Abstract
Envy is a complex and intriguing emotion that has received too little philosophical attention in recent years. Sara Protasi has come to remedy that gap with an original, thorough and carefully researched monograph that defends the view that envy is not all vicious, that one of its varieties can be fully virtuous, and that it plays an important role in our moral psychology.
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Notes
The work leading to this article has been carried out under a project funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 890316
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Montes Sánchez, A. Sara Protasi: The Philosophy of Envy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Hardback (ISBN 978-1-316-51917-2), £75. 260 pp. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 25, 517–519 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10294-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10294-9