Striving, Willing, and Acting in Pfänder and Husserl

Abstract

This article presents a mutual critique of the analytic and phenomenological theory of action. The first perspective focuses on the standard approach introduced by G.E.M. Anscombe. According to Anscombe, actions are events that are intentional under a description. Consequently, the distinction between action and mere behavior depends on the linguistic description of behavior. However, this perspective fails to address the possible transitions between behavior and action. One way to fill this gap is by investigating the specific form of intentionality belonging to striving or tendency. Such an investigation can complement the standard theory of action by illuminating the realm in which volitional and intentional actions are formed. In this regard, it is instructive to examine A. Pfänder’s and E. Husserl’s philosophy of striving and willing. Pfänder’s Phenomenology of Willing (1900) and the essay Motives and Motivation (1911) reflect on the genesis of volition from striving. Both texts view willing as a particular form of striving that may, but does not have to, lead to action. Similarly, Husserl aims to retrace the pre-voluntary roots of willing, but unlike Pfänder, he considers willing and action to be necessarily connected. The second perspective focuses on what analytic philosophy contributes to philosophical action theory: the recognition of language’s constitutive role in determining actions. This is evident not only in terms of how we describe actions (Anscombe), but also in how we ascribe willing, intending, and acting to one another in communicative contexts (H.L.A. Hart). Therefore, a phenomenological investigation of action should be complemented by linguistic analysis. This idea is already outlined in rudiments by Husserl and particularly by Pfänder.

1. A Gap in the Standard Theory of Action

According to the standard view, actions are events or forms of behavior that are intentional under a description. Intentions, in this sense, are reasons for actions. This view originated from Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe’s influential 1957 essay Intention (Anscombe, 1976) and has become a crucial part of the standard theory of action associated with Davidson (2001). Anscombe’s definition of actions as events that are intentional under a description helps alleviate methodological and theoretical assumptions and requirements in the theory of action. Anscombe’s perspective does not involve discussions of the ontological status of mental events or their connection with bodily movements, nor does it require privileged access to action from the first-person perspective. By rejecting introspectionism and psychologism, Anscombe argues that there is no significant methodological distinction between an intentional description from the agent’s perspective or an observer’s perspective.¹ Instead, actions as actions are constituted by how we discuss and understand our behavior linguistically. Furthermore, the concept of intention is linked to a communication context focused on justifying our actions. Intentions come into play when we are asked questions such as “why are you doing x?” or “why did you do x?”. Davidson’s standard theory of action builds upon this idea but expands the linguistic characterization of action as intentional behavior with a causal theory of action. According to Davidson, the notion of action encompasses both the intentional and causal dimensions.

Despite its indisputable merits for discussing action theory, the intentional definition of action raises some problems. One problem is that, according to Anscombe’s formula, there is a conceptually fixed qualitative gap between action and mere behavior that is solely dependent on linguistic description. According to her understanding of intention, an event or behavior is either an action or it is not. However, this analysis rules out the transitions between behavior and action. For example, waiting for the bus I nervously walk up and down at the bus stop without intending to do so. Even though the walking is conscious, it is not associated with any intention, not even the intention of calming nerves with movement. However, as my attention shifts to the walking itself, certain aspects of the behavior become intentional. For instance, walking on specific floor tile segments and avoiding others. This behavior, which previously had no intention, now becomes intentional in certain respects.² Similar examples can be given for shaping a collective intention from behavior. Let’s say a group of children is sitting at a table waiting for their meal, and unrest arises. Some children begin clattering their dishes and plates, and more children join in until a collective intention is formed through rhythmic clattering.³ Thus, what makes sense conceptually, namely the philosophical analysis of actions presupposing certain intentions, is called into question or at least needs supplementation from a phenomenological perspective. This is because, on the experiential level, it is not possible to abstract from the processes in which intentions and actions arise and are formed. These phenomenological aspects may influence the conceptual distinctions between behavior and action.

To address these questions, in what follows, I aim to combine phenomenological and analytic insights. Specifically, the considerations seek to demonstrate that phenomenological investigations of the intentionality of tendency and striving can contribute to filling the gap in the standard theory of action. This task will be explored further in the second and third sections of this article. Sect. 2 (“Pfänder’s Analysis of Striving and Tendency”) examines Pfänder’s reflections on the origin of volition from striving, as expounded in his Phenomenology of Willing of 1900 and his essay Motives and Motivation of 1911. In Sect. 3 (“Wishing, Willing, and Acting in Pfänder and Husserl”), the essential similarities between Pfänder’s and Husserl’s analyses of the distinction between wishing as a type of striving and willing will be addressed, primarily drawing on Husserl’s considerations in a brief paper from 1914. Additionally, Husserl discusses the connection between willing and striving and how willing is formed against the backdrop of striving in his Studies Concerning the Structure of Consciousness (Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins). However, unlike Pfänder, Husserl argues that willing is necessarily linked to acting. Husserl’s considerations demonstrate that the phenomenological elucidation of tendency and striving is compatible with the insight into the intentional constitution of action as posited by the standard theory. The concluding Sect. 4 (“Toward a Linguistic Phenomenology”), continues this discussion, providing a more precise characterization of the linguistic determination of action. It demonstrates that the linguistic description of action must be understood in a reconstructive and even ascriptivist sense. With a study of Husserl’s and Pfänder’s philosophies as a backdrop, it appears promising to incorporate a linguistic perspective into the phenomenological endeavor. In particular, Pfänder not only advocates for complementing phenomenology with a linguistic perspective but also suggests that the linguistic reference to our sphere of striving, willing, and acting can be understood in its reconstructive and partially productive role.

2. Pfänder‘s Analysis of Striving and Tendency

A way of addressing this gray area in action theory is provided by investigations into the specific form of intentionality of striving and tendency in phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenologists such as Alexander Pfänder and Edmund Husserl have explicitly tackled the question of how the particular intentionality of willing emerges and develops within the realm of striving and tendency. Here, striving and tendency are initially general terms for pervasive phenomena. They are not limited to the realm that precedes intention, willing, and action. This is a shared belief of both Pfänder and Husserl. Pfänder begins the first paragraph of his essay Motives and Motivation, entitled „The Field of Strivings,” with a broad characterization of striving:

Certain objects, or states of affairs, or events which are felt, perceived, remembered, represented, or merely thought by a human individual, arouse in him certain strivings or counterstrivings. By no means always, but only extremely rarely are these strivings directed toward or against feelings of pleasure or displeasure. There is a striving to feel or sensuously perceive something; to notice or to apperceive something; to visualize something; to recognize, to learn to know, to believe, to affirm, to infer, to support, to prove, to explain something; there is likewise a striving to get oneself into certain moods, to develop, diminish, or prolong them. Similar strivings are directed toward analogous goals in feelings of all sorts and in directed sentiments (Gesinnungen). And finally striving can also be directed toward the realization or non-realization of external objects, states of affairs, and events. (Pfänder, 1967b: 16/1963: 128)

Similarly, the term “tendency” refers to a general phenomenon that can take on various concrete forms. This is evident when we examine, for example, text no. VI in the third volume of Husserl’s Studies. Here, Husserl emphasizes the general structure of tendency in which something present refers to something absent: “Tendency from the sign to the signified (sign-consciousness—meaning-consciousness). Tendency from the indication to the indicated, from that which recalls something to that to which it recalls” (Husserl, 2020 [Hua XLIII/3]: 67). While the concept of tendency is not exclusively phenomenological, as indicated in the parentheses, the phenomenological perspective offers a specific understanding. The tendency from the sign to the signified is also relevant as a phenomenon of consciousness and subjective experience. Tendency encompasses various aspects of phenomenological inquiry, including perception, memory, imagination, judgment, recognition, desire, preference, and emotion. However, in the realm of volition and action, the concept of tendency takes on a more specific meaning, suggesting that willing and acting emerge from pre-voluntary strivings and through a process of specifying and actively determining intentional directedness.⁴ Moving forward, I will first delve into Pfänder’s explorations of striving and tendency in the following discussion.

In both his Phenomenology of Willing and his essay Motives and Motivation, Pfänder extensively examines the structures of the pre-volitional sphere of striving as the area in which willing is founded. Although Pfänder’s investigations culminate in the pursuit of a phenomenology of willing, the initial section of his Phenomenology of Willing, which comprises more than half of the book, focuses on the phenomenon of striving. Pfänder differentiates between the “consciousness of volition in the general sense” and a narrower concept of volition, asserting that the former encompasses phenomena such as “wishing, hoping, longing, desiring, fearing, loathing, etc.,” which he equates with the “consciousness of striving” (Pfänder, 1963: 12). In Motives and Motivation, the first of five sections also examines “the field of strivings” (Pfänder, 1967b: 16ff./1963: 128 ff.); in addition, the third and fourth sections provide further discussion and comparison of strivings with acts of will and motives, which are crucial for a comprehensive understanding of volition (Pfänder, 1967b:  24ff./1963: 138ff.).

Besides their many similarities, there are clear differences between the two texts, written respectively in 1900 and 1911. Stylistically, in Phenomenology of Willing, Pfänder develops his thoughts in a cumbersome and tedious manner, while in Motives and Motivation, he provides a concise and dense analysis of the complex of striving and willing. Additionally, the earlier text often develops descriptive passages primarily relying on linguistic, common sense-based, or psychological self-evidence (Selbstverständlichkeit) which are subject to phenomenological endorsement or rejection. Conversely, the later text is more focused, sharply contoured, and has clearer terminology.⁵

2.1. Striving as a Complex of “Movements”

In both cases, the paradigmatic example that guides the analysis of striving is the perception of a fruit, like an orange, which triggers the desire to taste it (Pfänder, 1963: 12; Pfänder, 1967b: 16 f./1963: 128). In Motives and Motivation, Pfänder distinguishes different movements within the phenomenon of striving. The first and initial movement is a “centrifugal ‘movement’ toward the confronting object” that I become perceptually attentive to (Pfänder, 1967b: 17/1963: 128; transl. modified). This means that, in a certain sense, I am initially connected to the things I encounter. Pfänder significantly puts the term “movement” in quotation marks here, suggesting that he is not referring to movement in the literal sense, neither as a behavioral process nor as the dynamics of striving. “Movement” is meant to indicate the simple fact that, for striving to occur at all, there must first be a “contact between object and ego” (Pfänder, 1967b: 17/1963: 129). In the example, there must be a connection between my taste and the fruit. The earlier text seems clearer when it says:

With the indication of this idea of taste, however, that fact of striving is not yet completely determined. A human being can have this idea or, as one says, ‘think of the taste’ without at the same time wishing, desiring, or willing it. Wishing, desiring, willing, or striving in general must be added to the idea of taste. And this is added by the appearance of a peculiar moment of consciousness, distinct from all sensations and ideas, which one is accustomed to call a pushing (Hindrängen), striving (Hinstreben), an ‘inner’ tendency, ‘inner’ activity, or the like. (Pfänder, 1963: 13)

At this first level, where the simple idea of taste is described, there is no question of a tendency or striving toward something. However, the way Pfänder explains the initial point of striving in Motives and Motivation is not entirely incorrect. The problem, roughly speaking, lies in the difficulty of linguistically characterizing the passivity of consciousness. For instance, associating the taste of an orange with what we see is something that occurs without us being actively involved, even in the smallest sense.⁶ The idea of taste simply arises. It is something for us, otherwise it would be nothing at all. It happens before any activity, whether it is bodily behavior or conscious activity; it is something that occurs to consciousness, rather than being initiated by it. This purely passive occurrence is necessary as the starting point for any kind of movement associated with the phenomenon of striving.⁷ However, in this passive experience, there is already an implied directedness toward something, which is very difficult not to linguistically represent as being active. With these remarks in mind, Pfänder’s explanation of the initial point of striving in Motives and Motivation can be well understood.

It is remarkable that Pfänder’s analysis of striving is immediately faced with a tension between the goal of describing psychic experience accurately and representing it linguistically. Moritz Geiger explores how Pfänder resolves this tension in his article on Pfänder’s method. Geiger highlights several key aspects of Pfänder’s approach. According to Geiger, Pfänder’s phenomenological-psychological analyses aim to capture essential structures, such as striving, using paradigmatic examples like the perception of an orange triggering striving (see Geiger, 1933: 8). However, viewing essences is merely “the starting point (Voraussetzung) for description, not description itself” (Geiger, 1933: 9). Description is what conveys the most important characteristics of the perceived essence. Pfänder achieves this by providing a ‘guide’ to seeing, allowing those without the ability to see to understand (see Geiger, 1933: 9). He does this by drawing on exemplary cases and employing analogies. Geiger argues that Pfänder’s development of the method of analogical description is a significant tool in phenomenological analysis (see Geiger, 1933: 11). Analogies drawn from areas like spatial movement are used, for example, to characterize relationships in perception and striving. Such a transfer presupposes the understanding that the thematic sphere and the analogical sphere are both not identical and share aspects of “phenomenal appearance, thing, or effectiveness,” without expecting a complete match between the compared objects (Geiger, 1933: 10). These assumptions underlie the effective use of metaphors, where figurative speech is justified despite its literal inappropriateness or even absurdity. Using the example of striving, Pfänder employs the term “centrifugal movement” in quotation marks to indicate that it is not meant to be taken literally. However, this metaphor sheds light on the experience of striving because of the similarities between striving and movement.

The subsequent movements, though metaphorical, are easier to comprehend. Once we have a representation (Vorstellung) of taste, a centripetal movement comes into play in the formation of striving. This movement is toward me as a center, as the object “arouses a striving in the ego” (Pfänder, 1967b: 17/1963: 129). It is important to understand this way of speaking correctly because further steps are required for striving to occur. The centripetal movement is not yet the movement of striving, but rather a necessary condition for it. It prepares for striving by allowing me to experience the object, in this case, the idea of taste, as something that affects me, excites me, or irritates me. The contact between the object and the ego enables the object to attract or repel the ego (see Pfänder, 1967b: 17/1963: 129). It is worth noting that the centripetal movement preceding striving, related to the object and the ego, is explicitly understood by Pfänder as “a process which is obscure in its course” (Pfänder, 1967b: 17/1963: 129). This interaction between the object and the ego is not consciously happening; therefore, in the movements leading to striving, neither the object nor the ego are properly “conscious”. Even the centripetal arousal or movement is not consciously understood in its drive structure. It is important to keep this in mind in order to understand Pfänder’s next level of description.

The movement through which Pfänder introduces the phenomenon of striving is described as “a new and different kind of centrifugal aiming or ‘movement’” (Pfänder, 1967b: 17/1963: 129). Though still blind (not consciously directed in its representation),⁸ this movement strives toward or resists something. It is a non-thematically conscious form of reaching out for something or fleeing from something, a striving toward or against something. Referring to Theodor Lipps’s Guide to Psychology (Leitfaden der Psychologie) of 1903, Pfänder further explains that striving is to be understood as a tension, “an inner polar duality” (Pfänder, 1967b: 17/1963: 129), in the sense that striving toward something is simultaneously directed against inhibitions, obstacles or resistances that need to be overcome.⁹ In other words, striving is triggered by a lack or adversity that it aims to overcome. Lipps provides an example of striving to find the name of a person we see but cannot remember (Lipps, 1909: 259). Similarly, Pfänder’s example of striving for the taste of an orange can be illustrated in this way, although perhaps not as convincingly, as the experience of resistance and inhibition is weaker. However, in both cases, striving arises from the implicit awareness of an absence.

2.2. Striving as a Feeling

In addition to the oscillating dynamics of striving, in Phenomenology of Willing Pfänder also delves into the emotional aspect of this experience.¹⁰ However, in Motives and Motivation this topic is largely absent. One possible explanation for this is that, in the latter work, Pfänder focuses more on the narrower problem of the will, as opposed to his earlier study from 1900. Another reason could be the content itself. In Motives and Motivation, Pfänder emphasizes that striving is a phenomenon that can be found in all spheres of life—in judging, cognizing, remembering, expecting, perceiving, feeling, etc.—and therefore, striving should not be exclusively associated with feeling. Nonetheless, the main reason why Pfänder avoids linking striving and feeling in Motives and Motivation is that in his Introduction to Psychology (Einführung in die Psychologie) from 1904, he explicitly criticizes the concept of the ‘feeling of striving’ (Strebungsgefühl) as contradictory. He now considers feelings as inherently passive experiences, while striving is implicitly connected with an active subject (Pfänder, 1904: 257).

In Motives and Motivation, striving is only linked once to a “feeling of lack, of insufficiency, or of displeasure (Gefühl des Mangels, der Unzulänglichkeit oder der Unlust)” as the “phenomenal source of this striving”¹¹ (Pfänder, 1967b: 18/1963: 130). Furthermore, I believe that the reason why in 1911 striving and feeling are linked again is the same as what prompted Pfänder to extensively discuss the emotional side of striving eleven years earlier. The concept of feeling helps characterize striving as an egoic relationship to the object, as “a certain state of feeling of the ego (eine bestimmte Gefühlszuständlichkeit des Ich),” which is essentially tied to something lacking, resistant, inadequate, or associated with displeasure (Pfänder, 1967b: 18/1963: 130). Therefore, striving is experienced as a state of the ego that directly refers to a specific content. Consequently, in Phenomenology of Willing, Pfänder writes:

This feeling of the ego (Ichgefühl) is always simultaneously a feeling of being related to something. The feeling of the ego and the ‘objective’ content (‘gegenständlicher’ Inhalt) are always given simultaneously, and thus the feeling of the ego already involves the relation between the ego and the content. Ego, the relation of the ego to a content, and the ‘objective’ content are just distinguishable moments of the same state of consciousness. The state of consciousness regarding the existence of a content can be viewed from two perspectives: from the perspective of the ego and from the ‘objective’ side. (Pfänder, 1963: 16)

Thus, Pfänder suggests that feeling is a suitable concept to represent the intricate connection between personal experience and its content. However, a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the ego’s feeling and the object is necessary to emphasize the uniqueness of striving, regardless of whether it occurs in the realm of feeling or not. In 1911, Pfänder attempts to avoid relying on the concept of feeling to characterize striving, which was a prominent approach in the 1900 study. In his Phenomenology of Willing, Pfänder refers to striving as a feeling, specifically as the ‘feeling of striving’ (unter dem Namen des ‘Gefühles des Strebens’ oder des ‘Strebungsgefühles’)” (Pfänder, 1963: 13, 57ff.), to convey the conscious experience and distinct quality of striving. The act of striving involves not merely perceiving something, but experiences “an urging, striving, as an ‘inner’ tendency, ‘inner’ activity, or the like (ein Hindrängen, Hinstreben, als ‘innere’ Tendenz, ‘innere’ Aktivität oder dgl.)”. Pfänder argues that striving, as an “element of consciousness of urging (ein Bewußtseinselement des Drängens)” that is closely linked to other feelings, is essentially a feeling itself: “This element of consciousness as such must, due to its nature, be categorized as a feeling” (Pfänder, 1963: 13).

In Phenomenology of Willing, Pfänder provides a detailed description of the specificity of this feeling. The key ideas, in my opinion, are as follows: Pfänder notes that in the process of striving, one particular content stands out from the rest, and the ego gives it special attention. This attention is not dependent on the intensity, vividness, or strength of the content (Pfänder, 1963: 17f.), nor does it rely on the pleasure or displeasure we experience while encountering it (Pfänder, 1963: 19). Furthermore, merely paying attention to something does not constitute striving (Pfänder, 1963: 19), as the nature of ‘meaning’ or ‘intending’ (Meinen) differs between the two cases. When something captures my attention or when I am attentive to something, the content of my attention is present to me (see Pfänder, 1963: 19f.). In contrast, when striving, intention is directed toward the desired outcome as something that is “not yet (or no longer)” present in consciousness, but rather represented (Pfänder, 1963: 23).

However, this alone is not enough to constitute striving. This characterization also applies to memories or expectations. In order to clarify this, Pfänder distinguishes between referring to something absent in a purely temporal sense and the meaning of the absent in which “the absent coincides with the ‘represented’ (mit dem ‘Vorgestellten’)” (Pfänder, 1963: 24). It is somewhat difficult to understand what Pfänder means by this, especially since his remarks are lengthy and roundabout. However, considering the deficiency aspect of striving mentioned earlier can be helpful, as striving is aimed at overcoming a lack, resistance, or obstacle. In this sense, striving is not only directed toward something that is temporarily absent; rather, the absence of what one strives for is a moment within the experience of striving itself: “in addition to this representation (Vorstellung), there is also an urge or striving directed toward the represented thing (das Vorgestellte)” (Pfänder, 1963: 39). The particular absence in striving, therefore, refers not only to the specificity of the desired goal but also (and primarily) to a moment of consciousness within the act of striving, a distinct quality of the ongoing experience of striving. While the sense of absence in remembering or expecting is exclusively related to the content of these acts (the remembered or expected being absent),¹² in striving the sense of absence is inherent to the experience of a lack. Therefore, striving cannot be characterized by linking its content-related goal to pleasure or displeasure (Pfänder, 1963: 36 ff.). While the idea of a pleasurable experience may potentially motivate striving, it is not yet striving itself (Pfänder, 1963: 40).¹³ Furthermore, in adults, striving does not always have to be pleasurable; pleasure is even rarely the actual goal of striving (Pfänder, 1963: 41). Thus, Pfänder states: “For consciousness, therefore, neither a represented (vorgestelltes) feeling of pleasure is the actual goal, nor does the representation (Vorstellung) of a feeling of pleasure belong to the representation of the goal. It is solely the fact of consciousness that is at play here” (Pfänder, 1963: 42).

In the following passage, Pfänder attempts to identify a “’relative’ pleasure (‚relative’ Lust)” in striving, either “as a companion to the goal or as the goal itself” (Pfänder, 1963: 43, 43 ff.). This understanding is open to further questioning, but it captures an important aspect of our experience of striving: we would not strive for something if it did not seem pleasurable to us, to some degree (Pfänder, 1963: 45). However, the characterization of this relative pleasure cannot come from a comparison (which would require attention to two different contents, something that is incompatible with striving). Instead, it arises in the transition from the representation of the absence of an experience to its presence. Relative pleasure, therefore, signifies a dynamic change in feeling, an increase in pleasure, or a decrease in displeasure during this transition (Pfänder, 1963: 52 ff.). Even though we focus on relative pleasure, we have not yet fully understood the feeling of striving. We have yet to grasp the moment of urging, the inner tendency that Pfänder regards as crucial in striving. The feeling of increasing pleasure or decreasing displeasure cannot be equated with this urge (see Pfänder, 1963: 57 ff.). Thus, further analysis is needed.

2.3. Striving as an Activity

What distinguishes the feeling of striving from the feeling of relative pleasure? Firstly, the feeling of striving shares its nature as a feeling with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. It is understood as “a state of consciousness-ego (eine Zuständlichkeit des Bewußtseins-Ich), a modification of the ego-feeling, a type of positive and negative involvement of the ego in ‘objective’ contents” (Pfänder, 1963: 61). Additionally, Pfänder emphasizes that we cannot be consciously aware of the feeling of striving while experiencing it. Therefore, thematic awareness of this feeling can only occur on a higher level. However, the significant difference between the feeling of pleasure/displeasure and the feeling of striving is that the former is passive, while the latter is active. The ego simply feels pleasure and displeasure, these feelings are “something that the ego merely experiences (erfährt oder erlebt)” or something that “is done to the ego (was dem Ich angetan wird)”. Consequently, they are “inactive or passive”. As Pfänder further explains:

In the feeling of striving, we feel ourselves as active or activating (aktiv oder uns betätigend)…; we do not feel suffering and joy as mere spectators of an event that is happening ‘on its own,’ but as active and reactive, as striving and resisting participants in this event. (Pfänder, 1963: 62)

According to Pfänder, this represents the final and essential element of the experience of striving.¹⁴ In order to describe the specific intertwining of these two feelings, namely pleasure/displeasure and the feeling of striving, he also refers to this blend as a “feeling of striving colored with ‘relative pleasure’ (mit ‘relativer Lust’ gefärbtes Strebungsgefühl)” (Pfänder, 1963: 63).

These considerations regarding striving for something are complemented by an examination of striving against something (Widerstreben). The distinction between positive and negative striving does not lie in the definiteness of goals, but rather in the emotional aspect of conscious experiences (see Pfänder, 1963: 68). Pfänder is guided by the corresponding reformulation of his characterization of positive striving:

Accordingly, striving against (Widerstreben) could be characterized by a feeling of striving colored with ‘relative displeasure,’ so that, accordingly, the ‘feeling of positive striving’ would be nothing more than a feeling of striving colored with ‘relative pleasure,’ and the ‘feeling of striving against (Gefühl des Widerstreben)’ nothing more than a feeling of striving colored with ‘relative displeasure’. (Pfänder, 1963: 69)

While in the case of positive striving, the feeling of striving is colored with ‘relative pleasure’ due to increasing attention to the (non-present) object of striving, in the case of striving against, the feeling of striving is colored with ‘relative displeasure’ due to increasing attention to the (non-present) object of striving against (Pfänder, 1963: 71).

3. Wishing, Willing, and Acting in Pfänder and Husserl

Husserl’s considerations on willing and striving are partially influenced by Pfänder (who, in turn, draws on the thoughts of Lipps). Both Pfänder and Husserl believe that detailed reflections on striving help in analyzing willing, and they both see willing as being grounded in striving. However, they also make a clear distinction between striving and willing. This distinction becomes particularly clear when they discuss the phenomenon of wishing. Wishing is a unique form of striving but also shares similarities with willing. Hence, comparing the processes of willing and wishing is especially interesting when it comes to understanding the differences between the two. This is where the decisive disparities between striving and willing need to be articulated clearly.

3.1. Wishing and Willing in Pfänder

Pfänder addresses these differences in a longer section of his book Phenomenology of Willing, where he emphasizes the following aspects. First, while it is possible to wish for something impossible (e.g., wishing to be in another place right now), willing requires the awareness or conviction that what one wills is also realistically attainable (Pfänder, 1963: 77). Second, in willing, one must also acknowledge that the desired outcome can, in principle, be achieved through human action. For example, one can wish for good weather tomorrow but cannot will it (Pfänder, 1963: 77). Third, related to this, the question of achievability is not limited to human action in general. In willing, I personally attribute the possibility of realization, either directly or indirectly, to myself as an agent. Pfänder states: “In short, willing involves believing in one’s own ability to bring about what is desired” (Pfänder, 1963: 78.). Fourth, and consequentially, while wishing can be directed toward the past, willing is always future-oriented (Pfänder, 1963: 79). Fifth, the defining characteristic of willing is the readiness for action or the active intention to bring about the desired outcome. Pfänder explains this as follows: “Every willing is a willing-to-do (Tun-Wollen)” (Pfänder, 1963: 80).

This latter point is particularly relevant because Pfänder also distinguishes between willing and striving by claiming that willing is always willing-to-do. Expanding on this distinction in his work Motives and Motivation, Pfänder uses the analogy of centrifugal and centripetal movements mentioned earlier. Both willing and striving are centrifugal movements, but there is a difference. Striving is caused by a centripetal movement from outside, while willing is solely motivated by an inner centrifugal movement. In the case of willing, the ego is the one who carries out the act and is fully responsible for it. Although willing generally arises from striving, it is “performed by the ego-center itself” (Pfänder, 1967b: 20/1963: 133). Willing is not only different from striving because it has the ego-center as its subject and origin but also because the ego is the original performer of the act. Therefore, “[p]henomenally, the act of willing appears precisely not as an occurrence caused by a different agent but as an initial act of the ego-center itself” (Pfänder, 1967b: 20/1963: 132).¹⁵ In line with this, the centrifugal movement of willing, unlike striving, must be conscious of what is willed, as “our meaning posits a practical intent” (meinend [wird] ein praktischer Vorsatz gesetzt) (Pfänder, 1967b: 21/1963: 134). Hence, acts of will are essentially motivated and based on reasons, so-called “grounds of the act of willing” (Gründe des Willensaktes) or “motives” (Willensgründe oder Motive) (Pfänder, 1967b: 27 ff./1963: 141 ff.).

3.2. Wishing and Willing in Husserl

With regard to these distinctions, we can now observe some convergences between Pfänder’s and Husserl’s views. Indeed, Husserl also makes a distinction between willing and wishing that is significant to understanding his phenomenology of the will. In 1914, he adds a section entitled “On the Phenomenology of Will (Zur Phänomenologie des Willens)” to his lectures on Basic Questions of Ethics and Theory of Values. This section contains important remarks that stem from Husserl’s careful reading of Pfänder’s Motives and Motivation (see Schuhmann, 1973: 94 ff.). In this context, Husserl briefly and concisely remarks on the difference between willing and wishing, which bears many resemblances to Pfänder’s views.¹⁶ According to Husserl, wishing is not a practical act; it is not willing in the strict sense (Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 103). Unlike what is wished, which needs not be conscious as something that can be practically realized, what is willed must be consciously understood as practically realizable in some way—be it certainly, probably, possibly, etc. The notion of practical realizability generally aligns with what we find in Pfänder’s Phenomenology of Willing:

A mere wishing is present where what is desired is not in the least conscious as practically realizable, where it is not conscious as such—either with certainty or in a quite problematic way, thus not even in the mode of what is possibly realizable—or even where it is conscious as unrealizable. (Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 103 f.)

This corresponds to Pfänder’s second point, which also includes the reference to possibility marked in the first point. In addition, the willed is understood as something that can be realized by me, the agent. Willing is not only directed to the willed being somehow realizable, but rather to the willed being realizable thanks to my direct or indirect intervention. This corresponds to Pfänder’s third point. For both Pfänder and Husserl, what matters is not only the factual realizability of what is willed, but rather that I, the agent, am aware that what I want can be realized by me, or by means of my intervention (see Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 104). This also implies that willing refers to the future (Pfänder’s fourth point), even when willing is constitutively at play in the execution of a present action (see Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 110). Since I can wish for something without willing to realize it, even if I can be aware that I could realize it, the awareness of the realizability is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for willing.¹⁷ For example, although I can go to the movies with my friends and have a strong desire to do so, I may be willing to do something else, such as finish an urgent job. Thus, the distinction between willing and wishing should also clarify what it means that I will realize something. Such a formulation may seem tautological, and as such it does not yet say much. It hints at a gap in the theory that a more precise analysis of willing is called to fill. Husserl tries to fill this gap by introducing the concept of “fiat”.¹⁸ With “fiat,” Husserl means the decisive moment that transforms willing into actual doing. In his analyses, Husserl emphasizes the creative bringing forth of what is willed. The main character and the essential determination of the will coincide with its directedness to the practical and intentional realization of the willed.

The will is directed to reality, not ideal, but individual, real reality… something that is not yet in it (i.e., this real environment; KM) shall become. The will aims at a certain now as the beginning of a fulfilled time series, and this now, in its determination, already points us to a field of reality. (Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 109)

In this respect, we can notice another aspect on which Pfänder and Husserl agree (corresponding to Pfänder’s fifth point mentioned above). Willing is directed toward the realization of something previously intended, which the willing person brings forth in and through a creative practice:

In every now, the direction of the will and the creative ‘Let there be!’ (‘Es werde!’) flow through the continuity of the moments of the will. With each new current moment of creation, a previous intention of the will, directed toward its content, is fulfilled. The acts of will (Wollungen) are not directed toward further acts of will, but rather each will (Wille) is directed toward the things, creatively fulfilled in the respective current phase of the process, and ‘intending’ toward the entirety of the remaining process to be realized. (Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 111)

3.3. The Crucial Difference Between Pfänder’s and Husserl’s Analysis

However, Husserl’s emphasis on practical creative realization also represents a significant departure from Pfänder’s analysis. Particularly in the excursus from 1914, Husserl’s interest in willing is driven by action theory. Willing is constitutive of action, meaning that acting includes a willing component that transforms mere doing into action. In a text from 1909/10, published in the Studies, Husserl states: “Every acting is therefore eo ipso a willing…” (Husserl, 2020 [Hua XLIII/3]: 24; transl. Spano, 2022a: 120). Since there are other forms of willing, such as “purpose-will” (Vorsatzwille) or “resolution-will” (Entschlusswille), which precede the willing that constitutes action, we should properly refer to “action-will” (Handlungswille) in order to emphasize willing as a constitutive or necessary condition of acting (Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: §§ 15 f., pp. 106 ff.). In contrast, Pfänder has a slightly different perspective. Willing can result in action, but it is not a prerequisite. There are also actions that are not strictly willed, actions that are not volitionally constituted, such as “drive-actions” (Triebhandlungen) (Pfänder, 1963: 113, 120). Interestingly, this form of action can impede the very constitution of a voluntary action, an “action of willing” (Willenshandlung) or an “action of choice” (Wahlhandlung). Pfänder provides the example of an alcoholic who, while contemplating whether it would be better to remain abstinent, is ultimately overcome by desire and reaches for the glass (Pfänder, 1963: 113). Most importantly, Pfänder analyzes willing as an essentially independent phenomenon. Thus, Pfänder’s phenomenology of willing is not conceived as an integral part of a theory of action, but rather as an investigation into the psychic realm of willing in itself. It is true that Pfänder considers willing to be closely related to doing and acting, but willing must still be distinguished from doing itself: “The willing of doing is not yet doing itself” (Pfänder, 1963: 81). This demarcation involves a focus on “acts of willing” (Willensakte) that does not align with Husserl’s interest.¹⁹ According to Pfänder, willing can also occur without necessarily being realized in action, whereas for Husserl, willing is the constitutive moment of an action that always actualizes the willed.

A notable terminological shift may also be connected to the differing interests in the realm of willing:²⁰ Both Pfänder and Husserl use the term “act of willing” (Willensakt). However, Pfänder views willing itself as a type of action, and he does this in light of his fundamental distinction between “acts of willing” (Willensakte) and “actions of willing” (Willenshandlungen). In contrast, Husserl uses the term “act of willing” (Willensakt) only for the overall terminological classification of the sphere of all volitional acts, encompassing voluntary decisions toward something (like purpose-will and resolution-will) as well as action-will (Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 103). However, when Husserl is concerned with an elucidation of the action-constitutive willing he terminologically uses the notion “action-will” (Handlungswille) and does not treat willing itself as an act or action. For willing is what constitutes doing as an action.

3.4. A Combination of Analytic and Phenomenological Interests (Husserl)

Compared to the main assumptions in the standard theory of action presented at the beginning, Husserl’s approach seems, in a certain way, to combine the analytic interest in conceptually clarifying action (as opposed to mere behavior) with the phenomenological enterprise of examining the experience of our doing and the emergence of willing and acting in the realm of striving. On the one hand, in line with the standard model of action in analytic philosophy (although not primarily focused on the linguistic description of action), Husserl emphasizes the constitutive meaning of willing (intention) for describing an action. On the other hand, however, this perspective is embedded in a phenomenological investigation of the intentional structure of striving as the source of willing and acting.²¹ This becomes clear when we consider how willing itself relates to the realm of striving. Husserl’s understanding of willing as the constitutive moment of acting is based on the creative power of the “fiat,” which includes a directedness toward something that agents are conscious of as something they can achieve. This presupposes that agents are aware of the willed as something that is part of their practical possibilities. In a footnote in the third volume of his Studies, Husserl writes: “I cannot will what I do not hold as practically possible (as realizable). The volition involves the consciousness of practical realizability” (Husserl, 2020 [Hua XLIII/3]: 404, fn. 1; trans. Spano, 2022a: 124; slight orthographic modification). As noted by Nicola Spano, this consciousness of practical realizability characterizes rational willing. Therefore, in principle, one may “will” something while knowing that they are unable to realize it. However, this would not be a rational act of willing (see Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 106; Husserl, 2020 [Hua XLIII/3]: 406; see Spano, 2022b: 47; Spano, 2022a: 124, fn. 15). Returning to the realm of “I can,” the analysis of willing also touches on the field of pre-volitional conditions of acting, which primarily includes non-voluntary doings, rooted in the realm of bodily possibilities that have been shaped in our past as habitualized possibilities of our behavior (see Husserl, 1989/Huserl, 1952 [Hua IV]). This point is clearly made in a 1918 manuscript published in the Studies:

But a practicable path points back to the same, or similar, much used paths, and since the volition as such already presupposes that, then from the outset we are pointed back to much-used paths, which were not still paths for a (deciding) willing, or to a representation [Vorstellung] of practicability that does not already involve the representation [Vorstellung] of a course of the will (indeed, we will not accept an endless regress). (Husserl, 2020 [Hua XLIII/3]: 103; transl. Spano, 2022a: 125)

Another necessary requirement for willing is the value of what is being willed (see Husserl, 2020 [Hua XLIII/3]: 84; Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 127; Spano, 2022b: 47, fn. 196; Spano, 2022a: 124 f., fn. 15). This condition should also be restricted to rational willing. While it is not impossible for irrational willing to be directed toward something that is not seen as desirable or valuable (see Husserl, 1988 [Hua XXVIII]: 105), rational willing requires that what is being willed is experienced as valuable, either directly as an end or indirectly as a means to an end.

If willing presupposes the possibilities of “I can,” which is rooted in our non-voluntary doings (and does not necessarily have to be explicitly conscious), and if willing arises from a striving for something valuable and desirable, it becomes clear why non-voluntary happenings and doings are the source of an explicit will. In fact, the sphere of non-voluntary happenings and doings also belongs to the consciousness of a person who can potentially turn every non-voluntary happening or doing into a matter of the will. For this reason, Husserl includes them among the volitional phenomena.²²

Furthermore, in his phenomenological elucidation of striving and tendency, Husserl also emphasizes that willing is ultimately rooted in the passivity of consciousness that precedes all activity, all action in the narrow sense. Accordingly, the non-voluntary doings must, in turn, be traced back to tendencies in the realm of the so-called “passivity of the will” (Spano, 2022a: 127), namely, the realm of passive drives, instincts, urges, etc. In the analyses presented in the third volume of the Studies, Husserl draws attention to the fact that all conscious attention (Zuwendung) arises from a passive, associative field that is fundamentally linked to our irrevocable corporeality (Leiblichkeit) (see Spano, 2022b: 50 ff.):

The ‘original’ (das ‘Ursprüngliche’) is a special kind of happening that brings the background into the foreground or consciousness, preceding the current, attentive consciousness starting from the ego (into attentive [consciousness]), and it is a process of tendency with a specific increase in pleasantness (Annehmlichkeit). The end can become associatively anticipating (vorgrifflich) a desired object, the goal of a desire, an inclination of the will (Willensneigung) (as it is the culmination of a subjective happening). Thus, we come to view every affect as a tendency to attention in the sense of desire (Zuwendung im Begehrungssinn), but this cannot be done originally without further consideration. (Husserl, 2020 [Hua XLIII/3]: 117)²³

If one follows Husserl’s line of thought, a comprehensive theory of action emerges that effectively combines insights from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions. On the one hand, Husserl highlights the close connection between action and will or intention, which is also emphasized in the standard analytic model. On the other hand, Husserl connects this view with a phenomenological program that allows for the exploration of the origins of willing and intending from the perspective of agents’ experiences. However, the phenomenological analysis of the sphere of striving and tendency that precedes volition, as explored by Pfänder and Husserl, requires supplementation with a linguistic analysis of action. Otherwise, the philosophical theory of action remains one-sided and incomplete. This point will be demonstrated in the concluding fourth section.

4. Toward a Linguistic Phenomenology

The formation of will in agents based on their conscious striving and tending is a significant matter in the field of action philosophy. As mentioned earlier, phenomenologists have made substantial contributions to this issue. However, it is worth noting that in recent years, the ‘phenomenology of agency’ has also become a crucial component of analytical action theory. According to Bayne, “there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent” (Bayne, 2008: 182). Analytical philosophers engage in detailed and dynamic discussions on conative phenomena such as striving and willing (Kriegel, 2015: 72 ff.), “the aspect of self as source” or “experiencing oneself as active” (see, e.g., Horgan & Nida-Rümelin, 2021). Consequently, there are now significant parallels and similarities between analytical and phenomenological discussions regarding the experience of striving, willing, and acting.²⁴

Conversely, approaches that reconsider the relationship between willing and acting while taking language into consideration can also be found in the phenomenological tradition, as demonstrated by Husserl and especially Pfänder. Methodologically, Pfänder and Husserl initially understand willing as arising within the realm of passive striving or tendency, which they believe can be analyzed through descriptive analysis of our subjective experience. According to their self-understanding, the task of phenomenological analysis is to adequately determine this. To further elaborate on this in relation to Pfänder: Pfänder’s works on striving and willing, titled “Psychology” and “Phenomenology,” are methodologically genuine psychological-phenomenological studies. Pfänder explicitly distinguishes his methodological approach from those that “in order to stick consistently to their general view, do not shrink from doing violence to the facts…” Pfänder instead emphasizes “respect (Pietät) toward the psychic facts” (Pfänder, 1967a: 6/1963: 5) and that “the conscious phenomena are completely and respectfully recorded” (Pfänder, 1967a: 11/1963: 10). Therefore, he characterizes the method uses in his Phenomenology of Willing as “subjective” (Pfänder, 1967a: 8/1963: 7). However, it is important to note that although Pfänder relates to the consciousness of the person striving and willing in his analyses, his method is not introspective. It does not suggest the possibility of “direct observation of what is immediately experienced” but rather involves reconstructing experiences based on memories. Instead of an introspective method, Pfänder also refers to it as a “retrospective” method (Pfänder, 1967a: 8/1963: 7; see Pfänder, 1904: 130).²⁵ In his examination of the nature of phenomenological reflection, Husserl arrives at similar insights when he highlights that understanding phenomenological reflection as an immediate and direct capture of our consciousness would be naïve. Rather, the attempt to grasp our primary consciousness through phenomenological reflection is inherently delayed, leading to the reification and modification of the originary experience. In his later writings, Husserl even refers to the constructive nature of his eidetic analysis (see, e.g., Hussel, 1959 [Hua VIII]: 456, 504).²⁶

More importantly, Pfänder and Husserl reflect on the relationship between consciousness and its analysis through linguistic means. Particularly in his early work, Husserl occasionally considers the role of language in phenomenological analysis. For example, he rejects the idea that linguistic representation is a mere dress of what one finds in the analysis of consciousness,²⁷ and he explores the metaphorical nature of phenomenological language.²⁸ Pfänder, on the other hand, deeply examines the connection between language and consciousness in all his work. In light of the methodological remarks mentioned above, Pfänder combines his concept of retrospective analysis of experience with a critical reflection on language. The way we (retrospectively) describe our experience is influenced by the way we speak about it. This applies not only to the language used in empirical psychology, which Pfänder repeatedly criticizes but also to the attempt to rescue the facts of consciousness relying on our everyday language and common sense opinions that shape the way we approach our consciousness. While linguistic expressions and interpretations are not without their flaws and can be misleading (see, e.g., Pfänder, 1967b: 14/1963: 125), they are unavoidable in the context of phenomenological analysis. Therefore, Pfänder’s explanations, particularly in his work Phenomenology of Willing, include frequent and concise remarks on the relationship between language and phenomenal consciousness. These remarks serve as both a heuristic tool for guiding the investigation and a critique of linguistic customs that have become ingrained in everyday language. It is important to note that language does not have the final say in the matter, but it undoubtedly plays a significant role.

If we consider Pfänder’s assertion that our consciousness cannot be directly grasped through introspection, but only in retrospective attention, then we cannot simply view linguistic expressions of striving, willing, and acting as mere descriptions. As previously mentioned, Pfänder’s phenomenological description aims to capture essential structures. It is indeed true that our psychic experiences can only be gained from our own psyche (Pfänder, 1904: 124). In order to transform individual experiences into essential analyses, they must be understood in a paradigmatic sense. According to Geiger (1933: 9 ff.), Pfänder achieves this by employing analogies and metaphors to make the essential structures he seeks more comprehensible. Consequently, our linguistic approach always involves a certain production of what is being addressed. Thus, striving, willing, and acting are reconstructed within the realm of linguistic understanding. However, Pfänder reflects critically on our language, prompting us to question whether this linguistic understanding truly aligns with the phenomena that we communicate about.

This perspective can be considered phenomenological as long as we understand that language is used heuristically, as Pfänder does (see, e.g., Pfänder, 1967a: 7/1963: 6; Pfänder, 1967b: 26/1963: 140). The way we express our will reflects a phenomenological truth that a retrospective and language-guided analysis aims to uncover as a fact of consciousness. Therefore, the process of recalling, reconstructing, and verbalizing an experience must be evaluated in relation to what is remembered, reconstructed, and verbalized—in other words, against the actual experience itself. This is possible if we acknowledge that we can critique the accuracy of subsequent linguistic descriptions of our striving, willing, and acting even without having an adequate linguistic expression of our original experience. This possibility reveals that what is expressed through memory, reconstruction, and verbalization cannot be equated with pre-reflexive experience. The retrospective and linguistic account does not provide a definitive description of our experiences of acting and willing. It serves as the initial point of analysis, a preliminary framework that helps us conceptualize our experience, but its validity (or lack thereof) must always be assessed in relation to the actual experience. It becomes evident that verbalizing our experience is not the end-all-be-all of understanding it, especially when we encounter resistance toward a particular linguistic reconstruction. In such cases, there is something that has not yet found its proper expression, and the linguistic descriptions as far as available prove to be inadequate.

With the help of linguistic analysis, we can gain a better understanding of some controversial issues in the phenomenology of willing and acting, such as those related to consciousness and self-consciousness. For example, we can better comprehend what Pfänder means when he says that “immediate consciousness of self” is crucial to willing (Pfänder, 1967b: 22/1963: 135). This does not mean that agents are epistemically aware of the ego-related nature of their will while they are acting (see Pfänder, 1967a: 7/1963: 6), but rather that “the subject is actively directed to herself,” insofar as “the act of willing entails an act of self-determination” (Selbstbestimmung), as Pfänder points out in his Introduction to Psychology (Pfänder, 1904: 422 f.). In this sense, according to Pfänder, every willing to act involves being aware of oneself.²⁹ However, speaking of a self or an ego does not necessarily imply having reflexive access to the ego. This is evident in Pfänder’s discussion of so-called ego-feelings, especially their lack of reflexive thematization. In such cases, the way we express our experience is merely an initial account that needs further elucidation. Nevertheless, this initial linguistic account is necessary because any phenomenological analysis must begin with words to reveal our originary experience. Therefore, Pfänder uses the concept of “ego” as an operational concept in Fink’s (1957) sense, to refer to certain aspects of the topic under investigation without any specific theoretical charge. In this understanding, Pfänder’s references to self-consciousness or the ego are phenomenologically open; they simply serve as placeholders for a more precise determination of the experience of striving, feeling, or willing. Conversely, Pfänder’s methodological reflections highlight the problematic claim of a purely descriptive phenomenological analysis. Phenomenological reflection not only describes and reproduces our experience but also retraces and reconstructs the structures of our experience. As these attempts help us gain a better understanding of the phenomenal world of our experiences, they remain within the realm of phenomenology.³⁰

Finally, I would like to point out an aspect of linguistic analysis that goes beyond the function of retrospective reconstruction already outlined. We are particularly faced with this in the context of willing and acting: Actions become thematic as actions in the context of our communication about our behavior. Therefore, actions are, according to both the phenomenological and analytic tradition, necessarily dependent on linguistically expressed intentional descriptions and reconstructions. However, in the context of our communication, this characterization should be determined more precisely as ascriptions. The reason for this can be explained as follows: In addition to their traditional characterization as something an agent causally brings about, actions have a fundamentally normative character. When we act, we always do something quite determinate:³¹ we go shopping, repair the bicycle, write an article, etc. And even when it is not clear what we are doing, it is always necessary to determine more precisely what the action in question is. Is the hand movement of the friend whom I happen to see on the other side of the street a greeting signal directed at me or is she using it to call a cab? Is the yawning of the listener during the lecture caused by his tiredness or is he expressing how boring he finds the lecture? Merely saying that someone has acted may make sense in action-theoretical contexts; in the context of our everyday understanding of actions, however, such a statement would be at least strange and, in any case, in need of supplementation. We are not only interested in the fact that someone has acted but always in what one has done. Also, doing something specific or acting in a certain way always means at the same time not doing something else or not acting in a different way. Yawning, for instance, in a particular situation is a provocative expression of boredom; thus, in these cases, it is not a physiologically determined behavior. Such determinations of action are subject to rules that are to be followed if the action is to be performed appropriately but can also be (intentionally or unintentionally) violated. For a behavior to be understood as “hailing a cab,” for example, certain conditions must be met: a certain bodily behavior—in the usual case, an arm movement—should be executed in such a way that it is visible to the respective addressees and can be understood as a movement addressed to them. There is certainly room for different possibilities of behavior here, but there are also limits to these possibilities: some kinds of behavior just cannot be understood as the execution of this or that action. Thus, for example, clenching one’s fist in one’s pants pocket would not be an appropriate way of hailing a cab. This is already the case simply because the condition for clenching the fist in one’s pants pocket to be a possible cause for hailing the taxi is not met. As Wittgenstein (2009) and Winch (2008) have argued, no one can decide by oneself about the observance or violation of the rules constitutive of certain actions. In contrast, one always acts in social contexts, that is to say, when acting one presupposes as a matter of principle possible mutual understanding. Regardless of whether one does something in a public or private space, if what one does is an action, then it must be subject to public rules and thus potentially understood as this or that action by others. Therefore, actions are, in principle, also possibly subject to public criticism and correction. For example, someone who yawns is certainly not expressing that they want to speak up, no matter what the yawner may claim; but it can be reasonably disputed, for example, whether yawning in a certain situation is an intentional action by which the feeling of boredom is to be expressed or whether it happens involuntarily out of tiredness after an exhausting day. Actions are thus products of social ascriptions (Hart, 1949). They are ascribed to agents in social communications about our doing. Since actions as objects of critique in the context of social communication are always linked to certain linguistic descriptions, the linguistic approach is essential for a sufficient theory of action. This is the point that authors like Anscombe or Hart have worked out with different accentuations (see Summa & Mertens, 2018).

However, this characterization is still incomplete because ascriptions cannot be considered independently of whether an agent may have causally brought about the action attributed to him. It also cannot be discussed separately from what the agent experiences. As Anscombe has shown, answering the question “Why did you do x?” by saying “I was not aware of having done x” is a possibility that needs to be taken seriously. This refers to a discrepancy between third-personal ascription of intentions and first-personal account of intentions (see Anscombe, 1976: § 6, pp. 11 f.). Therefore, the analysis of the linguistic characterization of our willing and acting leads back to the program of a phenomenology of agency that takes into account what it is like to experience oneself as a willing and acting person.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the preceding considerations argue that the methodological approaches of both analytic and phenomenological philosophy are complementary and indispensable in the theory of will, intention, and action.³² Both approaches converge in distinguishing action by focusing on intention or the phenomenon of willing. On one hand, the theory of action examines the constitutive meaning of linguistic expression and communication, demonstrating that the characterization of volition and agency relies on mutual understanding and public communication. Therefore, the theory of action must move beyond privileging the first-person (singular) perspective. On the other hand, willing and intending are first-personal experiences that need to be assessed as such. Descriptions, reconstructions, and ascriptions of actions, intentions, and volitions must always be connected to how agents experience these actions and their involvement in them. Linguistic characterizations should at least align with possible subjective experiences that pertain to the formation of will and action in the realm of striving. Linguistic and experiential analyses not only converge on a crucial point but also mutually challenge each other from different perspectives.³³