Introduction

The current higher education (HE) policies in China dates to the Reform and Opening-Up in 1978, when China determined to shift its focus from Cultural Revolution to economic growth. To achieve this goal, the reform of HE systems became one of the key areas, as HE plays a pivotal role in the training of highly skilled manpower and the development of science, technology, and culture for nation building (The CPC Central Committee, 1985).

This paper focuses on one policy instrument of this reform: the China Discipline Evaluation (CDE). It evaluates the overall academic performance of first-level disciplinesFootnote 1 which have the rights to award a master’s and doctorate degrees at Chinese higher education institutions (HEIs). It marked China’s attempt of power devolution from the central government to individual HEIs (Li & Yang, 2014; Mok, 2002). By setting evaluation criteria to guide HEIs’ decision-making, the party-state aimed to reduce its direct controls and achieve macro supervision simultaneously. Notably, as the CDE results are invisibly related to various resources, it is acknowledged as a “baton” that determines the direction of Chinese HE (The CPC Central Committee & The State Council, 2020). Thus, it keeps attracting high attention from policymakers, HEIs, the academia, and the public.

A consensus among all stakeholders is that the CDE should reflect the so-called “Chinese characteristics” (e.g. Huang, 2021). This terminology has long dominated Chinese policy-making since it was firstly proposed by Deng at the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), showing China’s determination in “blazing a path of our own and building socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Deng, 1982). However, neither key policymakers like Huang nor Chinese scholars have systematically elaborated what the Chinese characteristics of the CDE are, and what they mean to Chinese HE. On the other hand, regardless of the increasing global interests in Chinese HE, it is rare to see discussions about the CDE from non-Chinese scholars, and the core differentiating features of CDE’s Chinese characteristics seem indigestible for the rest of the world.

Therefore, this paper attempts to untangle the CDE and its Chinese characteristics. It poses the following question: how and in what ways do the Chinese characteristics shape China’s science evaluation policies, in terms of the CDE? Engaging with this question, this paper proposes a new interpretation of this terminology, and demonstrates an account of the CDE with three prominent Chinese characteristics by drawing on cross-country comparison of evaluation documents and secondary data in China and four Western countries. Based on these, it suggests that the CDE is in essence a “hegemonic project” and “hegemonic apparatus” for centralisation, and its major problem lies in the disproportionate party-state control over the HE in inappropriate ways.

Science evaluation policies in HE

China, like other countries in the West, has had a science evaluation policy in place for around four decades. Methodologically, I draw on a cross-country comparison by briefly laying out a larger landscape (see Table 1) to distil what might be distinctive about China’s science evaluation approach as signalled by the idea of Chinese characteristics.

Table 1 Distinctiveness of the CDE
Full size table

Based on previous comparative studies inside and outside China (e.g. Geuna & Martin, 2003; Guan, 2007; Hicks, 2012; Jiang et al., 2014; Jonkers & Zacharewicz, 2016; Lepori et al., 2007, 2018; Li, 2003; Ochsner, 2022; Teixeira et al., 2022), the scope of comparison is narrowed to the nature of evaluation agency, the evaluation objectives, core criteria, unit of evaluation, and evaluation techniques. The comparator evaluation models selected are from the UK, the USA, Australia, and New Zealand, which meet the following criteria:

  1. a)

    Evaluations must be at the national level, and as a policy instrument.

  2. b)

    Priorities are given to evaluations which fell into the scope of learning when China began to develop its evaluation system, so the US system is included in this comparison even it does not meet criteria a).

  3. c)

    Research evaluation must be the primary component of evaluation. Evaluations of the quality of degree programmes and teaching only are excluded.

  4. d)

    Evaluations must be ex post.

Critical discourse analysis is then employed to examine key policy documents of each model, such as the Invitation Letters and the Working Plans of the fourth and fifth round of the CDE and Guidance on Submissions and Panel Criteria and Working Methods of the REF. These documents are collected from the websites of each evaluation system. Especially regarding the CDE, it is supplemented by official secondary data, including CDGDC Answering Reporters’ Questions, and President Xi’s speech documented on the website of the Ministry of Education (MoE).

This analysis shows that the CDE is like other models in terms of the unit of evaluation and evaluation techniques. More importantly, it highlights that the CDE significantly distinguishes itself in terms of the distance between the evaluation agency and the state, and the logics behind evaluation objectives and criteria. In the remainder of this paper, I will turn to focus specifically on the CDE, exploring whether and how the idea of Chinese characteristics accommodates such distinctiveness.

Locating China’s science evaluation policy

With the rise of evaluation as a means of governing science sectors, great efforts have been made to understand why and how power is exercised with what outcomes. Although little has been done to examine the case of China, such scholarship is helpful in constructing a starting point for this analysis. For example, Dahler-Larsen illustrates that evaluations are an organisational and social process, which is “artificially designed with the purpose of facilitating a new view of a customary practice that breaks with existing habits and convictions” (Dahler-Larsen, 2012, p. 14). This is also true in the Chinese case. In the following review of the CDE’s history, I will show that the evolution of the CDE is a process of responding to problems in HE germane to social economic development and thus a potential solution.

The CDE’s history began in the 1980s, when Chinese HE encountered structural issues caused by the contradiction between the Soviet governance model based on planned economy, the adoption of market economy, and the emergence of global technology revolution (The CPC Central Committee, 1985). At that time, the state had strict control over HE affairs, including “(1) provision of core funding; (2) setting student enrolments for each institution; (3) approving senior staff appointments; (4) authorising all new degree programmes; and (5) managing students’ job assignment process” (Wei, 1997, p. 169). The CPC acknowledged that “…the government managed education institutions, especially HEIs, in a too rigid manner, which made them lack of the vitality they should have; but on what the government should manage, it did not do well either” (The CPC Central Committee, 1985). This situation was considered incompatible with the Reform and Opening-up in China, and could not help China to take up the challenges of global technology revolution (The CPC Central Committee, 1985). Therefore, the Decisions of the CPC on the Reform of Education System (the Decisions) was issued in 1985, with one focus that of empowering HEIs with more autonomy.

Evaluations to HEIs were subsequently introduced. In the Decisions, the CPC confirmed that the government should improve its ability to guide its governance at the macro level, by organising evaluations to HEIs with the education sector, the academia, and the personnel sector (The CPC Central Committee, 1985). In 1985, the first attempt of evaluations started from key disciplines, including political economy, physical chemistry, organic chemistry, communication and electronic system, and chemical engineering, and expanded to a broader scope afterwards. At the same time, the government also organised symposiums with Western experts, and sent large delegations to the West to learn from their experience and explore possibilities in China.

However, due to the lack of expertise and experience in evaluation, these early attempts were still controlled by the state (Wang, 2015). Therefore, the Outline of China’s Education Reform and Development was promulgated in 1993, where deepening the devolution in HE governance was further underlined. It stressed that “…the government should transform its functions from giving administrative order to macro-level supervision, by taking advantage of legislation, budget, planning, information service, policy guidance, and administrative measures when necessary” (The CPC Central Committee & The State Council, 1993). Echoing this decision, the Institute of Degree and Graduate Education Evaluation of Higher Education and Research (the Institute) was established in 1994. As the first non-governmental institution specialised in graduate education evaluation in China, its establishment marked a step-back by the state. From then on, “…while the state would still be responsible for determining the guidelines, policies, and tasks of evaluation, the Institute would take the responsibility for the design and implementation” (Lu, 1994, p. 6). In 1995, the Institute conducted its first discipline evaluation to five disciplines, involving 82 HEIs. This trial evaluation was the predecessor of the current CDE, and contributed significantly to understanding fundamental issues in evaluation, such as the choice of the unit of assessment and evaluation methodology (Zhao et al., 1997).

This steady pace of HE devolution was abruptly disrupted by the CPC central committee’s decision in 1999 to radically expand HE enrolment, as a response to the Asian financial crisis, and the high unemployment. This decision was criticised as a “forceful, disruptive and non-professional policy intervention”, because “politics prevailed over professionalism and expertise in policy-making” (Wang, 2014, pp. 134–135). Although it helped the regime to survive, the price was high. It not only reserved the progress of HE decentralisation, but also caused a series of new problems in HE (an informative discussion about this policy could be found in Ji, 2000), including a sharp decline of HE quality which caused wide-spread worry in the society.

Under this circumstance, the first round of CDE was initiated in 2002, with the primary objective of improving the quality of graduate education (Zhou & Wang, 2003). Until 2004, all 80 first-level disciplines in China were evaluated, which benchmarked HE quality and invigorated HEIs (Zhang & Ye, 2004). Such success led to the consensus that the CDE should be implemented periodically to provide a portrait of the disciplines in China for decision-making by governments, HEIs, and students (Zhou & Wang, 2003). Meanwhile, the Institute was also incorporated into a new specialised agency, China Academic Degrees and Graduate Education Development Centre (CDGDC). While keeping its identity as a public institution, the new CDGDC is affiliated to the MOE, and thus gains a bureaucratic rank to legitimate the CDE from an administrative perspective. I argue that this special status of the CDGDC is one of the distinctive Chinese characteristics of the CDE, and a detailed discussion will be provided in a later section.

The latest round of the CDE (the fifth round) started in November 2020, in the context of breaking away from the “Five Only”. The Five Only refers to the criteria and methods in different types of evaluation and grant allocation that focus only on the number of publications, the administrative rank, the title, the prizes awarded, and the number of research projects founded by national and provincial government. In the General Scheme of Deepening the Reform of Education Evaluation in the New Era (The CPC Central Committee & The State Council, 2020), these problems are officially acknowledged as a chronic disease that leads to the deterioration of the academic ecology.

To respond to this issue and such requirements from the state, the CDE 2020 adopted multiple reform measures, such as shifting the focus from quantity to quality, prioritising Chinese Journals, and setting up multi-dimensional criteria. These measures are asserted to consolidate the priority of quality, effectiveness, contribution, and features over quantity, and consequently rectify the ill value orientation of evaluation (CDGDC, 2020b).

Untangling Chinese characteristics

As mentioned already, the terminology Chinese characteristics was born in Deng’s speech, where he emphasised that “mechanical application of foreign experience and copying of foreign models will get us nowhere”, and “in carrying out our modernization programme we must proceed from Chinese realities” (Deng, 1982). However, if we closely examine these words, we may feel it seems to say everything but says nothing. Many questions remain: what are the relations between foreign experience and Chinese realties? How shall we take use of the foreign experience then? And what exactly do Chinese characteristics mean?

American sinologist Perry Link finds this phenomenon typical of contemporary Chinese officialese. Based on his observation, he concludes that Chinese officialese is a “fruit language” which features ambiguity and abstraction. “When we hear the word banana or apple we can picture an image in our minds, but when we hear fruit we don’t know what to picture (Link, 2013, p. 246)”. Such ambiguity and abstraction can accommodate different readings, and thus “…preserve a veneer of unity over controversies that remain unresolved beneath the surface” (Link, 2013, p. 247).

Link’s argument may hold true regarding many terms in the Chinese political language, including the Chinese characteristics. After the proposal of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, China adopted a new socialist economic system that was “a planned commodity economy based on common ownership” in 1984, and further determined to establish “a socialist market economy” in 1992. It is obvious that according to Western political-economic theories, planned economy and commodity economy are contradictory, and market economy and capital could never exist in a socialist society. However, “Chinese characteristics” legitimates the co-existence of these opposite economic systems, and consequently lubricates the implementation of these controversial policies.

Following this examination of the origin of Chinese characteristics, my argument is that this terminology itself does not necessarily have a concrete meaning. Traveling and developing from politics to every aspect in modern China, it is now a rhetorical modality (or a floating signifier) (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) which describes, labels, and legitimates what are often seemingly self-contradictory phenomena that may only be witnessed in China due to its social economic conditions. It especially draws attention to the idea of China itself, as an exception that cannot be reduced to that of another culture, such as Europe and the USA, and thus, such phenomena cannot be soundly explained and justified by Western theories.

Given this definition, I further suggest that this terminology serves at least two major functions when it qualifies a policy, such as the CDE in this study. First, it preserves policymakers’ options and allows them to hold maximum power of interpretation to that policy. Its ambiguity and abstraction imply that the reading of this policy is contingent upon the prevailing context and China’s reality, so the policy cannot be judged by Western standards. In this way, “Chinese characteristics” guarantees a positive public image of the party-state who always has the ability to make the best choice.

Second, it serves as a promissory legitimacy mechanism (Beckert, 2020). Due to China’s “transformative experimentation” in policy-making which features “innovating through implementation first, and drafting universal laws and regulations later” (Heilmann, 2008, p. 4), the outcome of a policy is more uncertain and unpredictable. At this point, Chinese characteristics reinforces the idea of China and the credibility of the party-state, creating an imaginary of a successful future of that policy, and consequently legitimates these political decisions. In other words, it blurs the potential deficiencies and risks of that policy by making a promise of development or movement towards something without having to state quite what that is.

Considered in this light, it is therefore not striking that research on CDE with Chinese characteristics is fragmented and, to a large extent, personal experience-based (Xu & Zhang, 2022). Explicit interpretation of CDE with Chinese characteristics could hardly be found (He, 2018) either. Among such limited literature, it is worth noting that most scholars tend to agree the Chinese characteristics of the CDE can be traced from three aspects. First, the CDE is under ideological guidance of the CPC (Bie, 2020; Lu et al., 2022; Wang, 1994); second, to “foster virtue through education” is the top consideration in designing the CDE (Gong, 2020; He, 2018 ; Huang, 2021); and third, the CDE should guide HEIs to fulfil national and social needs (He, 2018; Huang, 2021). Although these consensuses are shaky and require further scrutiny, they offer an avenue to understand the CDE. Nonetheless, this knowledge gap merits more attention in the future. Based on previous comparison findings and historical analysis, this paper tries to bridge this knowledge gap by proposing three prominent Chinese characteristics of the CDE.

Chinese characteristic 1: CDGDC’s paradoxical status

Three models of evaluation agency-state relation can be found among major HE evaluation systems around the world. On the one end is the centralisation model, where the agency operates as a governmental institution. On the other end is the market model, where the agency is a private institution, such as in the USA. The third and more common model, sitting in between these two ends, is the loosely coupled model. The agency and the government are somehow attached, but each retains a distinct identity and separateness, and their attachment may be weak in its mutual affects, and slower to respond (Weick, 1976). This model can be observed in many countries such as the UK, where evaluation agencies act in its own self-interest and keep an arm’s length’s distance with the government.

In contrast, the status of the CDGDC seems to be ambiguous and self-contradictory. Ostensibly, it claims to be a “social institution” and independent third party, which falls into the loosely coupled model. But in essence, it is commonly perceived as a state organisation which is under direct management of the MOE and the CPC. This can be evidenced by the discontent from academies. For example, Zhang notes that “although the CDGDC has the independent legal person identity, it has to carry out its work under the instruction of the MOE. This means it does not have the autonomy to organise evaluation independently (2019, p. 87)”.

I argue that such a paradox in terms of the organisation fundamentally distinguishes the CDE from other evaluation systems in the world, and thus should be seen as the foremost Chinese characteristic of the CDE. However, it should be stressed that such an identity of the CDGDC is not only self-contradictory, but also self-balanced. It reflects the power relations of actors involved in the CDE and represents a temporary equilibrium of push and pull factors in political, social, and cultural aspects.

Firstly, the party-state itself is a firm advocator of making the CDGDC a third party. As presented before, since its initiation, HEI evaluation is taken as a top-down reform measure. This intention has been growing stronger especially in the last decades. Most recently, the Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on Several Major Issues on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms underlines that the state should further push “…the separation of government administration, school management and educational evaluation”, and “entrust social organisations to carry out evaluation and monitoring of education” (The CPC Central Committee, 2013). Thus, by maintaining CDGDC’s putative independence, the state intends to convey an image of self-improvement and proactive decentralisation, which is expected to be perceived by the society. However, the actual effects of such “centralised decentralisation” (Li & Yang, 2014, p. 5) seems to be limited, with dissatisfaction expressed by scholars that these social institutions, including the CDGDC, “…are intertwined with the state, legitimise the inherited power, implement the state’s decision, and establish an explicit or implicit network of interests with the state” (Zhou & Li, 2016, p. 17).

Notwithstanding the efforts in HE decentralisation, the political tradition of centralised management has not been shaken (Zhang & Cheng, 2008). A pointer here is that drawing on Howlett and Ramesh’s (1995) typology of policy instruments, Zhang and Liu (2013) find that hortatory instruments, such as devolution, produced limited effects, and “administrative intervention is still the norm of HE governance” (Zhang & Liu, 2013, p. 53). However, it is also imperative to recognise that eliminating such path dependency or inertia within a limited timeframe is difficult and unwise, considering that this approach has rooted in this land for over 2000 years. To prevent the recurrence of radical and ill-suited reforms that are not in line with the Chinese context, such as the “wholehearted modernization” (quanpan xihua) in 1930s and “learning the Soviet Union entirely” from 1950s to 1970s, modest manner (zhongyong zhidao) is adopted. It reflects the political wisdom of balancing Yin and Yang in Chinese philosophy. The current CDGDC is precisely an embodiment of this political wisdom. As a centralised agency, it provides a certain degree of space for devolution, while also ensuring the maintenance of the party-state’s power. It can be foreseen that the CDGDC will continue to play such a buffering role for a long period in the future.

Moreover, at the social and cultural level, the bureaucratic prioritisation tradition (Guanben Wei) in China is deeply embedded in the HE system. As this name suggests, bureaucracy is the fundamental logic of the running of this country. I propose two ways to understand its shaping power on the CDE.

First, it is a power assignment system (Yu, 2013) which positions public HEIs into the unified national hierarchical ranking structure. Thus, Chinese HEIs gained one of the three bureaucratic ranks (in descending order): vice-ministerial (Fubu Ji), bureau (Zhengting Ji), or vice-bureau (Futing Ji) (Wang, 2016). In accord with this, HEI heads and standing members of the HEI party committee are also given a corresponding rank (Wang, 2016). In this structure, the higher rank means more power and resources, as well as the greater obedience from the lower ranks. Apparently, the most qualified organisation that could evaluate the performance of HEIs is the one that is in the same structure and has a relatively high rank. Therefore, through being affiliated to the MOE, the CDGDC obtains a departmental ranking (Zhengsi Ji), which equals to the bureau rank. This rank enables it to conduct evaluations smoothly and effectively by taking advantage of its political power and close relation with the MOE, such as in acquiring data from HEIs, and inviting panel members.

Second, the bureaucratic prioritisation tradition has also formed a special belief that the state, rather than professionalism or legislation, is the source of authority and reliability. Thus, on the one hand, by virtue of its special status, the CDGDC gains more recognition and trust in the society (Xiao & Yang, 2020). For instance, it has been proven that HEIs’ disclosure of their CDE ranks could significantly improve their minimum undergraduate admission scores (Guo & Wang, 2021), because higher CDE ranks are taken as a sign of reputation and education quality by students and their family. This, in turn, incentivises more HEIs to participate in the CDE, and consequently makes it seemingly more influential and trustworthy. On the other hand, the bureaucratic prioritisation tradition is disadvantageous to non-governmental third parties. People tend to see them as market-driven or money-driven, which means a low level of credibility and reliability (Mao & Xuan, 2021; Sun & Xu, 2021). And they cannot seek endorsement from the legal system, because in this cultural context the law is inferior to the state. That is why the HE legal system in China is far less developed than the sophisticated hierarchical ranking structure as mentioned above. Currently, the only law on HE evaluation was released in 1990, which may only provide shaky standing point for non-governmental third-party evaluations (Liu, 2005).

Chinese characteristic 2: contradictory values co-exist within the CDE

In both Chinese and English, the term “value” can be seen in the etymological root of “evaluation”. In Chinese, “evaluation” is composed of “appraise” and “value”; while in English, it consists of “é-” and “valuer”, which means finding out the value. Despite that evaluations should be objective, it is clear that evaluations are also value judgments (Dahler-Larsen, 2012; Wang, 1994). The evaluation of HEIs thus involves this ambiguous reading, an objective rational process that nevertheless is guided by a set of values typically favoured by governments to shape its HE sector (Ben-David, 1977; Lucas, 2006).

A thorough scrutiny of the wording of the objectives and criteria of comparator evaluation models shows that they illustrate and deliver Western values, rooted in capitalism as an economic system. Two types of values are common in these evaluation models. The first one is neoliberal inspired values as manifested in techniques such as New Public Management (NPM). Kettl proposes six core components of the NPM values, including productivity, marketisation, service-orientation, decentralisation, policy (of purchasing service), and accountability (2005, pp. 1–2). I find four of them specifically conspicuous in the policy lexis. The priority of productivity is shown in ideas such as allocating funding selectively, promoting quality, and the measurement of income and output. Marketisation is demonstrated in the ideas concerning performance incentives, national and international comparison and competition, supporting world-leading education, and maintaining internationally competitive rankings. A service-orientation can be seen in the rationale such as informing internal and external decision-making, as well as serving societal development and particularly the needs from industry and economic growth. Accountability could also be caught from the objectives of demonstrating quality and benefits of HE.

The second type of value is grounded in the emergence of new approaches of public administration, directly addressing the narrow utilitarian emphasis of the NPM. Such a paradigm shift is well documented in the literature such as the New Public Service (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000), Public Value Management (Stoker, 2006), and New Public Governance (Osborne, 2006). Albeit the responses have not constituted a coherent whole, it is becoming clear that “citizens, citizenship, democracy are central to the new approach” (Bryson et al., 2014, p. 447). These values are also ubiquitous in current evaluation models. For instance, values of collaboration, equality, and diversity are highlighted in the REF’s evaluation of environment; the NRC ranking claims to document the value of doctoral education to society and economy; and the PBRF in New Zealand has a special focus on the advancement of indigenous groups such as Mātauranga Māori and iwi.

On the contrary, the CDE arguably conveys a mix of the capitalist values and the socialist values promoted by the party-state. On the one hand, just like its comparators, the CDE also shows adherence to NPM values, especially in terms of productivity, service-orientation, and accountability. For instance, the aims of the CDE include ideas such as “improving the quality HEIs’ discipline construction”, “informing the society of HEIs’ academic performance”, and especially “providing information with students to choose universities and programmes”. The criteria system also involves a comparison of input and output, the evaluation of quality, and effectiveness. These embedded NPM values notably show the party-state’s endeavour in decentralisation as discussed earlier.

On the other hand, the recent years have also witnessed an increasing emphasis on HE’s complying with the party line in China. Thus, the socialist values promoted by the party-state win greater saliency in the CDE. A typical piece of evidence is the top priority given to the indicator—“the quality and effectiveness of ideological and political education”. This indicator aims to “examine HEIs’ performance and achievements on the ideological and political curriculum reform, social practice organisation, students’ ideological stand management, grassroots party organisation construction, and ideological and political team construction, as well as understand how ideological and political education improves students’ ideological level, political awareness, moral character, and cultural literacy through questionnaire surveys” (CDGDC, 2020a, p. 1). Another example lies in its emphasis on scholars doing research “based on China’s reality, and to solve China’s problems”. In the fifth round of the CDE, scholarly works published on the four official publications of the CPC Central CommitteeFootnote 2 are recognised as “important academic achievements”; and “representative works submitted for evaluation must include a certain proportion of papers published in Chinese journals” (CDGDC, 2020c). In doing so, the CDE reinforces socialist values among students and scholars, especially the “Core Socialist Values”,Footnote 3 the “Four Awareness”,Footnote 4 the “Four Matters of Confidence”,Footnote 5 and the “Two Upholds”.Footnote 6 It could be seen as an indirect but potent controlling mechanism over the HE, which is the continuation of centralisation.

Therefore, my argument is that the second Chinese characteristic of the CDE is the co-existence of such contradictory values: socialism with capitalism, and centralisation with decentralisation. This contradiction is enabled by CDGDC’s paradoxical statues, but more fundamentally, it can be seen as a result of the party-state’s value recalibration reflected in the HE.

As Mok points out, China is faced with the dilemma of taking advantage of “the energies and potential unleashed from the socialist market” and maintaining “the state’s ability to exercise control over social and political scenes” during the same process of liberalisation/decentralisation (2005, p. 81). Therefore, the party-state’s borrowing of NPM, market mechanisms, neo-liberalism, and broadly capitalism in HE reform is based mainly on their usefulness to deal with domestic and international crisis, but not on ideological shift (Mok, 2005; Urio, 2012; Vickers & Zeng, 2017). When it senses the risks that capitalist values might erode university students’ ideological adherence to the Core Socialist Values (Wang & Li, 2020), and consequently threaten the stability of its regime (He, 2014), then ideological and political education which is believed as “not only the characteristics of Chinese HE, but also the advantage of Chinese HE over Western models” (‘Adhere to Our Own Path of Higher Education Development’, 2016) is brought to the top of the agenda to recalibrate students’ and scholars’ values.

This ideological rectification exemplifies the principle that “Chinese learning as the foundation, while Western learnings for their function”, which originated from China’s early attempt of modernisation in 1860s. By granting the Chinese learning the superiority, it seeks to reconcile or at least suspend the opposition between Chinese and Western ideology. As the above analysis shows, the CDE is therefore a strong reinforcement to further consolidate the party-state’s authority and leadership in HE.

Chinese characteristic 3: the promotion of the visibility of the idea of China on the international stage

It is evident that the evaluation systems in Western counterparts commonly focus on their domestic society, and none of them has the ambition to influence the rest of the world. Even in the cases of Australia and New Zealand where words such as “world” or “international” are mentioned in their aims and rationales, their stances are still quite inward. For example, one aim of Australia’s ERA is to “allow for comparisons between Australian universities and against world standard for all discipline areas” (Australian Research Council, 2018, p. 1), and New Zealand says the PBRF will assist their HEIs “to maintain and lift their competitive rankings relative to their international peers” (The Tertiary Education Commission, 2019, p. 7).

In stark comparison, it can hardly be ignored the frequent articulation of the idea of China against an international academic and political background in the documents of the CDE. For instance, it requires scholars, especially in humanities and social sciences, to “tell a good story about China, and let China’s voice be heard” and to “demonstrate Chinese style and Chinese characteristics” (CDGDC, 2020c). CDGDC also claims that the CDE aims to “publicise the achievements of China’s HE reforms and development to the world, demonstrate the achievements of discipline construction in Chinese HEIs, attract high-level international students, strengthen the international discourse power of Chinese discipline evaluation theories and standards, and enhance the influence of the CDE” (CDGDC, 2016).

Based on this sharp contrast, I argue that the third Chinese Characteristic of the CDE is its promotion of the visibility of the idea of China on the international stage. It stresses the idea of China itself—as an exception that cannot be reduced to that of any other culture—to be seen and aware by the world.

This characteristic closely relates to what China terms as “discursive power” (Huayu Quan), “a type of narrative agenda-setting ability focused on reshaping global governance, values, and norms to legitimize and facilitate the expression of state power” (Thibaut, 2022, p. 1). In short, it is the power of influence which is conceived as the key in China’s rejuvenation amidst escalating international opposition. The academic discursive power, especially in humanities and social sciences, is believed underpins China’s discursive power (Zhang, 2012). In this regard, China still lags behind Western countries in many senses, including in the ability and achievements in setting academic agendas, innovating academic propositions, academic ideas, and academic viewpoints, as well as making academic standards, etc. (Xi, 2016; Xie, 2019). Therefore, through setting such criteria and aims, the CDE channels Chinese HEIs, students, and scholars to participate in the advancement of Chinese academic discursive power and to re-create an internationally visible Chinese HE system.

Taking a further step, I suggest that the second and third Chinese characteristics of the CDE are two sides of the whole picture—one faces the domestic society and the other faces the international. Together, they have an important bearing on the way we see the role of the CDE. It forcefully agitates and organises Chinese academia to willingly give their consent to the party-state’s leadership and to actively contribute to China’s advantage in the geographical competition. Thus, the CDE could be conceived as both a “hegemonic project” and a “hegemonic apparatus” (Thomas, 2013) that structures and organises the contemporary Chinese HE.

Conclusions and implications

The use of language is a paradigm of action that is situated within a historical and social context, exhibiting a dialectical interdependence with various other processes and facets of the society. Through a set of comparison and the analysis of the historical and social-political context of China, this paper demystifies one common terminology in the Chinese official language: the Chinese characteristics of the CDE. It suggests and examines three fundamental dimensions of the Chinese characteristics of the CDE, namely (i) the paradoxical status of the evaluation agency, (ii) the co-existence of contradictory values embedded in the objectives and criteria of the evaluation, and (iii) the promotion of the visibility of the idea of China on the international stage.

These three Chinese characteristics provide two insightful implications that are crucial for comprehending the Chinese HE.

Firstly, they are an illustrative example of the modern continuation of the Chinese tradition which prioritises the political utilisation of education. Through invisibly controlling the CDGDC, the party-state utilises the CDE to achieve the recalibration of value in domestic HE sector and enhance China’s discursive power at the international stage. Therefore, it may be appropriate to say that although the CDE looks like a decentralisation instrument, it in essence is a cultural-political institution for centralisation to serve the stability of the regime in the global competition of knowledge-based economy.

In this regard, Yang (2011) has a critical account of the strong alliance between education and politics throughout the Chinese history. However, in disagreement with his worries in the failure of a true blend of Chinese and Western ideas of HE, I argue that China, or at least the party-state, has never pursued such integration. Instead, the use of Chinese characteristics indicates that China’s ambition is to develop a unique Chinese HE model featuring Chinese values. As mentioned before, the principle that “Chinese learning as the foundation, while Western learnings for their function” has never been absent, and a higher position has always been assigned to the Chinese core (Ayers, 1971). It is just that at present, such a model is still not clear, and is fraught with contradictions and attempts of re-balancing, as showed in the case of the CDE in this paper.

My second insight further relates to the future of the CDE. I suggest that the key issue lies in balancing between the “politics first” tradition and academic freedom. As Ben-David (1977) puts, achieving a balance between governmental intervention and HE vigour and independence is a universal issue in research policy-making. My position here is that academic freedom can best be understood as a set of concrete practices that are always embedded in specific contexts (Marginson, 2014; Pringle & Woodman, 2022; Yang et al., 2007), and are based on certain consensual principles. Thus, “there is no point in posing judgements on one system in terms of the norms of another” (Marginson, 2014, p. 24). Specifically, “…managerialism associated with marketisation can also militate against the exercise of individual and institutional autonomy central to definitions of academic freedom” (Pringle & Woodman, 2022, p. 3).

The problem in China rests in its stiff, preachy, and vague approach to administrative intervention and political publicity. These manners may match the pre-1978 past of planned economy, but has minimal adaptivity to the current, diversified, and globalised society, and it has also cause dissatisfaction among scholars and students at the same time. A recent example is the protest from university students against the Covid lockdown. Such unintended consequences warn the party-state that its HE governance style must be updated as soon as possible. As for the CDE, I suggest that slogan-style criteria, especially those that superficially underline ideology and politics, need to be replaced by those which can foster deep recognition. Future research may be benefited from further exploring this topic, and the rest of the world may also learn from China’s lessons to solve this universal puzzle.