Skip to main content
Log in

Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions: Is there a Performance Effect?

  • Published:
Journal of Financial Services Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper uses a unique database that includes deal and bank balance sheet information for 220 cross-border acquisitions between 1996 and 2003 to analyze the characteristics and performance effects of international takeovers on target banks. A discrete choice estimation shows that banks are more likely to get acquired in a cross-border deal if they are large, bad performers, in a small country, and when the banking sector is concentrated. Post-acquisition performance for target banks does not improve in the first 2 years relative to domestically-owned financial institutions. This result is explained by a decrease in the banks’ net interest margin in developed countries and an increase in overhead costs in emerging economies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Mishkin (2001) and Tschoegl (2004) for a discussion on the benefits and costs of foreign bank entry as a policy to prevent financial crises.

  2. Micco et al. (2007) show evidence on performance indicators divided by type of ownership. Berger et al. (2005) use a sample of Argentinean banks to determine the static and dynamic effects of corporate governance. The authors find that foreign-owned banks perform worse than domestically-owned banks, but their performance is significantly better than that of state-owned banks.

  3. The formal version of the global advantage hypothesis states that some banks perform better both at home and abroad. In this paper, I assume that banks that acquire targets abroad perform better than all other banks in their home-country (see Focarelli and Pozzolo 2001). Hence, I test a restricted version of this hypothesis and focus only on the performance of the targets after being acquired by the foreign banks.

  4. Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004) do a cross-country comparison of the link between regulation and national institutions and bank overhead costs and interest margins.

  5. For a theoretical explanation of banking M&A’s, see Milbourn et al. (1999).

  6. These authors argue that there are several shortcomings in the empirical methods used in these performance studies, and recommend more M&A case-study analyses.

  7. See Altunbas and Marqués-Ibáñez (2008), Beitel and Schierek (2001), Beitel et al. (2004), and Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) for evidence on the performance effect in European M&As.

  8. In robustness tests, I include a measure of risk proxied by the volatility of the ROAs. I exclude this measure from the final estimation because it is time invariant. The main results are robust to the inclusion of this variable.

  9. Bank concentration is measured as the share of the three largest banks by country and year. We use this measure because of data constraints. One popular measure of bank concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. To estimate it I would need data for all banks in all countries in the sample. Another widely used measure of bank competition is the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic. Apart from the strong assumptions needed to estimate it (see Goddard and Wilson 2008, unpublished manuscript), the small number of banks with information in some emerging economies restricts the number of deals and countries that could be included in the sample.

  10. Although these three measures of financial market size are somewhat correlated, the cross-country differences might be important in the bank’s decision-making process to enter a particular country through a cross-border acquisition. Equity market capitalization is not correlated with public bond market capitalization, while the correlation with private bond market capitalization is under 0.2.

  11. The Sign Test is used instead of the t-test because the sample distributions of the relative—differenced with respect to the country index—accounting ratios are skewed. This would make the use of parametric techniques inappropriate. See “Section 4.”

  12. The Cost to Income Ratio is defined as Overhead costs divided by Net Interest Revenue and Non-interest Income.

  13. These variables are all divided by Average Assets. This measure is calculated by averaging Assets using t and t − 1 information.

  14. Berger et al. (2004) use similar variables to analyze exports and imports of financial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) across countries.

  15. Berger (1998) and Focarelli et al. (2002) use the same transformation.

  16. There are five legal origin categories: British, French, Socialist, German and Scandinavian.

  17. Similar GDP and Similar GDP PC are equal to \(1 - {{\left[ {abs\left( {X_j - X_h } \right)} \right]} \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{\left[ {abs\left( {X_j - X_h } \right)} \right]} {\max \left( {X_j ,X_h } \right)}}} \right. \kern-\nulldelimiterspace} {\max \left( {X_j ,X_h } \right)}}\), where X is defined as GDP in the former case and GDP per capita in the latter.

  18. This paper focuses on Commercial Banks due to their central role in retail banking in emerging economies. In addition, some Bank Holding Companies are included due to their similarities to Commercial Banks, especially in countries different from the US. I use unconsolidated financial statements when available (codes U1 and U2 in Bankscope).

  19. A bank is considered to have extreme financial information if Equity to Total Assets, Non-interest Income or Net Loans to Total Assets are less than 0. I also exclude observations with Net Interest Margins below −2.5 or above 28; ROA less than −10 or more than 12; ROE less than -100; Cost to Income Ratios below 0 or above 244; Non-interest Expenses to Average Assets above 100.

  20. Panama is an international financial center.

  21. Some countries are listed with zero cross-border deals. Cross-border acquisitions did take place in these countries, but due to extreme values in the financial data of the targets these observations, and the deals, were excluded.

  22. For these estimations I use bank data from 1994 to 2004.

  23. As a robustness check, I use the Investment Profile measure from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Although it is a more general measure of the overall restriction on cross-border investments in a country, its inclusion does not change the main results.

  24. For a discussion on market-based and bank-based economies see Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001).

  25. Estimations in this section include privatizations. They represent about 22% of the sample (23 deals). Excluding these deals does not change the main findings.

  26. Estimations using matched pair controls instead of industry indices yield similar results.

  27. Bayraktar and Wang (2004) show that there is a decrease in Net Interest Margins, Non-interest Income and profitability as foreign banks increase their share in the local banking sector. This is true for countries that liberalized the stock market first. See also Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) for cross-country evidence on net interest margins and profitability.

References

  • Altunbas Y, Marqués-Ibáñez D (2008) Mergers and acquisitions and bank performance in Europe: the role of strategic similarities. J Bus Econ 60:179–290, doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.03.003

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amel D, Barnes C, Panetta F, Salleo C (2004) Consolidation and efficiency in the financial sector: a review of the international evidence. J Bank Finance 28:2493–2519, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.10.013

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amihud Y, DeLong GL, Saunders A (2002) The effects of cross-border bank mergers on bank risk and value. J Int Money Finance 21:857–877, doi:10.1016/S0261-5606(02)00026-8

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barth JR, Caprio G Jr, Levine R (2000) Banking systems around the globe: do regulation and ownership affect performance and stability? World Bank Working Paper No. 2325

  • Bayraktar N, Wang Y (2004) Foreign bank entry, performance of domestic banks, and sequence of financial liberalization. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3416

  • Beitel P, Schiereck D (2001) Value creation at the ongoing consolidation of the European Banking Markets. IMA Working Paper No. 05/01

  • Beitel P, Schiereck D, Wahrenburg M (2004) Explaining M&A success in European Banks. Eur Financ Manag 10:109–139, doi:10.1111/j.1468-036X.2004.00242.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger AN (1998) The efficiency effects of bank mergers and acquisition: a preliminary look at the 1990s Data. In: Amihud Y, Miller G (eds) Bank mergers and acquisitions. Kluwer Academic, Boston, pp 79–111

    Google Scholar 

  • Berger AN, DeYoung R (2001) The effects of geographic expansion on bank efficiency. J Financ Serv Res 19:163–184, doi:10.1023/A:1011159405433

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger AN, Demsetz RS, Strahan PE (1999) The consolidation of the financial services industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future. J Bank Finance 23:135–194

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger AN, DeYoung R, Genay H, Udell GF (2000) Globalization of financial institutions: evidence from cross-border banking performance. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, pp 23–120

  • Berger AN, Buch CM, DeLong GL, DeYoung R (2004) Exporting financial institutions management via foreign direct investment mergers and acquisitions. J Int Money Finance 22(3):333–366, doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2004.01.002

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger AN, Clarke GRG, Cull R, Klapper L, Udell GF (2005) Corporate governance and bank performance: A joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership. J Bank Finance 29:2179–2221, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.03.013

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buch CM, DeLong GL (2004) Cross-border bank mergers: what lures the rare animal. J Bank Finance 28(9):2077–2102, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.08.002

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Calomiris CW, Karceski J (2000) Is the bank merger wave of the 90s efficient. In: Kaplan S (ed) Mergers and productivity. National Bureau of Economic Research, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 93–161

    Google Scholar 

  • Campa JM, Hernando I (2006) M&As performance in the European financial industry. J Bank Finance 30:3367–3392, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.06.006

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chamberlain SL (1998) The effect of bank ownership changes on subsidiary-level earnings. In: Amihud Y, Miller G (eds) Bank mergers and acquisitions. Kluwer Academic, Boston, pp 132–172

    Google Scholar 

  • Claessens S, van Horen N (2007) Location decisions of foreign banks and competitive advantage. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4113

  • Claessens S, Demirgüç-Kunt A, Huizinga H (2001) How does foreign entry affect the domestic banking market. J Bank Finance 25(5):891–911, doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(00)00102-3

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cornett MM, Tehranian H (1992) Changes in corporate performance associated with bank performance. J Financ Econ 31:211–234, doi:10.1016/0304-405X(92)90004-H

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cornett MM, McNutt JJ, Tehranian H (2006) Performance changes around bank mergers: Revenue enhancements versus cost reductions. J Money Credit Bank 38:1013–1050

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cornett MM, Hovakimian G, Palia D, Tehranian H (2003) The impact of manager–shareholder conflict on acquiring bank returns. J Bank Finance 27:103–131, doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00210-2

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crystal JS, Dages BG, Goldberg LS (2001) Does foreign ownership contribute to sounder banks? The Latin American experience. In: Litan R, Masson P, Pomerleano M (eds) Open doors: foreign participation in emerging financial systems. Brookings Press, Washington DC, pp 217–266

    Google Scholar 

  • Cybo-Ottone A, Murgia M (2000) Mergers and shareholder wealth in European banking. J Bank Finance 24:831–859, doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(99)00109-0

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Demirgüç-Kunt A, Huizinga H (1999) Determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability: some international evidence. World Bank Econ Rev 13(2):379–408

    Google Scholar 

  • Demirgüç-Kunt A, Levine R (2001) Bank-based and market-based financial systems: cross-country comparisons. In: Demirguc-Kunt A, Levine R (eds) Financial structure and economic growth: a cross-country comparison of banks, markets, and development. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Demirgüç-Kunt A, Laeven L, Levine R (2004) Regulations, market structure, institutions, and the cost of financial intermediation. In: Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pp 593–626

  • Esperanca JP, Gulamhussen MA (2001) (Re)Testing the ‘follow the customer’ hypothesis in multinational bank expansion. J Multinat Financ Manag 11:281–293, doi:10.1016/S1042-444X(01)00027-5

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Focarelli D, Pozzolo A (2000) The determinants of cross-border shareholding: An analysis with bank-level data from OECD countries. Banca d’Italia Temi di Discussione del Sevizio Studi, n. 381

  • Focarelli D, Pozzolo AF (2001) The patterns of cross-border bank mergers and shareholdings in OECD countries. J Bank Finance 25:2305–2337

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Focarelli D, Pozzolo A (2005) Where do banks expand abroad? An empirical analysis. J Bus 78(6):2435–2463, doi:10.1086/497052

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Focarelli D, Panetta F, Salleo C (2002) Why do banks merge. J Money Credit Bank 34(4):1047–1066, doi:10.1353/mcb.2002.0054

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Giannetti M, Ongena S (2005) Financial integration and entrepreneurial activity—evidence from foreign bank entry in emerging markets. Working Paper Series 498, European Central Bank

  • Goldberg LS (2004) Financial-sector FDI and host countries: new and old lessons. NBER working paper # 10441

  • Hannan TH, Rhoades SA (1987) Acquisition targets and motives: the case of the banking industry. Rev Econ Stat 69(1):67–74, doi:10.2307/1937902

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta L, Rafael FL-D-S, Shleifer A (2002) Government ownership of banks. J Finance 57(1):265–301, doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00422

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levine R (2001) International financial liberalization and economic growth. Rev Int Econ 9(4):684–698, doi:10.1111/1467-9396.00307

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levine R (2005) Finance and growth: theory and evidence. In: Aghion P, Durlauf S (eds) Handbook of economic growth. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine R, Zervos S (1998) Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. Am Econ Rev 88:537–558

    Google Scholar 

  • Linder JC, Crane DB (1992) Bank mergers: integration and profitability. J Financ Serv Res 7:35–55, doi:10.1007/BF01048339

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Micco A, Panizza U, Yañez M (2007) Bank ownership and performance does politics matter. J Bank Finance 31:219–241, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.02.007

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milbourn TT, Boot AWA, Thakor AV (1999) Megamergers and expanded scope: theories of bank size and activity diversity. J Bank Finance 23(2–4):195–214, doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00079-X

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller SR, Parkhe A (1998) Patterns in the expansion of US Banks’ foreign operations. J Int Bus Stud 29(2):359–390, doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490040

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mishkin FS (2001) Financial policies and the prevention of financial crises in emerging market countries. NBER Working Paper # W8087

  • Piloff SJ, Santomero AM (1998) The value effects of bank mergers and acquisitions. In: Amihud Y, Miller G (eds) Bank mergers and acquisitions. Kluwer Academic, Boston, pp 59–78

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose AK, Spiegel MM (2004) A gravity model of sovereign lending: trade, default and credit. IMF Staff papers No. 51, 50–63

  • Scholes M, Wilson GP, Wolfson MA (1990) Tax planning, regulatory capital planning and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks. Rev Financ Stud 3:625–650, doi:10.1093/rfs/3.4.625

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tschoegl AE (2004) Financial crises and the presence of foreign banks. International Finance 0405016, Economics Working Paper Archive EconWPA

  • Vander Vennet R (2002) Cross-border mergers in European banking and bank efficiency. In: Herrmann H, Lipsey R (eds) Foreign direct investment in the real and financial sector of industrial countries. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 295–315

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the editors of the special issue Robert DeYoung, Douglas Evanoff, Phil Molyneux, and two anonymous referees. I am also grateful to Charlie Calomiris, Elijah Brewer III, Juan J. Cruces, Dale Henderson, seminar participants at the International Finance Workshop at the Federal Reserve Board, the LACEA-LAMES annual meeting in Bogota, Colombia, the conference on “Mergers and Acquisitions of Financial Institutions” at the FDIC, and the annual meeting of the Midwest Finance Association in San Antonio, Texas. The usual disclaimer applies. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ricardo Correa.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Correa, R. Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions: Is there a Performance Effect?. J Financ Serv Res 36, 169–197 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-008-0043-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-008-0043-6

Keywords

Navigation