Introduction

Situated on the coast, Dar es Salaam is Tanzania’s largest city and a vital economic hub in East Africa. Dar es Salaam has experienced rapid population growth over the past decade, with its estimated 5,383,728 inhabitants increasing by 23% since 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022). However, the rate of urban expansion outpaces the ability to plan for adequate infrastructure and services, resulting in 75% of Dar es Salaam residents living in unplanned settlements (Pasquini et al., 2020) without access to core utility services such as solid waste management, primary healthcare, treated water, and sanitation (Peter & Yang, 2019).

For Dar es Salaam to transition its rapid growth more sustainably as per the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11: ‘Sustainable Cities and Communities’, challenges related to rapid urbanization need to be met through innovative and modern solutions that result in sustained change. One such solution is to move away from traditional city operating models that create closed and unconnected systems resulting in silos that stall city development. Alternatively, smart city operating models allow city data to be unlocked to improve efficiency, resilience, innovation, and inclusivity in city development (Cohen, 2015; Macomber, 2016; OECD, 2019). Barriers to smart city development, such as electrical outages, poor infrastructure, poor access to technology, absence of transport links and lack of financial capital, are starting to be addressed and remedied in Tanzania, enabling space for this transition (Oxford Business Group, 2018; TANESCO, 2017; World Bank, 2020).

An innovative and affordable smart technology solution (STS) named ‘Smart Technology Recording City Solution’ (Smart-TRACS) was piloted in Dar es Salaam to enhance solid waste collection services to citizens to meet their needs for a clean, healthy environment. Smart-TRACS has the potential to provide the datasets needed to transform solid waste management into a smart operating model with the potential for cross-sector application.

This paper first reviews smart cities in the context of emerging economies before critically reviewing Dar es Salaam's transition to smart city status and its solid waste management system. Thereafter, the motivations behind the development and implementation of Smart-TRACS are explored. The paper then tests the hypotheses that Smart-TRACS has; (H1) improved solid waste management service provision, and (H2) improved Refuse Collection Charges (RCC) collection rates in the two wards it has been piloted. Acknowledging that Smart-TRACS does not provide an overarching solution for Dar es Salaam to reach smart city status alone, the paper discusses its potential to support its transition to smart city status. Three components of Smart-TRACS supporting this transition are considered; (i) is Smart-TRACS an environmental, economic, and socially desirable solution for Dar es Salaam’s solid waste management needs? (ii) applicability as a STS across other smart city indicators in Tanzania, and (iii) applicability as a STS in other emerging markets. The paper closes by reviewing Dar es Salaam’s transition towards a smart city operating model and the key challenges faced in the implementation of this.

Background

What is a smart city?

Over the past decade, the concept and perception of a ‘smart city’ has evolved considerably. Driven by technology providers in the early years, the vision of a smart city was based on efficiencies created through innovative technology-based solutions with little consideration for long-term sustainability. However, as the concept was embraced and implemented by entrepreneurs, governments, and civil societies, it has since evolved to also include factors related to the three sustainability pillars, including economic, social and environmental components (Aras & Crowther, 2008; UNECE, 2018; Mueller, 2017).

The baseline incorporation of all three sustainability pillars is evident in the core fundamentals of the leading smart city model definitions (Cohen, 2015; Macomber, 2016; OECD, 2019; Washburn et al., 2010). Most agree that a smart city consists of technology, human and institutional factors, as per Fig. 1 below.

Fig. 1
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Fundamental components of a smart city (Washburn et al., 2010)

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How the smart city concept is interpreted, developed, and implemented depends on two core factors that can impact overall sustainability. First, the core driving entity pushing forward the smart city agenda, whether tech company-driven, government-driven, or citizen-driven (Cohen, 2015). Traditional models of smart city development have focused on top-down approaches of employing innovative technology with little consideration to citizens' needs or wants, leading to mixed success in implementation (Yu & Zu, 2018). In contrast, collaborative and human-centric approaches that meet citizens’ needs using technology as an enabler, not a necessity, have proved more successful (Cohen, 2015).

The second factor relates to a city's geopolitical agenda and issues at hand. The applicability of a particular smart city operating model depends on a complex myriad of city characteristics such as size, built environment, digital accessibility of citizens, fiscal resources, amongst others (OECD, 2019). Macomber (2016) suggests that smart city innovations and opportunities should match such city characteristics. He argues that cities can be divided into segments across two dimensions; legacy vs. new cities, and developed vs. emerging economies. He has categorized four types of cities depending on these dimensions, which can assist in the identification of appropriate smart city development trajectories as detailed in Table 1 below;

Table 1 City types for smart city solution application, adapted from Macomber (2016)
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Under Macomber’s model, Dar es Salaam fits into Segment 2, which recognizes the limits of financing smart city solutions in emerging economies and the opportunity and role of private capital investment. With this approach, smart city development has the potential to implore a human-centric vision of smart city development based on co-creation with citizens, the private sector, and government institutions. This approach incorporates the social-cultural sustainability pillar often missed in smart city development, thus connecting people, space and things.

Overall, smart city development is not a straightforward strategy that automatically leads to sustainable urban development. As with many development approaches, there is no standardized model and careful consideration needs to be made of the city's core characteristics such as size, built environment, digital accessibility of citizens, and fiscal resources. It also needs to be considered that for a city to be termed both 'sustainable' and 'smart', all urban parameters, including living, governance, environment, mobility, people and economy, must be considered. However, resources and models exist to assist governments, private developers, and citizens develop suitable smart city solutions to meet the urban development agenda for sustained change.

The rapid evolution of smart city models within emerging economy settings

Innovations for STSs in developed economies have progressed fast, with successes seen in cities like Oslo, Copenhagen, London and Singapore. These cities dominate the 'top smart cities' rankings for example IESE Cities in Motion Index (2022) and IMD Smart City Index (2023). However, the solutions these cities employ to make it into these top lists could be argued to be less ‘radical’ than first assumed as they are designed for and constrained around existing infrastructure, rigid institutions, and high levels of risk aversion (Aggarwala et al., 2018).

The rapid expansion of urban centers in emerging markets offers a platform for creativity, innovation, and rapid scale in STS development that recognizes the challenges faced by such cities (Vu & Hartley, 2018). However, results can be limited if not approached with inclusivity and caution, as presented in the following examples.

In China, ambitious national plans to promote smart city development are implemented through top-down industrial policy and central planning. The government ministries formulated a smart city industrial alliance, leading to ‘Guidance on Promoting Healthy Smart City Development’ in 2014. The approach used technology as the main driver for city development with little consideration for citizens’ needs or wants at a local level. Subsequently, results have achieved mixed success in implementation (Yu & Zu, 2018), with some cities such as Beijing having successfully implemented STSs meeting citizens' needs such as technologies to identify pollution hotspots which can subsequently be used to inform transport routing to reduce pollution build-up (Lai, 2023). However, other cities, such as Ordos, now named the largest ghost city on earth, were designed at a price point that the local population could not afford to live in, forcing citizens to live in neighboring cities (Euklidiadas, 2019).

In India, the Government introduced the ‘Smart Cities Mission’ in June 2015. The strategy includes the development of 100 smart cities, with a competitive selection process to encourage flexibility and creativity with locally designed and led initiatives that have the potential for replication (SMARTNET, 2020). However, this ambitious plan has had mixed results in implementation. Examples of successful implementation can be seen in the introduction of ‘Integrated Command and Control Centres’ in 70 cities which enabled a fast and effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic through data-driven services such as monitoring COVID-19 hotspots, oxygen capacity, availability of hospital beds, and ambulance services (Aijaz, 2021). However, implementation has been slow, with many cities yet to achieve the desired levels of transformation due to insufficient coordination between government institutions, lack of capacity to analyze and use data, and slow release of funds (Aijaz, 2021).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, leaders across 36 countries, including Tanzania, are taking a collaborative and proactive approach to push the smart city development agenda with the 'Smart Africa Alliance'. This aims to accelerate sustainable socio-economic development on the continent by steering Africa into a knowledge economy through affordable access to the internet and the usage of technologies in urban management (Smart Africa, 2023). The multi-stakeholder approach in the design and implementation of initiatives is proving successful. A benchmarking study carried out in 2020 across ten African countries revealed significant progress across all five pillars of the Smart City Digital Economy Blueprint, including; Digital Government, Digital Business, Infrastructure, Innovation-Driven Entrepreneurship, and Digital Skills and Values (Smart Africa, 2020). The observed progress means the gap in digital government services provision and achievement across smart city indicators is shrinking. However, despite this progress, multiple challenges remain across all countries assessed, including disjointed strategic coordination and subsequent investment siloes, funding and procurement challenges and underlying needs for renewed digital economy strategic planning.

Cities within emerging markets offer the opportunity to push STS boundaries, imploring creativity and innovation within design and implementation. This approach can install sustainable and modern aspects to smart city development that meets the demand for affordable solutions tailored to citizens' needs. However, this must be managed carefully as mixed results have also been seen through approaches that do not incorporate all three sustainability pillars, inclusive consideration of citizens’ needs, or disjointed strategic coordination in implementation. Subsequently, overarching supportive masterplans and frameworks that allow a safe space for innovation are paramount for smart cities' sustainable development.

Is Dar es Salaam transitioning to smart city status?

Like most cities, Dar es Salaam faces opportunities and challenges to address its rapid growth sustainably. Historical urban planning efforts using structural, action, and master plans have been unsuccessful in creating a properly planned and functioning city. This has led to 75% of residents living in unplanned settlements without suitable access to core services such as solid waste management, primary healthcare, treated water, and sanitation, refer to Fig. 2 (Pasquini et al, 2020; Sheuya & Burra, 2016).

Fig. 2
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Left: example of a planned area, Right: example of an unplanned area- Dar es Salaam (Peter & Yang, 2019)

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Compounded by the city's rapid expansion, efforts to resolve the challenges have been reactive and symbolic rather than proactive and actionable. For example, the 2016–2036 Dar es Salaam city master plan is yet to be notably actioned, as evidenced by mass uncontrolled urban sprawl and unsustainable changes in land use and land cover (Msuyu et al, 2021). Despite this, there have been improvements over the past decade to address and remedy some of the traditional barriers to smart city development, such as improving electricity access, baseline infrastructure, technology and internet affordability, public transport links such as the Rapid Bus Transit Network and accessibility to financial capital (TANESCO, 2017; Oxford Business Group, 2018; World Bank, 2020).

One such example is the Local Government Revenue Collection Information System (LGRCIS), which the Government of Tanzania initiated with support from the World Bank and the Danish International Development Agency. It aims to enhance and automate Local Government Authority's (LGAs) own source revenue collection, such as city service levies and taxes, using GIS to support the entire revenue collection chain (McCluskey & Huang, 2019). This system enhanced own source revenue collection by up to 30% in some cities within the first year of operation (World Bank, 2017b). However, in 2016 the Government decided to re-centralize property tax administration and other revenue streams (Fjeldstad et al., 2019). This was a huge challenge for LGAs as they lost a key part of own source revenue and efficiencies created through the digitized service. This example of sudden institutional reforms is a key threat to the progress of smart city development.

Innovative STS solutions commonly face challenges in Tanzania due to an uncertain and unreliable regulatory environment. Examples such as LGRCIS as presented above, are not unique. International e-commerce platforms such as Uber and Bolt attempted to introduce operations in Tanzania, however, after a few years were suspended citing a ‘tough regulatory environment’ (Njanja, 2022). This level of abrupt and, often, discretionary governance, hinders broader private sector participation and investment and sends a worrying precedent to prospective investors.

Despite the risky legislative environment in Tanzania for STS solution development, there is a growing citizen-led technology hub in Dar es Salaam, termed ‘Silicon Dar’. This area contains a collection of telecom companies, government institutions, academic centers, private sector companies, start-ups, and business incubators (Silicon Dar, 2021). These various entities are working closely together to develop innovations that meet the rapidly expanding city's growing needs. Different mediums such as workshops, competitions, hackathons, and outreach programs are all being run to enhance capacity building and provide seed funds to innovators to kick-start projects. Figure 3 below shows some of the active projects in Dar es Salaam regarding smart city development.

Fig. 3
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Smart city development examples in Dar es Salaam in relation to Cohan's (2015) six smart city indicators

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While ‘Silicon Dar’ provides a national resource for smart city development, its current model represents far too much of a cottage industry. Tanzania does not currently prioritize STSs within urban development plans and the absence of guiding legislative frameworks and policy directives constrains efforts to remediate the challenges identified in this paper on STS application and smart city development. However, these challenges appear to be recognized by the Government of Tanzania with projects in the pipeline to address Tanzania’s rapid urban development through a ‘smart city’ lense. This includes the Green and Smart Cities SASA! for Tanzania project, led by the President’s Office—Regional Administration and Local Government and funded by the European Union. This project aims to enable LGAs to effectively and efficiently deliver social, economic and environmental services to the citizens through green infrastructure, e-governance and more (Capacity4dev, 2022).

As has been discussed so far, implementing sustainable smart city operating models are undoubtedly complex. However, the fast urbanisation seen in Dar es Salaam provides a unique opportunity to enhance efficiency and liveability as institutional frameworks and infrastructure are being shaped. Indeed, the rapidly growing population and middle class provide a strong foundation for any ICT model requiring a critical mass of consumers and users. Furthermore, it must be noted that Dar es Salaam is rapidly breaking through traditional barriers to smart city development, such as electrical outages, poor access to technology, absence of transport links, and lack of financial capital. A growing innovation hub could face the challenge of providing STSs to meet the city's needs, integrating a ‘human-centric vision’ of smart city development that incorporates the social-cultural sustainability pillar that is often missed. Private capital investment is being utilized to meet the financing gap. However, innovation is stalled due to the lack of a robust overarching city master plan, a co-ordination framework that supports smart city development, and the high-risk environment of sudden institutional change. If projects such as the Green and Smart Cities SASA! address such challenges, Dar es Salaam could potentially move onto the path of sustainable smart city development. If they run in silo of the existing innovation hubs and the human-centric vision that Dar es Salaam needs, the city will remain trapped in a continuous loop of detached coordination as faced in numerous other cities globally.

Solid waste management in Tanzania- a framework developed in response to challenge

The current solid waste management organizational framework in Dar es Salaam directly results from the sector's historical, political, economic and development backdrop, refer to Fig. 4 for an overview. Under the socialist model of the founding Government of Tanzania, the central Government provided solid waste management services free of charge, leading to reduced funds available to be invested in the sector for necessary equipment, skilled personnel, or disposal sites. As such, solid waste management service provision was inadequate, with waste collection rates as low as 5% in Dar es Salaam during this time (Sollomon, 2011).

Fig. 4
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The journey of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam

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In the late 1980s Tanzania transformed into a capitalist economy. With that, the Government pushed decentralization by devolution (D by D) of core urban public services, including solid waste management (Mollell & Tollenar, 2013). This approach aimed to address deteriorated public service delivery and subsequent loss of confidence by citizens in central government institutions' competence to serve their needs (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010; Saidi et al., 2019). Subsequently, power and authority were devolved from the central Government to LGAs to bring service provision closer to service users to reflect citizens' needs and priorities (Venugopal & Yilmaz, 2010). In Dar es Salaam, this meant that Dar es Salaam City Council was responsible for implementing and enforcing solid waste management.

Initially, this approach did improve solid waste management service provision, with waste collection rates increasing from 5% to around 30% during the late 1980s. However, increased service provision was primarily attributed to waste collection equipment donations by various international development agencies (Sollomon, 2011). The LGA’s lack of adequate fiscal and institutional capacity to keep up with the fast-paced urbanization in their jurisdictions, political interference, lack of adequate regulatory framework and lack of adequate disposal and waste recovery facilities hindered overall improvements in the sector and subsequently collection rates fell once again in the early 1990s (Palfreman, 2014).

In the 1990s, Dar es Salaam City Council attempted to address solid waste management's institutional and fiscal gap by introducing environmental by-laws and privatizing waste collection services in selected, predominantly high-income, wards. Collection rates significantly improved to around 70% in wards receiving private services due to improved expertise and resources to carry out services. However, collection rates remained low city-wide at around 30% due to uneven service coverage (Solomon, 2011). This issue was perpetuated through a ‘user-fee’ cost recovery mechanism introduced in the by-laws. Citizens were now required to formally pay refuse collection charge (RCC) fees according to affordability, with service users in low-income wards having to pay less than those in high-income wards (CCAC, 2015). As increased waste generation is directly linked to increased wealth and thus consumption (World Bank, 2018), this tariff structure could theoretically improve RRC collection as it considers both the affordability and service user’s service requirements. However, in reality it “commodified” a public utility service, serving those who can pay, while ignoring those who cannot, or choose to default. Further, the lack of data on the number of service users and the amount of RCCs to be collected allowed for large-scale money leakage as there was no transparent system to record collected money and from where that money originated (Omar, 2020).

In 2017, the Government aimed to resolve this issue by making formal service providers working in certain wards use point-of-sale (pos) machines that registers RCC collections centrally. This system resulted in a dramatic increase in reported revenue totals for solid watse management, but it is only utilized in the wards receiving formalized collection services- accounting for 40% of waste collection totals (Huisman et al, 2016). It also does not track or register who has paid for RCCs. Thus, most RCC collection remains unrecorded, making it difficult for both service providers and LGA’s to plan for solid waste management service provision and cost recovery through RCC collection (Omar, 2020).

These challenges as detailed above remain today, continuously obstructing solid waste management service performance resulting in only 40% of waste in Dar es Salaam being collected and disposed of at the official dumpsite of pugu kinyamwezi (Huisman et al, 2016). With waste generation rates predicted to increase to 12,000 tons by 2025 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017), this is a huge problem that needs to be addressed rapidly.

The current organizational framework of solid waste management in Tanzania can be seen as a direct result of the challenges faced by the historical, political, economic and development backdrop as summarized above. Figure 5 below represents the pluralistic framework that has evolved to overcome these challenges, consisting of a mix of formal and informal actors.

Fig. 5
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Organisational framework of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam (Fassin et al., 2017)

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At face value, it looks like the solid waste management service provision by formal and registered actors with mechanized equipment in high-middle-income wards is functional. The waste appears to transfer effectively through the service chain from the waste generation point (citizen/business), through to waste collection services (ward/municipality), finally to waste disposal and recovery facilities (city council) (Fassin et al., 2017).

In part, this is true, as the planned structure of these wards enables mechanized vehicles to access waste, and there is a higher willingness/ ability of citizens to pay their RCCs (Kazuva, 2017). However, it is challenging for service providers to both obtain and maintain service contracts. The current regulatory framework at the LGA level is fast-changing and confusing, with short-term waste collection contracts issued by the municipalities to private service providers that are frequently breached or ended without notice, justification or consequence (Mpuya, 2021). For solid waste management service providers to even bid for a tender is challenging as the current process requires an upfront estimation of operational needs and RCC collection totals when there is no public data of service requirements such as the number and type of service users within a ward (Omar, 2020). A complete absence of Standard Operating Procedures, transparent application guidance and feedback, further hinder the ability of contractors to submit informed applications and cost estimates for service provision. The impacts of an absent paper trail also hurt the wider supply chain as contractors are hard-placed to obtain insurance, vehicle lease or financial products based on the lack or complete absence of watertight contracting documentation by the municipality. Such conditions make for a risky investment environment for private companies seeking to invest in Tanzania’s waste market. It furthermore leads many private contractors to simply “cherry-pick” and compete for the same desirable clients and areas—that are more likely to provide a return on investment due to wider payment compliance and a higher percentage of recyclables for sale.

In contrast, solid waste management in low-income wards is carried out by unofficial actors such as community-based organizations (CBOs) and youth groups. They are not issued formal contracts for service provision or required to register, leading to little accountability, professionalism, and worker health and safety. Much of the waste ends up being disposed of unofficially, such as in Fig. 6 below, as it is too expensive or time-consuming to arrange transport to the official dumpsite (Eubank, 2019). Many waste collectors in lower-income areas also employ non-motorized and inefficient forms of transport (e.g. handcarts) or very lightly motorized modes of transport (e.g. motorized tricycles). When combined with the fact that only one legal disposal dumpsite exists in Dar es Salaam—such transport modes, and their operators, are left with little choice but to crudely dump their waste. This issue is compounded by little enforcement of solid waste management laws and regulations and lack of understanding by LGAs and service providers of the service needs due to no accurate service users' data.

Fig. 6
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Informal solid waste management service providers disposing of waste in the Msimbazi river—Vingunguti ward, Dar es Salaam (Omar, 2020)

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Overall, it can be seen here that the adaptations made by the solid waste management sector in response to the challenges faced have resulted in a stressed system only reaching 40% of the city's service needs. It highlights the complex drivers behind setting up sustainable solid waste management systems and how gaps can increase issues. For a decentralized solid waste management model to be successful, there needs to be an understanding of basic service needs and accountability of service delivery across each element of the service chain. In Dar es Salaam, the challenges discussed, including political interference, lack of enforcement of the regulatory framework and lack of waste disposal and recovery facilities, do not encourage accountability across the various LGAs. This challenging operational environment is compounded by a lack of data on the minimum service requirements necessary for urban planners and service providers to plan for service needs.

Smart technology solution for solid waste management- the challenge and proposed solution

The challenge

Improving solid waste management is a critical aspect of sustainable urban development and minimizing risks related to poor disposal practices (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata, 2018). As discussed in the background chapter, the solid waste management sector in Dar es Salaam faces many challenges in delivering an effective service resulting in poor waste collection and recovery rates. These include political interference, lack of enforcement of the regulatory framework, and lack of waste disposal and recovery facilities (Palfreman, 2014; Huisman et al., 2016; Kasuva & Zhang, 2019). This challenging operational environment is compounded by a lack of data on the minimum service requirements for urban planners to plan for service needs.

Data is essential for decision-makers to set up, monitor, and enforce effective urban services such as solid waste management (Elsaid & Aghezzaf, 2015). After all, most solid waste management frameworks and models encompass data such as waste composition/ generation and number/type of service users as the core component of a system’s applicability (UNEP, 2009; C40 Cities, 2016; Giang, 2017). For example, the UN’s Integrated Sustainable Waste Management (ISWM) framework suggests that consideration of both physical (infrastructure) and governance (strategy) components is required for long-term sustainability. However, waste-related data and background information are essential to feed into these components, as shown in Fig. 7 below.

Fig. 7
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ISWM framework (UNEP, 2009)

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The C40 Cities solid waste management ‘Good Practice Guide’ also focuses on the elements critical to delivering a successful solid waste management system. The Guide includes developing datasets that provide proper information channels within and between municipalities about service needs. The Guide also advocates using smart technologies as a modern solution to manage solid waste and create a database of knowledge (C40 Cities, 2016).

Overall, Tanzania's solid waste management system does not meet the required performance standards due to a complex myriad of factors. Large-scale institutional reform is required to provide inclusive and sustainable solid waste management service delivery across all city areas. However, obtaining accessible and accurate service users' data is a crucial first step to enhancing operational planning and cost recovery while the slow mechanism of institutional reform is considered.

The solution

In 2018, a consortium of partners came together in response to the challenges facing solid waste management providers, as detailed previously. They designed and implemented a STS called ‘Smart Technology Recording City Solution’ (Smart-TRACS) in two high-density urban wards, Kisutu and Mchafukoge, in Dar es Salaam. The Kisutu and Mchafukoge wards were selected due to one of the project leads, Green WastePro Ltd, having an active solid waste collection service contract. The consortium partners included;

  • Green WastePro Ltd: private solid waste management company with a solid waste collection and environmental cleaning contract to service the wards. Green WastePro Ltd designed the solution and held overall responsibility for its implementation and use.

  • Dar es Salaam City Council (formerly known as Ilala Municipality): LGA responsible for solid waste management service provision and provided approval and support for the initiative.

  • Institution for Inclusive Development (I4ID): a UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and IrishAid funded development program based in Tanzania whose goal is to work with Government, representative institutions, civil society, media and the private sector to strengthen institutions in Tanzania to become more inclusive and accountable so that economic growth can be impacted by all. I4ID provided technical assistance and financial support.

  • Open Street Mapping Tanzania (OMDTZ): is a community-based mapping project under the Humanitarian Open Street Mapping (HOT) umbrella. OMDTZ provided technical expertise for data collection and mapping.

The ‘Smart-TRACS’ solution was to place a unique identifier as shown in Fig. 8 onto each service user’s property that connects to a centralized database. Building and service user information were then collected, digitized and mapped.

Fig. 8
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Smart-TRACS solution- ‘smart tags’

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There were four key steps to implement Smart-TRACS;

  1. 1.

    Building footprint digitization in OpenStreetMap (OSM) OMDTZ used high-resolution imagery (2017 BRT drone imagery provided by the World Bank and the 2016 fixed-wing imagery created by the COWI consulting group and provided by the Ministry of Lands) to re-do building footprint digitization and create a one-polygon-per-building baselayer for the field mapping. See Fig. 9.

  2. 2.

    Field mapping and data collection Data collectors went to each service user, placed a smart tag on the property entrance, and obtained the following information through a digital survey via the open-source software Open Data Kit Collect (ODK Collect);

  • Building information- digital footprint, name, address, number of floors, geographical co-ordinates, building registration number, and plot number.

  • Service user details (bill payer)- name, telephone number, and email address.

  • Service user type/ details- property type as per by-law categories, occupancy status, and current RCC tariff charged.

  • Service user needs assessment- whether the minimum by-law stipulation of twice weekly waste pick-up meet the service users' needs, e.g. hotels often require daily waste pick-up.

  1. 3.

    Reviewing and cleaning data collected and uploading to the Green Wastepro Ltd server. Some examples of data collected are shown in Figs. 9, 10, 11.

  2. 4.

    Smart-TRACS rollout whereby the service provider Green WastePro Ltd utilized the information to improve solid waste management operations and RCC collection. Figure 12 below shows an example of the Smart-TRACS application for RCC collection.

Fig. 9
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Digitized customer footprints in the Mchafukoge and Kisutu Wards

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Fig. 10
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Example of mapped service user types- Mchafukoge ward

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Fig. 11
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Service user types following customer digitization

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Fig. 12
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Smart-TRACS usage for RCC collection and tracking

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Methodology

The research methodology used both quantitative and qualitative data to test the hypothesis that the proposed STS, Smart-TRACTS, will (H1) improve solid waste management service provision, and (H2) improve RCC collection rates.

To test H1, various baseline parameters expected to be influenced by the implementation of Smart-TRACS were assessed, including operational planning (understanding of service user numbers and types and waste collection route optimization), resource recovery (recycling rates), and service performance (service user satisfaction). Datasets were collected and analyzed from the main actors involved in the solid waste management service chain, including the service provider (Green WastePro Ltd), the authority accountable for solid waste management (Dar es Salaam City Council), and end users (residences and commercial units).

Qualitative data was collected through structured interviews with the service provider and authority accountable for solid waste management. A mix of qualitative and quantitative data was collected through a digital service user satisfaction survey using Google Forms and a smartphone with service users. A total of 421 service users were surveyed, with 201 from the Mchafukoge and 211 Kisutu wards. To ensure unbiased selection, service users were randomly chosen using a randomization method in QGIS, ensuring representation from both areas (Mukhopadhyay, 2009). The sample size accounted for 18% of the total service users, surpassing the 10% threshold typically considered sufficient for obtaining meaningful survey results (Singh & Masuku, 2014). The survey questions were tailored to the target audience, utilizing precise and simple language in the native KiSwahili language. Various response options, including interval and open-ended questions, were provided to minimize response bias. The questions utilized can be viewed in Appendix 1.

Two parameters were assessed to test H2 that Smart-TRACS will improve RCC collection rates. First, the RCC collection rates by the service provider Green WastePro Ltd were analyzed in the two-year trajectory pre-Smart-TRACS implementation (FY2017 and FY2018) and one year after (FY2019). Collections from FY2020 were not considered due to the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak causing a significant impact on business activities and thus RCC collection rates. Collection from FY2021 was not considered due to GreenWaste Pro Ltd losing the contract for services during that FY. Collections before FY2017 were not considered due to the unavailability of data. Due to the confidentiality of information being analyzed, exact revenue numbers are not shared, and percentage changes are utilized to show trends. The second parameter assessed was RCC collection coverage pre (FY2018) and post (FY2019) Smart-TRACS implementation. This refers to the percentage of service users who made an RCC payment in relation to the confirmed number of total service users obtained through Smart-TRACS. No transaction data was available before FY2018 due to Green WastePro Ltd not storing transaction totals electronically in prior years.

Descriptive statistics were employed to analyze the collected data and establish patterns, trends, and relationships. Due to the limited availability of quantitative data prior to the implementation of Smart-TRACS, descriptive statistics were deemed appropriate for testing H1 and H2. However, it is acknowledged that more detailed analyses would be necessary in future studies, where data is available, to test the value of STSs for solid waste management.

Results

H1

Smart technology solution (Smart-TRACS) impact on solid waste management service provision.

Data was analyzed to review the core parameters of solid waste management service provision pre-Smart-TRACS implementation and post-implementation, with results in Table 2 below. Overall, the data indicates a positive impact for the service provider and authority accountable for solid waste management across all baseline parameters expected to be influenced by its implementation. However, it is important to note limitations in data availability for some service parameters.

Table 2 Core service provision parameters expected to be influenced by the implementation of Smart-TRACS
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The service user satisfaction survey results indicate a similar positive impact to solid waste management service provision post-implementation of Smart-TRACS for the service users. The respondents' demographic information is shown in Fig. 13 below, and results in Table 3.

Fig. 13
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Demographics of respondents (n = 421)

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Table 3 Service user satisfaction survey results of core service parameters post Smart-TRACS implementation
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The Dar es Salaam City Council Head of Environment supported the data in Table 3 that Smart-TRACS was linked to increased service user satisfaction levels. He reported receiving positive feedback on Smart-TRACS and subsequent solid waste management service performance while the service user Green WastePro Ltd was using it. For example, pre- Smart-TRACS implementation, he stated that he received complaints that Revenue Collectors were charging the wrong RCC tariff or requesting two payments within one month if the service user lost the manual receipt. As the bill payment history is now digitized, this can no longer happen.

Based on the datasets obtained and analyzed for H1, the findings indicate positive improvements in all aspects of solid waste management service provision parameters expected to be influenced by Smart-TRACS following its implementation. However, it is important to note that further comprehensive analyses are recommended in future studies to establish the significance of these improvements.

H2

Smart technology solution (Smart-TRACS) impact on refuse collection charge collection.

Data was analyzed to review RCC collection totals and coverage pre-Smart-TRACS implementation and post-implementation, with results in Table 4 below.

Table 4 Revenue change and RCC transactions before and after Smart-TRACS implementation
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Overall, there was an increase in total revenue collection since the implementation of Smart-TRACS, however, a disparity is observed between the total increase in RCC collection (avg. 13.5%) and transaction coverage (55% increase), which would be expected to be similar. Interviews with the Green WastePro Ltd management team identified two core reasons for this;

  1. 1.

    Service user types. Pre- Smart-TRACS implementation, the Revenue Collectors would target service users who pay higher tariffs, such as shops and hotels, not residences that pay the lowest tariffs. Post- Smart-TRACS installation, the Revenue Collectors were issued strict targets and thus collected more RCCs from residences as it is being tracked. Further, Smart-TRACS increased service users’ options to pay the RCCs remotely using mobile money if they are not home during business hours. As residential units are the lowest RCC tariffs, the increased transactions does not significantly drive up total revenue collection.

  2. 2.

    Government relocation to the capital. In 2017, Tanzania’s president John Pombe Magufuli declared that all Government institutions will transition to the capital, Dodoma (Mumbere, 2019). Many government offices were closed in Dar es Salaam which included those within the Kisutu and Mchafukoge wards during Smart-TRACS implementation timescales. This resulted in a drop in RCC collections in FY2019 as these are typically large offices with high RCC tariffs.

Qualitative data from an interview with the Dar es Salaam City Council Head of Environment supported the quantitative data analyzed above that Smart-TRACS was linked to increased RRC collection rates. He confirmed that the Municipal had seen an increase in RCC collection deposited into the Municipal bank account by Green WastePro Ltd. However, due to the confidentiality of Municipal accounts, this statement is not verified by data.

The Dar es Salaam City Council Head of Environment also stipulated that the information gained through Smart-TRACS could help identify other LGA own-source revenue streams such as business levies, city service levies, and more. However, he stated that this information being held and controlled within Green WastePro Ltd systems limits the Municipality’s accessibility for such purposes.

Overall, the data analyzed showed a positive trend that Smart-TRACS improved RCC collection rates post-implementation.

Discussion

This paper acknowledges that Smart-TRACS does not on its own provide an overarching solution for Dar es Salaam to reach smart city status, but rather critically reviews its potential to support the transition to smart city status. Four components of Smart-TRACS supporting the transition to smart city status are considered; (i) is Smart-TRACS an environmental, economic, and socially desirable solution for Dar es Salaam’s solid waste management needs? (ii) its applicability as a STS across other smart city indicators in Tanzania, and (iii) its applicability as a STS in other emerging markets..

Is smart-TRACS an environmental, economic, and socially desirable solution for Dar es Salaam solid waste management needs?

This paper has confirmed the hypotheses that the STS (Smart-TRACS) has enhanced the solid waste management service performance and RCC collection rates across the Mchafukoge and Kisutu wards. Therefore, according to these two parameters, it proved successful as a smart city tool. However, when looked at more broadly, factoring in innovation, cost efficiency, benefits, and social acceptance in Tanzania's socio-economic context, could Smart-TRACS be considered an environmental, economic, and socially desirable solution for the city’s solid waste management needs?

Environmental considerations

The positive environmental benefits of Smart-TRACS presented in this paper are improved cleanliness and livability in the two wards implemented due to enhanced solid waste management service provision. However, since Smart-TRACS implementation, 20% of respondents in the service user satisfaction survey reported no difference in service performance, and 14% reported that service had worsened. The causality of this is difficult to measure due to the limited incorporation of service performance data between the authority responsible for solid waste management, the solid waste management service provider, and service users. Thus a gap in Smart-TRACS is identified.

Accessibility of data and implementation of monitoring and evaluation systems between such critical stakeholders has proven to optimize internal solid waste management process management in other cities. For example, in Quito, Ecuador, the Municipal solid waste management entity EMASEO has developed a central data management system that tracks bin fill rates, collection routes, and citizen reporting system, increasing service efficiencies and accountability (Sagasti, 2016). Further, in Maputo, Mozambique, data is gathered through a citizen-driven system whereby citizens report waste-related issues to the Municipality using their mobile phones. City officials then use data visualizations and statistics to address problems as they arise (Kaza et al., 2016).

Such examples of real-time monitoring of service performance could be incorporated into Smart-TRACS. For example, real-time accessibility of Smart-TRACS waste pick up and service user complaints and queries data by the authority in charge of solid waste management, Dar es Salaam City Council, could allow for more robust solid waste management service key performance indicators to be set. Such key performance indicators can help enhance short and long-term holistic planning and effective decision-making, leading to a cleaner environment through enhanced accountability of service providers (AlHumid et al., 2019).

Interviews with the Dar es Salaam City Council Environmental Officer and Green WastePro Ltd uncovered that there was an attempt to achieve data connectivity, however, challenges were faced with incorporating public–private IT systems. Green WastePro Ltd states that data is made available upon request to Dar es Salaam City Council, however, Dar es Salaam City Council states access remains a challenge. Such challenges could be seen as a reflection of a lack of robust city masterplan supporting smart city development and innovation without a coordination framework in place, a significant obstacle in smart city development.

Economic desirability

Concerning the economic desirability of Smart-TRACS, cost-efficiency and economic benefits are considered. In total, it cost approximately $3 per service user unit to install Smart-TRACS, thus in relation to the benefits observed in RCC collection (avg. 13.5% increase) and coverage (55% increase), this could be considered a highly cost-effective solution to implement.

Cost-efficiency was gained by utilizing open-source technologies, including OpenStreetMap and ODK, which reduced implementation costs and risks associated with vendor lock-in from expensive technology providers, a key threat to STS sustainability (van der Klaauw, 2019).

The transparency of RCC collection data available through Smart-TRACS is an additional advantage considering the Government's agenda to enhance own-source revenue collection efficiencies (McCluskey & Huang, 2019). The existing revenue collection systems using Government issued pos machines do not track or register who has paid for RCCs or consider data on the total RCCs that should be collected within a given area. As such, most RCC collection remains unrecorded, making it difficult for both service providers and LGAs to plan for solid waste management service provision and recovery of solid waste management costs through RCC collection (Omar, 2020). Smart-TRACS provides enhanced insight into the service users' needs, solid waste management service provision requirements, and RCC collections, allowing for better financial planning and reinvestment back into the business. A direct example of this can be seen with Green WastePro Ltd purchasing a dedicated recycling truck due to increased revenues obtained through recycling as a direct impact of Smart-TRACS.

Green WastePro Ltd further demonstrated the economic benefits of Smart-TRACS by self-funding expansion to the Kivukoni ward, Dar es Salaam in June 2019, recording a further 745 service users.

Social desirability

The social-cultural desirability of the STS was considered from the beginning of the project. The collaborative design approach allowed a diverse experience base to respond to the solid waste management service sector's challenges. This approach incorporates the citizen's needs at the forefront of the solution design, as per Cohen’s (2015) view of sustainable smart city development. The service user satisfaction survey results confirmed overall positive satisfaction levels of Smart-TRACS, with 74% stipulating they would like to see Smart-TRACS implemented across other city utilities and areas. Therefore Smart-TRACS can be viewed as a socially desirable solution for Dar es Salaam’s solid waste management needs.

Overall, Smart-TRACS could be considered an environmental, economic, and socially desirable solution for the city’s solid waste management needs. However, further improvements can be made to optimize the benefits it provides. The challenge of data accessibility could be seen as a large barrier to achieving the benefits of optimizing internal solid waste management process management. However, a smart city development coordination framework is first needed to facilitate sharing datasets across public–private systems.

Smart-TRACS applicability to open up opportunities across other sectors in Tanzania

The value of data in today’s twenty-first century economies is paramount. Evidence from cities supporting data access has shown positive economic and social benefits for data providers (direct impact), data users (indirect impact), and the wider economy (induced impact) (OECD, 2015). The examples provided in the background section of STSs being utilized, including the introduction of ‘Integrated Command and Control Centres’ in India which supported an effective and efficient response to COVID-19 is a prime example of how public–private data-driven innovation has provided positive economic and social benefits.

Smart-TRACS provides a valuable dataset containing up-to-date and accurate digitized information on service users in urban spaces. This dataset could be used for city planning (e.g. understanding land use and demographics), crisis management (e.g. understanding the number and location of vacant properties and resource distribution needs), private sector development (e.g. mail delivery services, food delivery services and business planning) and government own-source revenue collection. However, Smart-TRACS open data access is limited to building information in OpenStreetMaps. Green WastePro Ltd owns and controls the valuable detailed dataset on service users. When interviewed, Green WastePro Ltd stipulated that such investments in innovation are risky as returns are not guaranteed due to the unstable business environment. As a result, the trust levels are low to share data. This risk was realized in 2021 when Green WastePro Ltd lost its waste collection and street cleaning contract, thus all the innovation that came with this solution was subsequently lost. Once again, the risky environment of pushing such innovation is proven in Tanzania, which may stall future developments in STSs across all sectors.

The high-risk and low-trust environment for innovation inevitably promotes data silos that defeat the connectivity objective of smart city development. As discussed in the background section, this highlights the distinct requirement for a robust Dar es Salaam masterplan and overarching regulatory framework to enable a safe and supportive framework to foster a fast-paced human-centric implementation of a smart city model. The pace could be enhanced with the contribution of both financial capital and expertise from the private sector, however, if the business environment remains too risky for innovation, how is this supposed to move forward?

Smart-TRACS applicability in other emerging economies

Smart-TRACS was designed according to the city characteristics of Dar es Salaam whereby most physical structures are already established, but fast-paced urbanization and congestion enhance opportunities to add value by improving efficiency and liveability. As such, the affordability and simplicity of Smart-TRACS make it an attractive option in other emerging economy cities that face similar characteristics and challenges relating to solid waste management.

However, any STS innovation must be cautiously approached due to a worrying trend of disjointed strategic coordination, funding and procurement challenges and inadequate digital economy strategic planning in emerging economies stalling smart city model implementation. Despite the ‘bottom-up’ approach of Smart-TRACS being implemented by a collobarative effort enabling a human-centric and innovative approach, the solution eventually failed due to a loss of contract and no linkage to existing government systems.

Conclusion

Overall the STS, Smart-TRACS, reviewed in this paper has indicated an enhancement to solid waste management service performance and RCC collection rates across the Mchafukoge and Kisutu wards piloted in. Quantitative and qualitative data show trends that Smart-TRACS has had a positive impact among all the key stakeholder groups that solid waste management impacts, including; (i) the authority accountable for solid waste management (Dar es Salaam City Council), (ii) solid waste management service provider (Green WastePro Ltd), and (iii) the solid waste management service users (residents and commercial units). For example, Smart-TRACS registered an impressive 129% increase in service user identification, providing enhanced insight into the service users' needs, solid waste management service needs, and RCC collection requirements.

The detailed and accurate datasets made available through Smart-TRACS provide evidence that there is potential to unlock city data in an affordable way to improve efficiency, resilience, innovation, and inclusivity in Dar es Salaam. Such data can open up opportunities to efficiently support city planning, crisis management, private sector development, and government own-source revenue collection. The study also proved that smart city operation models would be supported by citizens, with 74% of respondents surveyed stipulating they would like to see Smart-TRACS implemented across other city utilities and areas.

However, the unfortunate reality that Smart-TRACS is no longer used due to the service provider losing their service contract is a stark reminder that Dar es Salaam is falling into the trap of disjointed strategic coordination, funding and procurement challenges and inadequate digital economy strategic planning as per many other emerging economies. Subsequently, while there remains a lack of a robust overarching city master plan, co-ordination framework, challenging business environment, and the high-risk environment of sudden institutional change, sustainable smart city development and innovation will remain constrained.