Abstract
A major requirement for regional power status is the location and deployment of soft power attributes which may range from culture, political ideology, diplomacy, to sporting achievements, foreign policy articulation, tourism, media exports and language. While contemporary analysis of Nigeria’s regional and continental power profile is almost entirely focused on economic and military aspects, an objective account of the state’s power portfolio would be incomplete without a careful estimation of its soft power potential and influence. This article contributes to the study of Nigeria’s foreign policy by initiating the debate on the utility and prospect of its soft power characteristics. An assessment of the country’s soft power resources in the form of culture, political values and foreign policy reveals that Abuja can indeed use these co-optive platforms to mitigate the negative contradictions that dampen its regional power status in Africa. The paper concludes that, although there are enormous limitations, a careful articulation of Nigeria’s soft power assets has the potential to reinforce the country’s regional leadership.
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Notes
With a GDP of over $520m, Nigeria is ranked as the biggest economy in Africa.
According to the SIPRI reports 2004–2014, Nigeria ranked highly in Africa in terms of military expenditure.
The fact that there is barely any literature on Nigeria’s soft power should not imply that it is non-existent.
The concept of soft power can be gleaned from the works of Hans Morgenthau, Klaus Knorr and Ray Cline.
While public diplomacy is sometimes confused with soft power, we have referred to the term here as a foreign policy instrument as well as a component and expression of soft power especially when it is coordinated by government (see Melissen 2005).
The index measures soft power capabilities of a country on the global stage using 13 variables organized into three major categories: global integrity (freedom index, voter turnout, rule of law and CO2 emissions), global integration (immigration, tourism, English fluency and university ranking) and global image (Time’s 100, media exports, most admired companies, the Olympics and language enrolments).
As some scholars argue, South Africa regional prominence as an emerging power and a putative hegemony in the continent has been due largely to its superior soft power strength along with its traditional hard power competences (see Smith 2012, Sidiropoulos 2014, Ogunnubi and Isike 2015, Schoeman 2015).
We must state at the outset that President Obasanjo’s record from 1999 to 2007 may be disputed as an attractive element of Nigeria’s soft power. For instance, it was during his leadership that Nigeria experienced various violations of political human rights and corruption as the reports of many reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Freedom House show. Also, according to the Freedom House Reports, during Obasanjo’s 8 years in office, Nigeria was a hybrid state or ‘partially free’ state, which is a mixture of democracy and authoritarianism. Obasanjo on my occasions sought to undermine the Nigerian constitution and democratic experiment through his ‘third term bid’. Again, Obasanjo presided over a very fraudulent election in 2007. Even the late President Yar’Ardua, who he foisted on Nigeria, admitted that the election brought him to power was fraudulent.
D’banj won the award twice in 2008 and 2009, 2face in 2010, Davido in 2014 and Mavins in 2015.
Celebrated as the ‘Queen of Nollywood’, Omotola featured in Times Magazine 100 most influential people in the world in 2013, a list that included leaders like Barak Obama and Pope Francis.
It would perhaps incorrect to state that Nollywood only portrays Nigeria’s rich culture. Many Nollywood videos are known to project the vices of the Nigerian society. In fact, a recent report on Nollywood suggests that about 40% of films produced are soft pornography and enmeshed in vulgarity.
Nigeria has played host to subsequent three editions of the AMVCAs (2014–2016).
Nigeria’s Muslim population is the fifth largest in the world behind Bangladesh (fourth), Pakistan (third), India (second) and Indonesia (first).
Accorded almost a stately status, SCOAN is a popular destination for many in the Southern African region and is frequented by many African leaders including all manner of statesmen, celebrities and royalties.
The ANRU is a registered non-profit organisation (NPO) which has been in existence since 2004. Its goals, apart from fostering unity among Nigerians in area and catering for their welfare, are primarily geared towards.
In a detailed study of student flows in and out of the USA conducted by the Institute of International Education (IIE) and published in 2013, it was found that Nigeria ranked 19th (7316; 0.9%) in terms of place of origin of international students and is the only African country represented in a list of 25 countries.
This is notwithstanding the fact that the huge presence of Nigerians in almost every country of the world has its drawbacks for Nigeria’s soft power potential, given that it is itself a source of xenophobia. A number of Nigerians in the diaspora take part in illegal activities such as immigration fraud, drug-trafficking, human trafficking, credit card scams and 419, all of which pitch their host communities against Nigerians in general, irrespective of the fact that there are more Nigerians that make positive contributions than the few criminal elements.
See Amnesty International Report (June 2015); Stars on their Shoulders. Blood on their Hands: War Crimes committed by the Nigerian Military. London: Amnesty International. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/ogunnubir/Downloads/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF.
Some analysts disagree with this position arguing that there can be no soft power merit in granting asylum to a leader accused of horrendous acts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Inferably, Taylor was one of the worst mass murders in African history and now, rightly so, has been convicted by an international tribunal and sentenced to prison. It is difficult for his victims to see this gesture as evidence of good neighbourliness. The point also needs to be made that after President Obasanjo granted Charles Taylor asylum in Nigeria, he (President Obasanjo) then violated the ECOWAS-brokered agreement, under American pressure, and turned Taylor over for prosecution by the Special Court of Sierra Leone. Clearly, President Obasanjo did not demonstrate credibility, when he violated the aforementioned agreement that led to Taylor’s being granted asylum in Nigeria.
Although this is a hard power element of Nigeria’s foreign policy, its military engagement in Africa has also helped to improve its soft power profile. Nigeria’s extensive involvement in the decolonization process and liberation struggle in many African countries made a huge contribution to the independence of African states, particularly in the Southern African region. Nigeria was at the forefront of a number of decolonization struggles in Africa, exemplified in its uncompromising support for several liberation movements in Southern Africa including the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, the Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Patriotic Front, (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (see Amao and Okeke-Uzodike 2015, p. 9; Chinade 2013:4–7). This contributed to the appreciation of Nigeria’s profile as a benevolent big brother on the continent.
During the apartheid period, the Nigerian government made a donation of about $2 millon to the ANC in support of the liberation struggle. It is gestures such as this that solidified its status as a frontline state despite not being with geographic proximity of the southern African region.
In the National Development Plan (2030), South Africa clearly articulates its soft power policy noting that ‘In areas such as science, culture, higher education, sport and environmental protection, there is a need to showcase South Africa and promote its presence and leadership on strategic issues as part of its soft power in international relations…’ (NDP 2012, p. 241) and that ‘Public diplomacy is fundamental to South Africa’s projection of soft power’ (NDP 2012, p. 255).
See Ogunnubi and Isike (2015) which documents human rights, rule of law, media export, cultural export and iconic personalities among others as part of what constitutes South Africa’s soft power capabilities.
The arguments presented in this paper do not subtract from the continuous relevance of hard power which is rooted in the realist conception of power neither does it draw a parallel between the two. Rather, we argue that hard and soft power complement each other and both can be utilized to realize the national interests of Nigeria in the context of this paper.
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Ogunnubi, O., Isike, C. Nigeria’s Soft Power Sources: Between Potential and Illusion?. Int J Polit Cult Soc 31, 49–67 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-017-9258-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-017-9258-6