Abstract
Pessimistic meta-induction is a powerful argument against scientific realism, so one of the major roles for advocates of scientific realism will be trying their best to give a sustained response to this argument. On the other hand, it is also alleged that structural realism is the most plausible form of scientific realism; therefore, the plausibility of scientific realism is threatened unless one is given the explicit form of a structural continuity and minimal structural preservation for all our current theories. This essay aims to present what we call expansive structures, which are the structures that can be reconstructed from geometrized Newtonian gravitation and are capable of expanding into general relativity, explicitly. In this way, pessimistic meta-induction will be undermined.
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Notes
Whereby an induction is carried out on the past scientific theories, which all of them have been successful for quite a while but have now been rejected.
It is well-known that there are generally two forms of structural realism; according to the first, what we know are structures (the epistemic form), and based on the second, what there are are structures (the ontic form) (see, for example, [32, p. 2]),
It is noted that by a structure we mean what can be represented by a mathematical structure; that is, a set A with some relations defined on it, which generally represented by \(\left\langle A, R_{\alpha }\right\rangle _{\alpha \in A}\). In this case, it is evident that the continuity is structural continuity.
However, it is astonishing that concrete works by them are so few and far between.
GNG is a version of Newtonian mechanics in which the theory is formulated in a four dimensional manifold and gravitation is an exposition of curvature; that is, gravity has been geometrized away, such as general relativity.
We claim that in the vast majority of scientific changes this is the case, yet it is a claim that is reinforced or weakened over time by a case-by-case study of scientific theories, one of which has been done here.
Since structural realism claim needs an explicit backing up, which requires a case-by-case analysis for scientific theories, it is very important, in each theory change, to show explicitly what structure is preserved and why one holds that the models (structures) of preceding theory are approximate to the models of subsequent theory (structures).
The notion will be specified and defined momentary.
I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out to this issue.
This guarantees that the relation under consideration are defined in the two theories independently.
More specifically, on the case under consideration the frame theory of Ehlers [24,25,26,27,28,29], “makes explicit the conceptual and technical continuity between” classical and relativistic space-time theories [30]. The frame theory of Ehlers and a reconstruction of it in the topological (the compact-open topological) terms, presented by Fletcher [30] provide us with a systematic account of the Newtonian limit of general relativistic space-time theories. However, it should be noted that the papers by Ehlers and Fletcher cited do not assert that the parameter should be understood as the speed of light or a function of it.
Note that \(\left| \dfrac{\phi }{c^2} \right| \sim GM.\)
The metric formulated in the \(3+1\) form, which will be briefly mentioned below. Notice also that the gravitational field is static when \(N_i\rightarrow 0\), where \(N_i\) is the shift vector of GR metric [38, p. 104].
Suppose \(V_1\), \(V_2\), \(V_1^\prime\), and \(V_2^\prime\) are some vector spaces, and let T and \(T^\prime\) be linear transformations belonging to \(L(V_1, V_2)\) and \(L(V_1^\prime , V_2^\prime )\), respectively. If both T and \(T^\prime\) are the zero transformations, two structures \(\left\langle V_1, V_2, T\right\rangle\) and \(\left\langle V_1^\prime , V_2^\prime , T^\prime \right\rangle\) are trivially partial isomorphic (It is easy to find \(F_1:V_1\rightarrow V_1^\prime\), \(F_2:V_2\rightarrow V_2^\prime\) , and \(f:T\rightarrow T^\prime\) that satisfy the above conditions.).
It is worth noting that, Weatherall maintains that this is independent of any structural viewpoint and just is based on following stance: “‘sameness’ or ‘equivalence’ of mathematical models in physics should be the sense of equivalence given by the mathematics used in formulating those models.” [71].
In what follows, we consider the theories locally.
Cartan [11, 12], and Friedrichs [34], first, formulated some geometrized version of Newtonian and continued by others (see [47ch. 4]). The philosophical implications of relationships between relativity and Newtonian mechanics, in the light of these four-dimensional formulations of Newtonian mechanics, has been explored, for example, by Friedman [35], Malament [45, 46], Malament [47], Earman [21], Pooley [51], Fletcher [30, 31], Barrett [2], Weatherall [63,64,65, 68, 69], and Dewar and Weatherall [19], (see [70]).
As Knox puts it “determining the right spacetime setting for a theory is a subtle business. Perhaps the most widely accepted methodological principle for choosing a spacetime is that advocated by Earman [20, 21, pp. 45–47]: the symmetries of one’s spacetime ought to exactly match any universal symmetries of one’s dynamics.” [41].
I appreciate the anonymous referee for pointing out this point.
There is “a sense in which the two theories might be regarded as equivalent over the nonvanishing-mass sector, since the mutual pair of associations might be regarded as showing how the two theories are intertranslatable with one another” (Dewar [18]).
In what follows, a classical space-time is defined.
That is \({R^a}_{bcd}=0\) which this means that the classical space-time is flat.
See [59, pp. 415–416].
\(t_a\) is just \(d_a t\), which can be denoted by \(\nabla _a t\), namely \(d_a t=\nabla _a t\).
\(\Lambda\) and \(\Sigma\) are 1-dimensional timelike submanifold with the metric filed \((id)^*(t_{ab})\) and spacelike 3-dimensional submanifold with the metric filed \((id)^*({\hat{h}}_{ab})\), respectively.
Note that a “significant number of spacetimes of physical interest predicted by general relativity belong to this class” [54].
I appreciate an anonymous referee for constructive comment on this issue.
It follows from equations (4.1.10) and (4.1.11) of Malament [47].
Note that from [48] we have \({R}^i_{ab}\xi ^a\eta ^b= d_i+({R}^{Ni}_{ab})\xi ^a\eta ^b.\)
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Appendix A: Decompositions and Expansions
Appendix A: Decompositions and Expansions
First we note that according to the proposition (1.10.1) of Malament [47], there is an isomorphism between the tensor algebra of \(\Sigma\)-tensors at a point p of the metric submanifold \(\Sigma\) of the manifold M and the tensor algebra of M-tensors that are tangent to \(\Sigma\). Now let \(\Sigma\) be a three-dimensional metric submanifold of M with induced metric field \({\mathbf {h}}_{ab}\), and let \(h_{ab}\) be its corresponding symmetric tensor field that is tangent to \(\Sigma\). Then \(h_{ab}\) is completely determined by its action on the tangent and normal vectors to \(\Sigma\) at each point p [47, p. 100]. Similar remarks hold in the case of \(\Lambda\), a one-dimensional metric submanifold of M with induced metric filed \({\mathbf {t}}_{ab}\) for which \(t_{ab}\) is its corresponding symmetric tensor field that is tangent to \(\Sigma\).
Having pointed out the above remarks, here we introduce the decompositions and the expansions given in the Sect. 5. Before we see the decompositions and the expansions, let us define some useful notations.
-
(a)
\(\sigma _i\equiv {g}^i_{ab_{|_p}}\xi ^a \eta ^b= g^{ab}_{ i_{|_p}} \xi _a\eta _b.\)
-
(b)
\(\beta _i\equiv h^{ab}_{ i_{|_p}} \xi _a\eta _b.\)
-
(c)
\(\gamma _{i}\equiv \lambda ^a\lambda ^b_ { |_{_p}}\xi _a\eta _b\).
-
(d)
\(\delta _i\equiv {t}^i_{ab_{|_p}}\xi ^a \eta ^b\).
-
(e)
\(\theta _i\equiv {{{\hat{h}}}^i}_{ab_{|_p}} \xi ^a\eta ^b.\)
Note that in the relativistic space-time with the Minkowski metric \(h^{ab}\xi _a\mu _a={{{\hat{h}}}}_{ab}\xi ^a\mu ^a\) since
also it should be clearFootnote 32 that
In addition, we know that the following equations hold:
-
(A).
\(h^{ab}\xi _a\mu _b=0 \ {\text{if and only if}}\ \xi _a\in {(id_p)}_*{(T_p\Lambda )_a}\ {\text {or}} \ \mu _a\in {(id_p)}_*{(T_p\Lambda )_b}.\)
-
(B).
\(\lambda ^a\lambda ^b\xi _a\mu _b=0 \ {\text{if and only if}}\ \xi _a\in {(id_p)}_*{(T_p\Sigma )_a}\ {\text{or}} \ \mu _a\in {(id_p)}_*{(T_p\Sigma )_b}.\)
-
(C).
\(t_{ab}\xi ^a\mu ^b=0\ {\text{if and only if}}\ \xi ^a\in {(id_p)}_*{(T_p\Sigma )_a} \ {\text{or}} \ \mu ^a\in {(id_p)}_*{(T_p\Sigma )_b}.\)
-
(D).
\({{\hat{h}}}_{ab}\xi ^a\mu ^b=0\ {\text{if and only if}}\ \xi ^a\in {(id_p)}_*{(T_p\Lambda )_a} \ {\text{or}} \ \mu ^a\in {(id_p)}_*{(T_p\Lambda )_b}.\)
1.1 A.1 A Decomposition of \(g_{ab}\)
1.2 A.2 A Decomposition of \(g^{ab}\)
1.3 A.3 A Decomposition of \(t_{ab}\)
It worth noting that in the case under consideration \(e^{\Omega (p)}({\hat{h}}_{ab}+t_{ab})=(\gamma _{ab}-n_an_b) {t}^2_{ab_{|_p}}\xi ^a\eta ^b=\delta _2\).
1.4 A.4 An Expansion of \(t_{ab}\)
1.5 A.5 A Decomposition of \(h^{ab}\)
1.6 A.6 An Expansion of \(h^{ab}\)
1.7 A.7 A Decomposition of \(R^N_{ab}\)
By equation (4.3.1) we can decompose \(R^N_{ab}\) into the following sets.
1.8 A.8 A Decomposition of \(R_{ab}\)
From [48], it follows thatFootnote 33
1.9 A.9 An Expansion of \(R^N_{ab}\)
1.10 A.10 A Decomposition of \(g_{ab}\)
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Masoumi, S. On the Continuity of Geometrized Newtonian Gravitation and General Relativity. Found Phys 51, 37 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-021-00419-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-021-00419-y