Abstract
Complementarity can be considered as the weirdest idea associated with quantum mechanics. For Bohr, Complementarity is important in order to be able to convey successfully the non-classical features of quantum mechanics. This paper discusses the epistemic and ontological implications of different new experiments that attempt to detect complementarity. Complementarity has surely survived the attempts to overcome it, yet some of these experiments have led to a more general form of complementarity. Others claim to be able to differentiate among the different interpretations of quantum physics. Nonetheless, such claims have revealed contradictory representations of the ontological picture of the universe. Hence, Bohr’s position is still valid.
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Notes
Although many other experiments have been conducted, these three schemes can incorporate most of them. Hence the philosophical points raised in this paper can easily be extended to the rest of the experiments that are not discussed here.
The idea of interpreting Bohr's position as phenomenological realism was first introduced by Shomar in his 1998 Ph.D. thesis (published in 2013), and later elaborated upon in his 2009 paper "Bohr as a Phenomenological Realist". However, more recently, many papers have been published that connects Bohr's position with phenomenology (see for example Bilban 2013 and, Lurçat 2007). Nonetheless, it is important to mention that no historical evidence exists to support that Bohr ever read Husserl or Heidegger.
The debate over Bohr’s position have attracted many scholars, the list here mentions only some of them.
This does not mean that a mathematical scheme cannot represent nature as part of a low level theoretical representation.
I am using tools in the sense which Cartwright et al. (1995) use in their article “The Tool Box of Science”, where one can find a more rigorous discussion about tools and theories.
It might be important here to mention that most realists, who consider the pessimistic meta-induction argument (Laudan 1981, 1984), adopt a kind of theory dichotomy between the parts that represent and would overcome scientific revolutions and those that ought to be reinterpreted or to be dropped. In this regard, phenomenological realism adopts a dichotomy where the high-level theories are regarded only as tools whereas phenomenological models are the representative of the phenomena and would survive scientific revolutions due to the why they are built (Shomar 2013).
This is related to the element of “individuality” in Bohr’s terminology.
A recent paper (Camilleri 2017, pp. 32–34), suggested a similar dichotomy between "classical concepts" and "classical theories". I think his approach of proving that Bohr was an experimental philosopher supports the claim of a bottom-up approach in building theories that Bohr's phenomenological realism position adopts.
Bohr (1927, pp. 21–24).
These are Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle and Matrix Mechanics.
At that time the equivalency between both schemes was not yet proven. Such view can also be extended to count for Bohr’s possible reaction to the situation in which we have more than one fundamental theory to deal with the quantum realm (i.e. Copenhagen Interpretation, Bohm’s theory, GRW’s theory … etc.) .
It is important here, in accordance with phenomenological realism, to differentiate between low level theoretical description (phenomenological models) which might be counted as representative of nature, and high level theoretical descriptions (fundamental theories and theoretical models) which are counted as tools.
I think that discussing the new-Kantian interpretation of Bohr's position needs a separate and elaborate discussion in another paper.
Dieks (2016) discusses the relation between the classical mechanical device and the quantum system. He emphasises that the differentiation between these two levels of descriptions is not an ontic divide, and hence arriving to a similar conclusion: “In other words, the doctrine of complementarity in its relation to measurement contexts only makes sense if it is acknowledged that measuring devices, like macroscopic objects in general, are in principle subject to quantum mechanics, even if it is true that we need classical concepts to have epistemological access to them. This reiterates our earlier point that the use of common language, extended by classical physics, is an epistemological manoeuvre that does not imply any ontic divide.” (Dieks 2016, p. 27).
Phenomenological realism rejects “independent reality” in the classical sense, i.e. which suggests that the observer can be fully separated from the observed, as an alternative it claims that the observer ought to be counted as part of the phenomenon at hand, and hence an independent reality in the classical sense is no more possible.
Even now, it is not clear whether we can have such a set-up. The current experiments in quantum optics maintaining the ability to establish such a combination, are, to say the least, controversial, as we will see below.
It is worth mentioning that L. Rosenfeld tries to present a Marxist defence of complementarity as advocated in Jacobson (2007).
Kauark-Leite (2017) suggested three meanings of complementarity. These are: C1—complementarity between space and time and causality, C2—complementarity between wave and particle, and C3—complementarity between incompatible observables. In my terminology herein, C1 and C3 are incorporated in complementarity between modes of description, while C2 is complementarity combining the two classical properties: waves and particles.
Perovic (2017) suggestion that Bohr uses an “experimentally-minded methodology” can be easily connected to my interpretation of Bohr as a phenomenological realist. Perovec points out that Bohr insisted on starting from experiments to understand the physical phenomena.
I thank one of the referees for drawing my attention to such quotes.
It is important to highlight that the discussion is about the visualization of nature (i.e. how can we visualize the thing out there) and not about the agreement with the "quantum mechanics theory".
It is important to note that we are dealing with an experimental set-up that can be used to detect particle behaviour or it can detect wave behaviour in two different incidents, but GHA is not an experiment to detect wave and particle information from the "same" incident.
Perovic (2017) uses the concept “matter-wave” (imported from Gamow 1929) to express the dual personality of the particle, His paper tries to follow the influence of complementarity on the development of understanding of the tunnelling effect.
Bohr use of the term ‘information’ means here information in regards to the real properties of the system out there.
A more general approach to un-sharp quantum mechanics represented by the Italian school Cattaneo and Laudisa (1994), Cattaneo et al. (1993) depends on a new kind of formalism; unsharp (fuzzy) logical impact. The scheme here limits itself within the Hilbert space formalism of un-sharp quantum mechanics, in order to avoid non-commutativity.
It is important to notice here that this scheme use of ‘lost’ information refers to the information that the experimental set-up would not be able to detect. Hence, any ‘retrieve’ of such ‘information’ is done theoretically through combining and manipulating the data collected by experimentation.
My italics. Of course, as I have indicated earlier, Bohr used the uncertainty principle as a mathematical tool to express complementarity, but complementarity is due to the quantum postulate. Hence, Bohr would not accept such a statement.
Figure from: Hiley and Callaghan (2006).
It is a second order phenomenon because the interference is not detected, as is in usual interference experiments, directly but the set of data collected would be correlated with another set obtained earlier to “detect” the interference.
Dorato (2016) presents a rigorous account of why is it possible to argue that Bohr would accept that the quantum objects do have the disposition of being waves and particles.
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I would like to profoundly thank one of the referees for his important and extensive comments, for his time and dedication, and for his patience that allowed me to rework my paper until it has been accepted for publication.
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Shomar, T. Complementarity Revisited. Found Sci 25, 401–424 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-019-09641-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-019-09641-4