Abstract
We provide a theoretical and numerical framework to study optimal insurance design under asymmetric information. We consider a continuous-time model where neither the efforts nor the outcome of an insured firm are observable to an insurer. The insured may then cause two interconnected information problems: moral hazard and fraudulent claims. We show that, when costly monitoring is available, an optimal insurance contract distinguishes the one problem from the other. Furthermore, if the insured’s downward-risk aversion is weak and if the participation constraint is not too tight, then a higher level of the monitoring technology can mitigate both problems.
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Notes
In much of the literature on contract theory, communication games with costless reporting have been studied a lot in finite-horizon (typically, two or three period) discrete-time models. There are a few exceptions in a literature on insurance frauds; see e.g. Georges et al. (2009).
Under each of the information problems, more comprehensive coverage is associated with high risk (Chiappori 2000). Accordingly,it is difficult to identify whether it is due to their ability, to their laziness, or neither.Much empirical insurance literature has differentiated moral hazard from ex-ante adverse selection by making use of some different dynamic properties of the incentive structures between the two information problems in insurance contracts for various exogenous cases (typically, a reform of regulatory framework); e.g., see Abbring et al. (2003). However, that literature has not used any dynamic optimal (i.e., endogenous) insurance properties.
We focus on an European-type contract in which monitoring can be undertaken, depending deterministically on the reported wealth level, at time \(T\). Intermediate monitoring and stochastic monitoring are out of our scope in this paper, and will be our next research topics in future.
They assume that the contract can depend on the whole path of the wealth \(X^u_\cdot \) whereas we assume that it depends only on its time-\(T\) value. Still, note that they show that the optimal contract depends only on the time-\(T\) value. In this sense, our paper is not a generalization of Cvitanić and Zhang (2007).
Note that, in this model, the loss/gain process of the wealth is continuous. We may extend the process to have jumps under appropriate mathematical regularities. That will be our future work.
The first three derivatives of a function \(f\) are denoted by \(f^{\prime }\), \(f^{\prime \prime }\) and \(f^{\prime \prime \prime }\), respectively.
As one referee points out, this implies \((\frac{1}{U_1^\prime })^\prime \ge 1\), i.e., \(\frac{1}{U_1^\prime }\) grows faster than linear utilities with positive slopes. This assumption is actually technical and is not standard in the utility theory where concave utility functions are usually assumed. In contrast to the standard utility theory, \(e^{U_1}\) is included in the insurer’s expected utility under \({{\mathrm{\mathbb {P}}}}\) in our asymmetric information model, as in Eq. (3.5). The concavity of \(U_1\) is then not enough to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality of a contract, as shown in Eq. (3.9). Instead, the concavity of \(e^{U_1}\) is sufficient for it.
The assumption of the dependence on the time-\(T\) values might look restrictive. Cvitanić and Zhang (2007) show, in a model similar to ours, that it is not restrictive in equilibrium.
For example, payoff functions are kinked in debt contracts and options.
For example, consider the case that the insured could not commit to the contract at time \(T\). In the case, the insurer could enforce the insured to pay \(F\) in advance (i.e., at time \(0\)) in order to avoid failure to collect \(F\) at time \(T\).
The penalty can be interpreted as reputation loss and the cost of being imprisoned, for example.
As to the Clark–Ocone formula, see Appendix B.
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Acknowledgments
Financial support from the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) and the Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company, Limited and the Dai-ichi Life Research Institute Inc. is gratefully acknowledged.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3.1
As in Eq. (2.1), for \(u \in \mathcal{A}_1\), \(X_t^u = W_t + \int _0^t u_s {{\mathrm{\mathrm{d} }}}s\). As it was shown above, \(X^u\) is a driftless Brownian motion under the probability measure \({{\mathrm{\mathbb {P}}}}^u\) characterized by the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
Define the martingale \(M^u\) as
By the Martingale Representation Theorem, there exists an \( \mathbb {F} ^{X^u}\)-adapted process \(H^u \) such that
We also define \(\gamma ^u\) as
Since \(\int \limits \gamma ^u {{\mathrm{\mathrm{d} }}}X^u= \int \limits \frac{{{\mathrm{\mathrm{d} }}}M^u}{M^u}\), it holds that
and thus
Since the Clark–Ocone formula is applicable to \(e^{f(\cdot )}\),Footnote 14
Since \(X^u\) is the driftless Brownian motion under \({{\mathrm{\mathbb {P}}}}^u\), \(X_T^u \sim N(X_t^u, T-t)\) conditional on \(\mathcal{F}_t^{X^u}\). Hence,
as in Eq. (3.1). Therefore, \(\gamma ^u\) is bounded. Taking logarithms on both sides of Eq. (6.1),
Subtracting \( \frac{1}{2} \int _0^T (u_s)^2 {{\mathrm{\mathrm{d} }}}s \) from both sides and taking expectations under the probability measure \({{\mathrm{\mathbb {P}}}}\),
Note that \(\log {{\mathrm{\mathbb {E}}}}^u [ e^{f(X_T^u)} ]\) on the right-hand side of Eq. (6.4) is independent of \(u\). If \(\gamma ^u = u\), i.e., if there exists some \(u \in \mathcal{A}_1 \) that satisfies the implementability condition (3.3), it is an optimal solution. Moreover,
It is well known that, by Zvonkin (1974)(see also Karatzas and Shreve (1997), Chapter 5, Notes, p.396), the last Markovian stochastic differential equation (6.5):
has a unique strong solution \(X^*\). Since it is the strong solution, \( \mathbb {F} ^{X^*} = \mathbb {F} ^W\). \(\square \)
Remark 5.1
The remark right after the statement of Proposition 3.1 is proved as follows. For every adapted process \(u\) satisfying \( \mathbb {E} [\int \limits _0^T(u_t)^2 {{\mathrm{\mathrm{d} }}}t ]<\infty \), it follows from Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem that
where \(u^{(n)}_t:=u_t \mathbf {1}_{\{|u_t|\le n\}}\). Since \(u^{(n)}\) is a bounded process, it satisfies Eq. (6.4). By taking the limit \(n \rightarrow \infty \), the process \(u\) also satisfies Eq. (6.4).
Appendix B: Supplementary Note on the Clark–Ocone Formula
The Clark–Ocone formula for general functionals is stated in terms of the Malliavin-Fréchet derivative (see e.g. Ocone and Karatzas 1991; Revuz and Yor 1999; Rogers and Williams 2000), but, in order to show our formula (A.2), the following simple argument is sufficient.
Let us define the function \(g: \mathbf {R} \times [0,T) \rightarrow \mathbf {R} \) by
which is a \(C^2\) function since it is the convolution of \(e^{f(x)}\) and \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \pi (T-t)}} e^{-\frac{x^2}{2(T-t)}}. \) Also, we have
and thus the process \(\{ g(W_t, t) \}_{0 \le t < T}\) is a martingale. It then follows from Itô’s formula that
It remains to prove that
This can be shown by the following two properties combined with Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem:
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For almost every \(x \in \mathbf {R} ,\) \(\displaystyle \lim _{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{e^{f(x +\epsilon )} - e^{f(x)}}{\epsilon } = f'(x) e^{f(x)} ;\)
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Since the Lipschitz constant of \(f\) is \(K:=\sup _{x\in \mathbf {R} \backslash \{x_1,x_2,\cdots ,x_n \}} \left| f^\prime (x)\right| <\infty ,\) we have, for every \(x \in \mathbf {R} ,\)
$$\begin{aligned} \sup _{0<|\epsilon | < 1} \Big | \frac{e^{f(x + \epsilon )} - e^{f(x)} }{\epsilon } \Big |&= e^{f(x)} \sup _{0<|\epsilon | < 1} \Big | \frac{e^{f(x+\epsilon )-f(x)} - 1 }{\epsilon } \Big | \\&\le e^{f(x)} \sup _{0<|\epsilon | < 1} \frac{e^{|f(x+\epsilon )-f(x)|} - 1 }{|\epsilon |} \\&\le e^{f(x)} \sup _{0<|\epsilon | < 1} \frac{e^{K|\epsilon |} - 1 }{|\epsilon |} \\&= (e^K - 1 ) e^{f(x)}. \end{aligned}$$
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Nakamura, H., Takaoka, K. A Continuous-Time Optimal Insurance Design with Costly Monitoring. Asia-Pac Financ Markets 21, 237–261 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10690-014-9184-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10690-014-9184-9