Introduction

This article concerns the question of how the notions of the humanistic coefficient and of cultural sociology in general, as formulated by the Polish-American sociologist and philosopher Florian Znaniecki (1882–1958), are related to Weber’s verstehende Soziologie. It does not presume any influence of the latter upon the former. Both authors stress meaningful action and construe it in terms of its interpretation by the agents. These epistemological similarities notwithstanding, Znaniecki’s reception of Weber was limited and selective. As Hałas has put it, he “hardly refers to Weber” (Hałas, 2010: 190). This article is an attempt to elucidate the reasons for this condition. There are some surprising reasons for this. Znaniecki—far from working in seclusion- was familiar with several prominent sociologists of his time such as Park, Burgess, Simmel, and Durkheim, and was an active part of a cosmopolitan community of scholars (see Znaniecka Lopata, 2011: 171f.). In this article, frequent references will be made to the works by Znaniecki and Weber. We shall do so not in order to propose new interpretations, but rather to point to their respective aims and epistemological assumptions.

As for Znaniecki in particular, attention will be paid to passages in which the notions of the humanistic coefficient and cultural sociology are formulated—passages in which he also cites Weber’s writings. Subsequent to this, the article will discuss Weber’s notions of Verstehen (interpretive understanding) and verstehende Soziologie (interpretive Sociology). A comparison, based on passages by either author in which these notions are explicitly mentioned, will then follow. It is a theoretical comparison; to the effect that the epistemological positions of these two authors concurred in stressing meaning interpretation as necessary to understand social actions, but differed in their conceptions of these notions and their definitions of sociology’s subject matter. The comparison is intended to serve several purposes. First, it will clarify the meaning of these notions; second, it will illustrate the similarities and differences in their respective meanings; and finally, it will account for Znaniecki’s possibly deliberate ignoring of Weber. Znaniecki’s occasional references to his work (see Znaniecki, 1952: 205, 386) show that he was conversant with his writings, but that he preferred not to elaborate on them. In the summary and conclusion of this article, we will suggest some possible reasons for this.

Znaniecki’s Humanistic Coefficient

This concept is of crucial importance in his cultural sociology. In Hałas’s words, “cultural data have something more than meaning: they have sociological significance that makes them to be experienced as values”. As she further writes, “the principle of humanistic coefficient” involves “covering the subjects’ point of view in the course of action and communicated experiences” (Hałas, 2010: 110, 116). In the words of another qualified interpreter of Znaniecki, “Cultural life (for Znaniecki) is any immediate product of action and everything one may learn immediately to act and perform as a social being” (Grathoff, 2000: 1). These definitions are consistent with Znaniecki’s own statement of its meaning: “As an observer of cultural life, he [the sociologist]

can understand the data he observes only if he takes them with the ‘humanistic coefficient,’ only if he does not limit his observation to his own direct experience of the data but “reconstructs the experience of the men who are dealing with them actively” (Znaniecki, 1940: 5). In other words, the sociologist reconstructs the experience of the human agents who are actively interested in his or her observations (Znaniecki, 1965a, 1965b: 49f.). Accordingly, objects of investigation are “those phenomena … as they appear to … the people themselves who participate in them” (Znaniecki, 1965a, 1965b: 104). Znaniecki formulated his notion of the humanistic coefficient in the context of his view of sociology as cultural science (see Znaniecki, 1963: 380). As he wrote, “cultural scientists … consistently apply the humanistic coefficient to the phenomena they investigate” (Znaniecki, 1963: 400).

Znaniecki’s view of sociology as a cultural science was conducive to his focus on cultural life and data as a research object. His lifelong concern with cultural sociology stemmed from his early “interest in values and knowledge as bases for human behavior” (Znaniecki Lopata, 1965: xiv) and more in general, from the philosophical background which he acquired in the philosophical studies he conducted in Poland and abroad, in Switzerland and France. Znaniecki engaged himself in these studies in his capacity as a philosopher, before turning to sociology after World War I. As a philosopher, he published extensively in Polish, his native language, and was offered a chair in philosophy at the University of Poznan after the end of the war.Footnote 1 At his request, however, he taught there sociology. Henceforth, he defined himself as a sociologist. In this new capacity, he taught sociology in the United States at the University of Chicago, and subsequently at Columbia University (see Znaniecki Lopata, 1965: xiii–xvi, and the informative entry on Znaniecki by E. Hałas in the Encyclopedia of Social Theory, 2005: 896–898). As a sociologist, he was close to the Symbolic Interactionism perspective (see Znaniecki Lopata, 2011).

Weber taught at the Universities of Freiburg and Heidelberg. As a University Professor, he “held an unusually eminent place” in the German society of the late nineteenth century (Ringer, 1990: 38). Weber’s educational background was that of a legal scholar. As the legal sociologist Max Rheinstein wrote in his introduction to the book he edited on Max Weber on law in economy and society, “the facts that Weber had been trained to be a lawyer and had taught law to regular law students were to leave their marks on all his future work” (Rheinstein, 1954: xxv). Turner and Factor have called attention to Weber’s background as a student of Roman law. They have also pointed to the similarities and differences between the ways Weber and the prominent legal jurist Jhering approached the problem of historical explanation. They have moreover dwelt upon the notions of cause, purpose, interest, ideals, and the question of the moral basis of law the two scholars dealt with. Weber’s juristic background was then conducive to his historic research on “the concept of and the operations of abstraction” (Turner & Factor 1994: 177). Though he became a sociologist in the last years of his life, Weber “never abandoned scholarly interest in the law” (Turner & Factor, 1994: 6), and therefore his educational background as a historian and a lawyer. The notions of cultural life and data (Znaniecki), of causality and abstraction (Weber), will provide the leitmotiv of the ensuing sections of this article.

Cultural life encompasses an individual’s entire social life (Znaniecki, 1934: 121). Cultural data, therefore, “already belong to somebody else’s active experience and are such as this active experience makes them” (Znaniecki, 1934: 37). The principle of the humanistic coefficient is thus relevant in the theoretical context of cultural sociology. “The active experience of all those who recognize it an ‘objective’ significance which makes its validity seem to them independent of their ‘subjective’ emotions, wishes, representations” (Znaniecki, 1940: 8). Based on the humanistic coefficient the sociologist reconstructs the experience of all those who actively participate in a system of knowledge and abides by their own criteria of validity of this knowledge (Znaniecki, 1940: see especially 5–6; see also Znaniecki, 1927: 536). Cultural sociology and the related theoretical approach of culturalism assume a worldview that “should be constructed on the ground of the implicit or explicit presuppositions involved in the reflection about cultural phenomena” (Znaniecki, 1919: 15). While natural objects are things, cultural objects are values “in view of their essential practical determination with reference to human activity”.

A value possesses “both a given content …and a meaning” (Znaniecki, 1934: 41). The sort of phenomena such as values constitutes cultural reality insofar as they depend on the actor’s “personal experience and reflection” (Znaniecki, 1919: 55); that is, on his or her “cultural experience” (Znaniecki, 1967: 41). It therefore “transcends the limits of present individual experience” (Znaniecki, 1919: 67), and has a cultural reality of its own. For, reality from the viewpoint of the philosophy of culture “includes all cultural products whatever, among others even ideas, i.e., thoughts which have become the object-matter of other ideas” (Znaniecki, 1919: 46). Culture is not “a mere agglomeration of facts of consciousness with their material accompaniment and results”. It is rather constituted by “numerous systems … all with a specific objectivity and an intrinsic order of their own” (Znaniecki, 1967: 5f.). As Znaniecki states elsewhere, the very existence of culture ultimately depends on conscious and active human individuals, since regular cooperation among individuals rests on conscious interactions. These are guided by “common standards of mutual experience and understanding and by common norms of conduct” (Znaniecki, 1963: 396).

In order to assess values, that are meaningful objects (Znaniecki, 1967: 13), the sociologist must interpret and actively share with other agents the cultural experience and activities of those he (or she) investigates (Znaniecki, 1934: 172–174). An object is real “only if it influences other objects by being connected with them (Znaniecki, 1919: 67). There is a world “transcending any experiencing individual and yet common to all of them and experienced by all of them,” since every individual is “a center from which trans-actual thoughts and realities radiate to the common world”. The object matter of reflection is the real world. Thought participates in it by connecting with “some objective ideal order of the cultural systems of science or art, morality or religion, etc.” (Znaniecki, 1919: 43). As Znaniecki has stated elsewhere, “the name ‘cultural sciences’ will be meaningful only if we postulate the existence of a universal category of cultural order including all specific orders which students of culture have discovered and will discover” (Znaniecki, 1952: 10). Here order is defined as “the intentional creation of conscious agents” (Znaniecki, 1952: 18).

Sociology, as Znaniecki views it, is a cultural science (Znaniecki, 1952: 380). More precisely, it is the science of human or social relations, as these are subjectively experienced and consciously created by those who participate in them. Znaniecki considers sociology the central cultural science (Znaniecki, 1927: 563, 584; see also 1969: 34). Cultural sciences provide “a general foundational ordering of the theoretical and methodological perspective” of this discipline (Vaitkus, 1982: 122). Historical objects and cultural objects in particular, such as a myth, receive an objective character insofar as they are connected to other objects. At various moments, various individuals produce and reproduce it, thus conferring upon its content and meaning (Znaniecki, 1919: 94f.). Znaniecki proposed that empirical observation allows one to conclude that “social duties are always reciprocated by other social duties” (Znaniecki, 1934: 113), and he also argues that social actors are bound together by “a system of social relations” (Znaniecki, 1934: 114).Footnote 2 Like all systems, the social system is an empirical datum (see Znaniecki, 1934: 251, 259–264, 269). Social systems interact with each other and with cultural systems (Znaniecki, 1934: 318). Since human groups are products of culture, they also rest on value systems. And, as cultural products, they are systems of values (Znaniecki, 1934: 91; 1939).

In the cultural world as a world of values (Znaniecki, 1934: 59, 70), social actors play the double role of active and conscious agents on the one hand, and as empirical objects of activity on the part of other persons and groups on the other hand (Znaniecki, 1934: 130–132). In the cultural world—a world of values—(Znaniecki, 1934: 59, 70), social actors play a double role. They are active and conscious agents; also, they are empirical objects of the activities of other persons and groups on the other hand (Znaniecki, 1934: 130–132). By social relations, Znaniecki means the particular way in which social interactions are organized normatively. In his own words, “every norm recognized by a social agent as his duty toward somebody else is a component of a social system in which this agent and the object of his duty are bound together as partners. We call such a system a social relation” (Znaniecki, 1934: 114). Social roles are normatively organized and lasting social relations (Znaniecki, 1940: 19).

Norms, and complexes of norms such as the State, are social systems of one sort or another (Znaniecki, 1934: 128). Social actions, unlike social interactions and moral rules (Znaniecki, 1934: 113), are not necessarily based on norms. They are defined as “actions bearing upon men as their objects and intending to provoke reactions on their part” (Znaniecki, 1934: 107; see also 1927: 565; 1952: 388f.; 1967: 168). In other words, social actions intend to exert influence on individuals or groups. “It is a social action only it has a social object,” as Znaniecki puts it concisely (Znaniecki, 1967: 542). Social objects are other actors -be they individuals or collectivities- who are conscious and active human beings and whose spheres of active experience partly, but only partly, interpenetrate each other (see Znaniecki, 1967: 510; see also 1963: 187). They have “a disposition to harmonize or conflict with the agent’s active systems” (Znaniecki, 1967: 589). Their reactions to others must be spontaneous, otherwise “the action is not social, even though it affects human beings” (Znaniecki, 1967: 107). In a group, every member “is a social value for the rest” (Znaniecki, 1934: 132; see also 1927: 567). The task of sociology as the theoretical science of social interaction (Znaniecki 1964: 15) is, according to Znaniecki, to study social systems as empirical data (Znaniecki, 1934: 213, 264f., 269; cf. also Bierstedt, 1969: 20).

It concerns itself primarily with “processes which occur within or between such systems” (Znaniecki, 1940: 3). Znaniecki’s method of choice is analytic induction; namely, “to draw a general hypothesis from a single instance and then to substantiate it by comparing it to hypotheses derived from other different instances” (Znaniecki, 1934: 261). This method calls for a process of abstraction, which is based on principles such as structural dependence between the essential elements of a social system, and generalization. Analytic induction also draws on the principle of causality to account for changes that have occurred in the social system (Znaniecki, 1934: 249–262, 295–307). Any event that occurs in the social system involves a change in the system as a whole, and any such change conflicts “with the original significance of its values” (Znaniecki, 1934: 297). From a systemic point of view, which Znaniecki concurs with, every datum is conceived either as a system, a component of a system, or both. According to him, this systemic perspective is compatible with causal imputation only if “a system undergoes a change which is not explicable by its own dynamic order” (Znaniecki, 1952: 148). Znaniecki raises the problem of how mutual sympathetic understanding and agreement is possible.

More specifically, he is concerned with the problem of how it is possible that any understanding occurs “between two individuals who intuitively know each other’s mind almost as well as each knows his own mind,” and how an agreement can be obtained “between two individuals in their intuitive understanding of a third individual’s mind” (Znaniecki, 1952: 120). According to him, this problem requires a psychological explanation of similarities and differences between cultures. It therefore raises the further and related problem of the validity of psychology “as a strictly inductive science of actual experiences” (Znaniecki, 1952: 124). Cultural data are amenable to psychological explanation if the individual authors know and share the culture and the social life they wish to investigate (Znaniecki, 1952: 134). As Znaniecki further states, the “living human individual as common datum of human experience is a cultural product of many conscious agents” (Znaniecki, 1952: 147).

Max Weber’s Interpretive Understanding

Weber’s notion of Verstehen or interpretive understanding, which was formulated in his methodological writings, has made him one of the foremost methodological thinkers in modern sociology. Weber’s well-known definition of this discipline is as follows: “a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences” (Weber, 1978: 4). The notion of Verstehen has captured the attention of some representatives of Weberian scholarship who have endeavored to analyze and discuss it (see Eldridge, 1979: 28–32, Kaesler, 1979: 174f.; Swedberg, 2005: 279–281). In 1929 Abel conducted a detailed analysis of Weber’s epistemological writings and of the notion of Verstehen in particular (see Abel, 1929: 123–159). This analysis constituted an early effort to clarify and discuss it. It deserves to be mentioned here accordingly. However, we aim here not to focus on Abel’s contribution nor do we wish to propose new interpretations of this concept. Instead, we will compare the notion of Verstehen to Znaniecki’s humanistic coefficient in order to elucidate possible reasons for his qualified and limited reception of Weber.

Weber formulated this notion in his methodological writings and in the first pages of Economy and Society. The following passage epitomizes his methodological position: “A correct causal interpretation of a concrete course of action is arrived at when the overt action and the motives have been correctly apprehended and at the same time the interpretation is to some degree causally adequate” (Weber, 1978: 12). And, as he states elsewhere:

“The more unambiguously an action is oriented in accordance with the type of correct rationality, the less will psychological considerations of any kind contribute to a better understanding of the course of that action in terms of its meaning” (Weber, 2012a: 276).

As a methodological principle, human behavior when understood in this way pertains to interpretive sociology; namely, to a perspective that is “based on the notion of social interaction as an interpretive process” (Wilson 1970: 58). Understanding human behavior “possesses a specific qualitative ‘evidentness’ whose strength varies very considerably” (Weber, 1973: 428; 2012a: 273). As Weber asserts, “rational interpretable behavior very often constitutes that behavior that is the most appropriate ideal type for the sociological analysis of intelligible interrelations”. The object of interpretive sociology is action; namely, “an understandable behavior towards ‘objects’- understandable in the sense of being specified by some (subjective) meaning that it ‘has’ or that is ‘meant’ (though it may pass more or less unnoticed)” (Weber, 1973: 429; 2012a: 274). Action, so defined, is not necessarily spontaneous (as Znaniecki would have it); the only requirement Weber sets for it is that it should be meaningful to the actor.

Understanding, as Weber further states, involves uncovering “a concrete ‘motive’ that we can ‘re-experience’ ‘within ourselves,’ or a complex of such ‘motives,’ to which we can impute that behavior” (Weber, 1978: 43). For Weber, sociological understanding of “the action of typically differentiated human (and only human) individuals” is “the specific function of sociology” (Weber, 1978: 18). For him, understanding the meaning of an action is necessary but not sufficient to formulate a causal relationship between distinct phenomena. It is also necessary to ascertain, first, that a social action with verifiable frequency and regularity is followed by another and secondly, whether these two social actions are related in terms of their meanings (see Weber, 1973: 551; 1978: 12). But this is not the only task Weber assigns to sociology. Understanding in this way should also bring into light the social and historical causes of a given course of events; in his words, it should also disclose “the causal imputation of empirical events” (Weber, 1973: 534f.; 2012a: 330).

Rational conceptual constructions, which Weber refers to as ideal types, are necessary for this purpose. These are compared to empirical reality in order to assess the extent to which they either approximate it or are removed from it. This procedure, which aims at understanding the subjective motives of human action and explaining it on this basis, is “extremely important” to the objective of causal imputation. Precisely because the ideal type may be removed from empirical reality, its departure from reality makes it possible to “arrive at a causal explanation of the observed deviation” (Weber, 1973: 534f.; 1978: 21; 2012a: 331. see also on this point Burger, 1987: 139). “A correct causal interpretation of typical action means that the process which is claimed to be typical is shown to be both adequately grasped on the level of meaning and at the same type their interpretation is to some degree causally adequate” (Weber, 1973: 550f.; 1978: 12).

Understanding a given course of action, in other words, is prior as well as necessary to explain it causally. Weber distinguishes observational understanding (aktuelles Verstehen) –be it someone else’s thoughts, affects, or actions- from an understanding of motives. Only the latter type of understanding is preliminary to the causal explanation of social action (see Kaesler, 1979: 176f.).

Znaniecki and Weber: An Epistemological Comparison

This comparison will consider their respective views of rationalism and sociology. These two authors had different backgrounds and scholarly interests. Znaniecki’s educational and cultural background focused on philosophy, including phenomenology and pragmatism, and “was shaped on both sides of the Atlantic” (Hałas, 2010: 31). In his dissertation, which he presented at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, he discussed the problem of value in philosophy (Hałas, 2005: 897). His philosophical education paved the way for his turn to sociology; namely, to a humanistic sociology that concerned itself with the study of values and of culture in general (see Szacki, 1993). Weber’s background was that of a legal scholar. He “never abandoned his scholarly interest in the law” and acquired from Roman legal theory his model for conceptualization in social science (Turner & Factor, 1994: 6, 167). Weber’s and Znaniecki’s distinct educational backgrounds and intellectual interests were reflected in the different relevance to them of some of the sources they quoted.

Thus, considering here nineteenth-century authors only, Weber—whether in his methodological writings (2012a), or in Economy and Society (1972)—cited rather frequently Menger, Rickert, and Sombart. On the other hand, with reference to Znaniecki’s Cultural Reality (1919), Cultural Sciences (1963), Social Relations and Social Roles (1965), and Social Actions (1967), these authors were peripheral or –as it was often the case- completely ignored. The two scholars’ different education and background were possibly relevant to their distinct reception on the part of diverse sociological milieus in the United States. As Lawrence Scaff has written, “In the 1930s the main institutional settings for this Rezeptionsgeschichte were not only the New School for Social Research, but also Harvard University and the University of Chicago” (Scaff, 2004: 127). As for the New School, its foundation and early existence were due to the initiative of the German émigré sociologist Emil Lederer in conjunction with the economist Alvin Johnson, who became its first director. Lederer went to New York, where he founded and presided over the University in Exile (which was incorporated into The New School for Social Research in 1934) (Johnson, 1939).

Weber’s and Znaniecki’s distinct scholarly backgrounds did not prevent them from sharing a profound interest in Simmel’s philosophy and sociology. Their assessments concerned epistemological and theoretical issues that are relevant to sociology. Weber disagreed with Simmel’s notions of interpreting and understanding and with his conception of sociology (see Weber, 2012a: 60f., 418–421). Simmel was in fact cited and some of his works, discussed by Weber and Znaniecki, more than other prominent German sociologists of their time such as Sombart and Tönnies. In particular, Weber considered Tönnies’s magnum opus, Community and Society, a “fine” and “pioneering” work (Weber, 1972: 1, 22; 1978: 4, 41); yet, he quoted it only three times in his Economy and Society (Weber, 1972: 1, 17, 22), and but once in his methodological writings (Weber, 2012a:273). They are Weber’s major works on which we shall focus here. First, however, we will mention Hałas’s contribution as she is an authoritative interpreter of both authors.

Halas notes the similarity between Weber and Znaniecki in their respective views of reality as “inexhaustible and infinite in its variety” and consequently, to the need to formulate conceptual schemes—such as Weber’s ideal types—in order to grasp its culturally significant elements. Hałas also emphasizes their themes of modernity and the legacy of the Enlightenment, which were common to both these authors even if differently elaborated. She calls attention to the different paths they have followed and in particular to their distinct notions of rationality (see Hałas, 2010: 110–112, 189–195). She does not dwell on Znaniecki’s reception of Simmel, however, though Znaniecki and Weber cited him frequently. Nor does she discuss the question of whether there have been other authors in addition to Simmel who have drawn the scholarly attention of Weber and Znaniecki.

These two questions will be considered here. Znaniecki’s most citations of Simmel are found in Cultural Sciences (1952) and Social Actions (1967). These major works by Znaniecki were composed in the last period of his productive life. They point to Znaniecki’s knowledge of Simmel’s oeuvre and to the high esteem in which he held his German colleague— “a man of the highest cultural achievements,” as he wrote (Znaniecki, 1967: 333). His appreciation of Simmel went along with his occasionally critical reception of this author’s works. He objected, in particular, to Simmel’s use of the notion of social relation rather than to that of interaction (see Znaniecki, 1952: 388–389). This was so possibly because of their different scholarly backgrounds and the different aims they pursued. As mentioned, Weber had a legal and social-science education. He considered himself and has sometimes been considered a legal scholar, and he embraced social science in his last years only. Studying social science was for him “a cognitive enterprise with the sorts of cognitive enterprises that already existed, notably jurisprudence and the legal determination of responsibility” (see Turner & Factor, 1994: 136–143).

By contrast, Znaniecki aimed to investigate the cultural sciences. Specifically, he pursued the study of values as a branch of philosophy (see Znaniecki, 1919: viii-xi). Aside from Simmel, who was not only a philosopher but a sociologist as well, Weber referred to social scientists who were prominent in their respective fields of studies, whether history, economics, or other social sciences. Instances thereof were Comte, Dilthey, Le Bon, Marx, Menger, Mill, Mommsen, Ranke, Rickert, Sombart, Tönnies, and Treitschke. Sociology did not have pride of place among them. Weber either neglected altogether to mention a few sociologists even if they were well-known, as Spencer;Footnote 3 or he did mention and briefly consider them, but also deemed them unworthy of particular attention. Tarde was a case in point.Footnote 4 Philosophers, too, received scant attention; for Weber made “few concessions to the ‘philosophical’ or systematic expectations of his readers” (Turner & Factor, 1994: 8).

Aside from a few references to Plato in Economy and Society (1978) and in his methodological writings (2012a), Nietzsche and especially Rickert were exceptions as Weber referred to them frequently. Their relevance flowed from his sociological interest in Judaism and in the epistemology of the social sciences. Weber also cited and discussed authors who delved into subjects having a close affinity to his own pursuits. Sombart was a case in point since his investigation of the relationship between the Jewish economic ethic and that of modern capitalism was proximate to his interests (see Weber, 1978: 611–615; 2012a: 367–370,; 2012b: 285, footnote 8). Weber’s pursuits were neither specifically nor necessarily sociological, and they did not belong to any other social science exclusively. Weber and Sombart, moreover, concurred in underlining the importance of theory for history, economics, and the social sciences in general (see Weber, 2012a: 302f.f.).

These were then some reasons for Sombart’s relevance to Weber. As for Znaniecki, a perusal of the citations listed in his Cultural Sciences (1952) and Social Actions (1967) points to the relevance to him of the French sociologists Comte, Durkheim, and Tarde, all of whom are quoted several times. Znaniecki was also familiar with the writings of the American sociologists of the Chicago school Park and Burgess, both of whom he cited frequently in his Social Actions (1967). Chicago was the first American University with which Znaniecki established a professional relationship (see Bulmer, 1984: 49). He subsequently moved to Columbia, and finally to the University of Illinois where he was active until his retirement. Weber, by contrast, never cited these Chicago authors and was possibly unaware of them.Footnote 5 Znaniecki and Weber were accordingly investigating two different albeit related fields of study, that is, cultural life and social action.

The former field of study presupposes, in keeping with Znaniecki, “the existence of a universal category of cultural order,” that is, “an order of relationships among all kinds of human action” (Znaniecki: 10). Weber’s field of studies –the social action- was in a sense more specific than Znaniecki’s cultural order. This scholar’s broad notion of cultural order, and therefore of his subject matter, contrasts with Weber’s specific notion of social action as action meaningfully oriented to the behavior of others (see Weber, 1978: 22). The specific meaning of his conception of social action proved to be no obstacle to Weber from pursuing a vast field of comparative research on different civilizations (see Kalberg, 2021). Culture for Weber presupposes a value relation; for social scientists as human beings have value orientations, and accordingly take a position to the world –a viewpoint- that confers meaning to their actions. Historians and other social scientists hold values that guide them in their selection of those elements of reality to which they ascribe relevance, meaning, and general cultural significance (Weber, 2012a: 116-122; see also Bruun, 2007: 25f.; Burger, 1987: 80–86).

Weber’s historical sociology made use of ideal types as “a conceptual framework to serve historical analysis” (Holton, 2003: 30). Weber’s comparative analysis of religions as cultural systems was a comparison between different social orders, which he conceived as actions oriented toward determinable maxims that are agreed upon and considered obligatory (see Swedberg, 2005: 185f.). His use of the comparative method purposed to specify the different outcomes of distinct cultural systems, in accordance with Mill’s method of difference (see Ragin, 1987: 38f., 49). Weber’s view of the social order was conceptually less extensive than Znaniecki’s, who defined it –it will be recalled- as an order of relationships among all kinds of human action. This difference is possibly reflected by the broader scope of Znaniecki’s citations, which includes authors Weber never cited such as Durkheim and Thomas.Footnote 6

We shall focus here on Weber and Znaniecki’s conceptions of sociology and on their respective methods of choice, Verstehen and the Humanistic Coefficient. We are not concerned here with other sociological themes on which both authors have dwelt, such as modern nationalities (see Kaczynski, 2008: 11–18). First, however, it should be remarked that, although their respective notions of social action do not coincide, they are compatible. For Weber social action, it will be recalled, is action oriented to the conduct of others, whereas for Znaniecki is action that intends to exert influence on others. And for Znaniecki sociology is the science of social interaction and its subject matter is the study of social systems. By contrast, for Weber sociology is a science that concerns itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and with a causal explanation of its course and consequences. These definitions are mutually compatible, in the sense they both consider social interaction as an essential element of the subject matter of sociology. They differ in other respects, however.

Znaniecki does not state that interpretive understanding and causal explanation of social action pertain to sociology, but rather to psychology. He nevertheless discusses the sociologist’s –and more generally, the observer’s—ability to “‘understand,’ to obtain vicarious experience approaching original experience on the scientifically relevant points” (Znaniecki, 1934: 170f.). Znaniecki attends to the proper ways to test a vicarious experience. This experience should not only be compared to an original experience but should also “supplement it by observation to be sure that it refers to the same kind of system as the original experience with which we compare it”. Otherwise “my vicarious experience may be fictitious” (Znaniecki, 1934: 171). Znaniecki’s notion of the humanistic coefficient is relevant here as it calls for reconstructing someone else’s experience and abiding by their criteria of validity. Like Weber’s Verstehen, it refers to the social (or cultural) sciences but differs from Weber in some important respects. Weber does not state that human actions should be considered as they are experienced by the actors themselves, as does Znaniecki’s view of the humanistic coefficient. Further, Znaniecki does not affirm—in contrast to Weber- that understanding the motives for social action is a condition for explaining it.

Znaniecki therefore neither distinguishes between observational understanding and understanding of motives, nor does he affirm that action is understandable to the extent to which is rational—that is, adequate to achieve the actor’s ends. According to Znaniecki, this problem requires a psychological explanation of similarities and differences between cultures. It therefore raises the further and related question of the validity of psychology “as a strictly inductive science of actual experiences’. “An experience in this sense –he adds- is unrepeatable; the flux of experiences cannot turn back” (Znaniecki, 1952: 124). Cultural data provide adequate information sources if the individual authors know and share the culture and the social life they wish to investigate (Znaniecki, 1952: 134). As Znaniecki further states: the “living human individual as common datum of human experience is a cultural product of many conscious agents” (Znaniecki, 1952: 147). His notion of understanding deserves consideration. Subsequent scholarly inquiry into Znaniecki’s conception of meaningfulness has cast light on different levels of mutual understanding; namely, cognitive, axiological, and interpreting (see Hałas, 2010:154f.).

Cultural data are a collective product. In Znaniecki’s own words, “there is considerable evidence that many a collectivity is experienced by its participants and also by outsiders not as a mere aggregate of individuals, but as one concrete whole, identified by them as a common lasting datum which exists independently of any one of them”. Understanding involves the humanistic coefficient, for the sociologist would ask what any given individual “has been to those human agents (including himself) who have experienced him, whether directly or indirectly, in the total course of his life” (Znaniecki, 1952: 148). Znaniecki’s method of analytic induction involves, as noted, abstracting essential characteristics from one case that is considered typical characters, and generalizing them. It therefore involves identifying the culturally most significant phenomena of the social system, that is, Znaniecki’s unit of analysis.

Abstraction is also necessary for the construction of Weber’s ideal types. However, Weber does not state that “social actions involve a limited number of cultural patterns” (Znaniecki, 1967: 93). Nor does he affirm that a psychological explanation of similarities and differences between cultures, as Znaniecki would recommend, would be of any use. From Weber’s viewpoint, this would occur only if this explanation refers to the motives of the social actors as reconstructed in abstract ideal–typical terms. Weber argues that for the purposes of understanding and explaining a course of action the assumption of perfect goal rationality is appropriate (see Weber, 1973: 432–438). And as he asserts elsewhere (see Weber, 1973: 146–214), ideal–typical concepts are abstract and logically consistent constructions. Like all concepts, as Weber states with reference to Kant, they are “primarily means of thought for the intellectual mastery empirical data and can be only that” (Burger, 1976: 69). They are therefore primarily means of obtaining knowledge in terms of understanding and causally explaining events that occur or have occurred, in the empirical world.

Concepts are made from the viewpoint of social scientists by selectively emphasizing some aspects of the social–historical reality as relevant. As a Weber scholar has written, “Weber intended his conceptual framework to serve historical analysis, rather than transcend it” (Holton, 2003: 30). The relevance of the ideal–typical concepts depends on their cultural significance and, ultimately, on the values of the social scientists and their times (see Weber, 1973: 192–197). These may pave the way to imputing some events to others by assessing the distance of these conceptual constructions from empirical reality, and by attempting to causally account for this distance. In the words of another prominent Weber scholar, “ideal types are statements of general form asserting the existence of certain constellations of elements which are empirically only approximated by the instances of the class of phenomena to which each type refers” (Burger, 1987: 133f.). Weber’s ideal–typical procedure shares with Znaniecki’s method of analytical induction the principles of abstraction and generalization. However, it differs otherwise from this method. For Weber, the abstraction procedure does not involve identifying the essential typical characters of a given social phenomenon, and generalizing them, as it does for Znaniecki. In Weber’s words, “The construction of concepts of what is typical” involves eliminating “what is ‘accidental’ also and precisely in the case of historical individuals” (Weber, 1973: 201).

Investigating the human agents’ experience of cultural data in order to ascertain what is typical among them would not, from a Weberian viewpoint, contribute to bring to light their motives, and so understand and explain them. Cooperation—a theme on which Znaniecki dwelt under the heading of cooperative guidance (see Znaniecki, 1967: 163–188)—would involve according to him “the total guiding activity in the course of which the agent manages to switch their cooperation from the social object’s [the other actor’s] purpose to his own purpose” (Znaniecki, 1967: 171). For Weber, however, cooperation exists, as in the particular case of market exchanges, only if all the market participants “avoid at least striking infringements on the rules of good faith and fair dealing” (Weber, 1978: 637). The market therefore embodies an ethic of duties. Weber himself subscribed to this ethic, which was consonant with his knowledge of the Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy of his days (Kim, 2022).

Znaniecki approximated Cooley’s and Mead’s Symbolic Interactionist perspective and their notion of social order (see Znaniecki, 1952: 147, 393; see also Fine, 2000), but he strongly opposed behaviorism (see Znaniecki, 1967: 6–13). As he argued, if children are to become desirable human beings it is necessary that they come to view themselves in terms of others’ experience of them. It is also necessary that that they correctly react to such views and expectations on the part of these others (see Znaniecki, 1967: 201). Moreover, according to Znaniecki, teachers who aim to be good educators should put themselves “vicariously in the position of individual and collective agents” they are studying with the purpose of mentally grasping their normative tendencies and actions (Znaniecki, 1967: 216f.). Successful teachers elicit approval and interest in and exert influence upon their students. They identify with them and are therefore sensitive to their approval and blame (Znaniecki, 1967: 228–230). In general, “the origin of the individual’s reflected self” is “in the characterizations and evaluations of which he is the object” (Znaniecki, 1967: 326).

However, the individual’s self may also originate from an ideal self of which the person is not aware on the basis of his or her own experience, but which rather corresponds to the self-image–or to the ideal self- which he or she cherishes (see Znaniecki, 1967: 430f.) “for internal and external gratification” (Burke & Stets, 2009: 40). Znaniecki, therefore, abides by the Symbolic Interactionist tradition and by the socialization theory it has inspired. He is also consistent with his methodological requirement; namely, that inquiries should be consistent with the experiences and viewpoints of the subjects whose conduct the researcher is investigating. Weber, who is apparently less familiar than Znaniecki with Symbolic Interactionism and with Mead’s socialization theory in particular,Footnote 7 seems not to be concerned with how the socialization process works. His focus is rather on the consequences for the financial markets of successful socialization of the market participants. That socialization is mostly successful, at least in this case, is something that he apparently takes for granted. The problem of social order was previously discussed with reference to Weber and Znaniecki. As will be recalled, Znaniecki has dealt with this subject in his analysis of the cultural system, order being one of its defining traits.

Weber –who is interested in the societal aspects of the social order more than in its cultural aspects- views the social order as embedded in consensual action. Consensual action, on which cooperation and other forms of norms-compliance are premised, is obtained when the agreed-upon norms of conduct are likely to be complied with by all the interested parties. Compliance with norms may exist for whatever reason, such as inner conviction or expedience. Accordingly, Weber does not stress, as Parsons does, that normative patterns originate from conformity to institutionalized attitudes in the social system (see Parsons, 1951: 422); nor does he emphasize the need to have consensus on value orientation in order to maintain a stable and integrate social system (see Parsons, 2001: 228f.). Important instances of consensual action are found, according to Weber, among participants in the market and the language communities; provided, however, that they orient their actions to the conventional and generally unwritten norms guiding their conduct in these communities.

The social order, if there is one at all, rests for Weber on these norms and can be found in these communities rather than elsewhere. Their participants act in such groups as though (als ob) there were formal rules that prescribe these conducts even if such rules do not apply (see Weber, 1978: 1378f.; 1988: 441–464). Identifying the culturally most significant phenomena of the social system, in accordance with Znaniecki’s methodological recommendation, was not a concern for Weber. For Weber, according to one of his interpreters, “meaningful phenomena, as cultural phenomena, exist only because humans want to implement certain values” (Burger, 1976: 101). In Weber’s own words, “culture is a finite section of the meaningless infinity of events in the world, endowed with meaning and significance from a human perspective” (Weber, 2012a: 119).

Consensual actions are found in particular communities whose members share and abide by specific values. In his view, values and the cultures based on them may be significant in this sense only. Human individuals as cultural beings are –as one Weber scholar has recently argued- individually “responsible for their judgments, identity and actions” (Raza, 2022). This personal responsibility may hinder cultural integration. No integration of meaning is possible, Weber maintained, in modern life; for modernity as embodied in science and other cultural dimensions have been “severed from any interconnection” (Alexander, 1983: 125). “The difficult ‘universal historical problems’ we now face in a diversified world civilization” (Scaff, 2000: 115), and the plurality of orders that are obtained in the cultural reality of the modern civilization (Znaniecki, 1940: 192–195), follow therefrom. Identifying the culturally most significant phenomena of the social system, as Znaniecki recommends, would then be in Weber’s view an impossible task as long as the reasons for their significance are not specified. According to his neo-Kantian argument, the significance of the cultural and social phenomena stems from the social scientist’s interest in these phenomena. Ultimately, it originates from  the value relations that confer meaning to them, and provide norms shaping their conducts.

Different value spheres are often in conflict, as shown by the inherent conflict between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction on which Weber dwelt in his Conference on Politics as a Profession and Vocation (Weber, 1971: 505–560). Such conflicts cannot be resolved by recourse to ethical arguments (Weber, 2012a: 162f., 313-317f.; see also, for instance, Brubaker, 1984, Chapter 3; Bruun, 2007: 10f.). This fundamental difference between the tasks these two authors have assigned to their sociologies accords with their respective views of them; namely, to understand the motives of the actors (Weber), or to reconstruct their own experiences and viewpoints (Znaniecki). The process of social disorganization –the weakening of social and moral life organization principles in individuals and in whole countries- has been a major sociological concern for Znaniecki rather than for Weber (see Thomas, Znaniecki 1918–1920: 294–296). Thomas and Znaniecki are jointly cited here as well as in the vast secondary literature on their monograph concerning the Polish peasant in Europe and America (1918–1920) (see Madge, 1962: 52–87). However, they had distinct scholarly interests and backgrounds.

As Norbert Wiley has written, their collaboration “was a fruitful combination of American and European traditions,” although occasionally stressful (Wiley, 1986: 30). Luigi Tomasi (2000) has laid emphasis on Znaniecki’s “assistance in developing Thomas’ original ideas” by systemizing them, contributing to the sociological areas on which Weber’s own major sociological concern or “central question”. According to Wilhelm Hennis (1983), Weber’s major concern was the development of an appropriate life conduct in modern times, which are marked by personal and cultural fragmentation. These two authors also differed in some respects insofar as their reception of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy is concerned. Weber concurred with Kant in maintaining that the formulation of concepts in the social sciences serves mainly the purpose of understanding and explaining processes that occur in the empirical world. When formulated as ideal types “for the purposes of research and exposition” (Weber, 2012a: 125), these concepts provide a standard to assess the proximity of social or historical phenomena to their ideal image. The comparative historical method is applied to formulate typologies and provide a multicausal explanation of these phenomena, in addition to other purposes (Weber, 2012a: 125, 162f.f.; see also Holton, 2003: 29f.; Kaesler, 1979: 178–183; Kalberg, 2021; Torrance, 1974).

Like Weber, Znaniecki pursued the aim to find “causal laws of changes of social actions” (Znaniecki, 1967: 108), even though he did not delve into the theme of multicausality. However, Znaniecki’s reception of Kant differed, for he was rather interested in Kant’s “fundamental dualism, due to his participation in two distinct orders-the inferior order of Nature and the superior order of culture. Culture is a combination of both” (Znaniecki, 1934: 81). The cultural order, which is the subject matter of Znaniecki’s (rather than Weber’s) sociology, is defined by him as “An order of relationships among all kinds of human actions” (Znaniecki, 1952: 10). Like all orders, the cultural order is viewed as “the intentional creation of conscious agents” (Znaniecki, 1952: 18), in keeping with Kant’s notion of intentionality. Znaniecki dwelt repeatedly on the notion of historical sociology in his writings. As he wrote in “The Method of Sociology” (1934: 36f.), “every cultural system is found by the investigator to exist for certain conscious and active historical subjects, i.e. within the sphere of experience and activity of some particular people, individuals, and collectivities, living in a certain part of the human world during a certain historical period”.

Historical sociology deals with past events but concerns the present times (see Delanty & Isin, 2003: 1). In Znaniecki’s words, when “reproduced by history, historical objects reappear in our experience with a new real influence” (Znaniecki, 1919: 322). Historical data are of use to sociologists to the extent that they integrate the proper sociological information sources that social and cultural data provide. Occasionally, they also provide a necessary supplement to these sources. All historical information must be conveyed by means of abstract concepts as these concepts identify a “common datum of many individuals’ experience and thought” (Znaniecki 1963: 136f.; see also Znaniecki, 1967: 620f., 635). Historians, moreover, are entrusted with the tasks of “objectively determining the historical facts, adequately reconstructing and interpreting the theories of the past,” and finally, “tracing and explaining the historical evolution of knowledge” (Znaniecki, 1940: 149). In accordance with his evolutionary view of social and cultural change, Znaniecki laid stress on history as providing indispensable knowledge to the students of social relations and of social actions in general (see Znaniecki, 1965a, 1965b: 106f.).

An objective understanding of history, however, can be achieved “only as a result of a methodological knowledge of present cultural societies” (Znaniecki, 1969: 67). In this sense, therefore, history is subordinate to sociology. History is subordinate to this discipline in still another sense, according to Znaniecki. As he stated in his Cultural Reality, “each historian, each nation, each epoch, tends to reproduce first of all historical objects which seem to them most worth preserving because of the influence which they still may have upon future cultural life when historically revived” (Znaniecki, 1919: 323). As the reproduction of the total number of the concrete historical objects “in their whole content and meaning” is practically impossible (Znaniecki, 1919: 323), their possible influence on these objects’ current or future cultural life provides a selection criterion for individuating those events, or sets of events, that constitute the subject of inquiry. Weber and Znaniecki then concurred in considering history and sociology as complementary interpretive disciplines. Their research object is then constituted both by past and contemporary events.

Also, both these authors maintained that a selection criterion is necessary to social scientists for the purpose of understanding and explaining their specific research object, and identified their values as supplying such a criterion. They differ in some important respects, however, which concern the relation between values and empirical research. For Znaniecki, values as “found in a given collectivity” (Znaniecki, 1963: 238) provide such a selection criterion in keeping with Znaniecki. For Weber, too, “even purely empirical scientific research is guided by cultural interests—that is to say: value interests”. This procedure, he added, “is an operation that takes the individual valuation and the analysis of its meaning as its point of departure and then ascends even higher towards ever more fundamental valuational positions” (Weber, 2012a: 316). Weber’s position is therefore consistent with his methodological individualism. Znaniecki lays emphasis “upon the participation of conscious and active human agents and upon their relations with one another” (Bierstedt, 1969: 19), in accordance with the methodological principle of the humanistic coefficient. These epistemological positions are distinct, although compatible.

Summary and Conclusion

This article has dwelt on and compared Znaniecki’s notion of the humanistic coefficient with Weber’s Verstehen, or understanding action. Both these notions are instances of interpretive sociology, an epistemological position that the two authors share. However, Verstehen refers to the actor’s motives, while the humanistic coefficient refers to the actor’s experiences as reconstructed by the sociologist. The operation of Verstehen is, furthermore, relevant to psychology according to Znaniecki. It pertains only to sociology according to Weber. Both authors agree that the specific object of sociological inquiry is social action. Social action, however, is differently defined according to whether it is oriented to the conduct of others, as with Weber, or aims to exert influence on others, as with Znaniecki. For Znaniecki sociology is the science of social interaction and its subject matter is the study of social systems, and in particular of “social rules in their relation to individual attitudes” (Znaniecki, 1969: 80). Social psychology, as distinguished from sociology, concerns itself with the cultural attitudes and values that “are more or less generally found among the members of a social group” (Znaniecki, 1969: 77).

According to Weber, sociology is a science that concerns itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and with a causal explanation of its course and consequences; social action being defined as action meaningfully oriented to the action of the other person (Weber, 1978: 24; see also Swedberg, 2005: 246–248). In contrast to Znaniecki, Weber holds that sociology aims not only to understand social action but also to explain it. Weber, furthermore, does not restrictively define social action as one that intends to produce reactions on the part of others. For him, the actor’s orientation to others is a necessary and sufficient attribute of all social actions. For Weber, social actions therefore occur in a variety of social settings, circumstances, and cultural patterns; whereas for Znaniecki “social actions follow a limited number of cultural patterns” (Znaniecki, 1967: 93). Their distinct conceptions of social actions are consistent with these statements; for, Znaniecki’s more specific definition of this notion would preclude conducting encompassing comparative researches such as Weber’s.

As for their respective methods of inquiry, Znaniecki proposes to reconstruct the actor’s experiences and viewpoints by means of abstract concepts; while Weber advocates the formulation of abstract concepts, which he calls generic ideal types, for the purposes of describing and explaining social and historical courses of events. Finally, the existence of the social (or cultural) order is differently accounted for by the two authors. For Znaniecki, the social order pertains to cultural reality and is the intentional creation of conscious agents. As a Znaniecki scholar has written, “Reality becomes culture only with reference to concrete conscious beings which experience it” (Krasnodebski, 1993: 43). The study of the social order therefore belongs to the cultural sciences. For Weber, too, cultural reality is the creation of conscious agents. They endow “with meaning and significance from a human perspective” the meaningless infinity of events that occur in the world (Weber, 2012a: 119; see also Schroeder, 1992: 6f.). However, this creation results from its being “of value for the causal imputation of specific historical events” (Weber, 2012a: 113). These events are deemed significant from the agents’ viewpoint. Weber, differently than Znaniecki, laid no emphasis on the agents’ experience of cultural reality. As to the social order, it follows according to Weber from the prevalence of consensual action in particular communities such as the market or language communities. Otherwise, its prevalence should not be taken for granted.

As stated, both authors abide by the perspective of interpretive sociology, which when applied to historical inquiries “attends to the meanings which individuals give to their actions” (Delanty & Isin, 2003: 28). This article has shown, however, that their shared epistemological position did not prevent them from disagreeing on several important issues such as their conceptions of sociology and of its subject matter, their accounts of the social order, and their research method of choice. Similarly, social action is a key notion for both authors. Znaniecki himself points to the proximity of his interest in the problem of social action to that evidenced by other sociologists, including Max Weber (see Znaniecki, 1965a, 1965b: 15). This notion, however, has been differently defined by them, as previously shown. All these differences are fundamental and might account for Znaniecki’s disregard for his German colleague. In other words, the epistemological and methodological differences between the two authors were so significant that Znaniecki preferred not to expand on them. By way of conclusion, Znaniecki was knowledgeable of Weber and shared with him an appreciation of the theoretical approach of interpretive sociology. However, major diversities prevented him from being significantly influenced by Weber.