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The potential premium range of risk-rating in competitive markets for supplementary health insurance

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Abstract

In this paper, we simulate several scenarios of the potential premium range for voluntary (supplementary) health insurance, covering benefits which might be excluded from mandatory health insurance (MI). Our findings show that, by adding risk-factors, the minimum premium decreases and the maximum increases. The magnitude of the premium range is especially substantial for benefits such as medical devices and drugs. When removing benefits from MI policymakers should be aware of the implications for the potential reduction of affordability of voluntary health insurance coverage in a competitive market.

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Correspondence to Francesco Paolucci.

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Paolucci, F., Prinsze, F., Stam, P.J.A. et al. The potential premium range of risk-rating in competitive markets for supplementary health insurance. Int J Health Care Finance Econ 9, 243–258 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-008-9049-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-008-9049-8

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