Abstract
This essay accomplishes two goals. First, I explore Husserl’s study of “tension” from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest,” to reveal that it comprises his de facto first analysis of instinct. Husserl there describes tension as the innate pull to execute ever new objectifications. He clarifies this pull of objectification by contrasting it to affective and volitional experiences. This analysis surprisingly prefigures a theory of drive-feelings and anticipates the idea that consciousness is both teleological and autotelic. Second, I show how Husserl’s de facto account of instincts from 1893 inspires his robust philosophy of instincts from Studies concerning the Structures of Consciousness and other late manuscripts. While Husserl maintains many 1893 insights, he now claims that the instinct towards objectification comprises affective and volitional moments. Finally, I demonstrate that Husserl’s analyses of instincts throughout his life are united by the idea that consciousness possesses an essential structural lack.
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Notes
See Ales-Bello (2000, 249–250), Bower (2014, 133), Khalilizand (2016), Nakamura (2017, 139), Pugliese (2009, 141–143), Summa (2014, 229), Sweeney (2000, 287–288), Williams (2021). Of note is that both Wehrle (2015) and Bernet (2006) have also traced out Husserl’s earlier discussion of instincts. While Wehrle does discuss an 1898 manuscript and a lecture from 1904/05, she goes on to claim that Husserl only properly develops his theory of drives and instincts in Experience and Judgment and subsequent manuscripts (Wehrle, 2015, 54–57). Bernet instead expertly outlines Husserl’s theory of instincts, as it is found in Studies Concerning the Structures of Consciousness (Husserl, 2020), and further points out exciting comparisons between Husserl and Freud. The author of the current work is indebted to Bernet’s insights.
Even in those cases where scholars do happen to address elements of Husserl’s account from Noten, their studies are often brief or partially inaccurate. For example, even though Natalie Depraz only discusses Noten on one page of her article (Depraz, 2004, 16), she makes the claim which is—as shall be demonstrated below (see footnote six)— rather one-sided, that in Noten, Husserl rejects Stumpf’s theory of consciousness as tensing and relaxing. Denis Fisette also discusses Husserl’s insights from Noten, but does so sparingly, because his article is dedicated to examining Husserl’s overarching account of feelings and moods (Fisette, 2021, 226–228). Similar to Fisette, in his 2012 work, Ullrich Melle only briefly focuses on Noten, because he also seeks to elucidate the whole evolution of Husserl’s philosophy of feelings (Melle, 2012, 59–62). Ignacio Quepons Ramírez provides a more extensive investigation of Noten (Ramírez, 2015, 95–98). Yet, his analysis of the 1893 manuscript primarily serves as an introduction to his more robust examination of Husserl’s later account of moods. Finally, Antonio Zirión Quijano’s succinct analysis of Noten is helpful (Quijano, 2018, 43–45).
Before the German pagination, I provide references to the corresponding English translation where available. Quotes from the Logical Investigations always come from the first edition.
The cycling of a ‘single’ interest through tensing and loosening—which is Husserl’s topic of examination in this manuscript—is an abstraction from concrete consciousness. As a presentation is a mixture of signitive (inauthentic) and intuitive (authentic) partial intentions, the overall character of experience is a complex mixture of both tensings and loosenings. One is incessantly experiencing overlapping tensings and loosenings of interests, as more of certain objects are revealed, while others are concealed (compare Husserl 1970, 238–241/1984, 614–616). Concerning Husserl’s theory of inauthentic and signitive intentions, see Byrne (2017a, 2017b, 2020c).
In his mature works, Husserl defines instincts as a vital power to pursue something and to behave in a certain way (Mensch, 1998, 220, 222). Similarly, in the 1893 manuscript, Husserl describes tension as an essential variable energy or power, which is the continual push of interest towards observation and the ability to overcome distractions. He writes that, when we turn our attention towards something to loosen tension and overcome other distractions, there is “a feeling of exertion of power, of a certain work, of an activity” (Husserl, 2005b, 184. See also Husserl 2005b, 172). I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this point to my attention.
These insights held in mind, I can now clarify why Depraz’ central claim is one-sided. She writes that, in Noten, “Husserl will replace the Stumpfian energetic and bodily tension/relax model by the intention/fulfillment model, that is, formal intentionality” (Depraz, 2004, 16). While Husserl understands full intentional acts as capable of fulfillment, a primary goal of his 1893 study is to describe the tensing and relaxing of interested acts. Further, as discussed in the just above footnote five, Husserl elucidates tensed intentionality by using the model of energy (Husserl, 2005b, 172). This is to say that Husserl does describe intentionality via the energetic and bodily tension/relax model throughout the entire manuscript in an unambiguous and rigorous manner.
In line with this, it is important to highlight that many of Husserl’s 1893 conclusions result from his engagement with Stumpf and Brentano. Indeed, Husserl develops some of the core tenets of his theory of tensed interest, by revising (Husserl, 2005b, 168–171) Stumpf’s definition of attention—as pleasure in noticing—from his 1890 Tonpsychologie (Stumpf, 1890, 170–185). And by disputing (Husserl, 2005b, 161–162) Brentano’s broad definition of the third class of psychic phenomena from his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano, 1874, 262–263). For a broader examination of these important relationships, I recommend Baumgartner (2002), Rollinger (1999, 40–43, 83–89, 106–107), Rollinger (2004, 264–266).
Husserl’s 1893 account of the relationship between tension and loosening—and—displeasure and pleasure is more muddled than I am presenting it here. On the one hand, under the influence of Brentano and Stumpf, Husserl makes many assertions, which suggest that pleasure and displeasure are not distinct from, but rather characteristics of (or perhaps even equivalent with) the loosening and tensing of interest. Husserl writes, “Loosening has a decisive pleasurable character, tension has a displeasurable character” (Husserl, 2005b, 159). And at another time, he states, “Tension and loosening themselves obtain great pleasure” (Husserl, 2005b, 187). On the other hand, as I emphasize here, Husserl also frequently states that loosening is distinct from pleasure. He comments that pleasure is grounded in or results from the loosening of tension. Husserl writes that loosened interest, “has a certain similarity to pleasure, but is not to be identified with pleasure” (Husserl, 2005b, 167). Of note is that Husserl would continue to equivocate on this point in his subsequent writings. In his lectures from 1904/05 and even in the mature 1939 EU, Husserl is often unclear about the relationship between the instinctual rhythmic pull and release of consciousness and the drive feelings of displeasure and pleasure. Sometimes Husserl appears to claim that they are identical, while at other times, seems to assert that they are different (see Husserl 1973, 85–86/1939, 91–93; see also Summa 2014, 231–232 and Wehrle 2015, 52, 58–59). This ambiguity has a further parallel in Husserl’s discussion—from his mature analyses of passive synthesis—of affection and tendency, which are roughly equivalent with tension and the pleasure experienced from loosening; Husserl again blurs, if not erases the division between these two (Husserl 1966, 148–156). I am thankful to one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this last point to my attention.
Husserl was often unable to clarify or maintain the distinction between drive-feelings and feeling acts in his later works. Even in EU, as Wehrle writes, “Husserl seems to talk about feeling in this context in quite a naïve way. He does not differentiate explicitly between different senses in which he refers to feelings … Husserl does not further elaborate on the different notions of feelings in use here and leaves us in uncertainty” (Wehrle, 2015, 52). However, it is critically important for any phenomenologist to clearly distinguish between drive-feelings and feeling acts, for fear of mixing up the passive unthematic with the active thematic, as Bernet demonstrates in his 2006 work (Bernet, 2006, 46–48; see also Summa 2014, 230).
In a passage from the second half of the 1893 manuscript, Husserl does test out the possibility that some feelings might be non-intentional passive undergoings [Erleiden] (Husserl, 2005b, 179–182). He writes, “The pleasure … fills my soul, which occurs passively [passiv], not actively, receptively, not presentively [gebend]” (Husserl, 2005b, 179). I discuss this conclusion at length in Byrne 2022.
On the one hand, Husserl claims that striving is distinct from the will, because, “We speak of the will primarily when we are convinced that we can achieve the goal, [whereas] we speak of striving (seeking), where full conviction is lacking, potentially the mere possibility suffices” (Husserl, 2005b, 184). On the other hand, Husserl defines striving as a kind of willing, writing, “Simply stated, when we speak of striving, we are exclusively talking about willing and nothing further” (Husserl, 2005b, 184).
As the reader may have noticed, Husserl describes the tension of interest by analogizing and contrasting it to other structures of consciousness, while not providing an entirely positive account of the tension itself. A positive characterization of this tension is elusive in the 1893 text. In fact, in his mature writings, Husserl still struggled to provide a positive description of the instinct towards discovery and its affective character (see footnote eight above and section five below).
For what follows, the reader should note that, as Melle writes, “Husserl himself often uses the expressions ‘drive’ and ‘tendency’ as synonyms” (Melle, 2002, 191).
By remembering Husserl’s conclusions from Noten about rhythmic drive-feelings, one can read the early Husserl as claiming that life is essentially unpleasant. Despite the drive-feeling of pleasure, which is experienced with the loosening of the tension of interest, I am drawn back again and again into displeasurable tension.
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Byrne, T. The Origin of the Phenomenology of Instincts. Husserl Stud 39, 69–83 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-022-09316-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-022-09316-2