Setting the Stage

In her commentary on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, Romdenh-Romluc characterizes Merleau-Ponty’s view on the body as follows:

One of Merleau-Ponty’s most important ideas is his thesis that the body is a form of consciousness.… Empiricism and IntellectualismFootnote 1 conceive of the body as a physical object, which is answerable to causal laws, and does not differ in any significant respect from other physical objects like tables and rocks.… Merleau-Ponty argues in contrast that the body cannot be thought of as a mere object. Instead, it is a subject: a form of consciousness (Romdenh-Romluc, 2010: 62; see also 2012a: 107).Footnote 2

According to Romdenh-Romluc, thus, Merleau-Ponty’s main contribution to the philosophy of the body consists in his emphasis on the body’s conscious dimension: The body is not just a physical object determined by causal laws. For it is also a subject, a form of consciousness. And this conscious dimension of the body is what distinguishes it in principle from other physical objects like tables and rocks.

In contemporary philosophy, the distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body is often presented as “the phenomenological contribution to a solution of the mind-body problem” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: 136), as “an alternative to mind-body dualism” (Behnke, 2011, Sect. 1.b), and as “a powerful critique of Cartesian dualism” (Behnke, 2011, Sect. 6.; see also 1996: 151). The distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body has even been described as a “brilliant bit of problem-dissolution” (Morris, 2020: 232) with regard to the mind-body problem.

Now, the distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body does seem to be incompatible with Descartes’ theory of the body, as it is standardly interpreted. For Descartes explicitly denies that the body has any mental aspect, dimension, or side. As he puts it, e.g.: “I have a complete understanding of what a body is when I think that it is merely something having extension, shape and motion, and I deny that it has anything which belongs to the nature of a mind” (Descartes, 2005: 86; my emphasis).Footnote 3

It must be asked, however, whether this seeming incompatibility of the distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body with Descartes’ theory of the body also amounts to an overcoming of Cartesianism, more broadly conceived. For the main intuition behind Cartesianism is typically taken to be the claim that there are two realms of being, one conscious and one physical, that are governed by fundamentally different principles and separated by a gap that at least seems unbridgeable. And prima facie, it is difficult to see how the distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body is supposed to go beyond this intuition. For this distinction still seems to leave us with the tension between the physical and the conscious that is at the center of the mind-body problem. It still seems to oppose physicality and consciousness in a way that makes us wonder how they could be reconciled.

In addition to that, the constituents of the conscious dimension of the body, i.e., conscious bodily states, are commonly used by contemporary dualists to argue for their position. Take, e.g., pain: Pain is an essential part of the conscious dimension of the body. At the same time, however, pain features prominently in some of the most famous arguments against materialism in contemporary philosophy of mind. Let me just point to one of them: Levine’s argument for an explanatory gap between the neuronal correlates of pain and the sensation of pain itself (Levine, 1983; see also Kripke, 1972, 1980; Putnam, 1968). In this argument, Levine claims that the relation between pain and its neuronal correlates appears merely contingent because the neuronal correlates do not explain “why pain should feel the way it does” (Levine, 1983: 357). Now, Levine himself does not draw any dualist conclusions from the explanatory gap. But others, most notably Chalmers (1996, 2003), have readily taken this additional step: According to them, the explanation of pain by way of its neuronal correlates is gappy exactly because there is an ontological gap between them, i.e., because dualism is true (see also, e.g., Loose et al., 2018: 5f.; Meixner, 2004: 17).

In view of all of this, it should come as no surprise that some philosophers have asked whether the distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body, rather than being an alternative to dualism, just shifts the problem and is, in fact, a dualism in disguise. Thus, Halák writes with regard to Husserl’s distinction between Körper and Leib (Husserl, 2000), which corresponds to the distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body: “Husserl’s interpretation of Leib as a unity of co-apprehension of an upper stratum of sensations on a purely material object leads to insoluble difficulties in the Husserlian framework. Above all, this account is fundamentally dualistic” (Halák, 2021: 337). And Dillon makes the same point with regard to Sartre’s distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body or, as Sartre puts it, the body-for-others and the body-for-me (Sartre, 1978):

Sartre’s attempt to find separate grounds for the immanent and transcendent aspects of embodiment is essentially Cartesian and leads to failure, insofar as it results in an ontological dualism which fails to explain how a reconciliation is possible: Sartre leaves us with two mutually exclusive realms of being. (Dillon, 1998: 139)

Halák’s and Dillon’s objections must be distinguished from what Thompson calls the “body-body problem” (see Hanna & Thompson, 2003; Thompson, 2007) and what is, in fact, an attempt to solve the mind-body problem and to bridge the explanatory gap by reinterpreting the concepts involved in it in such a way that “an account of the lived body that integrates biology and phenomenology, and so goes ‘beyond the gap’” (Thompson, 2007: 237), becomes possible (see also Fuchs, 2018, Chap. 3.1).

Also, Halák’s and Dillon’s objections, of course, do not amount to definitive rebuttals of Husserl’s and Sartre’s theories of the body. Now, I cannot go into the possible answers that Husserl and Sartre might give to Halák’s and Dillon’s objections (see, e.g., Heinämaa, 2012; Mui, 2010; Slatman, 2005; Taipale, 2014; Zahavi, 2003). And I cannot discuss the relation between Husserl’s and Sartre’s theories of the body and the theory of Merleau-Ponty. My point, rather, is the following: If we accept Romdenh-Romluc’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body, then the same objections that Halák and Dillon make against Husserl and Sartre can also be made against Merleau-Ponty. For according to Romdenh-Romluc’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body, Merleau-Ponty opposes the physical and the conscious dimension of the body in much the same way as, according to Halák and Dillon, Husserl and Sartre do. And this opposition creates the same tension that Halák and Dillon point to.

In what follows, however, I will call into question Romdenh-Romluc’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body and argue that depicting this theory as emphasizing the distinction between the physical and the conscious dimension of the body is inadequate. Instead, Merleau-Ponty should be taken to go beyond the Cartesian framework in a way that breaks up the opposition between the physical and the conscious that is at the center of the mind-body problem and that provides us with a novel perspective on the idea of “the union of the soul and the body” (see, e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 91, 99).

Being in the World as the “Common Ground” Between Body and Soul

The point of departure of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body is the search for, as he puts it,

a single point of application or a common ground… between “physiological facts” (which are in space) and “psychical facts” (which are nowhere), or even between objective processes, such as nervous impulses (which belong to the order of the in-itself), and cogitationes, such as acceptance or refusal, consciousness of the past, or emotion (which belong to the order of the for-itself) (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 79).Footnote 4

Merleau-Ponty, thus, looks for “the means of joining the one with the other (the ‘psychical’ and the ‘physiological,’ the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-itself’) and the means of arranging an encounter between them” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 79f.). He wants to exhibit “the living bond and communication between one term and the other” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 72) and to “[integrate] third person processes and personal acts… into a milieu they would share” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 80).

Of course, these passages are quite vague and metaphorical, as is typical for Merleau-Ponty. What does seem clear, however, is that Merleau-Ponty wants to bridge the gap between mind and body. And he wants to do so by disclosing a structure that is common to both of them. This common structure is supposed to unite consciousness and organism and to constitute their shared milieu.

The name that Merleau-Ponty gives to the common structure he wants to disclose is existence or being in the world. As he says: “‘Being in the world’ will be able to establish the junction of the ‘psychical’ and the ‘physiological’” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 82).Footnote 5 And as he also puts it:

The union of the soul and the body is not established through an arbitrary decree that unites two mutually exclusive terms, one a subject and the other an object. It is accomplished at each moment in the movement of existence. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 91; see also 99)Footnote 6

Merleau-Ponty does not start out with a clear-cut definition of being in the world. Given that its function is to provide a “common ground” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 79) between mind and body, however, it seems natural to assume that being in the world has to extend beyond consciousness. For if the extension of being in the world were limited to consciousness, if being in the world were necessarily conscious, then it seems as though it could not fulfill its bridging function and unite body and mind.

A look at the literature, however, shows that this claim is by no means undisputed. For while there seems to be widespread agreement that being in the world does not presuppose consciousness in the more demanding sense of reflection (Sartre, 1978, 1991), first-personal self-reference (Baker, 2000, 2013; Castañeda, 1966, 1999), higher-order volition (Frankfurt, 1971, 1999), etc., there still seems to be a tendency to assume that being in the world is tied to consciousness in the less demanding sense of pre-reflective or minimal consciousness (for discussions of this concept, see, e.g., Sartre, 1978, 1991; Zahavi, 2005, 2014), after all. Matthews, e.g., writes: “[Merleau-Ponty’s] talk of ‘being-in-the-world’ is… not intended to get away from human subjectivity but to clarify the nature of that subjectivity.… His phenomenology… is focused on the analysis of pre-theoretical human experience” (Matthews, 2002: 56). Matthews, thus, links being in the world to subjectivity and experience in a way that seems to rule out the possibility of a kind of being in the world that goes beyond consciousness in the pre-reflective or minimal sense.Footnote 7

This tendency to assume a necessary connection between being in the world and pre-reflective or minimal consciousness stems, I believe, from the fact that being in the world is often introduced by way of skillful coping, as Dreyfus famously calls it, i.e., by way of bodily activities which, through practice over time, become “second nature” (Dreyfus, 2014a: 116; see also Mulhall, 1990; White, 2023). Typical examples of such bodily activities are playing tennis, driving to the office, brushing one’s teeth, etc. And indeed, some of the passages Merleau-Ponty is most famous for are descriptions of examples of skillful coping (see, e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 143f. (dancing), 145 (typing), 146 (playing an organ)).

Now, Dreyfus emphasizes that skillful coping does not presuppose reflection, first-personal self-reference, higher-order volitions, etc. In this more demanding sense of “consciousness,” skillful coping is not conscious.Footnote 8 At the same time, however, Dreyfus also emphasizes that “skillful coping is a mode of awareness” (Dreyfus, 2014b: 88). Thus, if “consciousness” is used in a less demanding sense, skillful coping, according to Dreyfus, does seem to presuppose consciousness. This comes out, e.g., in the following passage:

When everyday coping is going well, one experiences something like what athletes call flow, or playing out of their heads. One’s activity is completely geared into the demands of the situation. One does not distinguish one’s experience of acting from one’s ongoing activity, and therefore one has no self-referential experience of oneself as causing that activity. (Dreyfus, 2014b: 81)

Thus, when we are absorbed in skillful coping, when we are, so to say, “in the flow,” we do not distinguish between our experience of the activity and the activity itself. We do not, in other words, reflect on the activity. This absence of reflection, however, does not amount to an absence of consciousness altogether. For there is still experience, as Dreyfus points out. The activity, thus, still seems to be at least pre-reflectively or minimally conscious.

Now, if being in the world is introduced by way of skillful coping, then it may indeed seem as though being in the world entails at least a pre-reflective or minimal consciousness. What must be emphasized, however, is that Merleau-Ponty himself does not introduce being in the world in this way, i.e., by way of skillful coping, in Phenomenology of Perception.

Instead, the first example that Merleau-Ponty gives of being in the world is that of leg substitution in insects. Thus, while an insect whose leg is removed quickly substitutes the removed leg with a healthy one, an insect whose leg is not removed but tied is unable to do so. And the explanation that Merleau-Ponty gives for this inability of the insect to substitute the tied leg is the following:

The animal simply continues to exist in the same world and carries itself toward this world with all of its powers. The tied limb is not replaced by the free one because the tied one continues to count in the animal’s being and because the impulse of activity that goes toward the world still passes through that limb. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 80; see also 1967: 40)Footnote 9

Merleau-Ponty, thus, seems to explain the insect’s inability to substitute the tied leg by way of the fact that the tied leg, unlike the removed one, is still part of the insect’s being in the world. The world is, as one might put it in Gibsonian terms, still given to the insect as providing affordances with regard to the tied leg (see Gibson, 1979). And this is why the insect is unable to, so to say, “let go” of the tied leg and substitute it.

The example of leg substitution may still leave some room for debate with regard to the question of how being in the world and consciousness are related. For it may be claimed that even insects have a minimal consciousness, that in the case of the tied leg, the insect is still minimally conscious of it, and that this is why Merleau-Ponty takes the tied leg to still be part of the insect’s being in the world.

This claim is unusual. There are, however, some philosophers who make at least similar claims. Steward, e.g., argues for some kind of consciousness in the case of spiders. Thus, after a detailed description of the prey behavior of the spider Portia, she claims that this behavior can be explained only if Portia is taken to be minimally conscious. As Steward puts it: “The mind module is in business” (Steward, 2012: 108; with regard to the question of animal consciousness, see also Allen & Trestman, 2023; Mendl et al., 2011; Wilcox & Jackson, 1998).

In view of this, let us have a look at the second example of being in the world that Merleau-Ponty gives in Phenomenology of Perception, i.e., the example of reflexes (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 81f.). Merleau-Ponty, thus, writes:

In fact, reflexes… are never blind processes.… The reflex does not result from objective stimuli, it turns toward them, it invests them with a sense… that they only have when taken as a situation.… Reflex, insofar as it opens itself to the sense of a situation,… [is a modality] of a pre-objective perspective that we call “being in the world”. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 81)

Now, there are, of course, many reflexes which are, at least sometimes, accompanied by consciousness. Take, e.g., the reflex movement of the head toward a source of sound, which Merleau-Ponty discusses in The Structure of Behavior (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 39): Sometimes this reflex movement may be pre-reflectively or minimally conscious. However, sometimes it may not: Sometimes the reflex movement of the head toward a source of sound may take place completely outside of consciousness.

And Merleau-Ponty gives even more obvious examples of reflexes that are not conscious in The Structure of Behavior. Thus, he repeatedly discusses reflex movements of the eyes such as the fixation reflex, by way of which the eyes adapt to light stimuli such that they receive them in the retinal center (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 8, 33), and the pupillary light reflex, by way of which the diameter of the pupils changes in response to changes in the intensity of light (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 45): These reflex movements of the eyes are a necessary condition for consciously seeing. However, they themselves are not conscious: The fixation reflex and the pupillary light reflex take place below the threshold of consciousness. And even if we try, we cannot make them conscious.

Merleau-Ponty discusses many more examples of reflexes in The Structure of Behavior, such as the plantar flexion reflex of the toes evoked by stimulation of the sole (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 18), the relaxation of the flexor muscles of the foot when we catch our toe on a root (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 45), the different reflex responses by way of which cats react to different stimulations of their ears (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 11), etc. In fact, the development of a reflexology that goes beyond the mechanistic presuppositions of classical behaviorism is one of the main goals of The Structure of Behavior (see especially Merleau-Ponty, 1967, Chap. I and II): Merleau-Ponty wants to show that the behaviorist attempt to reduce behavior to reflexes is destined to fail, since reflexes themselves are incompatible with the mechanistic framework that classical behaviorism presupposes. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: “[In classical behaviorism], behavior is reduced to the sum of reflexes and conditioned reflexes between which no intrinsic connection is admitted. But precisely this atomistic interpretation fails even at the level of the theory of the reflex” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 4f.).Footnote 10  

At this point, it should be noted that the concept of mechanism has become increasingly difficult to pin down (see Craver & Tabery, 2023; Dupré, 2013). Merleau-Ponty uses this term in what seems to be the classical sense, according to which “mechanical philosophy is an eliminative reductionism that aimed at replacing the Aristotelian ontology” (Roux, 2017: 29). The classical mechanism, thus, seems to entail a kind of efficient causation and atomism, and to exclude any kind of teleology, formal causation, hylomorphism, etc. (for a more nuanced characterization, see, e.g., Roux, 2017; Slowik, 2021; Westfall, 1971). Merleau-Ponty, e.g., writes: “In its functioning the body cannot be defined as a blind mechanism, a mosaic of causally independent sequences” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 30; see also 2012: 75, 143). Now, around the turn of the twenty-first century, the so-called “new mechanism” emerged (see, e.g., Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Glennan, 1996; Machamer et al., 2000). And while there are similarities between the classical and the new mechanism (see Roux, 2017), the new mechanists have largely distanced themselves from “the austere metaphysical world picture” (Craver & Tabery, 2023, Sect. 2) of the classical mechanists. The new mechanism, thus, does not entail a commitment to reductionism (see Bechtel, 2009), and according to some of its proponents, it is even compatible with teleology (see Maley & Piccinini, 2017). – I will not try to assess what Merleau-Ponty’s view of the new mechanism might have been (for a critique of a version of the new mechanism inspired by Merleau-Ponty, see Sheredos, 2021). Instead, I will restrict myself to a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s view of the classical mechanism in what follows. I will, thus, use the term “mechanism” in the classical sense.

Being in the World and Life

Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of non-conscious reflexes as examples of being in the world leads to the question of whether the bodily movements of organisms that are not conscious at all, either temporarily or generally, can still be said to be a kind of being in the world: Can the bodily movements of a person in dreamless sleep or the bodily movements of plants and unicellular organisms still be categorized as a kind of existence, assuming that persons in dreamless sleep, as well as plants and unicellular organisms, presumably are not even minimally conscious? In what follows, I will focus on the second part of this question, i.e., on the question of being in the world in non-conscious organisms such as plants and unicellular organisms, since this question seems to be the more fundamental one.

Kee answers the question of being in the world in plants and unicellular organisms in the negative. He claims that even though “Merleau-Ponty explicitly states neither how broadly distributed behavior is within the organic world, nor what its minimal exemplar is” (Kee, 2021: 2327), Merleau-Ponty’s concept of behavior must be taken to apply exclusively to conscious organisms. It must not be taken to apply to plants and unicellular organisms.

Now, the concept of behavior is obviously closely related to the concept of being in the world. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty seems to equate behavior and existence or being in the world. He, thus, writes in The Structure of Behavior: “In our opinion…, when Watson spoke of behavior he had in mind what others have called existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 226). In view of this, Kee’s claim that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of behavior applies exclusively to conscious organisms seems to amount to the claim that only conscious organisms can be said to exist or to be in the world.Footnote 11

Kee’s claim is directed against the autopoietic enactivists, and especially against Thompson (2007), who extend the scope of concepts such as behavior, sense-making, meaning, normativity, etc., to all organisms, including plants and unicellular organisms.Footnote 12 And it is based on the observation that all of the examples of behavior that Merleau-Ponty discusses in The Structure of Behavior concern conscious organisms. As Kee emphasizes repeatedly, Merleau-Ponty does not discuss plants or unicellular organisms in this book (see Kee, 2021: 2327, 2337).

Now, the first thing to note with regard to Kee’s claims is that Merleau-Ponty clearly takes insect behavior to be an example of being in the world, as we have seen above. And the claim that insects are conscious seems to be at least questionable. Kee (2021: 2327) endorses this claim. But as we have said above, few philosophers are willing to follow him in this respect. Steward seems to be an exception.

Also, even though Merleau-Ponty does not discuss plants and unicellular organisms in The Structure of Behavior, there are many passages in this book which do seem to suggest that Merleau-Ponty takes the concepts of behavior, sense-making, meaning, normativity, etc., to apply to all organisms, including plants and unicellular organisms. Take, e.g., Merleau-Ponty’s definition of organisms:

We speak of vital structures… when equilibrium is obtained… with respect to conditions which are only virtual and which the system itself brings into existence; when the structure… executes a work beyond its proper limits and constitutes a proper milieu for itself. (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 145f.; see also 153)

This definition of organisms seems to be inherently normative, since organisms are defined by their tendency to obtain a virtual equilibrium. Merleau-Ponty, thus, also writes: “Organic structures are understood only by a norm” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 148). And there is no indication that he takes this statement to apply exclusively to conscious organisms.

Also, Merleau-Ponty uses terms such as “biological meaning” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 21, 25, 123), “meaning for the organism” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 45), “biological value” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 15, 49, 149), “biological significance” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 11), “vital significance” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 149, 161), “significance and value of vital processes” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 156), etc., throughout The Structure of Behavior. And, again, there is no indication that he takes the scope of these concepts to be restricted to conscious organisms.Footnote 13

In addition, Merleau-Ponty repeatedly uses the concept of behavior in a way that suggests an essential connection between life and behavior. He writes, e.g.: “The world, inasmuch as it harbors living beings, ceases to be a material plenum consisting of juxtaposed parts; it opens up at the place where behavior appears” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 125). And: “[Those wholes], which are called living beings, present the particularity of having behavior, which is to say that… the parts of the world to which they react are delimited for them by an internal norm” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 149). Merleau-Ponty, thus, seems to assume that where there is life, there is behavior, and that life and behavior go hand in hand.

In view of all of this, I tend to side with the autopoietic enactivists and their claim that, according to Merleau-Ponty, there is behavior, sense-making, meaning, normativity, etc., and, thus, existence or being in the world, “all the way down,” to the level of plants and unicellular organisms, even though Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly make this claim.

At this point, it should also be added that both Kee (2021: 2338) and Thompson (2011: 119) refer to Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on Uexküll in the course notes on nature (Merleau-Ponty, 2003) in order to support their interpretations. In these remarks, Merleau-Ponty does discuss unicellular organisms such as amoebas and paramecia. In my view, however, Merleau-Ponty’s remarks cannot decide the debate one way or the other. For just as the course notes on nature in general, they are based on student notes. And they are often highly elusive. In particular, it is not clear at all whether Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on Uexküll express Merleau-Ponty’s own view or whether they just summarize the view of Uexküll.

Being in the World and the Physical

The discussion of the relation between being in the world and life also raises the question of how being in the world relates to the physical: Does it not just extend beyond consciousness and into life but also into the physical? Are there physical systems that are kinds of being in the world? Merleau-Ponty’s answer to these questions seems to be straightforward: He seems to reject the claim that physical systems exhibit being in the world. Merleau-Ponty, thus, writes, e.g.: “One says of a man or of an animal that he behaves; one does not say it of an acid, an electron, a pebble or a cloud except by metaphor” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 225). And:

As long as one sees the physical world as a being which embraces all things and as long as one tries to integrate behavior into it, one will be driven… to a materialism, which maintains the coherence of the physical order only by reducing [the vital and the human order] to it. (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 137)

In view of Merleau-Ponty’s equation of behavior and existence or being in the world, these statements seem to amount to the claim that being in the world does not extend beyond life and into the physical, that physical systems do not exhibit being in the world.

Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty does not speak of meaning, normativity, etc., when it comes to physical systems but of a “combined interplay of laws,” a “system of complementary laws” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 139), etc. And although he characterizes both vital structures and physical systems as obtaining an equilibrium, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that this equilibrium is not obtained with respect to virtual conditions but only with respect to “real and present conditions” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 145) in the case of physical systems. Physical systems, thus, do not “execute a work beyond [their] proper limits” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 145f.). Instead, they merely “reduc[e] a state of tension” and “advanc[e] the system toward rest” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 145).

Summing up, Merleau-Ponty seems to restrict the scope of being in the world to the vital order. And he emphasizes the irreducibility of the vital order to the physical order. Merleau-Ponty, thus, endorses a kind of antireductionism about biology, according to which biology cannot be reduced to physics and vital structures cannot be reduced to physical systems (see, e.g., Barbaras, 2021: 23; Carman, 2008b: 126; Low, 2004). As Merleau-Ponty also puts it: “A total molecular analysis would dissolve the structure of the functions of the organism into the undivided mass of banal physical and chemical reactions. Life is not therefore the sum of these reactions” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 152).Footnote 14  

Merleau-Ponty’s antireductionism about biology yields an important result with regard to his philosophy of the body. For it shows that, pace Romdenh-Romluc, Merleau-Ponty does not take the body, insofar as it is not conscious, to be a physical object. Instead, the body is an organism. And organisms cannot be reduced to physical objects. Thus, it is not just the body’s conscious dimension that stands in the way of a physicalist reduction. For the body’s non-conscious dimension resists such a reduction as well.Footnote 15

The Question of Teleology

Merleau-Ponty’s claim that vital structures have to be characterized in terms of meaning, normativity, etc., as opposed to physical systems, which can be characterized in terms of laws, raises a question that, in my view, is quite important but that is seldom discussed in the literature, i.e., the question of teleology: Does Merleau-Ponty conceive of organic processes as purposive and goal-directed? Is his theory of the body teleological?

Thompson’s remarks on the relationship between normativity and teleology suggest a positive answer to this question (see Thompson, 2007: 147–149). For after a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s normative theory of the organism and its relation to autopoietic enactivism, Thompson writes: “The upshot of this discussion is that living beings embody an immanent purposiveness” (Thompson, 2007: 148). Thus, normative characterizations of organic processes, according to Thompson, imply teleological characterizations of these processes. And as a result, Merleau-Ponty’s normative theory of the organism is, in fact, a teleological theory.

Merleau-Ponty, however, explicitly rejects the notion of teleology, or, as he calls it, “finalism”: “Both mechanism and finalism should be rejected,” he says (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 184; see also 26). This point is emphasized frequently in the literature (see, e.g., Barbaras, 2005: 224; Bech, 2013: 154). But what is, again, seldom discussed is why Merleau-Ponty rejects teleology: What is the reason for this rejection?

The main objection against teleology is the objection of anthropomorphism. According to this objection, if we explain natural processes teleologically, we unjustifiably project human categories onto nature. Merleau-Ponty, however, explicitly defends the use of notions that will seem anthropomorphic to some. Thus, e.g., when emphasizing that the behavior of the organism can be classified as “ordered or disordered, significant or insignificant” due to the organism’s tendency to “re-establish certain states of preferred equilibrium” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 38), Merleau-Ponty writes: “These denominations [i.e., ‘ordered or disordered, significant or insignificant’], far from being extrinsic and anthropomorphic, would belong to the living being as such” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 38; see also 102).

But why, then, does Merleau-Ponty reject teleology? What is the reason for this rejection? With regard to this question, the following passage is illuminating: Merleau-Ponty writes that it is “necessary” to “renounce mechanistic realism along with finalistic realism, that is, [to] renounce all the forms of causal thought” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 51). Merleau-Ponty, thus, takes mechanism and teleology to be the two “forms of causal thought”. And he claims that all forms of causal thought must be rejected.

This parallelization of mechanism and teleology suggests that Merleau-Ponty takes mechanistic explanations and teleological explanations, despite their obvious differences, to share certain presuppositions that must be abandoned. Thus, in a way, teleological explanations, rather than being too anthropomorphic, are “too mechanistic” for Merleau-Ponty: The intuition behind his rejection of teleology seems to be that both mechanistic explanations and teleological explanations turn organic events into “blind processes” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 81), mere automatisms, the only difference, presumably, being that in the one case, these automatisms are set in motion by temporally prior causes, whereas in the other case, they are set in motion by some target state in the future toward which they are invariably ordered.

Merleau-Ponty’s position seems to be similar to and is probably influenced by, the position of Bergson in this respect. Thus, Bergson, e.g., writes:

Radical finalism is quite as unacceptable [as radical mechanism], and for the same reason. The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme form… implies that things and beings merely realize a program previously arranged.… As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs from the same postulate, with this sole difference, that in the movement of our finite intellects along successive things… it holds in front of us the light with which it claims to guide us, instead of putting it behind. It substitutes the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past. (Bergson, 1944: 45)

In the end, Merleau-Ponty claims that neither mechanistic explanations nor teleological explanations can do justice to what he calls “the vital dialectic of the organism and its milieu” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 176). Merleau-Ponty, thus, takes “the relations of the organic individual and its milieu” to be “truly dialectical relations” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 148). And he contrasts the circular character of these relations with the supposedly linear character of causation: “[Situation and reaction] cannot be placed one after the other as cause and effect: they are two moments of a circular process” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 130). The organism and its milieu, in other words, interact in a way that makes it impossible to reduce their interactions “to a series of uni-directional determinations” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 161; see also Priest, 1998: 162–165). And since causal thought, according to Merleau-Ponty, is committed to the claim that the relations between the organism and its milieu can be reduced to such uni-directional determinations, causal thought must be rejected.

It must be asked, however, whether the concept of causation really entails the commitments Merleau-Ponty ascribes to it: Does it really presuppose uni-directionality? And is it really incompatible with circularity? – What must be emphasized is that Merleau-Ponty does not seem to be quite consistent with regard to these questions, for he repeatedly speaks of “circular causality” when he describes the relations between the organism and its milieu. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, e.g.: “The relations between the organism and its milieu are not relations of linear causality but of circular causality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 15; see also 17). And this, of course, seems to imply that, according to Merleau-Ponty, there is a kind of causation that is compatible with the dialectical character of the relations between the organism and its milieu, and that the concepts of causation and dialectic are not mutually exclusive, after all.

Sheredos criticizes this interpretation. According to him, Merleau-Ponty’s repeated use of the concept of circular causality must not be seen as an endorsement. The claim that “‘circular causality’ is just another name for what Merleau-Ponty calls a ‘dialectical relation’,” in Sheredos’ view, is “an error” (Sheredos, 2017: 202).Footnote 16 In fact, Sheredos claims that, according to Merleau-Ponty, any characterization of the “meaningful exchange… between organism and milieu” (Sheredos, 2017: 202) in causal terms is a “category mistake” (Sheredos, 2017: 203).

Sheredos’ view is based on the presupposition that Merleau-Ponty assumes a gap, an opposition between the realm of “meaning and significance” (Sheredos, 2017: 202) and the realm of causation, that, according to Merleau-Ponty, meaningful exchanges and causal processes must be distinguished in principle. In view of the foregoing considerations, however, this presupposition must be called into question. For as I have argued, the decisive step in Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body is the extension of the use of terms such as meaning, normativity, etc., to non-conscious bodily processes.Footnote 17 And non-conscious bodily processes are typically conceived as standard examples of causation. Merleau-Ponty, thus, seems to reframe standard examples of causation in terms of meaning. And this makes it seem as though, rather than emphasizing the difference between meaningful exchanges and causal processes, Merleau-Ponty wants to blur this difference. Rather than underlining the opposition between meaning and causation, he wants to break up this opposition.

Just take Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of reflexes quoted above: “The reflex does not result from objective stimuli, it turns toward them, it invests them with a sense” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 81; my emphasis). Or take the following characterizations of the relation between the organism and its stimuli: “It is the organism itself… which chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 13; my emphasis). “With respect to the organism [stimuli] play the role of occasions rather than of cause” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 161; my emphasis).

In all of these passages, Merleau-Ponty characterizes reflexes and stimuli, which, again, are typically conceived as standard examples of causation, in terms that are obviously taken from the realm of meaning. In fact, Merleau-Ponty characterizes reflexes and stimuli in a language that is usually reserved for the characterization of actions, reasons, motives, etc. Certainly, there is an element of hyperbole in Merleau-Ponty’s formulations. For the claims that stimuli are chosen by the organism, that they are merely the occasions for the organism’s reaction, etc., seem to be just too anthropomorphic to be taken at face value. However, even if we take into account this element of hyperbole, it still seems as though Sheredos’ objection of the category mistake must be called into question in view of Merleau-Ponty’s formulations.

In the end, I believe that Sheredos’ claim that Merleau-Ponty’s repeated use of the concept of circular causality must not be seen as an endorsement is insufficiently justified. And as a result, I think that there is room for a kind of causation that does justice to the dialectical character of the relations between the organism and its milieu in Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body, after all.

Of course, it should also be noted that even if we take Merleau-Ponty to reject the notion of causation tout court, we do not have to follow him in this respect. The claim that there is a kind of circular causation may still be true, as Sheredos concedes: “Thompson’s own view [i.e., the view that there is a kind of circular causation] may be correct – but not his reading of [The Structure of Behavior]” (Sheredos, 2017: 203). My focus in this paper, however, is on the interpretation of Merleau-Ponty. And I believe that even if we restrict ourselves to this issue, Sheredos’ account is not conclusive.

Now, if Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the concept of causation is not final, then his rejection of the concept of teleology does not need to be conceived as final either. For as we have seen, Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the latter is based on his rejection of the former. And as a result, there seems to be room for a kind of teleology that incorporates circularity, non-linearity, etc., in Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body as well. A dialectical teleology seems possible.

In the end, I agree with Thompson’s contention that Merleau-Ponty’s normative conception of vital structures as tending to obtain a virtual equilibrium implies at least some kind of purposiveness and directedness, and, thus, at least some kind of teleology, which extends beyond consciousness and into life.Footnote 18 Of course, we cannot extract a full-fledged theory of teleology from Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body. And in comparison to the level of detail and technicality of the contemporary debate on teleology, and of the related debates on dispositions, powers, capacities, etc. (see, e.g., Anjum & Mumford, 2020; Groff & Greco, 2013; Jacobs, 2017), the passages in Merleau-Ponty which suggest a teleological interpretation seem quite vague. Nevertheless, these passages do further emphasize Merleau-Ponty’s antireductionism about vital structures and his endorsement of a metaphysically quite charged concept of life.

Also, there are a number of contemporary philosophers who have taken up Merleau-Ponty’s concept of circular causality and introduced it into the contemporary debate. Thus, the most comprehensive account of circular causality along Merleau-Pontyian lines was probably put forward by Thompson (2007), who fleshes out the concept of circular causality in terms of autopoiesis. Thompson, e.g., writes: “The cell embodies a circular process of self-generation: thanks to its metabolic network, it continually replaces the components that are being destroyed, including the membrane, and thus continually re-creates the difference between itself and everything else” (Thompson, 2007: 99). And Thompson then goes on to flesh out the concept of autopoiesis in terms of teleology, purposiveness, directedness, etc. He writes, e.g.: “Metabolism operates according to internal norms that determine whether otherwise neutral events are good or bad for the continuation of the organism. In these ways, metabolism is immanently teleological” (Thompson, 2007: 152).

More recently, Fuchs coined the term “integral causality” as an umbrella term for both the circular causality within the organism and the circular causality between the organism and its environment. Fuchs, thus, characterizes his theory as follows:

I… develop an ecological conception of the living organism as an autopoietic system related to its environment. From a certain level on, the organism becomes a center of subjectivity, which should be regarded as a continuous integration of the life process itself. Moreover, this conception involves a closer examination of the specific causality of living systems which I describe as a connection of vertical (inner-organismic or part–whole) circular causality and horizontal (organism–environment) circular causality. This leads to a concept of integral causality by which living beings become the causes of their own conscious enactments of life. (Fuchs, 2018: xix)

And just like Thompson, Fuchs is quite explicit about his endorsement of teleology, purposiveness, directedness, etc. He writes, e.g.: “A self-organizing living system is fundamentally goal-directed, namely towards the goal of its self-maintenance” (Fuchs, 2018: 86).Footnote 19  

What all of this goes to show is that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of a circular causality that is both dialectical and teleological has been taken up and refined in various ways and constitutes an important contribution to the contemporary debate.

Conclusion

Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly address the dualism objection that Halák and Dillon make against Husserl’s distinction between Leib and Körper and Sartre’s distinction between the body-for-me and the body-for-others. But we can now see how Merleau-Ponty wants to establish “the union of the soul and the body” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 91, 99): Merleau-Ponty unites soul and body by assimilating the body to the soul, i.e., by disclosing phenomena that are usually confined to the realm of the mind, such as meaning, normativity, etc., in the realm of life. This assimilation is supposed to overcome the opposition between the soul and the body by allowing us to conceive of mind and life as two kinds of being in the world. Thus, there is a continuum between the soul and the body. And there is a “common ground” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 79) between mind and life. A clash between mechanism and intentionality is avoided because mechanisms are reframed as meaningful responses of the organism to a situation.

Merleau-Ponty sums up his view as follows:

Taken concretely, man is not a psyche joined to an organism, but rather this back-and-forth of existence that sometimes allows itself to exist as a body and sometimes carries itself into personal acts. Psychological motives and bodily events can overlap because there is no single movement in a living body that is an absolute accident with regard to psychical intentions and no single psychical act that has not found at least its germ or its general outline in physiological dispositions. It is never a question of the incomprehensible encounter of two causalities, nor of a collision between the order of causes and the order of ends. Rather, through an imperceptible shift, an organic process opens up into a human behavior, an instinctive act turns back upon itself and becomes an emotion, or, inversely, a human act becomes dormant and is continued absentmindedly as a reflex. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 90)

In the end, many questions are left open, e.g.: Are all manifestations of life kinds of being in the world? What exactly is the relation between the physical processes and the biological processes taking place in the organism? How is being in the world individuated? And how should it be categorized ontologically? Etc. What I hope to have shown, however, is that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body marks a decisive break with the Cartesian framework and that it leads him away from a philosophy of consciousness toward a philosophy of life.