Abstract
Husserl seldom refers to feelings, and when he does, he mainly focuses on their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of value apprehension (Melle 2012). This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings in Husserl from a different angle. For this purpose it makes a detour through Husserl’s early account of attention. In a text from 1898 on attention the aspect of interest, which is said to have a basis in feeling, plays an essential role. Although Husserl argues here that every specific interest is dependent on an objectifying act of perception, he at the same time states that every act of perception necessarily has to be accompanied by an interest of some sort. In the latter sense, the genuine motivational force and necessity of this feeling aspect, namely interest, is emphasized. This ambiguity – or even contradiction – shall be the point of departure for the following considerations. The paper argues that it is possible to interpret the role of feelings in intentionality in a different way, namely not as an effect of current perception but as a cause of further perceptions. This tendency is first indicated in the text from 1898 and elaborated further in Husserl’s genetic approach in Experience and Judgment. In Experience and Judgment Husserl develops a broader notion of interest, defining it as a general perceptual drive. This general drive (as a general interest in perceiving) – so the paper will argue – expresses itself in concrete perception as a specific preference: it discloses or makes manifest what is relevant for an individual subject at a given time.
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Notes
This text („Abhandlung über Aufmerksamkeit als Interesse”) is part of Husserl’s lectures on attention, which he held in 1904/05 in Göttingen. Cf. Hua 38, pp. 63-123: Über Aufmerksamkeit, spezielle Meinung.
With the differentiation between formal and concrete levels of phenomenological analysis I refer to A. Steinbock, who argues that while Husserl in earlier texts used to differentiate between deeper (earlier) and higher (later) levels of foundation – time-consciousness is in this sense regarded as earlier in comparison to association – from the 1920s onward he no longer speaks of a foundational hierarchy but of formal and concrete conditions of constitution. Time-consciousness as a formal criterion of constitution thus has to abstract from the content of experience. For the constitution of a concrete object one needs association. See Steinbock (1995, 2002).
„[…] so erscheinen Gefühle als die eigentlichen Motoren und Quellen des Interesses” (Hua 38, pp. 108-109).
For further critical analysis of Husserl’s concept of objectifying and non-objectifying acts, see Melle (1990).
The same holds true for the axiological role of feelings, as value-apprehension and value-judgments. Value-perception also presupposes a neutral perception, the presentation of an object as object. In a parallel or even simultaneous manner this perception is accompanied by a sensual feeling, caused by the object. Sensual feelings then give rise to value-apprehensions and value judgments, which lead to proper feelings like joy, disgust or happiness as their effects. Proper feelings like joy or disgust are thus founded in value-apprehensive consciousness („im werterfassenden Bewusstsein“ Husserl, Ms. A VI 12 II/132a).
Jan Slaby (2008) would define this as affective intentionality.
For a similar differentiation between abstract and concrete foundational orders, see Steinbock (2002, p. 250). Steinbock describes the static foundation as a formal way of founding that goes from simple to complex states of consciousness, while the concrete genetic foundational order is dealing with the complex interrelations of the genetic layers. Steinbock argues that Husserl, in his later works, no longer differentiates between lower or more fundamental stages of constitution and less fundamental stages, but instead speaks of formal and concrete constitution. Time consciousness is thus no longer more fundamental but considered only as abstract or formal necessity for genetic constitution, while for a concrete constitution the synthesis of association is needed (Hua 11, p. 128; Steinbock 2002, p. 246.).
For an analogous argument, see Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, which he turns on its head in saying that existence includes the I-think and not vice versa (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 403). In the same way as the movement and situatedness of existing comes first, one could argue that feeling or drives are more fundamental than higher forms of cognition like objectifying acts. Descartes argued instead from an epistemological point of view: only in and through thinking do we know that we exist. In Husserl one can see both tendencies – an epistemological or static approach, which has to start with what is given, and a genetic approach, which goes back to pre-predicative and objective levels of consciousness. In the latter, egoless activities like passive syntheses presuppose the I-perceive or I-think. These genetic ideas can be also interpreted in an existential (Merleau-Ponty), developmental-psychological or even evolutionary way (see Thompson 2007).
In radical cases this may also influence the operation of the passive syntheses such as time-consciousness and association, as can be seen in psychopathologies. In research on patients with mood disorders and schizophrenia, for example, it was shown that the structure of time consciousness is deranged and fragmented (Gallagher 2005, Fuchs 2007, Bovet and Parnas 1993).
„Es ist ein Motor für mein Begehren nach Erkenntnis, es veranlasst mich zur näheren Inbetrachtnahme des Gegenstandes, zur Beschäftigung neuer Wahrnehmung, die neue Teilseiten desselben zur eigentlichen Wahrnehmung bringen.“ (Hua 38, p. 118).
Cf. (Hua 38, p. 86): „Aufmerksamkeit [ist] etwas Auszeichnendes in Beziehung auf einen wahrgenommenen Gegenstand, [es ist] ihre Eigenheit, unter der jeweiligen Mannigfaltigkeit präsenter Objekte gewissen einen Vorzug zu erteilen, wodurch sie aus wahrnehmbaren zu für sich wahrgenommenen Objekten werden.“
B. Bégout (2007) makes a similar distinction, but in relation to other passages on attention (e.g., Hua 24, pp. 249-252 and Hua 26, pp. 18-22). Bégout differentiates here between a structural aspect (intentionality) and a thematical aspect (interest) of attention. Even though there are no systematic analyses of perception and attention in the texts discussed by Bégout – in contrast to the lectures on perception and attention, which he unfortunately does not take into account -- his differentiation holds also true for this later edited text.
„[V]on einem brennenden Interesse sprechen wir oft genug, von einer brennenden Meinung zu reden, gibt keinen Sinn“ (Hua 38, p. 118).
In psychology this form of attention is called “vigilance”. Cf. Goldhammer and Moosbrugger (2006, pp. 16-33; here p. 24).
„Unsere geistige Natur hat zwei Seiten, eine intellektuelle und eine emotionelle, die in mannigfach wechselnden, bald einander ablösenden, bald einander durchdringenden Akten sich äußert.“ (Hua 38, p. 163)
Husserl speaks in this context of a reciprocal influence or an operating circle (Wirkkreis). Cf. Hua 38, p. 119.
But this has consequences for the ideal aim of perception, namely the distinct and clear givenness of an object, i.e., adequate perception. This is because interest does not reach its peak when the intended objective moments are fulfilled or “saturated” (gesättigt, Hua 38, p. 107) as in cognitive intentionality, but rather reaches its peak when something is absent or the experiencing subject is literally “missing” something. Interest is thus drawn especially to new and potential upcoming things, and this is why interest wanes before well-known objects, for example after an “all-sided and exhaustive inspection” (Hua 38, p. 108): “When the contexts of perception are passed through several times and every detail is familiar to us, we lose interest in the perceived thing, it becomes boring.” (Hua 38, p. 108: „Sind die Wahrnehmungszusammenhänge öfters durchlaufen und uns jede Einzelheit vertraut geworden, so verliert die Sache an Interesse, sie wird langweilig”). Interest is indeed a force that facilitates noticing and thus supports a better perception, but at the same time it opposes itself to this teleological alignment, because the all-too-familiar weakens interest and in this sense makes room for new impressions. The adequate givenness of things as a general ideal of phenomenology turns, in this practical sense, into a relative optimum, which defines itself in relation to current actions and interests of the experiencing subject (cf. also Hua 39, p. 204; Hua 11, pp. 23f).
„[D]elight in the rhythmic processes of interest, which is characterized likewise through processes of tension and release […], a delight in (the progress of) attending.” (“Lust an dem Rhythmus des sich spannenden und zugleich lösenden Interesses […], eine Lust (an dem Fortgang) des Aufmerkens.” Hua 38, p. 108).
See the ongoing edition of the three volumes on the structures of consciousness (Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins), edited by U. Melle and T. Vongehr at the Husserl Archives Leuven.
One could define this dynamic model of intentionality as a “stage-model” in the sense that it can be compared to developmental stages. The “primary” passive stages of temporality, drive-intentionality, and perception in this sense could be characteristic for early developmental stages in humans or the way certain vertebrates relate to their environment. More explicit and thematic forms of intentionality like thinking and judging are then special kinds of developed human intentionality. Since lower and higher stages of intentionality are interwoven with each other in the daily life and behavior of adult human beings, the different stages do not act separately but always in relation with the other forms of intentionality. The perceptual intentionality of an adult is thus always influenced and informed by more intellectual forms of intentionality (and habitual forms of knowledge and memory) and therefore cannot be compared with the perception of animals or children.
This kind of operative intentionality in Husserl is also analysed and emphasized by Lotz (2002, p. 25).
Therefore it is not adequate to describe all movements and bodily processes as zombie-like behavior or complete unconsciousness, which is stated in most approaches in the analytical debate on consciousness and attention (Koch and Crick 2001, Frith and Rees 2007). If we argue for a “stage-model” of intentionality, these operative forms of intentionality could also be characteristic of the way children relate to the world before they acquire higher intellectual capacities such as speech, and it could also be characteristic of certain “higher” animals. Infants as well as children experience their environment and themselves in a certain way; therefore consciousness, in a phenomenological definition, should be ascribed to both of them.
Lotz is heading in a similar direction when he argues that there need not always be an affection to awake the ego. Already on the side of the ego there has to be a certain specified directedness towards the perceptional field. According to Lotz, every consciousness has a certain attitude toward the things that affect it. Contrary to Lotz, I would not go so far as to argue that the directedness (Gerichtetheit) or determination of the subject must already be considered a form of value attitude (Werthaltung) (cf. Lotz 2002, p. 26).
One has to be careful with the use of the term “innate.” Recent studies in developmental psychology and genetics point out that this static category of innateness still involves a development, one that either takes place in the relation of the respective organism to its environment (the womb) before being born, or can be seen as a long-term development beyond the limits of one generation. If this article focuses on the genetic-practical aspects, i.e., bodily aspects, of affects and feelings, that does not mean that these aspects are seen to be innate as, for example, Johnstone presents them in his article on the bodily roots of emotion (Johnstone 2012, pp. 179-200). In discussing the passive and bodily nature of feeling and perception, this article rather wants to point out that the relativity and historicity of these affects and feelings are inscribed, developed and stabilized in and through the body.
„Sie weckt mich als der ich nicht nur Berufsmensch, sondern zum Beispiel Vater bin. Aber mein väterliches Interesse war nicht aktuell, von ihm ging daher nicht die Kraft der Affektion aus, die mich beim Anblick des eintretenden Kindes alsbald aufmerken lässt und mich zu väterlicher Betätigung motiviert. Mein väterliches Interesse wird nun allererst aktiviert.” (Hua 39, p. 594)
„Es gibt in der Wachheit (als Korrelat des Schlafes) überhaupt keine absolute Interessenlosigkeit, und was das ‚interesselos verlaufend heißt, ist selbst ein Relevanzphänomen niederster Stufe“. (Hua 39, p. 596)
„Das jeweils Erfahrene hat den Charakter des Anrufenden, des Reize auf das Ich Übenden […], aber der Anruf verhallt als das nicht im aktuellen Interesse stehende Ich bzw. nicht sein Interesse angehend“(Hua 15, p. 462).
„Die Welt, die jeweils für mich da ist, originaliter, selbst erscheinend, und in erster Originalität in der Weise des Wahrnehmungsfeldes, ist für mich da als Interessenwelt, und die Weise ihres Für-mich-seins ist jeweils Weise, wie sie mich interessiert […]“(Hua 39, p. 597).
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Wehrle, M. “Feelings as the Motor of Perception”? The Essential Role of Interest for Intentionality. Husserl Stud 31, 45–64 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-014-9159-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-014-9159-8