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Husserl on Perceptual Optimality

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Abstract

The notions of perceptual normativity and optimality have generated much discussion in the last decade or so in the literature on Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s position on the topic has been far less extensively investigated. Surprisingly, however, Husserl wrote a great deal about the question of perceptual optimality. Not only are there a considerable number of important passages scattered throughout the manuscripts (especially the D-Manuscripts), the archive also contains a few important full texts on precisely this issue. Given the role of fulfillment for Husserl’s concept of intentionality, this should not really come as a surprise, since the teleological nature of the fulfillment structure terminates in an experience of the optimum. Hence, however marginal this topic might seem at first glance, reflecting on it rapidly leads us to the heart of Husserl’s project and sheds further light on his conception of intentional experience.

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Notes

  1. Following Husserl, I will mostly be concerned with visual experience. In his 1907 lecture-course, Thing and Space, Husserl briefly considered tactile experience in line with his previous considerations of perceptual optima with regard to “normal viewing distance”, but then cut off the discussion briskly, saying that the tactile case “will not do”, since touch does not, in fact, function analogously to vision (Hua XVI, §37, p. 132/1997, p. 109). This remark is very symptomatic of Husserl’s well-known tendency to provide detailed analyses of vision rather than of the other senses. This pattern repeats itself in his writings on optimality, which are virtually all about vision. For this reason, this paper will also primarily be concerned with visual experience.

  2. In that sense, Husserl explains that each interest has its own optimum, and thus determines the systematic relations between the appearances (cf. Ms. D13 IV, 66a).

  3. Here is the relevant quote at length: „Das Objekt als ein Integral von Optima kann nur aufgefasst werden unter Bevorzugung irgendwelcher Besonderheiten bzw. Sonderoptima, also irgendwelcher sie darstellende Momente, die mir bewusst sind als Anfang eines Weges zu ihnen hin in geweckten und der Reihe nach entfesselten praktischen Intentionen. Kenntnisnehmendes Wahrnehmen in diesem vollen Sinn eines auf die ‚vollkommene’ Erfassung des Objekts (bzw. des Objekts als nach den und jenem vom Interesse ausgezeichneten Momenten und im Rahmen dieses Interesses) ist also ein gerichteter Prozess“ (Ms. A VII 13, 22b).

  4. This point of view is confirmed in various passages of his unpublished manuscripts where Husserl repeatedly defines perceptual optimality in terms of “maximal clarity” (maximale Klarheit) and “richness of content” (Inhaltsreichtum).

  5. Here is a passage to illustrate this: „das erfahrende Interesse geht ausschließlich auf dieses Optimum, weil es Optimum ist. Es ist dasjenige, dessen Erfahren am besten befriedigt“ (D 13 III 151b 1).

  6. Here’s the relevant passage: “Hence, we tend toward the maximum of visibility and we seek, just as when using a microscope, a better focus point, which is obtained through a certain equilibrium between the interior and the exterior horizons. A living body seen from too close, and lacking any background against which it could stand out, is no longer a living body, but rather a material mass as strange as the lunar landscape, as can be observed by looking at a segment of skin with a magnifying glass; and, seen from too far away, the living body again loses its living value, and is no longer anything but a puppet or an automaton. The living body itself appears when its microstructure is visible neither too much, nor too little, and this moment also determines its real form and size. The distance between me and the object is not a size that increases or decreases, but rather a tension that oscillates around a norm.” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 316).

  7. Here is a passage that support this claim: “Das Sich-Entfernen eines Objektes (eines ‚sehr großen’) kann […] eine Besserung herbeiführen, nämlich hinsichtlich der wahren Gesamtgestalt, aber darüberhinaus bringt es keine Besserungen mehr, sondern Verflechterungen” (Ms. A VII 13, 22a).

  8. In Ideas II and elsewhere, Husserl wrote extensively on the connection between healthy organs and optimality. Husserl’s basic idea is that having an optimal experience of anything requires that we are disposed to do so, and this starts with our own Leib, which must be healthy. Hence, the following remark: „Gesundheit [ist] sozusagen das Optimum.“ (Ms. D13 I, 218a) See the following passage as well: „Die normale Leiblichkeit bedeutet dann diejenige, die einen Kreis von Optima herstellt oder ermöglicht. Mit verbranntem Finger betaste ich schlecht, mit myoptischer Augen sehe ich in die Ferne schlecht usw“ (Ms. D13 II 63a).

  9. In his 1921 research manuscripts on normality and abnormality, Husserl explains in that vein that the very concept of normality implies a relation towards an optimum. What is “normal” is “concordant,” “optimal” in that sense. Hence, in perception, whatever is normal is the norm: „Das normale Ding ist die Norm, auf die alle abweichenden Erscheinungen hinweisen müssen“ (Ms. D 13 I / Tr. D13 XIV 29).

  10. This shows, then, that self-givenness alone is not sufficient for optimality; “normal conditions” must also be secured. These, however, are a function of the interest. Normality and abnormality are categories that only make sense with relation to certain interests. As to the complicated issue of the constitution of these “normal conditions” in social, cultural and historical contexts, this is a question I will not pursue here.

  11. See this passage as well: “If I have, in regard to the box, ‘good light’, then it makes no matter whether the sun is higher or lower in the sky, whether it is covered by clouds or not” (Hua XVI, §36, p. 128/1997, p. 106).

  12. And this includes experiences of surprise and disappointment, which are experiences of fulfillment like any other. For a powerful argument along these lines, see J. Benoist (2016, Ch. 6).

  13. „Wichtig ist noch, Folgendes ausdrücklich hervorzuheben: Normale Wahrnehmungstätigkeit ist aktualisierte und immer neu sich aktualisierende Intention auf fortschreitende Kenntnisnahme des Objekts, oder: Normales Wahrnehmen ist ein fortschreitendes Kenntnisnehmen, und im Sinn seiner praktischen Intention liegt es, immer weiter fortschreitendes Kenntnisnahmen sein zu wollen. Jedes optimale Moment, das erfasst wird, ist ein Schritt der Kenntnisnahme; ‚in Kenntnis Genommenes’, zur Kenntnis Genommenes ist habitueller Besitz geworden“ (A VII 13 22a).

  14. For Husserl, all of perceptual intentionality is founded upon a deeper drive or instinct intentionality. Cf. Bégout (2006).

  15. As Husserl explains in Idea 1, such an ideal is the result of a process of ideation (the ideating grasp of the “und so weiter” of the noema) (Hua III/1, §150, p. 315f./1982, p. 351).

  16. „Jede Anschauung ist Verwirklichung, aber ‚unvollkommene’ Verwirklichung, die vollkommene Anschauung nur ist ein Optimum, auf die das Wahrnehmen sozusagen hinaus will. Relative Optima als Durchgangspunkte für höhere Optima“ (Ms. A I 20, 39b / Tr. A I 20, 21).

  17. „Das Feld hat aber eine optimale Struktur, es kann unter dem Gesichtspunk einer Teleologie beschrieben werden“ (MS. D13 I 63a).

  18. Here are other relevant passages related to this idea: “there belongs to the thing its optimal constitutive content, to which all other data intentionally refer back.” (Hua IV, §18c, p. 69/1989, p. 74) See the following passages as well: „alle anderen, die nicht optimalen Erscheinungen, verweisen auf dieses Optimum” (Ms. D12 II 26a). “In the manifold of proper appearances, we thus have everywhere the consciousness of givenness, which in the highest sense gives us the very sense of the determination ‘as it actually is in the sense of the intention.’ Every other presentation, every other consciousness of givenness, is, so to speak, aiming at this determination” (Hua XVI, §35, p. 125/1997, p. 104). See also Ms. D13 I, 65a and 66a; Ms. DI3 III, 151b.

  19. There are a couple of passages where Husserl writes „Zentrales (oder Optimales),“ e.g., Ms. AVII 13 (throughout).

  20. In this regard, this passage is particularly illuminating: “In this sense, every object of external perception is given in an ‘image,’ and the object is constituted in the synthetic transition [synthetischen Übergang] from image to image, by means of which the images, as images (appearances) of the same object, come to have synthetic coincidence [Deckung]. Every perception which presents the object to me in this orientation leaves open the practical transitions [Übergänge] to other appearances of the same object. The possibilities of transition [Übergangsmöglichkeiten] are practical possibilities […] There is thus a freedom to run through [durchlaufen] the appearances in such a way that I move my eyes, my head, alter the posture of my body, go around the object, direct my regard toward it, and so on. We call these movements, which belong to the essence of perception and serve to bring the object of perception to givenness from all sides insofar as possible, kinaestheses. They are consequences of perceptive tendencies, ‘activities’ in a certain sense, although not voluntary actions. In doing all this, I do not (in general) carry out voluntary acts. I move my eyes, etc., involuntarily, without ‘thinking about my eyes’” (Husserl 1972, §19, p. 88f./1973, pp. 83f., translation slightly modified). See also Ms. D 13 III 149a.

  21. See, too, the following passage: “Also ist nicht irgendein bestimmtes Zentralbild Erscheinung des Gegenstandes selbst als Leibhaftigkeit, oder mindestens nicht die ‚adäquate’ Erscheinung, sondern das ganze System von Zentralbildern in seiner kontinuierlichen Durchlaufung, sofern es immer wieder ‚dasselbe’ Objekt zur Gegebenheit bringt und der Reihe nach zur ‚adäquaten’ Gegebenheit hinsichtlich aller seiner Teile und Momente“ (Ms. D13 I, 70b; italics are mine).

  22. Of course, two or more senses may be in conflict in their conditions for what counts as optimal. An optimal visual appearance of an object may, say, require that I get too far from it to have an optimal tactile appearance at the same time. (Think of really big objects, like big California redwood trees, which can only be seen as such from a certain distance.) For Husserl, there is no context-independent criterion by which one could decide once and for all what an optimal experience of any such object would amount to. Husserl’s conception of norm is situation-relative, and therefore, it is the interest that motivates each specific experience that determines our preference for one modality over another. The same holds for the concert example: I may wish to sacrifice the sound quality for a better view of the stage, or vice versa, depending on various factors.

  23. Husserl speaks in this sense of a „Tendenz auf das Optimum als Auswahlprinzip der praktischen Möglichkeiten“ (Ms. D13 III, 151a).

  24. In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty explains that there is something like a “privileged perception”, say, “an optimal distance from which [the object of my perception] asks to be seen” (2012, p. 315f.) Given the tight intentional connection between perception and action, we are habitually inclined to respond to this demand by occupying a privileged position. Constantly, albeit only implicitly, “we tend toward the maximum of visibility” and seek for “a better focus point.” (2012, p. 356) According to Merleau-Ponty, we are naturally drawn towards this point of “equilibrium” where something like a “perceptual optimum” can be experienced.

  25. In this sense, Husserl writes that „das Optimum ist als Objekt konstituiert, worauf all das kinästhetische Tun und Schaffen von Mitfolge abzielt, als Telos, sofern ein die Konstitution leitendes Interesse sich in die Richtung auf Steigerung und optimale Steigerung auslebt und als bleibend habituell wirksam bleibt“ (Ms. D 10 III / Tr. D 10 III, S.13).

  26. In this sense, Husserl writes in Erste Philosophie, „Jede Wahrnehmung ist als Dingwahrnehmung durch und durch Antizipation“ (Hua VIII, p. 51).

  27. Insofar as the spatiotemporal world becomes subordinated to the ideal of total knowledge in the scientific attitude, one could make the point that this inadequacy is also felt in the scientific attitude. There is something to this line of reasoning, but it doesn’t apply to individual scientific practices, but only to the idea of science as such.

  28. See this passage from a manuscript dating from 1893, in which Husserl already connects intrinsically his conception of intentionality with that of normativity: „Also Mangel und Fülle, Hemmung und Befreiung bilden nur das eine Stück, die eine Komponente im Wesen der repräsentierenden Vorstellung, auf ihnen beruht das Normative, das Seinsollen des Repräsentierten: die Intention“ (Hua XXXVIII, p. 188).

  29. On this topic, see also Steven Crowell (2013).

  30. On the transformation of the concept of intentionality from Brentano to Husserl, see Benoist (2016, pp. 120-133) and (2008).

  31. On this issue, see Wehrle (2015a).

  32. For Husserl, the interest is the intentional locus where my intentional life as a whole comes together and becomes meaningful with regard to my actual project. As such, the interest always implies a reference to the global context of my experience, which, in turn, bears the traces of my intentional history. That’s why we cannot reduce the interest to the inner mental state of an individual consciousness aiming at an object. The interest is driven by the past just as much as it is turned towards the future and, as such, it always refers beyond itself, to the other(s).

  33. Again, this category plays out not just at the cultural level (top-down), but also at the basic, pre-reflective level of constitution (bottom-up).

  34. An appearance that is produced, say, by a sick (or malfunctioning) organ „ist eine Modifikation, sie weist auf normale Erscheinungen zurück, als Normen, als Optima“ (Ms. D 13 I, 175a).

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to Zachary Hugo, Steven Crowell, Maren Wehrle, Corijn van Mazijk and Philippe Blouin for their very helpful remarks on earlier versions of this paper. I also wish to thank Jacob Rump for his excellent comment and Rudolf Bernet for his insightful question at the Husserl Circle meeting in Chicago, where I presented a first version of this article in June 2015. More than anyone else, I would like to thank Dieter Lohmar for his hospitality, and especially for having provided me unrestricted access to the D-Manuscripts.

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    Maxime Doyon

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Doyon, M. Husserl on Perceptual Optimality. Husserl Stud 34, 171–189 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-018-9224-9

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