On the interpretation of svapratyaya as “one’s cognition”, against the interpretation as “own cause” by Hattori (1979, p. 65) following Jinendrabuddhi’s Ṭīkā, see the convincing explanations by Pind (20152, pp. 172–173, n. 580 and 586), who rightly traces the background of pādas c and d to VP 2.134-135 (see following note).
As Pind (20152, p. 172, n. 580) points out, the phrase pratipattir anekadhā is literally borrowed by Dignāga from VP 2.134d, while the expression svapratyayānukāreṇa is found in the next verse of the VP (2.135c). The corresponding portion of the Svavr̥tti is not available to us (it might have been to Dignāga), and Bhartr̥hari’s statements in the kārikās are too loosely connected to be read in direct continuity with his developments on pratibhā in VP 2.143sq. Dignāga, on the other hand, establishes a clear connection between Bhartr̥hari’s relativist view of perception and language in VP 2.134-142 and the subsequent explanation of pratibhā. Whether this connection should be read back into Bhartr̥hari is an interesting question, of course, but one that lies beyond the scope of this study.
This interpretation of Dignāga’s compound arthakriyāpratipatti is, I admit, not unproblematic, and is in any case different from its interpretation by Pind (20152), who translates “a cognition about purposeful action” (p. 173). The difficulty is somewhat similar to that already encountered in the interpretation of the compound kriyāpratipattyanukūlā prajñā in Maṇḍana Miśra’s Vidhiviveka (see above, § 4.1 and n. 77), and its solution should be comparable. In the present case, additional input is given by Jinendrabuddhi’s comment in the fifth chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, on which O.H. Pind’s interpretation is based (see Pind [20152], p. 173, n. 582); it reads as follows: arthakriyāṃ pratipattā yayā pratibhayotpannayā pratipadyate, sā ‘arthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate’; “That insight by means of which, when it arises, the listener (pratipattr̥) undertakes (pratipadyate) an efficacious action, is the ‘idea [leading to] an efficacious action’ (pratipatti), [and] ‘it arises in various shapes’” (text quoted as in Pind [20151], p. 57, n. 295; I translate). Jinendra’s analysis presupposes, I think, a grammatical derivation of the word pratipatti by means of a primary suffix KtiN (A 3.3.94: striyāṃ ktin), usually found in the sense of action (A 3.3.18: bhāve) but also accepted by Sanskrit grammarians in the sense of other factors with the exception of the agent (A 3.3.19: akartari ca kārake saṃjñāyām), in the present case the instrument (yayā […] pratipadyate, sā […] pratipattiḥ). This analysis, however, gives way to two possible interpretations, depending on how one understands the verb pratipadyate in Jinendra: if one takes it to mean “cognises”, as Pind seems to do, then Dignāga’s idea would be that one cognises by means of an insight; if one understands it to mean “undertakes”, pratipatti becomes that (insight) leading one to undertake an efficacious action. This last interpretation comes indeed very close to Maṇḍana’s definition of pratibhā as “practical knowledge conducive to the undertaking of an action”, and appears preferable. I do not think that it is possible to fully reconcile Maṇḍana with Jinendra, for in the first case pratibhā is just “conducive to” (°anukūla) pratipatti, while in the second both are identified, but the main idea appears to be similar. My interpretation differs from Jinendrabuddhi’s, who has already proved inaccurate in this passage by lack of familiarity with Bhartr̥hari (see above, n. 91, the case of the compound svapratyaya in k. 5.47 of Dignāga’s work), and rather builds on the proximity of Dignāga’s terminology with Maṇḍana’s.
Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.47 (vr̥tti): asaty api bāhye ’rthe svapratyayānurūpyeṇārthābhyāsavāsanāpekṣā vākyād arthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate vikalpaś ca, vyāghrādiśrutivat. tadaviśeṣe vā śr̥ṅgārakāvyasya śravaṇād rāgiṇāṃ rāgānurūpā pratītir bhavati, vītarāgāṇāṃ tu saṃvegānurūpā (text: Pind [20151, p. 58]). My translation, though adapted to fit the conventions of this essay, heavily relies on the interpretation of this passage by Hattori (1979, p. 65) and Pind (20152, pp. 173–175).
Ślokavārttika (vākya°) 325cd. Quoted and translated below, § 4.3.
This aspect of pratibhā, particularly prominent in Dignāga’s text, is still visible in Kamalaśīla’s reformulation of Bhartr̥hari’s theory while commenting on VP 2.117 / Tattvasaṃgraha 892 (TSK) / 891 (TSD): sā prayogadarśanāvr̥ttisahitena śabdena janyate. prativākyaṃ pratipuruṣaṃ ca sā bhidyate. sa tu tasyā aparimāṇo bhedaḥ śabdavyavahārasyānantyān na śakyate vidhātum <vidhātum TSPK: vighātum TSPD>; “It [= pratibhā] is produced by a speech[-unit] accompanied by the repeated observation of its usage; it differs with every sentence and with every person, but such an unfathomable difference cannot be exposed, because linguistic communication has no limits” (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā 892/891 [TSPK p. 286.13-15 / TSPD p. 353.9-11]).
The date of the Yuktidīpikā is not entirely settled, although it is unlikely to postdate Dignāga by more than one or two centuries. Wezler & Motegi (1998, p. XXVIII) propose the dates 680-720 since the author of the Yuktidīpikā repeatedly quotes Dignāga, apparently ignores Dharmakīrti, and possibly quotes a passage of the Kāśikāvr̥tti, a grammatical work presumably composed towards the end of the 7th century. This last claim has been contested by J. Bronkhorst (2003, pp. 7-9), who appears unconvinced that the quote is indeed from the Kāśikā, and therefore leaves the possibility open of a slightly earlier date for the Yuktidīpikā. Bronkhorst’s arguments are reproduced, along with various other considerations, in the introduction to the recent edition of the Yuktidīpikā by Sharma (2018, pp. lv-lxiv).
For a preliminary inventory of these sources, see Pind (20152, pp. 173–174, n. 587).
Yuktidīpikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā 4: keyaṃ pratibhā nāma? āha—yo ’yam anādau saṃsāre devamanuṣyatiraścām abhinne ’rthe bāhye stryādau pratyaye pūrvābhyāsavāsanāpekṣaḥ kuṇapakāminībhakṣyādyākārabhedabhinnapratyaya itikartavyatāṅgam utpadyate, sā hi pratibhā. tathā coktam—yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo (…). yena hi yo ’rtho ’bhyastaḥ sukhāditvena tasya vināpi tenārthena śabdamātrāt pratipattir utpadyate. tad yathā vyāghro ’tra prativasatīty ukte vināpi bāhyenārthenābhyāsavaśād eva svedavepathuprabhr̥tayo bhavanti. tasmāt pratibhaiva devamanuṣyatiraścām itikartavyatāṅgatvāt pramāṇam iti. āha ca—pramāṇatvena tāṃ lokaḥ sarvaḥ samanugacchati | vyavahārāḥ pravartante tiraścām api tadvaśāt || (Text: Wezler & Motegi [1998, p. 75], reproduced in Sharma [2018, p. 75]).
See Pind (20152 pp. 174-175, n. 588). Interestingly, a strikingly similar idea is voiced by Bhartṛhari in the Svavṛtti on VP 2.436: ekā strī duhitābhaginībhāryāmātety apekṣāviśeṣaiḥ pravibhajyate; “The very same woman appears, depending on particular expectations, as a ‘daughter’, a ‘sister’, a ‘wife’ or a ‘mother’” (p. 313.5-6—I thank Vincenzo Vergiani for drawing my attention to that passage).
See Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā: vākyasya vāsanāprabodhanimittatāṃ darśayituṃ vākyād ity uktam (text as in Pind [20151, p. 57, n. 295]).
Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.46 has been recently edited and translated in Pind (20152, pp. 166-167, n. 557). I am referring in what follows to O.H. Pind’s version of the text.
Consider, for instance, Jinendra’s final claim that “it [= the speaker’s insight] is inferred by means of a sentence, which is an inferential sign [insofar as it is] an effect, just as we infer fire from smoke” (sā hi vākyena kāryaliṅgenānumīyate dhūmenevāgniḥ).
Ślokavārttika (vākya°) 325cd-327ab: pratibhānekadhā puṃsāṃ yady apy artheṣu jāyate || tathāpi bāhya evārthas tasya vākyasya ceṣyate | vākyaprayojanatvena janyatvenātha vā yadi || ucyate pratibhāpy artho na naḥ kiṃ cid virudhyate |
Bibliography and Abbreviations
Sanskrit Sources
A = Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, quoted following Renou (1966).
Abhinavabhāratī. See Gnoli (1968) and David (2016).
Ambākartrī (vol. 1). Vākyapadīyam (Part 1) (Brahma-Kāṇḍam). With the commentaries Svopajñavr̥tti by Harivr̥ṣabha & Ambākartrī by Pt. Raghunātha Śarmā. Benares (Varanasi): Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. 1988 (third edition).
Ambākartrī (vol. 2). See Vākyapadīya—Svavr̥tti (VPSV 2—Ed1968).
Kāvyamīmāṃsā. Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara. Ed. C.D. Dalal & R.A. Sastry. Baroda: Oriental Institute (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 1). 1934. Third edition, revised and enlarged—first published in 1916.
Kāvyādarśa. Kāvyādarśa of Mahākavi Daṇḍī. Ed. Acharya Ramchandra Mishra. Benares (Varanasi): Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan (The Vidyabhawan Sanskrit Granthamala 37). 2005 (reprint).
Kāvyālaṃkāra. Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha. Ed. Batuk Nāth Śarmā & Baldeva Upādhyāya. Benares (Varanasi): Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan (The Kashi Sanskrit Series 61). 1981.
Kāśikā (Sucarita Miśra). The Mīmāṃsāślokavārtika with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra. Ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī. Part 1. Trivandrum: Government Press (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 90 / Śrī Setu Lakṣmī Prasādamālā 2). 1926. See also Kataoka (2015).
Tattvasaṃgraha. TSK and TSD: see following entry, TSPK and TSPD.
Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā. TSPK: Tattvasaṅgraha. of Śāntarakṣita. With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. Ed. E. Krishnamacharya. 2 vols. Baroda: Central Library (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 30-31). 1926. TSPD: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita. With the Commentary Pañjikā of Śrī Kamalaśīla. Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. 2 vols. Benares (Vārāṇasī): Bauddha Bhāratī. 1981 (vol. 1) and 1982 (vol. 2).
Nyāyakaṇikā. See Vidhiviveka.
Nyāyamañjarī. Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, with Ṭippanī—Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor. Ed. K.S. Varadacharya. 2 vols. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute (Oriental Research Institute Series 116 & 139). 1969 (vol. 1) and 1983 (vol. 2).
Pramāṇasamuccaya and Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. See Pind (20151 and 20152).
Praśastapādabhāṣya (= Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda). See Bronkhorst & Ramseier (1994).
Brahmasiddhi (= BSi). Brahmasiddhi by Ācārya Maṇḍanamiśra with [the] commentary by Śaṅkhapāṇi. Ed. S. Kuppuswami Sastri. Madras: Government Press (Madras Government Oriental Series 4). 1937.
Mahābhāṣya. The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. Vol. 1. Ed. F. Kielhorn, revised by K.V. Abhyankar. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1985. Fourth edition—first, unrevised, edition published in 1880.
Yuktidīpikā. See Wezler & Motegi (1998) and Sharma (2018).
Yogasūtra. The Yogasūtra of Patañjali with the Commentary of Vyāsa. Ed. Bangali Baba. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1976.
Laghumañjuṣā. Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjuṣā by Mahā(…) Śrī Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa with two commentaries. Ed. Pandit Marvatiya Nityananda Panta & Sitarama Sastri Shende. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot (Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series 212). 1915.
Vākyapadīya (= VP, kārikās). See Rau (1977).
Vākyapadīya—Svavr̥tti (= VPSV)
VPSV 1: Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari with the commentaries Vr̥tti and Paddhati of Vr̥ṣabhadeva. Kāṇḍa 1. Ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer. Poona: Deccan College (Deccan College Monograph Series 32). 1966.
VPSV 2 (unless otherwise stated, reference is to Iyer’s 1983 edition):
M: paper transcript no. R-5543 (= S.R. 2924); Chennai, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library.
Ed1939/40: Vākyapadīyam. Bhartr̥haryupajñavr̥ttisanātham, puṇyarājaṭīkāsaṃyutaṃ. Dvitīyaṃ kāṇḍam (dvitīyavibhāge prathamakhaṇḍaḥ). Ed. Cārudeva Śāstrī (Cārudevaḥ Śāstrī Pāṇinīyaḥ). Lahore (Lāhor): Śrī Rāma Lāla Kapūr Nyāsasamiti. 1939/40 (= vi° 1996).
Ed1968: Vākyapadīyam. Part II: Vākyakāṇḍam by Bhartr̥hari, with the commentary of Puṇyarāja and Ambākartrī by Pt. Raghunātha Śarmā. Ed. Raghunātha Śarmā (?). Benares (Varanasi): Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya (Sarasvatībhavana Granthamālā 91). 1980.
Second edition—first published in 1968.
Ed1983: The Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari, Kāṇḍa II, with the commentary of Puṇyarāja and the ancient Vr̥tti. Ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer. Delhi/Varanasi/Patna, Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.
AD: electronic draft of a critical edition of the Vākyapadīya by Ashok Aklujkar (courtesy of George Cardona).
Vākyapadīya—Ṭīkā (VP-Ṭīkā). See Vākyapadīya—Svavr̥tti (VPSV 2—Ed1983).
Vidhiviveka.
G = Vidhivivekaḥ of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra, with the Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra. Ed. Mahāprabhu Lāl Goswamī. Benares: Tārā Printing Works (Prācyabhāratī Series 8). 1978.
S = Stern (1988).
SD = draft of a critical edition of the whole Vidhiviveka and Nyāyakaṇikā along with two sub-commentaries by Parameśvara I, by Elliot M. Stern; latest version dated 20th May 2019, quoted with the editor’s permission.
Ślokavārttika. The Mīmāṃsāślokavārtika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. With the Commentary called Nyāyaratnākara by Pārthasārathi Miśra. Ed. Rāmaśāstrī Tailaṅga. Benares: The Secretary, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series Office (Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series 3). 1898-1899. See also Kataoka & Taber (2021).
Sphuṭākṣarā (Śrīvr̥ṣabha) (= Paddhati of Vr̥ṣabhadeva). See Vākyapadīya—Svavr̥tti (VPSV 1).
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David, H. Pratibhā as Vākyārtha? Bhartr̥hari’s Theory of “Insight” as the Object of a Sentence and Its Early Interpretations. J Indian Philos 49, 827–869 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09482-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09482-1