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Do preferences of drinker-drivers differ?

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Abstract

Why people engage in illegal activities is not well understood. Using data collected for this research from eight cities in four states, this study investigates alternative explanations as to why people drive while intoxicated (DWI). We find that preferences and subjective beliefs about arrest/incarceration of persons who drink and drive do differ systematically from others in terms of benefits and costs of drink and driving, and in their risk tolerance. While most findings imply that DWI is a deliberate choice, we do find that drinker drivers tend to be more impulsive and lack self-control in their drinking.

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Notes

  1. One can use different terms to describe these frameworks. In a recent review of the economics of health behavior, Cawley and Ruhm (2012) use the terms “traditional” for the standard neoclassical framework commonly used in economics and “non-traditional” for frameworks employed in the behavioral economics literature. We use Cawley and Ruhm’s terms in this study. Other classification systems have been used. For example, Nochajski and Stasiewicz (2006) call our traditional approach “criminal justice models.” They also describe “addiction models,” which incorporate psychological concepts including addiction.

  2. See Shavell (2007), especially pp. 144–48, which describes this type of model which applies in both a civil and criminal law context.

  3. Another activity is driving. One study reports that higher gasoline prices reduce the frequency of motor vehicle crashes, especially less severe crashes while alcohol consumption has a greater effect on frequency of more severe crashes (Chi et al. 2010).

  4. Among the stylized facts is the real excise tax on alcoholic beverages has been falling in the U.S. and that the probability of being arrested for DWI conditional on driving while intoxicated is very low, estimated at 0.001–0.002 conditional on driving while intoxicated (Bertelli and Richardson 2008; Dowling et al. 2011).

  5. See (Sloan et al. 1995) for a discussion of the comparative statics of a similar model.

  6. Decisions about z and e occur almost simultaneously since the individual’s blood alcohol content diminishes soon after alcohol consumption ceases. So it is appropriate to treat these decisions as joint and simultaneous.

  7. Conceptual analysis of risk preferences in the context of deterrence has focused on the relationship of risk preferences to the relative effectiveness of certainty versus severity of punishment (see e.g., Becker 1968 and Friesen 2012).

  8. Per capita consumption of ethanol in gallons in 2007—NC (2.0), PA (2.2), WA (2.4), and WI (3.0) (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 2009). Arrest to population ratios varied from 0.25 % (WA) to 0.67 % (WI) in 2009 (our calculation from arrest data we obtained from each state). The four large cities—Seattle, Philadelphia, Raleigh, and Milwaukee—have populations 380,000–1.4 million. The smaller cities—Yakima, Hickory, Wilkes-Barre, and La Crosse—have populations 37,000–82,800. The racial makeup of each city varies, e.g., Philadelphia and Milwaukee with large African-American populations, 43 and 37 %, respectively, Yakima with a large Hispanic population, 34 %. Further, auto insurance varies greatly among the cities. In an article entitled “Why is Automobile Insurance in Philadelphia So Damn Expensive?” Smith and Wright (1992) found that automobile liability insurance premiums in Philadelphia were about twice as high as they were in Seattle. Seattle’s were about 50 % higher than those in Milwaukee. Raleigh/Durham did not make the list. The authors attributed high premiums in some cities, at least in part, to large numbers of uninsured motorists in some markets. Ratios of uninsured motorist to bodily injury claims varied from 0.38 in Philadelphia, 0.14 in Milwaukee, to 0.089 for Seattle. Wisconsin is a particularly interesting state for this study as it is one of only three states that did not have compulsory auto insurance laws (at the time of the survey). Another statutory difference among the four study states is that North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, but not Washington, have a key statute in DWI control—allowing sobriety checkpoints.

  9. Spending a night in jail following arrest but prior to a conviction is common for DWI arrests.

  10. Our notion of altruism thus does not incorporate the motive of reciprocity. This cannot be expected in the context of driving. On this motive, see Fehr and Gächter (1998).

  11. We obtain the laws from various sources to judge whether or not respondents’ answers are correct. Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §46.61.5055; North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §20–179; Pennsylvania: 75 Pa. C.S. §3804; Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. §346.65.

  12. The SAD asked for educational attainment and household income in the past year in mutually-exclusive categories. To develop continuous variables for educational attainment, we translate descriptions of highest grade or year of school completed into years. For example, we assume that “less than a high school graduate” equals 11 years and “graduate education” equals 18 years. Income was asked in income categories. For income, we take the mid-point of each category. The open-ended category for income was $250,000+. We set income of persons in such households at $350,000.

  13. The SAD did not ask follow-up questions about social interactions, including peer effects. While potentially important, this line of questioning would have taken a lot of survey time, which budget and survey time constraints precluded.

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Acknowledgments

This research was funded by a grant from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA, #R01AA017913).

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Correspondence to Frank A. Sloan.

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Sloan, F.A., Eldred, L.M. Do preferences of drinker-drivers differ?. Int J Health Econ Manag. 15, 241–268 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-015-9169-x

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