Consciousness of Emotion and Emotive Consciousness in Geiger and Husserl

Abstract

Moritz Geiger’s 1911 article on the consciousness of feeling, entitled “Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen,” was an object of study for Husserl in a series of manuscripts recently published in Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins II. Gefühl und Wert (1896-1925)(2020). Geiger’s article and Husserl’s remarks on it received attention from Métraux (1975), but, more recently, an increasing number of publications have been devoted to the topic (Averchi, 2015a, 2015b; Crespo, 2015; Quepons, 2017; Marcos del Cano, 2023). These new publications identify a central area of disagreement between the two authors concerning the nature of emotive consciousness, i.e., the mode in which affective states relate to their objects. For Geiger, emotions are directed toward their objects but are not regarded as intentional and, in certain forms of consciousness, can even lose their relation to their objects. By contrast, for Husserl, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of emotive consciousness. The paper shows that Geiger’s and Husserl’s disagreement on the nature of emotions is rooted in their different pictures of the structure of consciousness and, in particular, the place of feeling in their respective ontologies of the mind.

Introduction

Moritz Geiger, one of the main representatives of Munich phenomenology, published an article in 1911 on the consciousness of feelings, entitled “Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen”. The article appeared in the journal Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen as part of a collection of contributions written by former students of Theodor Lipps to commemorate his sixtieth birthday. Geiger’s main concern in the article was whether we can turn to our actual feelings, i.e., feelings in the very moment in which we experience them, without introducing modifications to the experience. This question was not original to Geiger. In fact, at least since the end of the nineteenth century, it had been present in methodological discussions about the limits of introspection and inner observation by the main representatives of psychological philosophy at that time, such as Franz Brentano and Wilhelm Wundt. It had also been a central concern for Lipps and his Munich followers. Yet, what is novel in Geiger’s article is that he provides a nuanced analysis of different forms of consciousness of feeling, linked to a discussion of the nature of emotive consciousness, i.e., how feelings relate to their objects.

Insofar as phenomenology is concerned with the description of the structure of consciousness and its objects, it is not surprising that the issue tackled by Geiger immediately piqued Edmund Husserl’s interest. In fact, it was Geiger himself who sent Husserl a copy of his article, together with a copy of an article published the same year on the empathy of moods, entitled “Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung”. Interestingly, although Husserl openly referred to Geiger as being only a quarter phenomenologist (as quoted in Métraux, 1975: 144) and, in later years, was very skeptical about whether the Munich phenomenologists might be considered phenomenologists, Geiger’s article was important for him from a methodological point of view since he was interested in the more general question of how to grasp experience in its originality, with feelings being only a part of it (Averchi, 2015b: 237). Husserl read Geiger’s article on the consciousness of feeling in the same year, leaving in the margins of his copy the series of annotations published by Alexandre Métraux in his article on the issue (1975: 156f.). Also in 1911, Husserl wrote a series of manuscripts, which contain an accurate discussion of Geiger’s views and which have recently been edited by Ulrich Melle and Thomas Vongehr in Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins II. Gefühl und Wert. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1896–1925) (Husserl, 2020: 143–183).

Geiger’s text and Husserl’s remarks on it have already been studied by Métraux (1975). Métraux (1975: 155–157) had already observed the differences in his analysis of the possible influence of Geiger’s article on Husserl’s method of reflection. However, in the context of renewed interest in the early phenomenology of feelings, an increasing number of publications have been devoted to both texts. In these recent publications, attention has been paid in particular to the phenomenon of ego splitting (Averchi, 2015a), the forms of consciousness of feelings (Crespo, 2015, Marcos del Cano 2023), and the intentionality of moods (Quepons, 2017).

An issue often tackled in the literature concerns the disagreement between both authors regarding the intentionality of feeling. After examining the main forms of consciousness of feeling in Geiger and distinguishing those that introduce modifications to the feeling from those that enable us to have an orientation toward the feeling without modifying it, Mariano Crespo focuses on how Geiger’s text influenced Husserl, coming to the conclusion that Geiger “influenced the way Husserl conceived of something so decisive as emotive intentionality” (2015: 375). Crespo argues that Geiger’s text is particularly important for phenomenology and for “all those philosophies that make reflection their central method” (2015: 376). Michele Averchi (2015) devotes an article specifically to the disagreement between the two authors regarding the intentionality of feeling, reconstructing the historical background of both texts. According to Averchi, Geiger argues that “in feelings, consciousness is sometimes not oriented to representations (and, therefore, that object-intentionality is not an essential property of the mind), while Husserl incorporated object-intentionality in the broader structure of time-consciousness” (2015b: 71). In another recent article, Quepons (2017: 58) argues that Husserl’s critique of Geiger anticipates some questions regarding the model of intentional analysis later developed by Husserl (2017: 58). As he discusses, phenomenology’s problem is in describing the meaningful relation of feelings to their objective correlates (2017: 64). In this vein, his article focuses on moods (e.g., melancholy) of which the intentional structure has often been put into question.¹ In connection with the recent translation of Geiger’s and Husserl’s texts into Spanish by Zirión (2021), Jesús Miguel Marcos del Cano (2023) has offered a detailed analysis of the disagreement between the two authors. His aim is to defend a Husserlian position regarding the intentionality of feeling and to criticize Geiger’s interpretation of pleasure and pain as feelings. In different degrees, all these texts argue that what is at stake in the disagreement is the possibility of the phenomenological reduction itself.

This paper too is concerned with the disagreement between Geiger and Husserl regarding the intentionality of feeling (or lack thereof). Indeed, a central difference between the two authors concerns the nature of emotive consciousness, i.e., the mode in which affective states relate to their objects. It is intriguing that, for Geiger, emotions are directed toward their objects but are not regarded as intentional and, in certain forms of consciousness, can even lose their relation to their objects, while for Husserl, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of emotive consciousness. Yet, unlike the previous publications, my aim here is to show that Geiger and Husserl’s disagreement on the nature of emotions is rooted in their different pictures of the structure of consciousness and, in particular, the place of feeling in their respective ontologies of the mind.

My article differs from the extant literature in three respects. To begin, while the majority of the extant literature has underscored methodological differences between both authors, this paper focuses on the issue of the ontology of the mind: the nature of feelings and the emotions in particular, and what this reveals about the structure of consciousness more generally. Indeed, I suggest here a shift of focus from methodological to ontological questions. Moreover, while previous accounts have been centered on Husserl, either by showing Geiger’s influence on him and/or by demonstrating the superiority of Husserl’s account in comparison to that of Geiger, my aim here is to analyze the disagreement by focusing mostly on Geiger’s picture of the emotions and their place in the mind and how Husserl diverges from it. Finally, while the extant literature discusses Geiger’s views on feelings, which include both sensory feelings (e.g., pleasure and pain) and emotional feelings (e.g., anger, shame), this paper focuses in particular on the latter. Indeed, the disagreement between both authors becomes more pronounced when it comes to explaining emotional feelings, or what we call today “emotions”.

The focus of the paper is on Geiger and Husserl. Yet, throughout the paper, I indicate which elements in their respective works are shared by other early phenomenologists. In so doing, I put forward the suggestion that Geiger and Husserl could be regarded as representative of a different branch of early phenomenology regarding the nature of the mind. These two brands are the Munich phenomenologists around Lipps of whom Geiger was one of its main representatives, on the one side, and phenomenologists of a Brentanian orientation such as Husserl, on the other. The very fact that Geiger explicitly distances himself from Brentano and his disciples at the beginning of the paper suggests this. To investigate this suggestion further is beyond the scope of the present paper and will be a matter of further research.

To develop my account, I will proceed as follows. In the next section, I present the main question of Geiger’s article within the context of Munich phenomenology (Sect. 2). I proceed to discuss Geiger’s distinction between different forms of consciousness of actual feeling and Husserl’s remarks in the recently published manuscripts (Sect. 3). I then turn to the problem of intentionality by focusing on Geiger’s account of emotive consciousness and Husserl’s disagreement with him (Sect. 4). In the final section, drawing on the results of my analysis, I argue that the disagreement between Geiger and Husserl regarding the intentionality of feeling (or lack thereof) should be understood in terms of a more profound disagreement between both authors regarding the nature of consciousness and the place of feeling in the ontology of the mind (Sect. 5).

Geiger’s Question in the Context of Munich Phenomenology

In this section, I consider Geiger’s question about the consciousness of actual feelings by embedding it within the context of the research program and picture of the mind typical of the Munich phenomenologists. As I shall argue, Geiger’s question is marked by a strong focus on feeling and a realist view of the mind.

To begin, when Geiger published his article, feelings were an important subject of research among the Munich phenomenologists. For instance, Lipps had already devoted part of his work to issues like empathy, self-feeling, and the significance of feeling for self-consciousness (e.g., Lipps, 1901, 1902); Pfänder (1900) had published on will and motivation; Voigtländer (1910) on feelings of self-worth; and Haas (1910) on inauthentic feelings. Scheler (e.g., 1973a, 2008), who can also be placed in this context at around this time, started to develop his rich analysis of the affective life. Although Husserl also worked on feelings (Melle, 2012; Vongehr, 2011) in his early writings (Byrne, 2023) and this interest was pursued by other phenomenologists working closer to Husserl, such as Stein (1989), what is particular to the Munich phenomenologists is that they regarded feelings as constitutive elements of self-consciousness. Fréchette (2013: 657) refers to this in terms of an “emotivist account of self-consciousness,” and it is fundamentally different from Husserl’s account of self-consciousness, in which feelings do not occupy a central place. Against this backdrop of emotivism, it is not surprising that Geiger devoted his article to the methodological problem of how to study feelings.

The particular view of feelings that is operative in Geiger’s work needs to be understood in the context of early phenomenology and in particular of the Munich Circle. Let’s focus on the two taxonomies of feelings that Geiger offers in his article. In the first taxonomy, Geiger identifies the following four types. First, there are “feelings and affects of pleasure and displeasure” (Lust-Unlustgefühle und -Affekte), such as enjoyment, joy, sadness, anger, anxiety, fear, enthusiasm, compassion, and so on. The second type is “sensory feelings” (sinnliche Gefühle), such as pleasure in a taste, displeasure in a color, etc. Third, there are experiences such as liking and disliking, approval, doubt, etc., which are usually considered feelings. The fourth type is “self-feelings” (Selbstgefühle) such as pride and humility, envy and vanity, feelings of honor, etc. (1911: 128).²

For a contemporary reader, this taxonomy is quite unusual. In current research, there is a strong focus on emotions, though moods, sensations, and sentiments are also mentioned as types of affective states. However, no current taxonomy resembles Geiger’s. Moreover, Geiger’s taxonomy differs from other taxonomies of feelings as set out in recent studies of the early phenomenological literature, where feelings are distinguished from each other according to the rank of values to which they are related. For instance, Scheler (1973a) distinguishes between sensory feelings directed toward the agreeable and disagreeable, vital feelings directed toward the values of the vital, psychological feelings directed toward ethical and aesthetical values, and spiritual feelings directed toward religious values; for a similar taxonomy, see also Stein (1989). Perhaps it is such issues that have led Marcos del Cano (2023) to regard Geiger’s taxonomy as arbitrary.

However, in my view, Geiger’s taxonomy makes sense when we place it in its historical context. Indeed, feelings of the second type – the sensory feelings – had been the object of separate analysis by early phenomenologists. In line with other taxonomies of feelings, such as those presented by Scheler (1973a), Geiger categorizes pleasure and displeasure as part of the affective life despite lacking the feature of intentionality, a point developed by Husserl (2001) following Stumpf in the 5th Logical Investigation.

Feelings of the fourth type – self-feeling – had been identified and studied by two Munich phenomenologists. In Fühlen, Wollen und Denken (1902), Lipps elaborated a taxonomy of feelings by distinguishing between four subclasses: feelings related to objects, intellectual feelings, psychological feelings, and feelings of self-worth. What is striking about this taxonomy is that the category of feelings does not necessarily have an object in sensu strictu. In fact, the feelings of self-worth, which were the object of a detailed study by Voigtländer (1910), another Munich phenomenologist working under the auspices of Lipps, target the self of the person in question.

The distinction between feelings of the first type and of the third type is more challenging. In my view, the first type indicates what we today call emotions properly speaking, which, by virtue of entailing bodily moments, exhibit a hedonic valence. Indeed, joy, sadness, and anger can be classified as pleasant or unpleasant. The third type³ indicates a particular kind of feelings for which today’s emotion research does not have a particular term. However, in Geiger’s time, likes, dislikes, and feelings of approval were regarded as intentional feelings. Thus, Geiger distinguishes here between what we today call emotions, on the one hand, and intentional feelings, a phenomenon for which we today do not have a particular name, on the other. A similar distinction can be found in Scheler (1973a) between emotional responses and intentional feelings. He regards both kinds of feelings as different in kind. For Scheler, intentional feelings are able to apprehend their objects, i.e., value qualities, while emotions are responses to the values apprehended by an intentional feeling, but they do not have any cognitive function. In his view, an intentional feeling can take place without an emotional response. I can dislike an unfair action (third type) without experiencing the emotional response of indignation (first type). By contrast, in Husserl (1982) and Stein (1989) usually feelings of the first and third type are two sides of the same coin: joy (first type) involves an intentional feeling of grasping something positive (third type),⁴ and in Husserl these are built upon sensory feelings (second type).

Thus, in my view, Geiger’s taxonomy is perfectly coherent and reflects research being done by other early phenomenologists, in particular the Munich Circle. The identification of feelings of the fourth type is a clear achievement of Lipps and Voigtländer, and the distinction between feelings of the first and third type as not only two different but separate classes was present also in Scheler. In my view, Marcos del Cano’s critique of Geiger is the result of placing Geiger’s thought within a Husserlian conceptual frame in which self-feelings are not taken into account and in which feelings of the first, second, and third types are usually intertwined.

Geiger argues that these different types of feelings will be considered insofar as they entail components of pleasure and displeasure, stating that the “moments of evaluation” (Wertungsmomente) and the “intellectual moments” (intellektuelle Momente) will be disconnected. These claims show that Geiger—like many other early phenomenologists—is working with a concept of feeling (Gefühl) as a technical term, according to which feelings involve three moments or aspects. First, they have a specific phenomenal quality, or “what it feels like”. Feelings are felt; they have a qualitative character, with pleasure and pain being the most prominent features of their phenomenology. Second, Geiger regards feelings as presenting the targeted objects under an evaluative light, i.e., the object of a feeling is not neutral but is presented as having an evaluative property which invites us to adopt a pro- or contra-attitude. Finally, feelings have an “intellectual” or, as we would say today, “cognitive” moment. Indeed, the objects targeted by a feeling are presented to us not by the feeling itself but by a cognitive state. If I fear a dog, the dog which is here the object of my fear is presented to my mind by means of perception, memory, imagining, judgment, or supposition. With all these different “moments,” Geiger is only interested in feelings insofar as they involve pleasure and pain, i.e., only insofar as they exhibit a phenomenal character or qualitative feel. Thus, when Geiger is interested in attending to actual feeling, he is in fact interested in how attention affects the phenomenal character of a feeling.

Later in his text, Geiger introduces a second taxonomy by distinguishing between “proper emotional feelings” (eigentlich emotionale Gefühle), such as sadness, enthusiasm, liking and anger, and “sensory feelings,” like pleasure and displeasure of the taste of a dish or the smell of a flower, etc. (1911: 129). Since Geiger agrees with Husserl’s critique, in the 5th Logical Investigation (2001), that “sensory feelings” are not intentional, the main point of disagreement will concern the proper emotional feelings, i.e., what we today call emotions.

A further feature of the Munich phenomenology, which cannot be found in Brentano and his followers, is that the authors belonging to this circle endorsed a realist view of consciousness, according to which mental states are real entities of the mind that can be the objects of inner perception, just as physical objects can be grasped in outer perception. The idea is that mental and physical entities can exist independently of our experience of them. One of the implications of this analogy is that there is no privileged access to one’s own mental life. In this regard, Munich phenomenologists were, like Lipps, very critical of the idea of an infallible inner perception (Reinach, 1989). In fact, they considered that the idea of a privileged inner perception led to subjective idealism. Applied to the field of feelings, the immanent psychic realism argues that the existence of a feeling does not presuppose its being felt. Indeed, a person can be moved by her envy over decades, without being aware of it. Moreover, we can have a failed perception of a feeling. For instance, we can think that we feel remorse while in fact what we experience is only fear of the consequences of our acts. Finally, we can experience an emotion without in fact having one. We can imagine feeling in love and end up experiencing a love-like state without in fact really being in love.⁵ This particular form of realism was present already in Lipps, for whom, as noted by Fréchette (2013: 663), experience is divided into two different ontological categories: the experience of objects (hearing a noise, seeing a house) and mental events (joy, regret) (Fréchette, 2013: 663). This doctrine was also defended by several early phenomenologists, such as Scheler, 1973bc; Pfänder, (1913/1916), Haas (1921), and Stein (2000).

Though in later writing Geiger labels this position in terms of “immanent psychic realism” (Geiger, 1921), it is remarkable that at the beginning of his article on the consciousness of feeling, he is already aligning himself with a realist view of the mind. To begin, Geiger observes that we can distinguish between the existence (Sein) of feelings and the way in which we experience them (Art des Erlebtseins), just as we would do in the case of physical objects (1911: 125). Moreover, he argues that feelings can be given to consciousness in different forms. As Geiger puts it, just as a color can be perceived, imagined, thought, attended, etc., feelings are not always given to our consciousness in the same way. I can experience fear that something bad might happen, and I can remember this fear and know about it, or I can re-live the past fear. As he puts it: “‘The sameʼ feeling of fear is given to my consciousness in very different ways” (1911: 125). Here, Geiger is not only distinguishing between the content and the mode of consciousness. Rather, he is endorsing a realist view about mental states, according to which we have objective contents of consciousness on the one hand, and the experience of these contents on the other. Geiger probably developed this view drawing on Lipps for whom the concept of “content” is crucial. However, for Lipps, the separation of content and our consciousness of it does not apply to all forms of consciousness. In particular, with regard to self-consciousness, Lipps rejects this separation and argues that here there is an identity between subject and object, between consciousness and content (though it is likely that Lipps was not always consistent in this view). Yet, within Munich phenomenology, a position closer to Geiger was endorsed by Scheler.

From all these different modes of consciousness of feeling, Geiger is exclusively interested in studying the consciousness of feelings when we “actually” experience them (1911: 126). This focus of concern limits Geiger’s investigation to the particular case of actual feelings. Indeed, he is interested not in how to investigate feelings that we might have but which are not experienced, such as long-term emotions.⁶ He is interested not in explaining how we can turn toward an enduring envy or a dispositional hate, but rather in occurrent feelings, i.e., episodic acute emotional states.⁷ Furthermore, Geiger is not interested in modes of consciousness other than feeling (such as memory, imagination, judgment, etc.), though these modes of consciousness might have a feeling as content (I can remember a feeling, imagine a feeling, judge a feeling, etc.). Rather, he is interested in how we turn to our feelings in the moment in which we experience them; how we are conscious of our own acute episodes of anger and shame.

Forms of Consciousness of Actual Feeling in Geiger and Husserl

Geiger on Forms of Consciousness of Actual Feeling

According to Geiger, in the psychology of his time, there were three main positions regarding the consciousness of actual feeling. According to the first, attention destroys the feeling: it is impossible to attend to one’s own feelings in the moment one experiences them. According to the second position, attention to a feeling increases the level of awareness of the experience. Finally, according to a third position, we can attend to our feelings and simultaneously analyze them. Since, according to Geiger, there are arguments in favor of and against each of these positions, an accurate answer requires us to distinguish between different forms of “attention” (Beachtung) to feeling. In his view, “attention” (Beachtung) works as an umbrella term under which we subsume different phenomena. In this context, he establishes a distinction between three kinds of attention – simple, qualitative, and analytical attention—and examines how each one can be applied to the feelings.⁸ However, the prominent role of attention in Geiger’s article should not lead us to overlook three other forms of consciousness of feeling studied in his work: the consciousness of feeling in ego splitting, in the objective orientation, and in the state orientation.⁹

Simple Attention

The first form of consciousness is “simple attention” (schlichte Beachtung). Simple attention occurs for instance when a knock at the door suddenly tears me away from my thoughts, or when I consciously direct my attention to a sound of a car. In simple attention, the apprehended object is given to me as a “whole”. Here it is secondary that we apprehend the qualities of the object (e.g., that the knocking is loud) (Geiger, 1911: 131). This form of attention is the most primitive and all others build on it. According to Geiger, feelings can be objects of “simple attention”. For instance, when we notice that we are angry, this feeling does not vanish. Thus, a simple attention to feelings in the moment in which we experience them is possible. Though our interest in the feeling can be theoretically motivated, we can attend to these feelings without modifying them. For Geiger, we have here two rays of consciousness (Bewußtseinsstrahlen): on the one hand, my consciousness is directed toward what elicits my anger; on the other, my consciousness is directed toward the anger itself.

Qualitative Attention

Qualitative attention (qualitative Beachtung) presupposes simple attention. Yet, here we turn to the quality of what is apprehended. For example, I attend to the colors of the things to which I pay attention and I notice if they are red or blue. According to Geiger, feelings can also be objects of qualitative attention while we are experiencing them. We can notice if the feeling we are experiencing is pleasant or unpleasant. We can also notice whether we are experiencing anger, sadness, pity, joy, or excitement. We can notice whether these feelings are deep, superficial, etc. Thus, feelings can be objects of qualitative attention without being modified by this.

Analytical Attention

The “analytical attention” (analysierende Beachtung) is typical of the psychological state of “observation” (Beobachtung) (though not exhausted by it). Analytical attention differs from qualitative attention in two respects. First, in analyzing attention, I am interested in the “generic nature” (Geiger, 1911: 132) of the single quality I am observing. I approach the object with questions. Indeed, I not only notice that a bird flies quickly, but I try to analyze it. I not only observe that a piece of music has different tones, but I also try to classify these tones. Second, unlike qualitative attention, analytical attention breaks down its subject into moments, in order to better analyze what is apprehended. This is the kind of attention often used in science.

According to Geiger, analytical attention to actual feeling is not possible (1911: 134). I cannot analyze the feeling of anger, fear, or rage, take it apart, and ask questions while experiencing the feeling. As Geiger writes: “When I try to observe the feeling, it fades away, and I grasp nothing but certain bodily sensations that tend to accompany the feeling—I get hold of the constriction of the chest, for instance, or the unpleasant sensation in the larynx, but the feeling itself in its actual emotional nature eludes the analytical observation at the moment of actual experience” (1911: 134). Analytical attention to actual feeling is not possible without modifying the feeling. The reason is that analytical attention requires the division of the feeling into moments and parts which can take place only afterward, when we have stopped to feel it and the feeling has been objectified.

Ego Splitting

The observation of feeling in ego splitting constitutes a further case of consciousness of feeling. The phenomenon at stake here does not indicate a pathological case but refers to a division of the self in which the ego is duplicated in a living ego (erlebendes Ich) and an observing ego (beobachtendes Ich).¹⁰ In the splitting of the ego, the whole ego turns into an object. The ego has distance from itself and looks at itself as if it were another subject. The observing ego is not another living ego with its own personality but a disinterested spectator. Insofar as the self is a spectator of its whole self when the ego splits, it can observe its own feelings (1911: 137). For instance, one observes how one reacts emotionally to certain events, how joy and fear form, how love and hate arise, how one is compassionate or cruel, how one bursts into anger. Insofar as a split of the ego is possible, Geiger defends what Averchi has called a “weak ego view” (which was a rather uncommon position among early phenomenologists, who generally defended the strong ego view). As Averchi notes, this is a consequence of his immanent psychic realism: there is a difference between the psyche as a realm of entities and the consciousness as the experience of such entities (2015a: 236).

According to Geiger, cases of “observation of feeling in the ego splitting” (Beobachtung von Gefühlen bei Ichteilung) differ from the cases of “observation of feelings” in analytical attention. First, in the analytical attention to feelings, there is a unitary conscious ego (einheitlichen Bewusstseinsich) with two rays: one ray is like the feeling directed toward the object, the other is directed toward one’s own feeling. In contrast, in ego splitting there is no unitary consciousness because of the very fact that the ego splits. Moreover, while in analytical attention, we observe our own feelings, in ego splitting, we do not observe the feeling but rather the experiencing ego in its totality, with all the feelings that belong to it. Given that the object of the observing ego is not the feeling but the whole ego, access to feeling is mediated.

Objective Orientation

Geiger focuses on a further form of consciousness of feeling, which he refers to as “objective orientation” (gegenständliche Einstellung) (1911: 143).¹¹ In “objective orientation”—as in “state orientation,” as we will see below—we turn to the emotion while living through it, without objectifying or modifying it. In the particular case of objective orientation, we are oriented toward the object of the feeling (Einstellung auf die Gegenstände der Gefühle). For instance, we can be conscious of our anger while living through it and orient ourselves toward the object of the anger: the outrageous response that made us angry.

State Orientation

In the final form of consciousness of feeling mentioned by Geiger, the “state orientation” (zuständliche Einstellung), we are oriented toward our own feeling (Einstellung auf das Gefühl selbst) rather than its object. While living through an episode of anger, we attend to the state of anger and not the object toward which the anger is directed. This form of consciousness of feeling neither objectifies the feeling nor modifies it, and our interest in turning to the feeling is experiential rather than theoretical.¹²

Geiger accurately separates the state orientation from the attention to feeling. In fact, for Geiger, it is possible to be in the “state orientation” and not attend to the feelings. This happens, for instance, in the “sentimental attitude”: we focus on the experience of feeling without simultaneously attending to the feeling.¹³ Yet, Geiger maintains that the “state orientation” and the “attention to feelings” are similar. In both cases, I am focused on the feeling and not the object. Moreover, some of the properties of “attention” can also be found as properties of “state orientation,” such as “degree of consciousness” (1911: 146) and an inward “being there” (1911: 148) with the feeling.

According to Geiger, we can already find both orientations in our language: we claim to be happy about something (objective orientation) and we also claim that something elicits our happiness (state orientation). Geiger identifies the contrast between objective orientation and state orientation in “emotional feelings” (emotionale Gefühle), such as sadness, enthusiasm, and joy, and also in “sensory feelings,” such as pleasure and pain. For instance, we can have pleasure in food or the food can elicit pleasure in us. However, in emotional feelings, the subjective side is stronger, while in sensory feelings, the objective side is stronger.¹⁴

Geiger ends his considerations by arguing that because “state orientation” is not, in fact, an “orientation,” it would be better to describe both orientations by other terms. He suggests here that we use Schultze’s terms: inner concentration for state orientation and outer concentration for objective orientation (1911: 152). In later works, Geiger will indeed adopt Schultze’s terminology to refer to both kinds of attitude toward feelings (Geiger, 1974).

The two forms of consciousness of feeling just mentioned—inner and outer concentration—are particularly intriguing. As Crespo (2015: 375) notes, both show that it is possible to be oriented toward feeling without objectifying and modifying it. In these two cases, we turn to our feelings while living through them, by focusing on either their objects or on the feelings themselves. This shows that forms of consciousness of actual feeling are possible, though these differ from the phenomena we usually subsume under the term “attention”.

Husserl on Geiger’s Forms of Consciousness of Feeling

Husserl discussed Geiger’s analysis in a series of manuscripts published in the sixth chapter of Studien II. In particular, Husserl discusses the consciousness of feeling in analytical attention, ego splitting, and state orientation.

Analytical Attention

For starters, Husserl does not agree with Geiger’s thesis that analytical attention to actual feeling is impossible. As he writes: “I am overcome by the feeling of the futility of my work. And while I experience this mood, I look towards it. Now Geiger thinks that this is attention (Beachtung), not observation (Beobachtung). But now I want to observe” (2020: 143). Husserl argues that he can observe this mood. In fact, he states that he can re-live sad moods “in their relation to the motives” and he adds: “at the same time I observe parts and sides. Admittedly, fresh memory plays its part in this, but the mood I analyze is not the past one, but the ever-living one” (2020: 144). As noted by Marcos del Cano (2023: 128), Husserl believes that we can re-create at least part of the feeling and, in so doing, we may analyze it. Although Husserl seems to acknowledge that the theoretical interest of the researcher will have an effect on the feeling by diminishing its “vivacity” (Lebendigkeit), and may even lead to its evaporation (verfliegen), this is not a problem for its investigation. In fact, for Husserl, analytical attention might modify feeling, but rather than destroying it, it enables us to discover its essence. Therefore, in contrast to Geiger, for Husserl, it is possible to attend analytically to your feelings without destroying them because their essential structure is preserved.

Moreover, in Studien II, Husserl suggests that there is no crucial difference between attending to a feeling analytically and attending to other experiences, such as perception, analytically. Although he shifted, in later works, to a position closer to Geiger, realizing that attention led to one losing the experiential moment of feeling, and in so doing acknowledged that there is a greater difference between attention’s effect on feelings than on perception,¹⁵ in Studien II, feelings do not occupy a special position in consciousness. Indeed, for Husserl, feelings are analyzable in the same sense as other mental states. Furthermore, since Husserl does not endorse the doctrine of immanent psychic realism, differences in the consciousness of actual feeling are less radical.

Ego Splitting

In the case of ego splitting, Husserl questions Geiger’s radical distinction between analytical attention to feeling and observation of the self and its feelings. As Husserl puts it: “the question is here whether we are really dealing with radical differences” (2020: 146). Furthermore, Husserl does not see why the observation of feelings is possible in ego splitting but it is not in analytical attention. Importantly, Husserl acknowledges the phenomenon of ego splitting insofar as we (as subjects) might adopt a perceptual, judgmental, emotive, volitional stance toward ourselves (as objects). This is the case when I feel that I am in a difficult situation, or when I imagine myself in a particular scenario, such as, for instance, being a father. Yet, here he also distinguishes between different forms of reflection.¹⁶ Finally, while the indirect observation of feelings in ego splitting was a disadvantage in Geiger’s eyes (the fact that we do not observe the feeling but rather the whole ego), for Husserl, it is an advantage to observe the whole ego during an actual feeling. As Averchi puts it: “The splitting of the Ego provides a way to grasp the life of the Ego as a whole at once, as a normal reflection would not do, and it paves the way for the possibility of a phenomenological reduction” (2015a: 231). As suggested by Averchi in this quotation, what is at stake in Husserl’s critique is something that impinges on Husserl’s phenomenology itself, namely the possibility of the reduction. If Geiger were right, a phenomenological description presupposing the reduction would arguably be difficult.

State Orientation

Husserl acknowledges the phenomenon identified by Geiger as state orientation, according to which there is a form of consciousness of feeling in which we are oriented toward the feeling by living through it. However, as noted by Marcos del Cano (2023: 131), Husserl does not agree with Geiger’s explanation of this phenomenon in terms of “orientation”. In fact, Husserl regards the distinction between an objective and a state orientation as “skewed” (2020: 150). As is the case for other experiences, there is also a distinction between feelings being in the foreground of consciousness and them being in the background. In this regard, Husserl explains Geiger’s state orientation in terms of thematic consciousness. It is the “theme” which explains whether something is in the foreground or in the background of consciousness. In particular, themes are determined by the phenomenon of interest. Husserl illustrates his thought by means of an aesthetic example: imagine you are sad and then you read a Goethe poem aesthetically. The aesthetic experience in this case is in the foreground and it produces a theme for my consciousness, while the sad mood is in the background. Moreover, for Husserl, in Geiger’s objective orientation, we are directed toward an object of consciousness, while in Geiger’s state orientation, we are directed toward the experience of this object.

Emotive Consciousness in Geiger and Husserl

Geiger on the Object Directedness of the Emotions

Considerations about the consciousness of feeling (though Geiger focuses on sensory and emotional feelings, I focus here on emotional feelings or emotions) lead Geiger to reflect on the nature of feeling and its relation to its objects. In particular, while exploring the “objective orientation,” Geiger presents a series of intriguing observations on the structure of emotive consciousness which will be the object of critique by Husserl.

Geiger states that, in feeling, we are directed toward an object. For instance, when we claim to be happy about something, we are directed to that in which we rejoice. However, Geiger argues that the way in which the object is given to us in joy is different from how it is given to us in perception, in being our own, etc. Importantly, Geiger claims that the relation between emotion and its object resembles the intentional relation that other mental states have with their objects, though it cannot be assimilated to this. Therefore, there is a similarity between the way in which perception, etc., on the one hand, and emotions, on the other, relate to their objects.

That said, Geiger declines to label the relation between emotion and its objects in terms of intentionality (1911: 141). In fact, he reserves the term “intentional” for cases in which the object is grasped in the experience. When I am happy about my friend’s visit, it is not through happiness that the friend’s visit is presented to my mind. Rather, the friend’s visit is presented to my mind by means of another mental state such as a perception or belief. My happiness is directed to my friend’s visit, but my friend’s visit is not given to my mind by means of my happiness. Since, for Geiger, feelings are directed toward objects but are not what originally grasps them, feelings are not intentional in the pregnant sense of the word. Thus, he refers to the relation between feeling and its object in terms of an “object directedness” (Gegenstandsrichtung). Geiger acknowledges that feelings show a sui generis relation to their objects which, despite similarities, cannot be explained in terms of the intentionality of other mental states.

The notion of the intentionality of emotion is also questioned from another angle. Geiger observes that while experiencing an emotion, the targeted object has a kind of shimmer. The objects of our cheerfulness seem to shine and in sorrow to darken (Geiger, 1911: 144). This observation shows that, in emotion, we do not grasp a property of the object but rather project the nuance of the emotion onto it. This issue is examined by Geiger in the aforementioned article published in the same year on empathy with moods. In this other article, “feeling characters,” such as the cheerfulness of a landscape, the tranquility of the color blue, the festiveness of a violet, the joviality of music, etc., are emotional properties that extend across objects. In order to explain why we refer to these feeling characters in emotional terms, he distinguishes between two moments or sides of affective states: a subjective side and an objective side, which he labels as “feeling tone” (Gefühlston) (Geiger, 1976: 35). The subjective side refers to the fact that, in sadness, joy, hatred, etc. we feel ourselves sad, joyful, hating, etc. Affective states also exhibit an objective side insofar as they are able to “color” the objects they target and, in this way, have an effect on how we perceive their objects (Geiger, 1976: 33). Thus when we experience an affective state, this state impregnates the targeted objects with a coloration (Färbung), giving them a brilliance (Glanz). Given that the properties we find in the landscape when we claim it is sad are similar to the way in which our sadness colors the landscape when we are sad, we refer to feeling character and feeling tone by employing the same terms. My thinking here is that Geiger’s views on moods as being able to tincture the world rather than simply being a means to grasp their objects or properties of them are generalizable to emotions in his article on the consciousness of feelings.

That said, Geiger’s position that emotions are object directed but not intentional enables him to argue, in a more radical vein, that emotions can lose their objects in “state orientation”. For Geiger, there are cases—several of which are typical of the aesthetic domain—in which the feeling seems to lose its relation to its object. This happens, for instance, when in contemplating a picture, I focus on the pleasure I am experiencing. It also happens when I read a lyrical work and concentrate on the mood created by it. The same is true when we focus on the mood generated by a picture of a landscape. In these cases, in which I turn to the feeling while living through it, the object of the feeling remains outside my focus. Indeed, we are immersed in the experience of the feeling. According to Geiger, in these cases, the feeling loses its direction toward the object which is only possible because the object is not intrinsic to the feeling. In other words, in this orientation, the object remains outside the feeling because it is not part of it.

In fact, in these examples, the object is regarded as what elicits the feeling. As Geiger indicates, in these cases, the feeling seems to come from the object (1911: 143). For instance, we have the impression that the melancholic mood I am experiencing is something that comes from the lyrical work or from the picture of the landscape. As Crespo notes, in these cases “there is not just a shift of the object of attention, but also a change of attitude (Einstellung) in which the ‘order of consciousness’ (Bewusstseinsordnung) is ‘altered’ (verschoben)” (Crespo, 2015: 381). The displacement becomes clear when the feeling loses its object. In my view, this displacement can be regarded as Geiger’s proof that emotional feeling is not intrinsically intentional, though it is object-directed.

Husserl on the Intentionality of Emotion

In Studien II, Husserl shows his crucial disagreement with Geiger on the nature of emotive consciousness (Crespo, 2015; Averchi, 2015b; Marcos del Cano, 2023). Let us examine Husserl’s critique in more detail.

To begin, in contrast to what Husserl understands as Geiger’s interpretation of his own account in the Logical Investigations, he maintains that “I never said that joy ‘grasps’ (erfasst) as presentation ‘grasps’ (erfasst)” (Husserl, 2020: 149). Here, Husserl also distances himself from Brentano and his disciples, arguing that, when Geiger claims that the joyous object is not given in the experience of joy in the way that the perceived object is given in perception, etc., he is in fact defending his own position. Yet, here Husserl’s critique is based on a misunderstanding of Geiger’s view. In fact, Geiger does not argue that, for Husserl, the intentionality of emotions is of the same kind as the intentionality of other mental states, such as presentations. As we have seen, Geiger speaks of a relation of similarity. As noted by Crespo, “Geiger defends Husserl’s view of the relationship between theoretical intentionality and the intentionality of feelings in terms of similarity and not in terms of identity” (Crespo, 2015: 377, 382 and 383). Contrary to Husserl’s beliefs, Geiger does not claim that, for Husserl, theoretical intentionality and affective intentionality are equal.

Furthermore, Husserl criticizes Geiger’s rejection of the term “intentional” to refer to the object directedness of feelings. As Husserl writes: “Geiger does not find it appropriate to call the relation of joy to the state of affairs (he himself now uses the same unavoidable expression as I do) intentional. It is more appropriate, he says, to speak of intentional relation only where an objective is really grasped in the act. He speaks of ‘Gegenstandsrichtung,’ an expression that I nevertheless also often use” (Husserl, 2020: 149). Thus, while Husserl employs the terms “intentionality” and “object directedness” synonymously here, Geiger reserves the former claim for cases in which the object is grasped. However, this is not just a terminological issue and reflects a radical difference between both authors. As mentioned above, in the 5th Logical Investigation, Husserl argues (against Brentano but in line with Stumpf) that sensory feelings are not intentional but he considers emotional feelings, i.e., emotions, as intrinsically intentional. Therefore, for Husserl, emotive consciousness is intrinsically intentional. For Geiger, in contrast, sensory and emotional feelings (emotions) are not intentional, although they are directed toward an object. Intentionality is, for him, not a feature of emotive consciousness, given that emotions do not grasp the objects toward which they are directed (recall the example above about joy about a friend’s visit).

Husserl argues against Geiger’s idea that in “the orientation towards the feeling, the object of feeling would remain ‘outside the orientation’” (2020: 151). Insofar as emotions are, for Husserl, intrinsically intentional, the thought that they can lose their objects is, for him, a contradiction in itself. While, for Geiger, the object toward which the emotion is directed stays outside the emotive consciousness, for Husserl, emotive consciousness is tied to its objects by virtue of its being intrinsically intentional. For Husserl, a feeling cannot lose its object when we focus on the feeling itself because emotive consciousness entails the presentation of the object—it is built upon it and presents the object in a particular way.

Geiger and Husserl on the Place of Emotion in the Ontology of the Mind and the Nature of Consciousness

Having presented and discussed Geiger’s claims about the consciousness of feeling and emotive consciousness and Husserl’s remarks on them, this section focuses on the ontology of the mind underlying both accounts. In particular, I argue that the disagreement between both authors should be understood as rooted in their different ontologies of the mind and the place of emotion within it.

Drawing on Stumpf, Husserl criticized Brentano (2015) by arguing that sensory feelings are not intentional. However, like Brentano, Husserl interprets emotions in intentional terms. Husserl does not question Brentano’s idea that there is a genuine emotive intentionality. For Brentano and his disciples, the relation between feeling and its objects was usually explained in terms of intentionality. Though Brentano did not actually employ this term (he used the term “intentional in-existence” meaning that each mental phenomenon has an object within itself), it is customary to regard him as introducing the view that intentionality is the mark of the mental. In fact, Brentano (2015) distinguished between three forms of intentional relation: while presentations present the objects to our mind, judgments present them as being either true or false, and the affective/conative states present them as being either good or bad. Brentano thus acknowledges the existence of a sui generis intentionality which is characteristic of emotive consciousness. This idea is operative in Husserl’s text in Studien II. Importantly, while in other texts Husserl develops Brentano’s understanding of the intentional reference by distinguishing different forms of intentionality—such as object intentionality, horizon intentionality, or operant intentionality—in the manuscript discussed in this paper, he does not question the idea that emotions are intentionally directed toward their objects, i.e., they exhibit object intentionality.

By contrast, Geiger refuses to label the relation of feelings to their objects in terms of intentionality. As we have seen, this view is shared by Lipps and other Munich phenomenologists. Geiger speaks of the object directedness of emotions as being similar to the intentionality of other mental states. Yet, in spite of the similarity, he rejects characterizing them as intentional. Emotions are not intentional because they do not grasp the object or its properties. Moreover, as he makes clear, emotion projects its color or tone onto the objects toward which it is directed. It is not just that emotions do not grasp their objects; they impregnate the targeted objects with their own evaluative light. Acknowledging this issue makes the idea of emotions being able to grasp objective properties of an object hard to defend.

The claim that emotions are not intentional might sound surprising in today’s context, where we regard Brentano’s idea of intentionality as bearing the mark of the mental, and Husserl’s development of this idea as one of the main achievements of early phenomenology. Yet, Geiger’s claim is in line with many other early phenomenological accounts developed by authors working close to the Munich Circle. For instance, Reinach (1989: 381) distinguished between “ego-belongingness” (Ichzugehörigkeit) and intentionality. Moreover, for Reinach, emotions are states rather than acts. They do not grasp the properties of the object though they are responses to them. Voigtländer (1910) distinguished feelings that seem to respond to features of the world from feelings (such as love) that present the other in a certain light (in the case of love, for instance, as desirable or tender). Although he uses a slightly different terminology, Scheler considered emotions to be directed toward objects but not cognitive, since they do not apprehend objects and their properties. As in Reinach, in Scheler emotions are regarded as responses to values (see Vendrell Ferran, 2022). To summarize, for Geiger, as for other Munich phenomenologists, emotional feelings are states of the self but not intentional acts.

Geiger’s claim that emotions are not intentional also goes against the picture of the mind endorsed by Husserl (and other followers of Brentano) in another respect: it introduces a radical dichotomy between affective and cognitive mental states. While the former are not intentional, the latter exhibit an intentional structure. In this vein, Métraux has argued that this shows that, for Geiger, there is a heterogeneity between feeling and thinking. More recently, Salice (2012, 2020a, b) has argued that, for many early phenomenologists (here Salice mainly quotes authors close to Munich phenomenology or related to it, such as Reinach, Conrad and Daubert) intentionality is a property that characterizes only certain experiences (such as acts of meaning something) but is not a general feature of experience. As Salice puts it: “the term ‘intentionality’ captures only the (roughly) cognitive, but not the affective sense of aboutness. Early phenomenologists do not settle on one technical term for the non-cognitive sense(s) of aboutness—their expressions vary and include: ‘objectual consciousness (Gegenstandsbewußtsein)’, the ‘(mere) having of an object (bloß rezeptives Haben des Gegenstandes)’, etc.” (2020b: 95). My conclusions in this paper cohere with Métraux and Salice’s claims.

As I have shown, for Geiger neither self-consciousness nor consciousness can be characterized in intentional terms. As mentioned above, one important feature of Munich phenomenology is that it considers emotions as constitutive of self-consciousness. Yet, paradoxically, Geiger’s analysis shows that emotional feeling—which, for several Munich phenomenologists, is central to the definition of self-consciousness—is not intentional. Thus, Geiger’s claim that emotional feeling is not intentional is rooted in a more radical claim, according to which intentionality is not what defines consciousness. In contrast, while Husserl corrects Brentano’s claim in the case of sensory feelings, he is still adamant that intentionality constitutes the general structure of emotions and of consciousness more generally. Contrary to this, Geiger goes a step further in denying that intentionality is necessarily what makes consciousness about something.

The analysis of Geiger and Husserl’s disagreements about consciousness of feeling and emotive consciousness leads us to conclude that each of these authors works with a different view on the nature of consciousness and the place of feeling within it. It is a matter for further research to investigate whether this disagreement reflects deeper differences between the brands of early phenomenology to which each of them belonged. In any case, it is clear that since its very beginnings, phenomenology was not unitary.¹⁷ Rather it was an enterprise in which different authors, all interested in the description of consciousness, converged.