Introduction

Alongside China’s rising trajectory, discussions on its power strategy have become heated. Conventional realists share the viewpoint that China’s pursuit of reemergence is a zero-sum game (e.g., Ikenberry, 2014; Sakuwa, 2009; Tammen & Kugler, 2006). Soft power gains popularity as an explanation for China’s global rise through public and cultural diplomacy (e.g., Li & Worm, 2011; Mulvey, 2020; Wang, 2008). A few studies incorporate constructivism to uncover how Chinese historical and philosophical values shape its mindset for ascent (e.g., Callahan, 2012a; Jacques, 2012). Particularly, a neo-tributary perspective draws parallels between China’s imperial tributary system and contemporary tactics (Pan & Lo, 2017).

From past to present, Southeast Asia has long been one of China’s priorities to enhance its presence. The legacy of tributary system left a lingering Chinese influence via material and cultural exchanges between ancient China and Southeast Asian states. The shared lifestyles, customs, religions, and philosophical thoughts are still prevalent in the region, especially in Chinese diasporas (He & Wilkins, 2019). Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has now become China’s top mercantile partner for two consecutive years, surpassing European Union in 2020Footnote 1.

Recently, China has been intensively engaged with Southeast Asia in higher education. This is evidenced by establishment of 39 Confucius Institutes (CI) and 34 Confucius Classrooms (Chen, 2020), aid modalities in forms of scholarships, training seminars and university-building projects, and higher education partnerships including joint programs and branch campuses. The growth of Southeast Asian student share is exponential. The total number of the cohort in Chinese campuses reached 98,823 in 2018, accounting for 20.08% and nearly tripled that in 2008Footnote 2.

China’s higher education engagement with Southeast Asia potentially serves as a nexus of international relations, China Studies, and comparative and international education theories to depict how China radiates its influence. However, it has remained largely unexplored, with a few studies mainly on CIs. Empirical investigation is even more scarce, particularly on rarely noticed but recently emerged approaches like education aid. Theoretically, existing research on China’s higher education export heavily relies on Western concepts like soft power and center-periphery dichotomy (Mulvey, 2021), rather than indigenous lexicon.

To address this lacuna, the present article explores China’s higher education outreach paradigm in Southeast Asia from a Chinese history-based neo-tributary perspective, probing into how it (re)conceptualizes China’s power strategy. It also reassesses the analytical utility of tributary and neo-tributary models in interpreting contemporary China’s mindset for rejuvenation through the lens of higher education exchanges. To portray an up-to-date and comprehensive picture, China’s higher education export to Southeast Asia has been unfolded in approaches of language training, educational aid, student mobility, and institution/program partnerships from 2016 to 2021.

Literature review

Higher education as a prism to decipher China’s power strategy

Soft power has been a frequently employed lens to look at China’s power strategy through higher education. Education, as an essential dimension of high culture realm, is a core resource of soft power (Nye, 2004). Tertiary education is the most influential one for being a carrier of cultural and political values among a large group of mobile students (Wojciuk, 2018). Hence, a bunch of scholarship elaborates on China’s tactful use of higher education-related soft power assets, mainly on CI expansion and international student recruitment. Discussions on CIs have been obscured by two extremes. In the ‘Global North’, some empirical cases verify the mutual benefits of CI as an internationalization mode of higher education (Kwan, 2014; Song, 2017). Conversely, CIs might impair China’s soft power for being accused as a menace to academic freedom (Shambaugh, 2015; Zhou & Luk, 2016) and suspicion of violating anti-foreign interference regulations (Han & Tong, 2021). In the ‘Global South’, CIs contribute to polish China’s benign image (Hartig, 2012) or bridge economic connections (Wheeler, 2014) or nurture future elites with recognition of China’s cultures and values (Kragelund & Hampwaye, 2015).

As for the second path, being a host to foreign students, theorists mostly investigate on its efficacy of bolstering soft power. Surveys and interviews show that most international sojourners at Chinese universities form more favorable attitudes towards China (Gao, 2015). However, lack of student-faculty interaction, insufficient quality assurance system, and weak English proficiency of lecturers all hamper the cultural penetration (Jain, 2018; Wen et al., 2018). It is also noteworthy that more scholarships at ministerial/provincial/institutional level have been awarded to students from countries along the Belt and Road (BRI). Future research is necessitated to unpack corresponding impacts on educational soft power of China.

Several scattered descriptive studies in Southeast Asian context discuss the roles of CIs to promote China’s socio-cultural profile (e.g., Shuto, 2018; Theo & Leung, 2018), cross-border educational services (Welch, 2012), regionalization of higher education featured by ‘quiet achievers’ in borderlands (Yang, 2012), and practices of tertiary education partnership (Wen, 2016). A recent empirical article identifies China’s popular culture, high-tech industries, STEM education, and economic development model as emerging attractions, but it is still confined to the scope of soft power (Zhu & Yang, 2023).

The construct of soft power might not be a panacea. It is limited in interpreting different cultural norms and theoretically opaque for simplified division of soft and hard resources, whereas Beijing’s policies contain both consensual and coercive elements through economic, infrastructural, and educational initiatives. Only relying on Western notion might be deficient in thoroughly analyzing the original motivations, ongoing interactions, and future directions of China’s higher education outreach, let alone how those practices mirroring its strategic moves.

Imperial tributary system and neo-tributary perspective: disputes and insights

The loose imperial tributary system had never been a formalized mechanism to rule neighboring regimes of feudal China. In the historical records, only ‘chao’ (朝, present oneself before the emperor) and ‘gong’ (贡, tribute) appear separately, while the conception of foreign policies as a system of tribute is absent (Zhang, 2009). As an invented Western intellectual concept, it has become a prevailing model to interpret East Asian regional relations since the latter part of last century. The earlier conception by Fairbank defines tributary order as a non-coercive diplomatic scheme to form a hierarchical order with peripheries. Sino-centrism underpins the Fairbank model. He argues that the cultural rather than material pre-eminence of early Chinese ripens the tributary system. The surrounding subordinates are motivated by trading opportunities but also acknowledge China’s innate cultural superiority through paying the tribute and being assimilated into the Confucian ethics. By doing so, they are entitled with a legitimate entry into the Chinese-centered cosmos (Fairbank, 1942; Fairbank & Têng, 1941). His conception of tributary system is also tied to premodern Chinese worldview of tianxia (all under heaven). Rather than idealizing tianxia as a harbinger of harmonious world order, tributary system inclines to manifest tianxia’s connotations in spatial governance with its inherent hierarchy (Xu, 2017).

Whereas The overemphasis of Sino-centrism leads to ignorance of other entities in the system. Kang attributes the age-long peace in pre-modern East Asia to the mentality of hierarchy and hegemony in tandem with the collective cultural framework shared by all members (Kang, 2010), but he is criticized for excessively magnifying war-retarding nature of Confucianism and overlooking non-China actors (Meng, 2023). Questioners view the routinization of tributary system as a mutual accommodation rather than a domination-seeking pathway (e.g., Womack, 2012; Zhou, 2011). China’s centrality as a ‘solid center’ with overwhelming resources and population is a double-edged sword. When China was united, the centrality was an advantage. When disunited, it was a temptation for neighboring polities. The over-extension beyond its capacity to govern resulted in everlasting consumption of troops and supplies (Womack, 2012). The conflictual interaction between the center and the margins eventually led to the institutionalization of tributary system to manage a mutually acceptable relationship (Zhou, 2011).

The tributary system, albeit ambiguous, still generates some intellectual payoff to depict imperial Chinese worldview. Possible continuities between past and present might shed light on reinterpretation of Chinese foreign policy. Since the traditional Chinese perception of international order collapsed too suddenly and rapidly while its underlying assumption of Chinese superiority had not been fully and naturally eroded, it is plausible to observe the possible impact of dynastic Chinese worldview on its present diplomacy (Cranmer-Byng, 1973), including peaceful rise and good neighbor geopolitical initiatives (Shambaugh, 2013).

Seeing the feasibility of looking to history to reconceptualize China’s plan for the future, a few commentators propose a neo-tributary perspective. Jacques (2012) highlights the marked disparity between interstate relationships in China-centered and Westphalian systems. As smaller regimes absorbed into the orbit of China due to asymmetric powers and interests, it is more accurate to gaze at the emergent international norms in neo-tributary terms instead of Western imperialism. Callahan and Barabantseva (2012) view neo-tributary order as a reviving benevolent hierarchy conceived by China’s domestic elites as an alternative solution to the global plight. To systematically examine the neo-tributary terms, Pan and Lo (2017) summarize a four-pronged framework. Firstly, Chinese exceptionalism inherits the legacy of Sino-centrism and has been embodied in contemporary public diplomacy. Next, the contemporary China’s foreign policy in forms of leadership visits in place of tributary rituals is still intertwined with trade. The third regards modern-day export of language and education programs as assimilation into Chinese culture. Lastly, image building as legitimacy defense underlines international policies and humanitarian efforts.

The neo-tributary analytical framework supplements Western international relations theories with Chinese history-based angle to decipher how China perceives its own rise. However, it is still based on inadequate principles of the Fairbank model, in which legitimacy, security, mutual assurance had not been taken into full consideration. More importantly, since China’s Dao (universal principle) previously based on Confucian ideology has been reshaped by Western scientific outward-looking worldview (Yang, 2002), the possibilities of modern transformations in traditional Chinese ideals are largely neglected (Callahan, 2012b). Therefore, it lacks contemporary empirical evidence to examine how China’s historical perception of world order evolves and informs its current strategic objectives.

Higher education as a nexus for neo-tributary and other indigenous lexicon

A strong state-steering higher education system has been preserved in China. Chinese higher education system was restructured upon Soviet template during the Cold War. Triggered by the reform and opening-up, American branches were grafted on it to serve the marketization (Yang, 2002). Projects 211 and 985 were launched as responses to the national policy of ‘reviving the country by science and education’ promulgated by Jiang Zemin’s administration in 1995. Two decades later, the Double First-Class Plan was implemented to spawn knowledge economy for boosting ‘China’s renaissance as a great nation’, the ultimate goal proposed by the present government.

Given the tight links, higher education outreach paradigm in the new era might offer insights to reinterpret the mindset behind China’s global prominence. The vast scholarship has adopted soft power lens as aforementioned. Research from other perspectives, especially an indigenous history/philosophy-based one, is desperately needed but barely existed. Neo-tributary analytical model emerges as a valuable prism despite its flaws in fully interpreting imperial and contemporary China’s worldviews.

Pan and Lo (2018) argue that higher education acts as a nexus of neo-tributary framework as Fig. 1 presents. First, mainland Chinese universities are endowed with the mission of building a knowledge innovation center with enhanced academic standing, corresponding to Chinese exceptionalism asking for international acknowledgement of its greatness. Next, higher education is the vanguard to initiate and reinforce trading and diplomatic connections with educational exchanges. Third, Chinese universities diffuse China’s geopolitical and cultural influence by educating international students and offering diverse training programs. Lastly, curriculum regulated by the Ministry of Education of China (MOE) nurture national pride and loyalty among domestic students while molding a benign profile to foreigners through cultural and academic events.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Higher education as the nexus for neo-tributary analytical framework. Source: Pan and Lo (2018)

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Despite the possibility of reinterpreting China’s higher education outreach paradigm through a neo-tributary prism, more empirical research is necessary to test its analytical depth and perfect its theoretical bases. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, only one study has adopted this formula to elucidate how geopolitics influence Sino-foreign higher education partnership in China’s subregions. Its findings confirm the influence of a tributary mindset on the distribution of newly approved joint programs between 2018 and 2020, echoing with Beijing’s ambition to expand transnational higher education cooperation along the BRI (Si & Lim, 2023), whereas its dataset was confined to policy texts from government websites and practice review of joint programs. Its discussion has not touched upon the possible discontinuities between the neo-tributary framework and the original tributary system, with an eye to the controversial mentalities.

From a non-Western eye, the concept of tianxia also re-ignites dispute in a few nascent conceptual studies. Notwithstanding the Sino-centric hegemony embedded in the use of tianxia throughout concrete historical situations (Ge, 2020), optimists value its all-inclusivity, co-existence, and reciprocity denoted mainly in ancient intellectual writings (Zhao, 2011). Pundits in higher education research tend to absorb the latter to either envisage a world-centered tianxia heuristic for reimagining ethical values of a more connected and sustainable higher education sphere (Yang et al., 2024), or put weight on the openness to diversity when thinking public good through tianxia instead of nation-states (Marginson & Yang, 2022). Their pioneering efforts prove that reconceptualization of East Asian lexicon based on its core meanings in realpolitik and intellectual settings could shed light on analyzing contemporary issues. However, indigenous conception might be constrained to its own cultural positionality. Empirical research with higher education as a nexus to further verify and enrich indigenous notion is still lacking.

Methodology

Specifically put, the qualitative case study is selected due to its stance that the realities are constructed by people and should be interpreted from the perspective of people in a naturalistic setting (Merriam, 1998). Deciphering how China’s higher education outreaching practices manifest its tactics for ascent necessitates the behaviours, perceptions, and values that are interpreted within the context (Bryman, 2012) through rich and deep data concentrated on the focused phenomenon.

The case of this study is defined as China’s higher education engagement with Cambodia, encompassing language training, student mobility, development assistance, and institution/program partnerships. Cambodia is chosen for three-fold considerations. Firstly, Sino-Khmer relationship has been consolidated in recent years. Surrounded by Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, Cambodia holds geostrategic importance for China to radiate its influence in this region. Beijing endeavours to win over Khmer’s cooperation in sovereignty disputes and connectivity along the BRI. Economically, Cambodia represents other ASEAN members to some extent. Southeast Asia occupied eight seats of the 18 best-performing emerging countries, with Cambodia listed for its 7% average annually GDP growth rateFootnote 3. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s flourishing economy is tied with reciprocal relations with China as the latter has ranked first among foreign direct investors since 2012Footnote 4.

Secondly, ancient Cambodia, including Dynasties of FunanFootnote 5 and AngkorFootnote 6, was once the informal or ceremonial tributary state of feudal China from approximately the second century to the fifteenth century (Huang, 2012). It is significant to probe into how historical tributary system might cast influence on modern China’s mentality behind its neighborhood policy, which makes Cambodia a suitable case for examining the neo-tributary perspective. In addition, roughly 3 to 5% of the population (around 700,000 Cambodian) are ethnic Chinese who have at least some Chinese ancestry (Sambath, 2018). Similar to Cambodia, premodern regimes existed in Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei also used to be vassal states of imperial China (Zhuang, 2005).

Thirdly, China’s four approaches of higher education export to Southeast Asia could all be observed in Cambodia. The CI at Royal Academy of Cambodia (RAC) was inaugurated in December 2009. By 2017, it has 27 teaching classrooms at schools, companies, and government ministriesFootnote 7. Over 2000 Chinese government scholarship receivers were from Cambodia by 2016, which ranked among the forefront of ASEANFootnote 8. Chinese universities have strengthened partnerships with Cambodian counterparts. For instance, Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP) has signed MOUs with ten Chinese institutions, seven of which are located in Southwestern ChinaFootnote 9. East China Normal University and RAC have jointly launched international Chinese language education master program since 2020Footnote 10. With 10 million US dollars aid from China, University of Kratie has been put into use since April 2018Footnote 11.

Data was collected from documentation, institutional dataFootnote 12 and semi-structured interviews with 40 informants during the first author’s field visits to Phnom Penh in 2019 and to mainland China in 2019 and early 2020. Additionally, online documents and media reports from 2020 to 2021 had been reviewed to uncover possible impacts of the pandemic. The interviewees include ten leaders of relevant institution/program partnerships, seven insiders of China’s higher education aid projects in Cambodia, seven members of the  CI at Cambodia, and sixteen Cambodian students from various disciplines of Chinese universities (see Appendix Table 1). Except for two CI teachers (I22-23) and one deputy director at RUPP (I36), others are Cambodian. Their first-hand experiences have been triangulated with documents and institutional data to display a holistic and authentic picture of Sino-Khmer higher education exchanges. It must acknowledge that respondents’ positionalities do affect their perceptions. The viewpoints of informants who were beneficiaries of Sino-Khmer partnerships/aid projects/Chinese scholarships might be biased. Thus, the first author also approached relatively disinterested stakeholders. Three Khmer officials were previously involved in Chinese higher education programs but had been transferred to other posts (I31, I35, I38). Four respondents simultaneously participated in Japan-/Europe-aid projects and contributed their comparative reflections (I26, I33, I37, I39).

Findings and discussions

This section expounds main findings from interviews, triangulated with institutional data and document analysis. The neo-tributary analytical framework facilitated the clustering of emerging topics. Evidence firstly conceptualizes China’s power strategy as seeking recognition of cultures and values while harmonizing the periphery through economic and diplomatic incentives. Both mechanisms involve image-building activities to quickly respond to ever-changing international perception of China’s national image. The last theme discusses Chinese exceptionalism and image-building together in that the former always has been the inner drives of the latter and China’s strategic tactics above. This underlying mindset explains why China’s higher education outreaching programs sometimes turn out to be temporary or even inappropriate image-building practices for legitimizing its greatness and goodness.

Seeking wide acknowledgement of contemporary China’s values and cultures

China observers often fear that Southeast Asia would be a testing ground to re-constitute Sino-centric regional order (Callahan, 2016). In the face of these critiques, China has shifted its strategy from ‘peaceful rise’ to ‘tell China’s story well’. Findings suggest that higher education has acted as a pioneer to give a good Chinese narrative. Moreover, the content recently has emphasized more on multi-layered culture, society, development, and governance of contemporary China. Signalling the action of obtaining wide recognition, MOE requires international degree students to take ‘China Panorama’ as compulsory course since 2017. Compared with previous language-and-traditional-culture-oriented curriculum, ‘China Panorama’ encapsulates cultural, social, economic, and scientific development of modern China. The ratio of ancient knowledge points to contemporary ones included in textbooks that came after 2017 was 1:1.2 (Liu & Li, 2020). Half of the informants who attended Chinese universities after 2017 admitted that their teachers have incorporated intense contents on Chinese popular culture, society, and economic initiatives into syllabus (I4, I6, I9, I13). One student further explained, ‘we have writing assignments on how we perceived the influence of BRI in our home country from an economic or socio-cultural or educational perspective. Our teacher helped us to polish the language and then submit our articles to magazines’ (I12).

In a similar manner, CIs’ curriculum has gradually evolved from language-oriented mode to equal stress on language and culture. Since 2017, the teaching team of CI classroom at Asia Euro University in Phnom Penh started to compile new textbooks. They have finished the series of ‘One Belt and One Road, Culture Going Out First’. Hereinto, China’s latest national condition has been highlighted (I23). One CI student shared, ‘our teacher introduced China’s popular lifestyles such as Alipay and bike-sharing…I use WeChat to chat with classmates…I learned about BRI online and asked our teacher to revise my speech content on benefits and risks of Cambodia’s involvement in BRI’ (I19). The candidates of the 2019 final match of Chinese Bridge in Cambodia also frequently referred to BRI, the ‘Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area’, and ‘a community with a shared future for mankind’ in their speechFootnote 13. During the epidemic, Center for Language Education and Cooperation of MOE has partnered with CIs in Southeast Asia and Alibaba to launch MOOCs in Chinese Plus website, spotlighting the classification of ‘Contemporary China’ with ‘Digital China’ and ‘China Panorama’ as core courses to narrate socio-economic development and fashionable lifestyles of modern China.

Results further confirm that China’s development model has become a core pragmatic value embodied in higher education aid. As Western discourse remains mainstream, China’s economic development paradigm rather than political ideology might be an attractive value to seek acknowledgement from developing countries (Zhu & Yang, 2023). Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) Scholarship is the hallmark of obtaining recognition of China’s development model among elites from the ‘Global South’. In 2020, its seven public administration and economics programs explicitly outlined their objectives as cultivating future leaders of developing countries via learning from China’s development practices. The compulsory, elective courses and field trips contained in their syllabus were closely related to China’s perspectives on public policy and development strategyFootnote 14. One MOFCOM scholarship awardee who was a government official recalled,

Because China has a lot of engagement in Cambodia, I want to go there to learn more about Chinese culture and government.… we’ve done a lot of activities about exchanging ideas on governance experiences of China…We went to Shanghai to study about its development, to Xi’an about agriculture. (I2)

Additionally, training seminars for professionals and officials from periphery states held by MOFCOM at Chinese universities also have given prominence to China’s development experience. The flagship project ‘Seminar on China’s Development Experience and Cases for Developing Countries’ has been organized consecutively for 14 years until 2019. Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19, there was no training sessions about Beijing’s development model during 2020. Subsequent seminars have been transferred to online sessions since 2021Footnote 15.

Although certain universities and CIs have incorporated contemporary cultures and values, courses set up for international students still have been largely dependent on superficial presentation of Chinese traditional cultures (Wang & Li, 2020). Those folk customs and cultural heritages are attractive indeed at the beginning; however, it is hard for foreigners to dive into the core values behind the shallow representations (Wang, 2018). Conversely, curriculum with multifaceted national condition and development trajectory of China yields more positive impressions (Xu, 2023), echoing one respondent’s reflections, ‘China’s developmental history would inspire me to think about how my motherland could be changed and transformed in the future. That is also the reason that why I like to study contemporary Chinese society and culture rather than traditional one.’ (I20).

This study suggests a ‘cultural recognition’ tactic experimented by Beijing. This approach seeks a wider acknowledgment of contemporary China’s beliefs and cultures as alternatives and supplements to Westphalian ones. ‘Cultural assimilation’ proposed in the neo-tributary formula, however, is disproven by empirical results. Based on a misleading assumption that imperial China had kept a regional hegemonic order simply because of its cultural superiority and neighbors’ assimilation into the values of Confucian legacy (Perdue, 2015), the supposed cultural assimilation has been taken for granted. The smaller powers might only show the deference of cultural norms to get autonomy and pragmatic benefits in return from the larger neighbor. For both sides, it is an effective measure of maintaining a mutually acceptable relationship (Womack, 2012).

Harmonizing the periphery through diplomatic and economic connections

The harmonized connectivity between China and its surroundings is considered as a crucial factor for China’s reemergence. Chinese higher education partnership program usually serves as a flag for its good neighbor policy. Take RUPP-DHY Chinese Center as a vivid example. Initially, the inception of the center by three local institutions situated in southeastern China was attributed to ‘bridgehead’ foreign policy. A founding member of the center explicitly remarked:

Under the guidance of foreign policies, especially ‘bridgehead’ strategy, Department of Education of Yunnan Province implied that Dali University should take the lead to extend higher education collaboration to Southeast Asia. We have geographical advantages…it’s better for us, local institutions in Yunnan, to radiate influence in Southeast Asia. (I36)

Diplomacy also plays a critical role in China’s policies of enrolling international students. Scholarships and training schemes have consistently been packaged with the key China-ASEAN diplomatic events and official addresses of Chinese leadership (See Appendix Table 2). The commencement of BRI further fueled a sharp increase in ASEAN enrollments. The statistics speak for themselves: the year 2015 witnessed a total enrollment of 71,101, which rose sharply to 81,210 in 2016, and surged further to 95,009 in 2017, representing the highest growth rate during the last two decadesFootnote 16.

Meanwhile, a toolkit of economic leverage has always been paralleled with Beijing’s periphery diplomacy. Beijing has been applying not merely trade connections but new institutions and grand initiatives. With capital of 100 billion US dollars, Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank became a main funding resource of BRI collaborative projects in Southeast Asia (Yamamoto, 2020). Along with the heavy investment wrapped with BRI, ever-increasing Chinese enterprises have been incentivized to form trading connections within BRI’s geographical reach (Hu et al., 2019). The results corroborate that higher education has been deeply involved in reinforcing Sino-Cambodia economic ties. First, CI at RAC contributes to the growth of trade volume via lowering transaction costs by training human capital with lingual and socio-cultural familiarity of China. It either offers short-term language training classes for employees in large-scale corporate like China Duty Free Group (I22) or cultivate graduates who fit in jobs related to business with Chinese side (I17, I19-21). Second, training seminars act as exhibitor to facilitate business collaboration. For instance, ten out of sixteen site visits of 2017 Seminar on ICT in Higher Education Innovation for Asian Countries were arranged to Chinese enterprises. Enterprises first exhibited their products and then invited trainees to a formal meeting for prospective trading opportunitiesFootnote 17.

Nonetheless, most Chinese institutions only establish nominal partnership with Cambodian counterparts as responses to foreign policies and domestic initiatives. As one RUPP leader made it clear, ‘some Chinese universities signed MOUs with us, but they do not go to our university to meet with our people…They do not think about their partners but only stick to their own agenda.’ (I34), whereas southwestern Chinese institutions absorb a large number of Southeast Asian students (Yang, 2012) and sustain collaborative programs with neighboring countries. Since foreign universities adopt a utilitarian logic to participate in China’s BRI (Lee et al., 2021), those diplomacy-oriented higher education programs without solid cooperative practices might contribute little to cultural linkage.

Findings appear to validate the concept of trade intertwined with diplomacy in neo-tributary framework. Since the primary intention behind the past ritualized tribute and trade for both the central and the surroundings might be managing an asymmetric relationship (Zhou, 2011), China’s current practices demand retrospection. Some commentators endorse a reviving hierarchical order that a dominating China will rise through enhanced infrastructural and economic connectivity under the cover of benevolent diplomacy (Narins & Agnew, 2020). However, in a global age, China’s inclusive foreign policies and economic incentives might also be modern pathways to stabilize multilateral asymmetric relationships.

Chinese exceptionalism as underlying mentality while image-building activities on the surface

The contours of Chinese exceptionalism used to be overwhelmingly shaped by discussions on China’s past. Orientalists believe that traditional Chinese ideals, with significant discrepancy from the West’s, will offer a hierarchical but harmonious order (Callahan, 2012b). However, the connotation of Chinese exceptionalism is evolving. It is not only about China’s civilization. Empirical results echo Ho’s argument that the gist of Chinese exceptionalism is to view itself as being good and great (Ho, 2019). Universities serve as a showcase for greatness and goodness of a more pragmatic Chinese exceptionalism, in which traditional Chinese worldview has been incorporated with scientific outward-looking Western ideals. They demonstrate China’s leading technology and prosperous market, tell vivid stories of China’s development pathway, and harvest hearts and minds of overseas elites with benevolence and inclusionism.

On the one side, international STEM enrollments have been intentionally enlarged. The number rose to 20,813 in 2018, ranking 1st and accounting for 33% of the total government scholarship holdersFootnote 18. Tailored programs for STEM students have been set up to expand China’s influence in science and technology. For instance, two undergraduates had firstly undertaken one-year preparatory programme at Tongji University. The curriculum with language and foundation courses was designed for international STEM students, which effectively eased the language barrier for future professional studies (I3, I16).

On the other side, pioneering degree programs for international students have incorporated China’s lessons. Initiated by the Chinese government in 2015, the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development (ISSCAD) at Peking University aims to share China’s developmental cases with elites from developing sphere. It offers a one-semester-long China Immersion Program as core course for postgraduates to compare China’s experiences with their home countries. One ISSCAD graduate recollected that he has benefited tremendously from seminars and discussions on China’s economic reforms, opening-up initiatives, and the BRI (I1).

In addition, knowledge sharing has been underscored in training seminars. Field visits to high-tech companies, certified courses on Big Data, Cloud Computing and Cyber Security delivered by Huawei Academy were most impressive sessions. Trainees were extremely surprised by the scale of Huawei headquarter and the quality of Huawei courses (I24-27). The department head frankly spoke, ‘I actually want to have Huawei examination center in RUPP, and I also purchase the Huawei device for the network and teaching’ (I28). The study tours earned their acknowledgement of China’s fast-developing scientific and technological capabilities. This result is in line with Chou and Demiryol (2023)’s proposition that a flexible and non-hegemonic pathway in knowledge domain has been deployed by China to engage more participants to legitimize its central status.

Simultaneously, Beijing has been seeking to burnish its international profile as a responsible and benign country. The recent proposed ideal of ‘human community with a shared future’ and the launch of BRI reflect its confidence in international governance for public good (Gong, 2021). Accordingly, China’s higher education programs have paid full attention to show courtesy and benevolence to foreign recipients, corresponding to the goodness mentality of Chinese exceptionalism while manifesting as image-building efforts on the surface.

Governmental scholarship packages contain tuition waiver, accommodation, living expenses, and medical insurance. Compared with domestic students, international students enjoy better accommodation of single/double room with 24-h hot water, television set, and air conditioner (I2-I3, I6-7, I9). ISSCAD students are even sponsored with research and fieldwork support, textbook reimbursement, settlement allowance, and round-trip ticket per year. After orientation, School of International Education would organize a variety of free activities for foreign sojourners, such as ‘cultural trip to memorial temple in Guangzhou’ (I9), ‘Cambodian festival celebration activities’ (I12), ‘a cultural exhibition day to show language, clothes, food, heritage of our home countries’ (I1).

The strong intention to recast a benevolent image sometimes turned into inappropriate privileges. International students usually should study extremely hard to keep pace with their Chinese classmates, especially in STEM foundation courses. Thus, ‘there are international-student-only classes in mathematics, calculus, and computer basics’ (I3). ‘The examinations for Chinese schoolmates are more difficult, but ours (international students’) easier’ (I16). Even ‘the passing scores were different: 60 for domestic classmates while 45 for us (international students)’ (I9).

Recently, problems related to privileged and under-qualified international students have generated increasingly heated public debates (Li & Gong, 2017). Without equal enrollment/graduation standards and clear boundary between benevolence and prerogative, the academic lure of Chinese higher education and the soft aim of exhibiting greatness and goodness would both be severely weakened. Compared with higher education as a source of Chinese exceptionalism and as a disseminator of cultures and values, its role as an instrument for diplomacy, trade, and image building has been more evident in Southeast Asia, especially in latecomers like Cambodia. The pragmatic approach of over-emphasis on trade and diplomacy inevitably endangers the long-term, sustainable, and mutually beneficial relationship between China and its neighbors.

Concluding comments

Chinese exceptionalism has been the intrinsic impetus of China’s resurrection strategy. To this end, China adopts two main approaches in Southeast Asia: first, to tell stories of its attractive contemporary cultures and values to seek acknowledgement from international audiences; second, to build ‘a community of a shared future’ through economic integration and periphery diplomacy. On socio-cultural side, higher education has been employed as a vanguard to transmit appealing cultures and values. Outreaching educational practices start to depict China as an ideal of good life and a successful model of economic development. Notably, ‘cultural recognition’ instead of ‘cultural assimilation’ in the original model might be more in accord with China’s realistic strategies to expand its sphere of influence. Surrounded by suspicions and controversies, giving a good Chinese narrative is the primary mission. Yet most higher education export has still been confined to a simplistic and rigid presentation of Chinese culture. Systematic coordination with non-governmental actors, such as short-video platforms, e-commerce giants, and high-tech companies, in telling China’s stories has not been formulated. On political and economic front, higher education serves as a facilitator for strengthening diplomatic and trade ties between China and its neighbors. Following the trajectory of foreign policies and economic initiatives, China’s higher education engagement with latecomers in Southeast Asia appears to be fragmented. It sometimes ends up as short-lived image-building projects to showcase amicability and greatness. Even more, the newly emerging attractive values only have partially permeated the well-educated elites who are beneficiaries of Sino-Khmer higher education exchanges rather than the vast local people.

Compared with time-consuming infiltration through socio-cultural and educational sectors, China has relied more on financial incentives and diplomatic alliance to obtain rapid gains. BRI does serve as a catalyst to strengthen socio-cultural ties and recognition of Chinese development model, but it exacerbates the disproportion of China’s engagement with different sectors of receivers. Notably, infrastructure investment is the prior mean of Beijing’s economic incentives in Southeast Asia. From 2015 to 2019, Cambodia received US$ 1160 millions of China’s development assistance in infrastructure sector, greatly exceeding the total US$ 492 million of China’s aid to its social, cross-cutting, and educational sectorsFootnote 19. The huge investment in infrastructure could not efficiently ameliorate China’s profile, but sometimes invoke skepticism of its intentions behind. For China to demonstrate a world order different from the Western dominance, a solid people-to-people connectivity based on genuine understanding and respect of local socio-cultural contexts is a must. Higher education engagement with local stakeholders should play a more concrete part in future practices to generate mutual benefits.

The results further authenticate the ambivalence of Chinese exceptionalism. Utopians exaggerate the all-inclusivity of tianxia and tributary system as cultural superiority of Chinese exceptionalism. Their cherry-picking imagination of an exceptional civilization-state legitimizes China’s path as a better alternative (Ge, 2020), whereas the higher education outreach paradigm puts more emphasis on returning to the core of tianxia through economic and diplomatic alliance instead of socio-culturally reciprocal coexistence as Chinese exceptionalism traditionally advocates. There is no denying that indigenous values such as he er butong (harmony-in-diversity) and tianxia weigong (all under heaven belongs to all and is for all) have long been consistent in Chinese societies (Yang, 2022). However, it is hazardous to overstate the practice of those beliefs in political order of ancient and contemporary China.

The historical and contemporary Chinese politics defy easy explanation. The presuppositions of China’s mentality of dealing with the outside have been bookended by two opposing narratives. Advocates optimistically believe in a reviving order with similar look of hierarchical but noncoercive tribute relationships. Opponents persist in the imperial and exploitative intention of a rising China, leading to unavoidable clashes. This article revisits the use of tributary order in historical context and critically examines the framing of neo-tributary perspective with contemporary empirical findings. It might contribute to a more integrated rather than dualistic lens to observe modern China, as a mutual complementation with tianxia. The neo-tributary framework focuses on down-to-earth interactions between China and its neighbors, while tianxia offers a more holistic and intellectual heuristic to reframe social and political orders.

The neo-tributary perspective does have limitations in neglecting the agency of smaller states, but still systematically analyzes China’s higher education export from four dimensions, ranging from underlying mindset, economic, diplomatic, and socio-cultural levels to superficial behaviors. To fully sketch the contours of modern China’s mindset, it must break the assumption of a simplified Sino-centrism inherited from the past (e.g., ‘cultural recognition’ instead of ‘cultural assimilation’) and integrate pluralistic perspectives (e.g., tianxia and knowledge diplomacy) to unveil China’s interactions with the ‘Global South’ and the ‘Global North’. Focusing on Cambodia as a single case, this present article is limited in generalizing findings to other Southeast Asian members. More empirical studies could be conducted through the proposed integrated prism to further explain China’s higher education activities and the evolving worldview of a resurrecting China.