Introduction

There is rising skepticism about how the Internet will affect democracy, even though it was formerly seen as a vehicle for democratization or at the very least, “expansion of deliberative public sphere” in authoritarian settings (Abbott, 2013, 580). To track, evaluate, and eventually suppress online and offline opposition, authoritarian regimes around the world have been acquiring increasingly sophisticated equipment and expertise from the global information security market (Feldstein, 2021). In addition to stifling free speech and action online, governments also want to sway the opinions of their people by saturating the Internet with propaganda stories (Chang & Lin, 2020; Tan, 2020) as part of their "Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs) (Yilmaz et al., 2023). There is a growing trend of digital authoritarianism, which Polyakova and Meserole have defined as “the use of information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations” (2019, 1). Digital authoritarianism can include a range of measures, such as Internet censorship, online harassment, cyber-attacks and hacking, Internet shutdowns, persecution of some online users/activists, and digital surveillance of emails and other online communications (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015; Wagner, 2018, Yilmaz, 2023; Yilmaz & Saleem 2022; Yilmaz et al., 2022). In recent years, the dynamics of digital authoritarianism has attracted some critical attention (Howells & Henry, 2021; Jamil, 2021; Polyakova & Meserole, 2019). Strategies for managing the digital sphere are inherent components of the digital authoritarian toolkit. Increasingly, states across the developing world are designing such governance strategies in ways that would help them sustain their authoritarian political structures (Howells & Henry, 2021). The research on Internet governance has generally focused on China, Russia, and Western countries, but there is limited literature on the developing world. Hence, this research focuses on Pakistan to understand what kind of Internet governance model is being adopted in developing countries.

Existing studies on Internet governance in developing countries (Holden & Van Klyton, 2016; Bhuiyan, 2014; Opperman 2018) have made significant contributions to understanding the oppositional politics pursued by developing countries towards the US-led global Internet order. For example, the volume edited by Abu Byuihan (2014) examines the role of various stakeholders (i.e., governments, media players, and international institutions) in Internet policymaking and how they are trying to challenge the US unilateral control of the Internet root. The volume edited by Opperman (2018) discusses the historical development of Internet governance practices in the Global South along with contemporary debates in countries in Latin America and Africa. While the case studies show the ongoing struggles against what is considered to be the US dominance in global Internet governance, they fall short of examining political implications of Internet governance frameworks emerging in developing countries.

Munoriyarwa and Chiumbu (2022) examined the dynamics of growing Chinese influence in digital surveillance practices in Zimbabwe and Zambia. In this study, there is some acknowledgement of the influence of transfer of technology from China. Compared with economically advance countries, for instance, China, most developing countries lack the required human and financial resources to be able to extensively design and implement effective Internet governance models (Tan & Taeihagh, 2020). Moreover, there can be challenges linked to different governance models, for instance, democratic checks and balances, while limited, still exist to prevent the state’s total control of the information space. We, therefore, believe that a case study of Pakistan would be idea because it is a democratic country with a long history of the military influence in governance. This study aims to answer the following questions: How is the Internet governance is emerging in Pakistan? How is the authoritarian Internet governance being contested by civil society and judiciary in Pakistan?

To examine these questions, this study focuses on four key features of Internet governance (Internet infrastructure; Internet service providers; online platforms and websites; and Internet users) and related control mechanisms (firewalls, surveillance, license restrictions, content filtration, license restrictions and persecution), to shed light on the relationship between Internet governance and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan. We analyze the role of technology transfer in increasing Pakistani state’s capacity of mass surveillance and Pakistan’s transformation of its Internet governance in a more authoritarian direction in recent years. In addition, we contribute to the literature by discussing ongoing contestations over the establishment of the authoritarian governance and shortcomings of the Pakistani state.

Our findings show that while successive regimes in Pakistan have sought to take advantage of advances in cyber technology to undermine political dissent, discredit their opponents, and limit the capacity of protest movements, they have faced challenges and push back. Gaining up-to-date technological expertise and system coherence remains elusive given Pakistan’s limited resources and civil society resistance to intrusive surveillance and censorship.

In what follows, we begin with an examination of the context that maps out authoritarianism in Pakistan with a particular emphasis on digital authoritarianism. This follows a discussion on the conceptual framework and methodology, followed by an examination of Internet governance, focusing on legal frameworks and their effectiveness. Finally, the analysis focuses on contestations over Internet governance in Pakistan.

Digital Authoritarianism and Internet Governance

Internet governance can be defined as “governance that shapes the use and evolution of the internet” (van Eeten and Mueller 2012, 731). Specifically, it refers to the management and regulation of the Internet, including policies, legal frameworks, and practices that determine how the Internet operates, how it is used, and how it is governed at various levels. Internet governance offers authoritarian regimes new strategies to “manage” their societies, facilitating the rise of digital authoritarianism. Governing the Internet is a crucial part of governing a society. The fundamental premise here is that authoritarian stability and information controls are inherently connected. Authoritarian regimes take measures to eradicate threats to their stability, criticisms of the leadership, and government performance. They seek to prevent protest mobilization and collective action outside their control (King et al., 2017). Effective Internet governance can serve authoritarian goals. Research on China has documented how the state’s Internet governance efforts focus on centralizing political control and utilizing the Internet for surveillance and censorship (Zeng et al., 2017). This approach is reflected in the institutional changes adopted by Xi Jinping’s administration in 2014 creating a centralized and integrated institutional framework for propaganda and political censorship on China’s cyberspace (Creemers, 2017).

Digital authoritarianism involves the utilization of digital technology to extend authoritarian practices to cyberspace and to expand authoritarian control over society. As such, digital authoritarianism is also a reaction by non-democratic state actors against the growing use of digital technologies by non-state actors such as opposition politicians, independent media, and civil society. Digital authoritarian practices involve practices such as online censorship and restrictions, online and urban surveillance, suppression of online dissent, and digital deception and manipulation. As argued by Feldstein (2021), the level of digital authoritarianism depends on regime types, and regimes that are more authoritarian are more likely to practice digital repression through a variety of measures: digital surveillance, biometrics, censorship, and Internet shutdowns.

Pakistan presents a good case study for exploring Internet governance in developing countries. Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic, with a President as the head of state and a Prime Minister as the head of government. The country has experienced periods of military rule and democratic transitions, which have influenced its approach to Internet governance.

The military rule of General Pervez Musharraf from 1999 to 2008 is particularly relevant to our study because of its relevance to our data period. The national press and state-run Pakistan Television (PTV) and PBC largely continued to work under self-censorship and curbs in the initial years of Musharraf’s era. After the Kargil War against India, the Pakistani military leadership was convinced that the role of the media is crucial in shaping narrative in times of crisis. While the new government is credited for a widespread network of private TV channels, it also established the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) in 2002 for controlling the electronic media. Like PEMRA, the state established the Press and Publication Regulatory Authority in 2006 to control the print media. The Musharraf regime also introduced new legislations, such as the Freedom of Information Ordinance (2002), the Defaming Ordinance 2002, the Contempt of Court Ordinance 2003, the Access to Information Ordinance 2006, and the Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Ordinance 2007. The purpose of these ordinances prohibited any negative reporting against the head of state, armed forces, executive legislation, and judiciary.

While the military regimes used multiple strategies to control the media, there are other factors that also contribute to press censorship in Pakistan (Ahmed et al., 2023). A study focusing on the print media in Pakistan identified “self-censorship such as unofficial state controls, the oligopolistic newspaper structure, the legal system and the lack of security journalists” as key external factors shaping reporting (Nadadur, 2007, 45). After living through repressive regimes, the media has adopted a self-censorship survival strategy to avoid any reprisal. A Pakistani journalist, Ghazi Salauddin, said, self-censorship “is the worst kind of censorship because it is done out of fear” (Gannon, 2018). In recent years, there are noticeable changes in Pakistan as state and non-state actors increasingly use digital mediums to promote certain narratives (Yilmaz, 2023). A study found that “social media is one of the important elements of military’s media strategy to manipulate public opinion in Pakistan” (Rahman et al., 2023, 716). While the military is promoting its own narratives through its social media pages/accounts, it also has a wider network of social media influencers who are actively promoting the military’s agenda and goodwill in digital spaces (Rahman et al, 2023). While all civilian administrations have enjoyed some level of military support, the government of Imran Khan was labeled as the “most military-dominant” one (Rahman & Shurong, 2021, 943). We have to keep in mind this contextual understanding to comprehend digital authoritarianism in Pakistan.

Pakistan shares a close relationship with China, its neighbor, often referred to as the ‘all-weather friendship’ by Pakistani officials (Ahmed et al., 2021). This partnership extends to various areas, including technology and infrastructure development (Safdar, 2022). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project has facilitated Chinese investments in Pakistan’s telecommunications infrastructure and digital sector (Siddiqui, 2019). There is an ongoing collaboration between Huawei and the Pakistani Telecommunication Authority (PTA). Pakistan has a significant youth population, with a majority (64%) under the age of 30 (Ahmad, 2018). This demographic factor plays a crucial role in shaping Internet usage patterns, digital inclusion efforts, and demands for freedom of expression online. Over the past decade, Pakistan has witnessed a substantial increase in Internet penetration and digital connectivity. This growth has been fueled by the availability of affordable smartphones, expanding 3G/4G networks, and the rise of digital platforms and services.

Scholars have previously noted how the growing Internet connectivity has been utilized by Pakistani protesters to mobilize in a highly restricted political environment. Moreover, the Pakistani state uses restrictive measures such as Internet shutdowns as “a strategic measure to prevent mobilization and prop up the state, as well as a disciplinary measure to prevent marginalized ‘others’ from taking part in the national political debate and documenting their grievances” (Wagner, 2018, 3932). Focusing on journalists and Internet freedom in Pakistan, Jamil has found the state to be using a variety of old and new tactics to counter dissent. While among old tactics, the state continues to rely on violence, laws, physical surveillance, and arbitrary detentions, there is increasing use of digital surveillance, online bullying and cyberattacks (Jamil, 2021). A study focusing on religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Muslim countries found increased Internet restrictions, for example, through Internet outages and content removals, during 2018–2022 (Yilmaz, 2023; Yilmaz et al., 2022). Nonetheless, research on any correlations between Pakistan’s evolving Internet governance and digital authoritarianism is woefully absent.

Methodology

This paper draws on primary and secondary data. The primary data includes official reports and policy documents from Pakistan on institutional reforms, policy proposals, and state-market relations. The research team carried out 10 in-depth interviews via Zoom with relevant participants, including former public officials, tech experts, digital and human rights activists, researchers, journalists, and academics. These were largely expert interviews with carefully selected participants. The approach of expert interviews—widely applied qualitative methodology—is used to explore “a special field of action” and hence does not demand a large sample size (Döringer, 2021, 265). While our original aim was to interview at least 20 participants, it was not possible because of ongoing developments (e.g., increased digital surveillance) due to which many potential participants were hesitant to participate in this research. Separate questionnaires were designed for participants in different categories to solicit the most relevant data in those interactions. Interviews took place during September–October 2022 over Zoom. During September and October 2022, Pakistan was experiencing significant political instability and polarization, largely stemming from the ousting of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in April 2022 and the subsequent political maneuvering. The period was marked by political tensions, street protests, economic challenges and growing divisions between Imran Khan’s PTI and the coalition government led by Shahbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). This period, as we will examine below, witnessed a significant crackdown on PTI workers and supporters and voices of dissent from the journalist community. Hence, many of our potential interviewees were reluctant to be interviewed online.

This research complies with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research by providing a plain language statement, consent, and withdrawal forms to all participants. Only those who have offered consent are attributed in this paper. The secondary data is drawn from Western and Pakistani media reports and existing literature.

Internet Governance in Pakistan

As authoritarian regimes gain more control of the mainstream media, activism using digital technologies has grown. Improvements in Internet penetration have made digital activism a growing experience in developing countries. Internet penetration rate in Pakistan was 6.3 percent 2005, nearly tripling to 15.51% in 2017 (Statista, 2017). By January 2022, the Internet penetration rate stood at 36.5% (Kemp, 2022)—nearly two-thirds of the population still does not have access to the Internet (see Fig. 1 for data on the Internet usage in Pakistan). According to the data provided by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), the broadband penetration in Pakistan was 50.96% during 2021–2022 (PTA, 2022). As of May 2023, the Internet penetration (broadband) stood at 53.65% (PTA, 2023), which is comparable to many other developing countries. For instance, the Internet penetration rate of India was 59.5%, Laos 57.5%, Myanmar 51.9%, and Sri Lanka 41.2% in July 2022 (Statista, 2022). As of December 2020, there are 43.31 million Facebook, 20 million Twitter, 10.1 million Instagram, and 2 million Twitter users in Pakistan (Hashim, 2020).

Fig. 1
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Internet usage per 100 persons in Pakistan (2001–2021). Source: (WB, 2023)

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It was only in 2014 that the state of Pakistan sought to put in place a comprehensive approach to Internet governance. The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) was developed in response to a growing concern over the misuse of electronic media and technology in relation to harassment of women and child pornography (Zehra, 2022). The Act was passed by the Pakistani parliament in August 2016, and it became operational in November of the same year. Pakistan, like many other countries in the world, has seen a significant increase in the use of electronic media and technology in recent years. While these developments have brought many benefits, they have also created new challenges, including the rise of cybercrime and the spread of extremist propaganda and hate speech on the Internet.

The PECA was developed to address these challenges and provide a legal framework for combating cybercrime and protecting the rights of citizens in the digital space. The Act covers a wide range of offenses, including hacking, identity theft, cyberstalking, and cyberterrorism. It provides for strict penalties for those found guilty of committing such crimes. At the time, Pakistan was severely affected by terrorism and following the terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar (December 2014) the military had launched operations in north-west of the country. Therefore, PECA was introduced in the context of heightened national security concerns and was spurred by a state-driven security narrative that considered the control of cyberspace integral to the fight against terrorism. In the 2014 Global Terrorism Index, Pakistan was ranked number three after Iraq and Afghanistan (IEP, 2014, 8). In that context, the PML-N government presented PECA as a crucial step in terms of Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts that involved restrictive measures (Aziz, 2022). National security played a key role in terms of reaching swift approval in roughly a year and a half after a draft bill was presented in the National Parliament in February 2015. After being approved by the parliament in April 2016, the bill was unanimously approved by the Senate of Pakistan in July 2016. Critics of the Act, however, have raised concerns about its potential for abuse and its impact on freedom of expression and privacy. Some argued that the Act could be used to silence dissenting voices and restrict access to information, while others criticized its vague and broad definitions of offenses and the lack of oversight and accountability in its implementation.

PECA has become a complete legal framework to identify various types of electronic crimes, methods for investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. The act has “been criticized for vaguely defining the cybercrimes, failing to specify what constitutes critical infrastructure, and undermining freedom of expression” (Shah 2022a). According to Sect. 21 (d), “Whoever intentionally and publicly exhibits or displays or transmits any information which cultivates, entices or induces a natural person to engage in a sexually explicit act, through an information system to harm a natural person or his reputation, or to take revenge, or to create hatred or to blackmail, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with fine which may extend to five million rupees or with both” (GOP, 2016, 11).

PECA has also shaped Internet governance by centralizing the management of the Internet in the hands of the PTA and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and increasing the authority of these institutions. First, PECA has enhanced the authority of public institutions such as the PTA and FIA in terms of digital surveillance, data collection, and persecution. The PTA enjoys unfettered and wide powers under Sect. 37 of PECA to block and remove content. Often the PTA has justified those restrictions by claiming that certain social media platforms and websites promote “vulgarity” and “corruption of youth.” More on this is discussed under digital authoritarianism below. In the absence of any data protection privacy laws, the existing laws provide unhindered powers to the authorities to monitor and collect citizens’ personal data. In terms of information governance, there has been an evolution towards more restrictive and intrusive measures and capabilities on the part of the Pakistani state. While the PECA is more comprehensive and covers the Internet space, there are similar legal in the Fair Trial Act 2013 and Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996 through which certain public institutions can seek a warrant to monitor private communications to prevent a threat or in matters of national security. There is also the Monitoring and Reconciliation of Telephony Traffic Regulations of 2010 through which the state demands all VPN owners to register their VPNs with the PTA. In September 2022, the PTA had tweeted through its official account urging public and private organizations, foreign missions, and freelancers to register their VPNs before 31 October 2022 (Khilji, 2022).

The PECA provides unprecedented authority to the FIA and PTA to counter cybercrimes through surveillance, social media monitoring, search and seizure, and retention of data (GOP, 2016). While the PTA mainly deals with licensing and regulation, quality of service monitoring, and consumer protection, the FIA has the National Response Centre for Cyber Crimes (NR3C) that deals with investigations, surveillance, and data retention for cybercrimes. The FIA also has the authority to make arrests. Since the PECA’s execution, the agency has made arrests on charges of anti-state propaganda through social media (Raza, 2017). To facilitate Internet governance, the PECA works with PTA and FIA. The PECA can impose fines on social media companies operating in Pakistan for non-compliance with the law. According to PECA, social media companies are required to remove any unlawful content from their platforms within 24 h of being notified by authorities. Failure to do so can result in a fine of up to PKR 500 million (approximately US$3 million) for the social media company. In addition to the fines, the Pakistani state requires social media companies to establish local offices in the country and appoint a designated representative to work with law enforcement agencies in Pakistan. Countries are pushing social media providers to open local offices for a variety of reasons. Overall, Pakistan seeks to have greater control over content on social media platforms to ensure compliance with local laws, such as the PECA, particularly regarding religious sensitivities, hate speech, and national security. Local offices in the country opens social media companies to greater regulatory pressures by the government (Bhatti, 2020). Google opened its liaison office in Pakistan in 2022; Facebook’s mother company Meta is expected to follow suit (Hussain, 2022; Geo, 2022). There is a similar demand on social media companies elsewhere in the developing world to open their local offices, for instance, Bangladesh demanded Facebook and Google to open their local offices in 2020 (TBS, 2020).

Digital Authoritarianism in Pakistan

The previous section laid out institutional arrangements for Internet governance in Pakistan. Attention needs to be paid how these institutional arrangements are used to enable digital authoritarian practices. Due to its widespread application in curbing popular dissent, PECA is dubbed a “draconian law” in Pakistan (Aziz, 2022). PECA has established the legal framework to crack down on social media dissent and criminalize any disapproval of state institutions (Bangwar 2022). Moreover, PECA has been implemented on the false pretenses of countering online harassment and hate speech as it has “proven to be an effective weapon in the hands of the state, to harass, intimidate and silence critics” (Aziz, 2022). Across the developing world, similar trends have been observed where states are trying to control digital spaces to shape/control narratives in their favor. India, the world’s largest democracy, introduced the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 in August 2023. This Act has been criticized for the state taking charge of controlling data, instead of only private companies (Gupta, 2023). Similarly, Indonesia has introduced new laws to justify online censorship and restrictions on freedom of speech (Yilmaz, 2023; Yilmaz, et al., 2022). In what follows, we examine how the state uses various strategies to extend its authoritarian grip on digital spaces through analysis of practices pertaining to censorship, surveillance, and countering dissent.

Censorship

PECA is one component of the Internet governance framework that has helped the state implement digital authoritarianism in Pakistan. A significant aspect of the PECA has been its Sect. 34 on “unlawful online content” that has increased the power of PTA to “remove or block or issue directions for removal or blocking of access to an information through any information system if it considers it necessary in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court or commission of or incitement to an offence under this Act” (GOP, 2016, 18). The PTA has increasingly used this power to block certain online content and social media accounts. This is clearly a growing trend as the PTA has been submitting more data requests to Google and Facebook (see Table 1). There is a similar trend elsewhere, for instance, Indian authorities submitted 119,400 data requests in 2022 compared with 6850 in 2013 (Meta, 2023a). In 2021 alone, PTA had requested data for 2803 Facebook accounts from Facebook. Across the world, this is a growing trend as Facebook increasingly receives an overwhelming amount of data requests from states. For instance, during January to June 2022, Facebook received 237,414 requests for 412,285 accounts/users and produced data for 76.10% of the total requests (Facebook, 2022). Then one needs to see how the data was classified, for example, between January and June 2020, the state of Pakistan had mostly (54%) requested data from Facebook under the provision of “emergency disclosure” (Facebook, 2022). This means that this requested data was not linked to any ongoing legal proceedings in Pakistan.

Table 1 Requests from Pakistan for user data from Meta (2013–2022)
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Similarly, Pakistan has been regularly contacting Google to remove certain contents. Article 34 of the PECA empowers relevant authorities to act against “unlawful online content” (GOP, 2016). That is also a growing trend as can be seen in Table 2. Like the case of Facebook, Google is receiving more data removal requests. Looking at the data, there has been a sudden upsurge in data removal requests from Pakistan to Google since the enactment of the PECA in 2016. Pakistan submitted its highest number of data removal requests, i.e., 303, in 2019. As of September 2024, Pakistan has submitted 4109 data removal requests to Google, since 2011, and Google removed about 80.3% of contents under its “legal” category (Google, 2024). Increasingly, there is more compliance from multinational social media companies. First, the state has reacted strongly to non-compliance which was the case when the state of Pakistan had requested YouTube, in 2012, to remove an anti-Islam move “Innocence of Muslims." As Google did not comply, YouTube was banned in Pakistan for roughly 3 years (Yilmaz, 2023; Yilmaz et al., 2022, 26). Similarly, TikTok was banned for spreading immorality (Masood, 2020). Facebook and Twitter have also faced such bans in Pakistan.

Table 2 The state of Pakistan’s data removal requests to Google (2009–2022)
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It is important to understand the nature of contents that PTA has been trying to block. Most of those are linked to spreading immorality in the country, as perceived by the authorities, such as porn, and anti-Islam or blasphemous material. This is similar to many other Indonesian countries, for instance, Indonesia threatened Google, Meta, and Twitter that they would be blocked unless they comply with new regulations concerning data removal (Wong, 2022). In 2017, the Islamabad High Court has ordered the government to monitor websites and social media to block blasphemous contents (Pasha, 2017). There are then legal provisions under the PECA that allow authorities like the PTA to liaise with social media organizations for blocking certain accounts and contents. According to a research participant, digital rights activist with Bytes for All, the Pakistani state was previously also requesting social media platforms to block certain contents, but that did not happen as there was no law in Pakistan (Baloch, 2022). This is clearly depicted through the above data (Tables 1 and 2) as Facebook and Google have been complying more since 2016. Baloch also talked about his collaboration with Google and Facebook in Pakistan and revealed that the state of Pakistan sends then regular requests for content removal and “regulating content which is not favorable towards them” (Baloch, 2022).

Pakistan has made numerous requests to social media companies Facebook and Twitter for user data to assist in investigations and legal cases. These requests often pertain to accounts or content that the government believes is associated with criminal activities, terrorism, or religious defamation. According to Facebook’s Transparency Report for the second half of 2023, the Pakistani government made 1614 requests for user data. In response, Facebook provided data for about 75.46% of those requests. In this period, 1556 requests were linked to ongoing legal processes in Pakistan (Meta, 2024). Similarly, the government requested Twitter to provide information about users involved in what they claimed was the propagation of “anti-state” or “blasphemous” content. Twitter’s transparency reports also show a steady increase in these requests from Pakistan. Like Meta, X continues to comply with Pakistan’s data requests. In 2019, X complied with 35% legal requests from Pakistan (Jahangir, 2020).

Internet Shutdowns

Since the prominent cases during the Arab Spring protests in 2011, Internet shutdowns have emerged as a key component of Internet governance for authoritarian countries (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011). In South Asia, countries such as Pakistan and India have been using Internet shutdowns regularly in order to deal with various forms of public discontent, protests, and instances of political violence (Shah, 2021; Wagner, 2018). PTA has restricted Internet access at certain times and in specific areas. This is typically justified in terms of counterterrorism, often in former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (ex-FATA)—bordering Afghanistan—or preventing sectarianism during religious gatherings (e.g., Ashura for the Shi’as) and political demonstrations (Kamran, 2017). The state can also blame technical failure for Internet state shut down. This was the case during the PTI’s jalsa (gathering) in Lahore on 23 March 2023 (Raza, 2023). Earlier, the Internet services in major cities of Pakistan were disrupted during the PTI’s demonstrations in May 2022 (Greig, 2022). In 2022, there were report of the PTA attempting to introduce a centralized DNS (domain name system) in Pakistan. If successful, this would mean that international DNS services like YouTube, Akamai, Facebook, Netflix, and Cloudflare would be blocked or restricted in Pakistan. This will be a significant step towards creating a national intranet, such as those in Iran and China (Hassan, 2022). After facing backlash and concerns that it would slow the Internet service in the country, the PTA clarified that it is not implementing a centralized DNS in Pakistan (Dawn, 2022d).

Internet shut down has been legally challenged in Islamabad High Court (Baloch, 2022). In 2018, the Court declared network disruptions were unconstitutional (Khilji, 2020). Despite this ruling, the state continues to rely on the sledge-hammer approach of Internet shutdowns to disrupt and undermine dissent. This could also because of its limited capacity to block all websites, including social media sites, for which the state is dependent on authorities based outside of Pakistan, as was shared by a cyber security expert and an academic based at the National University of Sciences and Technology in Islamabad (Ali, 2022).

Internet shutdowns and data removals in Pakistan have been used as tools of political control, particularly in relation to the political activities of Imran Khan and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Over the years, especially following Imran Khan’s removal as Prime Minister in April 2022 through a vote of no-confidence, there have been numerous instances where Internet blackouts, social media restrictions, and content removals have coincided with political unrest or protests led by PTI. Besides Internet shutdowns or slowdowns, there is a targeting of PTI workers and supporters on social media. Social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have occasionally seen restrictions or content removals, especially when Imran Khan and PTI were rallying public support against the government. There have been reports of PTI-related hashtags being shadow-banned and PTI’s digital content being taken down under pressure from the government, which frames these actions as part of maintaining public order. In several cases, PTI supporters have claimed that their social media posts or live streams of protests were taken down, limiting their reach to wider audiences. To bypass such restrictions, PTI workers and supporters have been using VPNs (The Express Tribune, 2023).

Surveillance

In addition to censorship, surveillance has become an integral component of digital governance in Pakistan. The PECA has empowered the PTA in terms of digital surveillance, for instance, the Act requires service providers to retain user data and the PTA can access that (GOP, 2016). Deep Packet Inspection is a key technological advancement in this regard (DPI). Data processing in which the contents of the data being delivered are carefully examined and the data is then rerouted as necessary is known as DPI (Geere, 2012). DPI examines data being delivered over a network and may take a variety of actions, including logging the content, alerting, blocking, or re-routing the traffic, among others. Comprehensive network analysis is possible using DPI. While it can be used for good, ensuring the content is supplied correctly and screening it for viruses, it can also be used for bad, like Internet censorship and stealing sensitive information (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011). PTA employs DPI technology that it has acquired in Pakistan. 2018 saw the Pakistan Telecom Authority (PTA) purchase a “web monitoring system” from Sandvine. According to reports, the initial contract was worth US$18.5 million (Ali & Jahangir, 2019). Prior to this, in 2012, PTA had acquired filtering technology from another Canadian business, Netsweeper. Website blocking and DNS tampering are both made possible by Netsweeper technology, which helps direct Internet traffic in an unauthorized direction (Dalek et al., 2013).

All research participants claimed that the state’s surveillance capacity has increased significantly since 2010. Jamil argues, “now digital surveillance and online censorship have emerged as an advanced forms of the government’s media control in Pakistan” (Jamil, 2021, 17). It is important to look at the reasons for this. Despite laws like PECA, there remain some grey areas in terms of the purpose of surveillance and how that affects civil liberties. For instance, who can be surveilled and under what circumstances? On this, Counterterrorism efforts at home have played a key role in terms of not only Internet governance but also digital surveillance. On this a research participant, an information security expert in Pakistan, argued, “This surveillance aspect will remain a grey area. It will remain a field in which anyone can operate according to his or her own desires, and this is a serious challenge” (Sheikh, 2022).

Since its independence, Pakistan has been a security state, and this is clearly reflected also in the country’s cyber security laws. While the Imran Khan government had justified the PECA in relation to addressing social problems like child pornography (Zehra, 2022), there is no denying of the fact that it was mainly developed as a counter terrorism measure. As PECA was justified as being crucial to Pakistan’s national security and fight against terrorism, it is crucial to know how various elements of digital surveillance are being used for counterterrorism. A research participant and a leading local journalist, Imtiaz Gul (executive director, Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad), highlighted the role of digital surveillance in tracking down certain terrorist belonging to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Gul, 2022). Historically, Internet shutdowns in Pakistan were also linked to counterterrorism as the state blocked or slowed down Internet during certain events like Muslim religious occasions in Pakistan (Ahmed, et al. 2023).

Then, there is the other side as the technology acquired in the name of national security has also been used to curb dissent. With an overwhelming focus on national security, for instance, by countering terrorism, the state has ignored its obligations under domestic laws and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture. Despite regular data breaches and scandals involving audio and video leaks of key political figures, judges, and journalists, there are no laws providing safeguard against collection of personal data and privacy (DRF, 2018). There have been regular data breaches involving the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), including a staff having unauthorized access to get the data of Chief of Army Staff General Asim Muneer and his family members in 2022 (Cheema, 2023). Civil society groups in Pakistan have expressed concerns regarding the state’s increasingly surveillance of citizens in general and some targeted individuals, such as journalists, politicians, and human rights activists, as such measures at the cost of the right to privacy. There are concerns regarding the increasing surveillance capacity of intelligence agencies like the FIA and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other authorities, such as the ones administering safe city projects, as they have developed their social media monitoring cells. While the legal provisions permit digital surveillance for counterterrorism measures like blocking hate speech contents (Pasha, 2017), it appears that the state is using its enhanced surveillance capacity to counter dissent.

In Pakistan, successive administrations have collaborated closely with China to develop safe city infrastructure throughout the country’s urban districts. The safe city gathers information on at least six different categories, including personal information, vehicle and traffic data, criminal profiles, crime statistics, and parking information. Facial recognition, artificial intelligence, vehicle number plate tracking, dedicated telecommunication networks, data centers, drones, mobile applications, and intelligent transportation systems are all included in Pakistan’s safe city surveillance systems (Yousufi 2020). The Punjab Safe Cities Authority (PSCA), which has its main office in Lahore, is the most well-known initiative. With the help of the center, the Punjab Police can manage traffic, fight crime, and dispatch emergency services using a network of more than 8000 cameras and other sensors placed in more than 1500 locations throughout Lahore. Significantly, Huawei from China has constructed every secure city system in Pakistan. NADRA and Huawei completed the first one in Islamabad in 2016 for a cost of $125 million, a loan from China’s EX-IM Bank (Ahmed, 2021). 2018 saw the construction of another safe city system in Lahore. Although this project was constructed by Huawei, National Engineering Services Pakistan (NESPAK) and Arup, a multinational architecture, engineering, and design firm based in the UK, provided consultancy and technical support (Ahmed, 2021).

There has also been an increasing use of surveillance technology to identify and punish people who criticize the state, its officials, and state institutions like the army. The founder of digital media houses like Gi5O and the Nerve Centre, Hussain Nadeem, shared how facial recognition technology was used to track down a family who had verbally attacked Federal Minister Ahsan Iqbal (Nadeem, 2022). Once tracked down, the family involved in hackling Iqbal publicly apologized (Dawn, 2022a). There have been many other similar incidents in which people have been picked up by authorities for posting certain comments on social media. A research participant, a former journalist with Daily Pakistan and Aaj TV, argued that extrajudicial behavior is being normalized with the use of technology: “This is not a minor matter, to pick someone up from their house against their will, without a warrant, and to take them to a different location. It is a huge crime” (Ahmed, 2022). Similarly, a prominent Pakistan journalist, Imtiaz Gul, shared his concerns in relation to how young people are deprived of their right to express themselves and authorities are engaged in cultivating conformity (Gul, 2022).

Countering Dissent

Digital authoritarianism continues to grow since the implementation of PECA that has empowered various public institutions. While the state still claims that its surveillance is for counterterrorism, it is clear how Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) are operating to counter dissent. A research participant, a digital rights activist and journalist, shared how the state has been using the NADRA database to track down relatives of social media activists based abroad. He shared the case of a person based in Norway whose family was harassed in Pakistan to stop criticizing the state on social media. He also mentioned that the FIA has a database of prominent social media accounts connected to real-world individuals (Ahmed, 2022). While there are state institutions in action, there are also troll armies and social media influencers who are targeting the opponents through social media. The aim is to counter dissent. Such troll armies have been created by not just the main political parties, such as the PTI, Pakistan Muslim League, and the Pakistan People’s Party, but also by the military (Akhtar, 2022; Rahman, et al, 2023).

Since Imran Khan lost the vote of no confidence as PM in the parliament in April 2022, there has been a growing trend among his supporters on social media blaming the military establishment. The sate closely monitors social media activities of opposition politicians. This was recently revealed in the case of Senator Azam Swat of the PTI who was arrested by the FIA and charged under Sect. 20 of the PECA (malicious code) for posting humiliating messages on Twitter against the Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Bajwa (Anjum, 2022). In one of his tweets on 13 October 2022, Senator Swati wrote, “Mr Bajwa congratulations to you and few with you. Your plan is really working and all criminals are getting free You have legitimize corruption. How you predict now the future of this country?” (Swati 2022). While Senator Swati was fighting his cases in courts, a real video was leaked from his bedroom with his wife and was sent to his wife to allegedly blackmail him to tone down his anti-military rhetoric. The senator was humiliated in public. Swati and his party supporters, such as Imran Khan, blamed the state for making and releasing this video. FIA later stated to have had forensically analyzed the video and found it to be fake (Dawn, 2022b). In December 2022, the Balochistan High Court ordered to drop all cases against Senator Swati (Nihad, 2022). The PECA has become a tool in the hands of the state, especially the military, to counter dissent. A recent case is of Sikandar Zaman, a PTI supporter from Faisalabad, who was sentenced for three years under the PECA for what the media reported as “running a campaign against the military.” He was charged under PECA’s Sects. 20 and 24C (Ihsanullah, 2023). Regarding this, an Islamabad-based security expert at the Institute of Policy Studies talked about the deeper impacts of such audio/video leaks on the Pakistani society:

Most of the videos and audio leaks are meant to draw maximum political leverage. This is a very crude way of showing your political opponents in a bad light. So, if the prime minister’s office gets bugged, each political party releases an audio clip that suits its interest. I think this needs to stop somewhere. The only thing such leaks do is to polarize an already divided society. I do not think it serves the national interest in any way. (Yamin, 2022)

Revenge politics plays a major role in terms of how the PML-N led government is handling Imran Khan’s PTI and its supporters. An editorial in Dawn, a prominent local newspaper in Pakistan, discussed the ongoing revenge politics: “These arrests and cases against government critics follow the playbook of the PTI when it was in government. Arresting critics, opponents, journalists and dissenters over serious charges like sedition was the hallmark of the PTI regime” (Dawn, 2023). As of March 2023, there were over 100 cases against Imran Khan, including many under PECA for criticizing the military (Khan, 2022). In March 2023, the Federal Police sent its team to Lahore to arrest Khan, but it could not because of the heavy presence of PTI supporters. In February 2023, prominent PTI support former general Amjad Shoaib was arrested for making anti-state remarks on social media (Subhan & Zake, 2023). The head of the PTI social media cell, Azhar Mashwani, was picked up on his way to Imran Khan’s residence in Lahore in March 2023. As of 28 March 2023, there was no news regarding his whereabouts and the Lahore High Court had urged the FIA to find Mashwani (Gabol, 2023).

While the state has always been practicing certain old strategies to counter dissent, there is now an increasing use of new tools. The PECA has certainly increased the authorities of state institutions, especially the PTA and FIA. These institutions continue to use their extended authority, as granted under the PECA, to carry out a range of authoritarian practices including content removals, license cancellations, digital surveillance, and arrests. As Jamil has found, the state continues to simultaneously use old strategies, for instance, violence and arbitrary arrests, and new tools like digital surveillance, cyber bullying, and cyber-attacks, to crush dissent (Jamil, 2021). A combined effect of that can be seen through Pakistan’s poor ranking in the Freedom on the Net index (see Fig. 2).

Fig. 2
figure 2

Pakistan in the Freedom on the Net (2011–2022). Data source: (FH, 2023)

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During the data period, Pakistan’s overall score decline from 45 to 25 mainly because of obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. Even before the implementation of the PECA in 2016, the digital landscape was quite authoritarian in Pakistan as the country score dropped from 45 in 2011 to 31 in 2015. This period witnessed a significant decline in Pakistan’s score under “violation of user rights” from 18 to 11. In Freedom on the Net index, Pakistan consistently been ranked among the worst countries of the world in terms of places where Internet freedoms are labeled under “not free.” In the 2015 report, Pakistan was ranked at number ten from the bottom.

Contestations and Shortcomings

Despite increasing censorship and surveillance in the digital sphere, building a coherent authoritarian model of Internet governance has been difficult in Pakistan due to two structural reasons. First, the Pakistani state is lacking resources, both human and technological, to build a working model of authoritarian Internet governance. Second, the successive Pakistani governments’ attempts at installing authoritarian control over the Internet have been contested by democratic forces that still exist within the country, be it in judiciary, civil society organizations or the press. Such structural factors show that for most developing countries such as Pakistan, it is very difficult to emulate either Chinese or Western model of Internet governance, but rather, they will create an ad hoc model that is affected by various human and infrastructural shortcomings, as well as contestations rising from democratic forces. There was an amendment proposed in February 2022 to the PECA, making it illegal to “defame” government entities online, including the military and courts. The 2022 ordinance added a new definition of “person” that includes any company, association, or body of persons … institution, organization, authority, or any other body established by the Government under any law or otherwise, expanding the law’s already expansive provisions against defaming “natural persons” to include criticism of the state, including the military (HRW, 2022). It is however important to mention that the local civil society has been concerned about the PECA from the beginning. As revealed by an activist during interview for this research, “we had discussion with different stakeholders involved in the formulation of PECA and then we sensed that this law [PECA]was not something that was going to empower human rights defenders and journalists” (Baloch, 2022). This is clear as many prominent journalists, deemed pro-PTI, have been booked under PECA. This includes journalist Imran Riaz Khan who runs a YouTube channel with nearly four million subscribers and around six million followers on X (Naseer, 2022b; Saeed, 2024). Imran Riaz Khan has been targeted by the state for his outspoken and often critical views on the government, the military, and particularly his support for former Prime Minister Imran Khan (Saeed, 2024).

Given that the NADRA database has been hacked numerous times in the past, many experts expressed worry regarding data safety risks (Albasit, 2016). Several car images from Lahore’s CCTV cameras have been posted online in 2019. The images featured what is regarded as inappropriate sexual content (Kamran, 2020). The effectiveness of Huawei’s safe city infrastructure in lowering urban crime has been the subject of debate. Huawei asserted in a dubious presentation in 2019 that its safe city solutions have been extremely effective in decreasing crime, raising the case clearing rate, cutting down on the time it takes to respond to emergencies, and raising citizen happiness. But according to CSIS investigation, these figures have been greatly overstated, if not entirely invented. For instance, total crime increased by 33% in Islamabad a year after the safe city systems were put in place. Pakistan’s national crime rate is up by 11% (Hillman & McCalpin, 2019). Similarly, a research participant said, “We have not seen any positive outcome in that regard through a reduction in the crime rate” (Baloch, 2022). As claimed by the state that these safe city projects are for counterterrorism, one can see that there was a significant decline in terrorism in the country as the number of terrorist attacks declined by 2034 in 2013 to 365 in 2022 (SATP, 2023); however, this cannot be solely attributed to heightened surveillance.

A major pushback faced by the state is from the judiciary in relation to increasing digital authoritarianism and digital repossession in Pakistan. It is a continuous process that covers legals cases under the PECA, the authority of institutions like the FIA, data protection, and privacy issues. Local courts have already responded critically to the PECA Amendment of 2022 that focuses mainly on criminalizing defamation and declares it a non-bailable offence. According to Human Rights Watch, this amendment expands “PECA’s already overboard criminal defamation provisions to online statements about government institutions violates Pakistan’s international obligations” (HRW, 2022). Pakistan media houses took a case against the PECA Amendment to the Islamabad High Court, where Justice Athar Minallah found new legal provisions a violation of freedom of speech under article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The court had also ordered the interior ministry to investigate the conduct of the FIA’s Cyber Crime Wing as there were concerns raised regarding its abuse of power and infringement of individual’s fundamental rights (Naseer, 2022a). In relation to defamation and the concerns of public office holders of being attacked on social media, Justice Minallah said that “no one should be afraid of criticism” (Bashir, 2022). Following this, the FIA closed nearly 7000 cases under mainly defamation (Chaudhry, 2022).

In the wake of increasing digitalization in Pakistan, most participants expressed concerns regarding data protection and privacy. As someone working closely with the state in cyber security, Taha Ali proclaimed that the concept of cyber security is non-existence in Pakistan as has already been evident through hacking of data held by public institutions like the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and NADRA. He added that the FBR did not have a Chief Information Security Officer before this hacking (Ali, 2022). In 2021, FBR’s data was hacked, and it was blamed on outdated software despite that fact the World Bank had provided the US$80 million loan for system upgrades (Rana, 2021). After successive hacking attempts, then the finance minister informed the National Assembly that on average the FBR’s portal faces 71,000 hacking attempts every month (Khan, 2021). This demands policymakers to be more critical of the types of data, its use, and security. This has not been a priority even in the case of safe city projects. A research participant shared his concerns regarding data projects in safe city projects: “We have serious reservations about this technology [surveillance] because this is provided by Chinese Huawei, which is notorious in terms of collecting data from different countries” (Baloch, 2022). Already reports have emerged of data leakages from safe city projects in Islamabad and Lahore, and that has resulted in a significant criticism on the state (Azeem, 2019). In Lahore, there were multiple complaints filed by women who were being blackmailed through their secretly recorded videos using safe city CCTVs. The plaintiffs took the Punjab Safe City Authority to the court where it was ordered to investigate the matter (Dawn, 2022c); however, there is not update on what happened in this case afterwards. In the wake of numerous data breaches, calls for an independent Privacy Commission are gaining ground in Pakistan, questioning the role of external stakeholders like Huawei (Albasit, 2016). In many ways, Pakistan is still catching up in terms of developing sufficient or comprehensive legal frameworks in relation to the digital space. Regarding this, a social media activist said that Pakistan still does not have sufficient laws and individuals are still vulnerable to the state’s surveillance and its misuse (Sheikh, 2022).

Despite the growing trend in politically motivated censorship, there have been challenges to the state’s authoritarian practices by judicial authorities, civil society activists, and politicians. For example, when the PTA blocked the website of Awami Workers Party in 2018 due to unexplained reasons, the party took the case to the Islamabad High Court where a judge objected to blocking the website on the basis of hate speech (Kamran, 2020). Similarly, the website of the most dominant party in Karachi, Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), was blocked in 2016 after its leader allegedly delivered an anti-Pakistan speech (Ali, 2016). The MQM website was unblocked after its chief, Altaf Hussain, blamed Imran Khan for inciting violence on military installations in May 2023 (Shah, 2023). Concerned by regular restrictions on the Internet and social media access in Pakistan, digital rights activists have become prominent in the country. Usama Khilji, a digital rights activist from Pakistan, said that the PTA could not block YouTube every time during Imran Khan’s jalsas. He also added, “This is unconstitutional censorship which has no basis under law. Stop making a joke of the Constitution and treating the country like a video game” (Dawn, 2022e).

In addition to pushbacks from the judiciary, the state of Pakistan has also faced a serious resistance from civil society. Civil society plays a vital role in a democracy by promoting citizen participation, advocating for the rights and interests of marginalized groups, monitoring state’s actions, and fostering a culture of accountability and transparency. On this a research participant, an Islamabad-based academic at the National University of Modern Languages, talked about the importance of civil society in Pakistan. He said, Pakistani civil society has always been there playing its role. There are both local and international NGOs present in Pakistan like the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and the Transparency International, and they continue to highlight what is going on in Pakistan through their regular reports (Shad, 2022). Similarly, a digital rights activist shared that “there is a big movement inside. All those are digital rights organizations actively working on policy advocacy and digital rights” (Baloch, 2022). He further added that such organizations, including the HRCP, are engaged with not only relevant public institutions but also like-minded political for the protection of digital rights in Pakistan. The pressure of such groups, international human rights organizations and social media companies, has produced some positive outcomes in the shape of the PTI government’s decision to withdraw new rules under the “Citizens Protection (Against Online Harm) Rules 2020.” These rules included the controversial clause linked to social media companies providing decrypted data to the FIA. As this involved companies like Facebook and Twitter, they reportedly reached out to then Prime Minister Imran Khan to raise their concerns regarding sharing decrypted data (Rehman, 2020). In February 2020, the state attempted to implement a similar version of new rules under the Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content. That would have expanded the PTA’s authority to block and monitor digital content. After facing heavy criticism, Imran Khan had ordered those rules to be revised based on a consultative process (Hashim, 2020). In November 2020, the state’s attempt to add an amendment to PECA also received criticism from social media companies and digital rights organizations in Pakistan. Pakistani local civil society labeled such measures as clear signs of growing digital authoritarianism. Farieha Aziz of Bolo Bhi shared in an interview with Al Jazeera that the state’s “goal appears to be complete control over information by the state, and for that they have total hegemony over information” (Hashim, 2020).

There is a visible impact of such authoritarian measures. There is a growing tendency for self-censorship practiced by journalists (Rehman, 2020). They are also extra cautious about the use of smartphones. On this, a research participant revealed, “We are now very conscious of talking with each other when on smartphones. We try to be guarded a little bit sometimes because whether its WhatsApp or Facebook, everything is traceable” (Gul, 2022). This is also partly because many social media activists, journalists, and political leaders have faced hacking of their email and social media account, as was shared by a local digital media expert in Pakistan (Leeza, 2022). Despite all these challenges, a research participants believed that Pakistanis still find ways of sharing their opinion through various ways like through satire (Sheikh, 2022). This is true in various ways because prominent media personalities, for example, Anwar Maqsood, have avoided much trouble by indirectly criticizing state institutions. For many decades, Maqsood has been using satire to criticize the state through his popular programs like “Loose Talk” (Ahmed, 2015). He continues to do through the mainstream media and public gatherings, but not through social media. This could be a reason that he has not faced the same challenges as many journalists who used social media to get the state.

As discussed above, the timing of such shutdowns is crucial for understanding state objectives. While historically Internet shutdowns were rare and carried out for security reasons, increasingly the state is utilizing this measure for political reasons by targeting the opposition. This particularly has been the case against Imran Khan’s PTI, while the PDM (Pakistan Democratic Movement) government initially relied on putting restrictions on the mainstream media, for instance, by initially reducing the airtime to the PTI. There was also a period in 2022, when Imran Khan’s live speeches were censored by TV channels, but in May 2023, the state completely banned Imran Khan’s speeches on TV channels. This was a reaction to Imran Khan’s speech on 5 March 2023 in Lahore in which he blamed the former army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, for bringing down his government (Hussain, 2023). Being a frontrunner in terms of using social media in Pakistan, the PTI has often bypassed such restrictions for disseminating its messages. A prominent example is of virtual jalsas via Twitter Space by the PTI during 2022 and 2023—a period when the Pakistan Electronic Media Regularity Authority (PEMRA) has been implemented restrictions on the party’s visibility through TV channels. In April 2022, nearly half a million people watched Khan’s address through Twitter Space (Jahangir, 2022). Although virtual, this level of people’s participation in PTI gatherings has been troubling the state that continues to practice digital repression.

Conclusion

There are varying degrees of digital authoritarianism around the world, including in developing countries. This is particularly noticeable in the world’s largest democracy India, and its neighbor Pakistan. A key difference between the two is that the military in Pakistan remains influential in terms of how digital authoritarianism has been rolled out. Pakistan’s journey towards digital authoritarianism is characterized by structural limitations, resistance from democratic forces, concerns about data protection and privacy, pushback from the judiciary, and the emergence of a vigilant civil society. The country faces significant challenges in establishing an authoritarian model of Internet governance, resulting in an ad hoc approach with various shortcomings and obstacles.

The implementation of the PECA in 2016 aimed to address the challenges of cybercrime and protect citizens’ rights in the digital space. While PECA established a legal framework, it has also faced criticism for its potential for abuse and its impact on freedom of expression and privacy. The Act centralized Internet management in the hands of institutions such as the PTA and FIA, granting them extensive powers for digital surveillance, data collection, and prosecution of cybercrimes. The implementation of PECA has led to censorship, restrictions on access to information, and the curtailment of freedom of expression. The vague criteria for content removal and blocking have been used to stifle dissent and anti-state criticism. Internet shutdowns have also been employed to suppress opposition. Surveillance technologies, including DPI and safe city initiatives, have enhanced the state’s surveillance capacity, raising concerns about privacy and civil liberties.

The misuse of surveillance technologies and the selective targeting of individuals have further contributed to digital authoritarianism in Pakistan. Opposition politicians, social media activists, and journalists critical of the state have faced arrests, prosecution, and harassment. The state’s focus on national security has overshadowed its responsibility to protect personal data and privacy. Political censorship and Internet shutdowns in Pakistan have targeted not only terrorist organizations but also specific political groups, leading to self-censorship among journalists and activists. As the military enjoys a strong influence on domestic politics, for instance, through its proxies, it has been a key actor in shaping digital authoritarianism in Pakistan.

However, Pakistani state’s attempts at building an authoritarian model of Internet governance has been limited by structural factors and popular resistance. The state’s implementation of safe city surveillance systems has raised concerns about data safety risks and their effectiveness. Outdated software, inadequate cybersecurity measures, and the lack of prioritization of data protection and privacy exacerbate these concerns. The judiciary’s intervention and the role of civil society organizations and activists have played a crucial role in challenging restrictions and advocating for digital rights. Moreover, resistance from democratic forces and a vigilant civil society continue to contest digital repression and push for greater transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights. As we have noticed through the case of Pakistan, there are problems associated with building a full-fledged digital authoritarian framework because of the different political and economic realities as Pakistan lacks resources and is a democratic country. Contestation from the judiciary, civil society organizations, and the press has hindered state’s efforts. Grassroots resistance combined with technical challenges have kept the state’s authoritarian advances in check and resulted in an ad hoc digital governance model. While this research mainly focused on Pakistan, we believe that our findings could be relevant to other similar contexts in transitional democracies. In this regard, the findings of this research make a significant contribution to the literature on digital authoritarianism in transitional democracies.

This research reveals that representations of sex are exploited by trolls and government actors to manipulate public opinion and politics in Pakistan. This suggests that censorship and government shutdowns are not primarily about regulating explicit content, combating misinformation, or protecting vulnerable individuals, but rather about consolidating political control. Although a feminist analysis of power is beyond the scope of this article, future studies should investigate this nuanced relationship. There is an obvious scope to research how sex and media are used to influence politics and examine how censorship and shutdowns, often framed as measures to address explicit content or misinformation, might actually serve as strategies for political consolidation.