Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of the Pramāṇavārttika’s tenet affiliation and the related question of its final philosophical view within the framework of Buddhist philosophical schools. There are contrasting views and positions on this issue in Tibetan interpretations of the text. Some claim that the Pramāṇavārttika is a text advocating the other-emptiness (gzhan stong) doctrine, while other scholars argue that it is a Sautrāntika–Vijñānavāda or Vijñānavāda treatise. By contrast, Padma dkar po holds view that it is a Svātantrika-Madhyamaka text, while believing that it explicates the epistemological theories of Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda. The present paper shows why Padma dkar po does not agree with other Tibetan interpretations on this issue, and why he deals with this problem by attributing a Svātantrika-Madhyamaka affiliation to the Pramāṇavārttika. This paper is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the reason why the Pramāṇavārttika is not a text written from the perspective of the doctrine of other-emptiness. The second section deals with the question of whether it is a Sautrāntika–Vijñānavāda work or a Vijñānavāda text. It will be shown that for Padma dkar po it is none of them. The third and the last section show the reasons why Padma dkar po interprets the Pramāṇavārttika as a text written from the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka perspective.
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Notes
To cite one expression of this opinion, Masaaki Hattori writes that “this work of Dharmakīrti’s is not a mere commentary on PS (V), but rather an exposition of the author’s own thoughts. The topics dealt with by Dignāga are discussed therein in full detail by the sharp intellect of Dharmakīrti, and new philosophical problems which were current at the latter's time are taken up for investigation. Thus, the Pramāṇavārttika is much richer in contents and more penetrative in arguments than PS (V)” (Hattori 1968, p. 15).
In this regard, Masaaki Hattori writes that “after this grand work of Dharmakīrti’s appeared, it came to take the place of PS in the academic world and was carefully studied by the Bauddhas as well as by the rival schools. By the post-Dharmakīrti commentators, PS was often referred to as the words of the mūlācārya, but it was no longer the basic text of Buddhist learning” (Hattori 1968, p. 15). Moreover, the PV is being studied as the main Buddhist pramāṇa text in Tibetan monastic colleges in India.
Regarding this, Dreyfus writes that Śāntarakṣita (725–783 AD) and his disciple Kamalaśīla (740–795 AD) “also strongly influenced a group of later Indian commentators who interpreted Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika” (Dreyfus 1997, p. 21). Similarly, Stcherbatsky states that “Prajñākara Gupta interpreted the Pramāṇavārttika from the stand point of extreme Relativists, of the Mādhyamika-Prāsangika school” (Stcherbatsky 1962, p. 45). However, Padma dkar po does not consider Prajñākaragupta to be a follower of the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka School.
Later reports of these two Tibetan scholars’ positions will be discussed below. van der Kuijp writes that Śākya mchog ldan points out the Madhyamaka elements of rNgog lo tsā ba’s thought rooted in Prajñākaragupta (van der Kuijip 1983, pp. 35–36, 49). With regard to Phya pa’s epistemological works, van der Kuijp says that Tshad ma bsdus pa yid kyi mun sel and its autocommentary are not extant, but they are available in Tibetan published by Bod ljongs bod yig dpe rnying dpe skrun khang in 2012 as given in the reference of this paper. Regarding Phya ps’s view on Dharmakīrti’s tenet affiliation, van der kuijp advocates Śākya mchog ldan’s reception which holds that Dharmakīrti embraces the Madhyamaka view. See (van der Kuijip 1983, pp. 62–63).
The doctrine of other-emptiness was introduced by Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292–1361) in Tibet, the founder of Jo nang sect of Tibetan Buddhism. This doctrine has been philosophically elaborated and defended by Jo nang Tāranātha (1575–1634), the most well-known scholar of the sect. He makes a clear distinction between self-emptiness (rang stong) and other-emptiness within Madhyamaka. According to him, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical treatises (rigs tshogs) and their interpretations by subsequent scholars such as Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti assert that all phenomena are empty of intrinsic nature. This is the lineage of self-emptiness doctrine. On the other hand, Nāgārjuna’s hymns (bstod tshogs) and the works by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu propound the true nature of mind which is by nature clear (gsal ba) and empty (stong ba) from the beginning less time. Moreover, the other-emptiness doctrine expounds the nature of the union of mind’s clarity and emptiness through the concept of three natures (rang bzhin gsum): imputed nature (parikalpita, kun btags), dependent nature (paratantra, gzhan dbang) and accomplished nature (pariniṣpanna, yongs grub). According to the other-emptiness view, the world is the imputed nature just an illusion, so it has no reality of its own. Consciousness is regarded as the dependent nature, which being contaminated by ignorance, it also not truly existed. But the true nature of the mind is considered to be the accomplished nature, which is empty of the other two natures. Furthermore, the wisdom of the Buddha is considered to be the ultimately existent, though it is beyond the extremes of existence (yod pa), non-existence (med pa), both the existence and non-existence (yod pa dang med pa gnyis ka), and neither existence and nor non-existence (yod pa dang med pa gnyis ka min pa). The Jo nang-pa view of other-emptiness has been controversial in Tibet, with many contending that it endorses true existence (bden grub), which is the main object of the negation by Madhyamaka philosophy. However, Tāraṇātha defends the philosophy of other-emptiness by responding that it does not advocate true existence because it negates all four types of extremes (mtha’ bzhi), and that it asserts the ultimate nature of mind affirmatively rather than negatively (Tāranātha 2010, pp. 329–343). Since the time of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan, other-emptiness has been an influential doctrine in Tibetan Buddhism influencing scholars outside the Jo nang-pa sect such as the seventh Karmapa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454–1506), Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), and Mi pham (1846–1912). A relevant question in this context raises here is whether these later scholars from other sects adopt a certain version of the other-emptiness view exactly as it is held by some Jo nang-pa scholars or a modified form. This question, however, is not addressed here because it is beyond the scope of this paper.
A brief sketch of the key distinction between Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda Schools would be helpful at this point as it relates to the question of the PV’s philosophical affiliation. The most important difference with them has to do with the status of consciousness’ mental content, or ākāra. Both traditions maintain that this ākāra is mental rather than material, but proponents of Sautrāntika consider it to be grounded in a mind-independent reality, whereas Vijñānavādins accept that it is grounded in the consciousness. As Richard P. Hayes states, “the key philosophical issue that is supposed to separate the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra perspectives is that of whether or not the objects of experience actually exist independently of our awareness of them” (Hayes 1988, pp. 97–98). Similarly, quoting from Ślokavārttikavyākhyā (Tādparyaṭīkā) of Bhaṭṭombeka, Masaaki Hattori says that the “difference between the views of the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras is described in ŚVV as follows: ye ’pi Sautrāntika-pakṣam evaṁ vyācakṣate—bāhyo ’rthaḥ prameyam, vijñānasya viṣayākāratā pramāṇaṁ sva-saṁvittiḥ phalam iti.... idāniṃ Yogācāra-pakṣe ’ - pi. . . teṣāṁ caitad darśanam—bāhyārtho nāsti, vijñānasya viṣayākāratā prameyā, svākāratā pramāṇam, sva-saṁvittiḥ phalam iti” (Hattori 1968, p. 102).
“Pramāṇaphala” or “the result of valid cognition,” is a topic that addresses such questions as how a valid cognition cognizes its object and whether a valid cognition and its resulting cognition are identical. Two different views exist in the Buddhist pramāṇa or epistemological theory concerning the issue of pramāṇaphala. According to the Vaibhāṣika and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka traditions, pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are separate cognitions. Sautrāntika, Vijñānavāda, and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka traditions, on the other hand, believe them to be two aspects of the same pramāṇa. In this regard, Chos grags rgya mtsho discusses Dharmakīrti’s notion of pramāṇaphala by interpreting three kinds of pramāṇaphala or the concept in three levels. The first and second levels show pramāṇaphala from the perspectives of Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda respectively, the third level reveals the other-emptiness doctrine. From the point of view of the third level, the cognition which is free from subject-object duality is the object of the valid cognition (prameya). The subjective aspect of valid cognition is the valid cognition (pramāṇa), and the self-cognition is the resultant aspect of the valid cognition (pramāṇaphala). Chos grags rgya mtsho states that according to the other-emptiness view, the third level of pramāṇaphala is confined to the conventional level because ultimately, only the primordial wisdom of the Buddha is considered to be real, which is stainless and has the nature of clarity and emptiness (Chos grags rgya mtsho 2006, pp. 347–349). Chos grags rgya mtsho says that these ideas are conveyed not only in the PV but also in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (Dharmakīrti 2015, pp. 220). Further, he maintains that these assertions are grounded in the PS 1.10 (Dignāga 2016, p. 103): gang tshe snang ba de gzhal bya // tshad ma dang de’i ’bras bu ni// ’dzin rnam rig pa’o de’i phyir// de gsum tha dad du ma byas. For an English translation of this verse see Hattori (1968, p. 29).
The Tibetan version of this verse reads: gang gis dngos po rnam dpyad na// de nyid du na de dngos med// gang gi phyir na de dag la// gcig dang du ma’i rang bzhin med. Regarding the order of chapters of the PV, there are two different views. According to Chos grags rgya mtsho and Padma dkar po, the four chapters of the PV are pramāṇasiddhi, pratyakṣa, svārthānumāna, and parārthānumāna. Other Tibetan commentators like Dar ma rin chen and Mi pham adopt the following order of the chapters: svārthānumāna, pramāṇasiddhi, pratyakṣa, and parārthānumāna. Throughout this paper, Dar ma rin chen’s order of chapters is adopted. Here, in an effort to demonstrate the prevalence of the other-emptiness thought in Buddhist literature, Chos grags rgya mtsho shows that Nāgārjuna emphasizes the emptiness of the true nature of mind and phenomena, while Maitreya explicitly shows the true nature of the mind’s clarity in the Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra. These two lineages are thus shown to be compatible because in both traditions the clarity and emptiness of the mind are unified (gsal stong zung ’jug). For his discussion of such Buddhist classical sources in light of the other-emptiness doctrine see Chos grags rgya mtsho (2006, pp. 348–349).
Within Vijñānavāda, there are two sub schools—Sākāravāda (rnam bden pa), or True Aspectarianism, and Nirākāravāda (rnam rdzun pa), or False Aspectarianism. Both of them reject external reality completely and hold that consciousness is truly existent. The world is understood as a projection or manifestation of the mind due to the ripening of karmic imprints stored in the consciousness. Although subject-object duality is only a form or aspect (ākāra, rnam pa) of consciousness, Sākāravāda subschool holds this ākāra to be real, whereas Nirākāravāda considers it to be an illusion caused by ignorance as delineated by Dorje (2010, p. 443). The Sākāravāda/Nirākāravāda distinction is relevant to the interpretation of the PV because some Tibetan writers such as Dar ma rin chen argue that the PV presents its epistemological theory from the point of view of both of these Vijñānavāda subschools (Dar ma rin chen 2001, p. 159). Padma dkar po, on the other hand, holds that the PV expounds Vijñānavāda theory of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala is shown from the point of view of Sākāravāda alone, because Nirākāravāda does not accept the subjective and objective aspects of the cognition, which are mentioned in the PV (Padma dkar po 2005, p. 49).
Vijñānavāda and the other-emptiness doctrine agree with each other to the extent that both accept the consciousness that is devoid of subject-object duality and primordial wisdom. However, in Vijñānavāda philosophy, such consciousness and primordial wisdom are ultimately or truly existent (don dam par ram bden par grub pa). According to the later doctrine, the consciousness and primordial wisdom have the nature of clarity and emptiness (gsal stong gi rang bzhin can), exist ultimately, while they are beyond the four extremes (mtha’ bzhi).
Padma dkar po argues that Nirākāravāda view of accomplished nature propounded in the PV is wrongly held as other-emptiness doctrine by some Tibetan writers such as Chos grags rgya mtsho: rnam rdzun pa ni….shul na ngo bo lus pa ni chos nyid yin pas yongs grub bo/ des na gzhan kun btags kyis stong la/ yongs su grub pa rang gi ngo bos mi stong pas ’di kha gzhan stong dbu ma’o/ zhes mgrin pa bstod te sgrog go (Padma dkar po 2005, p. 33).
According to van der Kuijp, Śākya mchog ldan was influenced by Chos grags rgya mtsho whose commentary on the PV is considered to be visionary due to its interpretation from the other-emptiness perspective (van der Kuijip 1983, pp. 20–21).
Śākya mchog ldan recognizes the fact that Maitreya and Asaṅga are the pioneers of Yogācāra School and that they have propounded its philosophy systematically. However, according to this Tibetan scholar, Maitreya and Asaṅga explicated Madhyamaka philosophy in the Mahāyānottratantaśāstra and Mahāyānottratantaśāstravyākhyā as well. Maitreya writes that the nature of mind is like the space-element (dhātu), being devoid of cause, condition, aggregation, production, extinction, and existing (Maitreya 2005, p. 62): sems kyi rang bzhin nam mkha’ yi// khams ltar rgyu med rkyen med de// tshogs pa med cing skye ba dang// ’jig dang gnas pa’ang yod ma yin. Similarly, Asaṅga states that the non-composite tathāgatagarbha is like the space and that is beyond production and destruction and has the nature of changelessness (Asaṅga 2005, p. 63): ’dus ma byas pa de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po ni nam mkha’ bzhin du skye ba med cing ’gag pa med pa shin tu mi ’gyur ba’i chos nyid du bstan pa yin no.
Nirākāravāda-Madhyamaka is nothing other than Nirākāravāda sub school of Vijñānavāda. In other words, Nirākāravāda School is sometimes called Nirākāravāda-Madhyamaka. See Dar ma rin chen (2001, p. 159).
Like Chos grags rgya mtsho, Śākya mchog ldan also holds that other-emptiness does not contradict Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka philosophy. He shows how the teachings of the tradition of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva and those of the tradition of Maitreya and Asaṅga are not mutually contradictory, though their emphases are different. According to him both of these traditions are called Madhayamaka. Of the three wheels of dharma (dharmacakra) spoken about in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, the tradition of Nāgārjuna takes the second wheel of dharma to be teachings that can be accepted literally (sgra ji bzhin pa nyid du bzhag pa). The tradition of Maitreya, on the other hand, takes the third wheel of dharma to be teachings that can be accepted literally. Moreover, the Madhyamaka philosophy is also explicated by Dharmakīrti in the PV. Śākya mchog ldan (2006, p. 271): lugs ’di yi mthar thug gi grub mtha’ ni dbu mar gnas pa nyid do zhes mdor stan nas/ de yang bstan pa ’di la grub mtha’ bzhi yi rtse mor gyur pa’i dbu ma pa gnyis ’byung ste/ mdo sde dgongs ’gel las bka’ ’khor lo rim pa gsum gyi rnam gzhag ’byung ba de’i nang nas bar pa sgra ji bzhin pa nyid du bzhag pa’i dbu ma dang/ ’khor lo gsum pa sgra ji bzhin pa nyid du bzhag pa’i dbu ma’o/ dang po ni/ mgon po klu sgrub zhabs kyis rigs tshogs su bkral ba de yin la gnyis pa de ni byams pa’i chos kyi rjes su ’brangs nas thogs med zhabs nas ’chad. See also Dreyfus (1997, p. 29).
Sautrāntika accepts both self-cognition and external reality, whereas Vijñānavāda refutes external reality while endorsing self-cognition. By contrast, Madhyamaka rejects substantiality altogether. Śākya mchog ldan (2006, p. 270): lugs ’dir thog mar phyi rol don grub dang/ don ’gog gi skabs gnyis las dang po’i tshe na/ mdo sde pa’i gzhung ji lta ba khas len te/ phyi rol gyi don khas blangs nas rnam med rjen char ’gog pa’i phyir dang/ phyi rol gyi don yot par yang rtags las bsgrub dgos kyi mngon sum gyis mthong bar mi ’chad pa’i phyir….. gnyis pa don ’gog gi skabs su ni/ grub pa’i mtha’ sems tsam pa dang/ ’bras bu rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa ste/ chos kyi bdag med la ’jug tshul phyogs gcig mdo sde pa dang mthun la/ phyi yi don bkag pas/ gzung ba chos kyi bdag med la ’jug cing/ ’dzin pa chos kyi bdag med la ’jug tshul ni sems tsam pa la med do.
Śākya mchog ldan (2006, p. 293): des rnam ’grel mdzad pa’i dgongs pa ji ltar bkral ba ni/ mthar thug gi dgongs pa ngo bo nyid med pa’i tshul du gnas par bshad nas nges don stong pa nyid kyi ngos ’dzin med par dgag pa nyid du ’chad pa dang/ de gtan la ’bebs byed gcig dang du bral la ’chad. See also Dreyfus (1997, p. 115).
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge writes that his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel provides the essence of the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge 2012, p. 915).
Sa skya Paṇḍita (2004, pp. 275, 277): rnam rig pa’i lugs ltar na rang rig pa dang/ rnal ’byor gyi mngon sum gnyis las/ gzhan mi srid pa dpal ldan grags pa’i dgongs pa yin no.
Sa skya Paṇḍita (2004, p. 314): de ltar grub mtha’ bzhi las slob dpon ni phyi rol don khas len pa na mdo sde pa ltar mdzad la/ shes bya nang la ’jug pa na rnam med zhal gyis bzhes so. Sa skya Paṇḍita indicates more specifically that what Dharmakīrti adopts is the Nirākāravāda variety of Vijñānavāda.
Go rams pa (2006, p. 166): slob dpon gyis don rig gi tshad ’bras kyi skabs su/ bye brag smra ba bkag nas/ mdo sde pa’i lugs bsgrub pa na/ rang rig gi tshad ’bras la/ thog mar rnam bden brdzun gnyis char gyis khas len pa’i tshad ’bras kyi skya ris ni/ mdo sde pa’i lugs bkag nas rnam rig pa’i lugs bsgrub pa ste.
Dar ma rin chen (2001, p. 159): slob dpon rgyan mkhan pos dngos rnams tha dad ces pa’i gzhung dbu ma par stong nyid ston par bshad pa ni/ sems tsam rnam rdzun pa la dbu ma par byas pa de nyid yin gyi/ gnyis stong gi shes pa ngo bo nyid med par smra ba’i phyogs ma yin te/ shes pa de don dam par yod par lan du mar bsgrubs pa’i phyir ro.
Dar ma rin chen (2001).
PV III 331–332 are cited in Dar ma rin chen (2001, pp. 224–25) as follows: rig bya rig byed rnam pa med// skra sogs shes pa’i tha dad bzhin// gang tshe gzung ’dzin rnam phye ba’i// mtshan nyid rnam par bslad pa can// ji ltar ’khrul pas mthong gyur pa// de ltar ’di rnam bzhag byas pa// de tshe gzung dang ’dzin pa yi// mtshan nyid la ni brtsad bya min.
dGe ’dun grub pa (2010, pp. 44–45):’dir mngon sum rtog bral du sgrub pa’i skabs su don gyi mthu yis ni/ yang dag pa’i skye ba yin phyir ro/ zhes gsungs la/ sems tsam pas dbang mngon rnams gzung don las skye bar mi ’dod pa’i phyir/ des na mdo sde pa’i thun mong min pa’i lugs yin no/ ’o na sde bdun gyi gzhung gang du yang/ sems tsam pa’i lugs kyi mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid ston pa’i gzhung med par ’gyur ro zhe na/ skyon med de sems tsam pa’i lugs la rtog pa dang bral zhing bag chags brtan ba las byung ba’i shes pa de/ mngon sum yin pa rnam nges la gsungs pa’i phyir.
mKhas grub rje (2006, p. 103): mtshan nyid ’di mdo sems gnyis ka’i lugs la khyab pa yin.
dGe ’dun grub pa (2010, p. 11): mngon sum le’u phyi rol gyi don bkag nas rnam pa rig pa tsam du bstan.
On the Sākāravāda connection, see the footnote 9.
Dar ma rin chen (2001, pp. 247–261): don rig gang yin so sor rig……don rig par ni ’gyur ba yin.
Ibid 152: yongs gcod nang yin phyi rol ltar// gnas pa ’di ni cha gzhan yin// tha dad med can shes pa yi// tha dad snang ba slad pa nyid.
Dar ma rin chen (2001, pp. 152–153): de la gcig ni med pas kyang// gnyis ka’ang nyams par ’gyur ba yin// de phyir gnyis stong gang yin pa// de ni de yi’ang de nyid yin.
These verses (ji lta ji ltar don bsams pa……phyi rol spyod la ’jug par mdzad) are interpreted from the perspective of Vijñānavāda in Dar ma rin chen (2001, pp. 149–162).
These ideas are discussed in Dreyfus (1997, pp. 103–105).
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 162): ’dis ni rnam rdzun pa’i stong pa nyid bstan par sems so.
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 1): bshad bya tshad ma’i mdo kun las btus pa/ ’chad byed sde bdun gyis bshad pas theg pa chen po’i chos mngon pa dbu ma rang rgyud kyi sgo nas gtan la ’bebs pa zhig ston.
Training in wisdom is one of three trainings, the other two being training in ethical conduct (tshul khrims kyi bslab pa), and training in meditative concentration (ting nge ’dzin gyi bslab pa).
Yogācārins interpret Prajñāpāramitāsūtras in favor of establishing the mind-only view, whereas Mādhyamikas interpret it in order to prove that all phenomena are devoid of true existence.
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 2): slob dpon chen po ’di tshad ma’i mdo ma mdzad phan sems tsam pa yin du chug kyang rab tu byed pa ’di brtsams pa nas dbu ma pa yin te.
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 3): gang la ’phags pa nyid byon rjes gzung de ni dpal ldan dri med blo mnga’ ba.
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 1): phyogs kyi glang po sems tsam rnam rdzun pa yin zhing mdo yang grub pa’i mtha’ der bstan zhing/ chos kyi grags pas de dang mthun par bkral lo zhes sgrog mod.
Padma dkar po (2005, pp. 2–3): ’di brtsams pa nas dbu ma pa yin te/ de yang ’di’i tshigs su bcad pa dang po brtsams pa na/ sa gyo ba dang sgra dang ’od chen po byung zhing mu stegs kyi ston pa dag rengs pa sogs ltas ngo mtshar bas mu stegs thub rgyal nag po zhes pas mngon shes kyis bltas pas/ tshigs su bcad pa de’i mthur rig. Similarly, Padma dkar po writes: ’phags pa ’jam pa’i dbyangs dngos su byon nas rjes su gzung bas theg pa chen po’i ’phags pa’i sa brnyes pas so/ de ltar yang rnam nges las/ gang la ’phags pa nyid byon rjes gzung de ni dpal ldan dri med blo mnga’ ste/ zhes ’byung bas so.
Candrakīrti (2011, p. 163): slob dpong klu sgrub zhabs kyi lam las ni// phyi rol gyur la zhi ba’i thabs med do.
Padma dkar po says that PV III 359cd–360ab refutes Sākāravāda and establishes Nirākāravāda position: gang gis dngos po rnam dpyad na// de nyid du na de ngos med// gang gi phyir na de dag la// gcig dang du ma’i rang bzhin med (Padma dkar po 2005, p. 186). By contrast, PV 217–219 delineate Madhyamaka philosophy as Padma dkar po writes: ’di ni dbu ma pa’i ste/ de ni chos thams cad rten cing ’brel bar ’byung bar gzhan la go bar byed pas so/ phyi don ’dod pas phyi ma ni gzugs la sogs pa dpyad na gzugs rung du byed pa la sogs pa de ni de nyid ma yin te/ dbu ba rdos pa lta bu la sogs pa yin pa’i phyir stong pa’o zhes ’dod pa’o (Padma dkar po 2005, pp. 163–165). In this regard, Steinkellner writes that “the last five quotations (PV III 4, 208, 209, 210, 359) and one earlier (PV III 219) are characterized as ‘Mādhyamika doctrine’” (Steinkellner 1990, p. 74).
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 161): de’i phyir rnam par shes pa ni rnam par shes pas stong ngo/ zhes gsungs na chos thams cad ni stong pa nyid do zhes bya bar rigs so.
CŚ VIII 15: Zhi ba ’tsho, Zla bag rags pa, and ’Phags pa lha, p. 53: bsod nams min pa dang po bzlog// bar du bdag ni bzlog pa dang// phyi nas lta ba kun bzlog pa// gang gis shes de mkhas pa yin.
Cited in Dar ma rin chen (2001, pp. 149–150) and Padma dkar po (2005, pp. 160–161) as follows: ji lta ji ltar don bsam pa// de lta de ltar rnam bral zhes// mkhas pa rnams kyis gang gsungs pa// de ni ngos stobs ’ongs pa yin.
Unlike Padma dkar po, Dar ma rin chen interprets this verse as a refutation of the external reality. See Dar ma rin chen (2001, pp. 149–150).
Vigrahavyāvartanī 29. Nāgārjuna writes, “If I had any thesis, that fault would apply to me. But I do not have any thesis, so there is indeed no fault for me” (Nāgārjuna 2010, p. 29).
Toh no. 543, Sde dge bka’ ’gyur, rGyud ’bum, vol. na, 105–351.
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 3): smra ba thams cad kyi gtsug gi nor bu/ phas kyi rgrol ba thams cad tshar gcod par lung bstan pa/ dpal ’khor lo sdom pa rdo rje mkha’ ’gro’i sgo nas sa bcu gsum gyi dbang phyug chen po brnyes pa’o. Although Buddhist tantras and Vajrayāna are considered to have emerged later by modern scholars, they are regarded as the words of the Buddha in Tibetan Buddhism. The Tibetan scholar Taranātha says that Dharmakīrti practiced Vajrayāna (Taranātha 2010, pp. 182–183). However, the historical question of whether Dharmakīrti was a Vajrayāna practitioner is beyond the scope of this paper.
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 14): ’dir ni re zhig don dam pa btang snyoms su bzhag nas/ ’jig rten la thugs brtse bas phyi rol gyi don yod par zhal gyis bzhes te mu stegs byed la sogs pa’i log par rtog pa chen po bzlog par mdzad do/ ’dul bar bya de khong du chud pa na/ yang sems tsam bstan te/ phyi rol gyi don med/ de ltar snang ba thams cad sems tsam yin par bstan cing/ de rtogs pa dang/ yang snang ba med pa dbu ma’i lam bzang po la khrid nas de yang bzlog par mdzad pa yin no. In support of his view, Padma dkar po cites PV III 219: de de nyid don btang snyoms can// glang chen gzigs stangs nyid mdzad nas// ’jig rten thugs ni ’ba’ zhig gis// phyi rol spyod la ’jug par mdzad (Padma dkar po 2005, p. 164).
Padma dkar po (2005, p. 1): chos rnams thams cad stong ba’i tshul la ’jug pa’i sgo// yang dag rigs tshogs klu sgrub zhal nas gsungs pa de// rigs pa’i mthar thug rnam ’grel mdzad pa’i gzhung mdzes las// gsal bar rtogs nas lugs ngan gzhan kun rtsa bzhin dor.
The statement in question in the colophon is found in Dharmakīrti (2015, p. 180): lta ngan kun sel gnyis su med pa yi// don dam rnam dpyod lhur len bstan bcos ’di.
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Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the unknown reviewers for their comments. One of the reviewers gave insightful comments and suggestions during the revisions of the manuscript of the article. However, reviewers are blameless for any fault in the article. I would also like to thank Prof. C.D. Sebastian and Prof. Pravesh Jung Golay for their guidance.
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Nurboo, T. Is the Pramāṇavārttika a Madhyamaka Treatise?. J Indian Philos 48, 827–844 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09443-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09443-0