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Can Theories of Mental Representation Adequately Explain Mental Imagery?

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Abstract

Traditionally it is taken for granted that mental imagery (MI) is a mental representation (MR) of some kind or format. This yields that theory of MR can give an adequate and exhaustive explanation of MI. Such co-relation between the two is usually seen as unproblematic. But is it really so? This article aims at challenging the theoretical claim that the dominant ‘two-world’ account of MR can adequately explain MI. Contrary to the standard theory of MR, there are reasons to believe that: (a) MI has different cognitive architecture, (b) the relations between elements of MI are dynamic, (c) relations between elements of MI are context-dependent. Consequently, it follows that dominant account of MR neglects important characteristics of MI and, thus, fails to give a comprehensive explanation of the latter. Alternatively, I will argue that a sign-theoretic approach, proposed by C. S. Peirce, can suggest a promising explanation of MI and fully account for the divergent empirical data on the matter.

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Notes

  1. I call the representing relation between the physical and mental worlds dyadic, because this relation holds between two distinct domains. A dyadic relation is thus the type of relationship that holds between two entities.

  2. I use the term ‘cognitive architecture’ following Z. Pylyshyn (2002) to signify the underlying structure of MI, that is “properties and mechanisms [that] are intrinsic to, or constitutive of having and using mental images…” (Pylyshyn 2002: 159, original emphasis).

  3. Another alternative and non-representational approach to MI is the enactivist or sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Nöe 2001; Thompson 2008; Thomas 2009, 2014). According to enactivism, imagery is a mental capacity of an active cognitive search of information in the absence of actual perceptual stimulus (Thomas 2009: 454–455). Although some empirical research (e.g. Bartolomeo 2007; Dulin et al. 2008; Moro et al. 2008) seems to support the enactivist theory, it still encounters serious problems (e.g. vagueness of the explanation of MI functioning) and thus remains unpopular among cognitivists.

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  1. Tallinn University of Technology, Akadeemia tee 3 – 434, 12611, Tallinn, Estonia

    Jelena Issajeva

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Issajeva, J. Can Theories of Mental Representation Adequately Explain Mental Imagery?. Found Sci 25, 341–355 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-019-09613-8

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