Abstract
In this paper, we present experimental evidence on the effect adverse selection has on coverage choices and pricing in corporate insurance markets. Two sets of experimental data, each generated by experiments utilizing a specific parameterization of a corporate insurance decision, are presented to gauge these effects. In the first, subject behavior conforms to a unique equilibrium in which high risk firms choose higher coverage and contracts are priced accordingly. Insurers act competitively and convergence to equilibrium behavior is marked. In the second set, there is little evidence that subject behavior is consistent with either of the two equilibrium outcomes supported by the experimental setting—pooling by fully insuring losses and pooling by self insuring.
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JEL Classification C90, G14, G22
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9152-y.
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Goswami, G., Grace, M.F. & Rebello, M.J. Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance. Exp Econ 11, 67–95 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9152-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9152-y