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When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi

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Notes

  1. We mean that R has an unfair (i.e., unjustified) DBD (Fritz and Miller 2018: 123).

  2. Though he does not blame, he may be disposed to blame. If he does have an unfair DBD then he lacks the standing to blame, on our account.

  3. Rossi explicitly acknowledges that we understand standing as a right (560, fn. 18). If he is engaged with us in a genuine debate, he must understand standing as a right.

  4. Roadevin also acknowledges this (2018: 145).

  5. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to clarify this.

  6. Todd 2019 claims that the fact that hypocrisy undermines moral standing has no explanation.

  7. See Fritz and Miller forthcoming.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper by Steve McFarlane, Justin Capes, and Maggie O’Brien.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Policy Leadership, University of Mississippi, 105 Odom Hall, University, MS, 38677, USA

    Kyle G. Fritz

  2. Department of Philosophy, West Virginia University, 142 Arnold Hall, Morgantown, WV, 26505, USA

    Daniel J. Miller

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  1. Kyle G. Fritz
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  2. Daniel J. Miller
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Correspondence to Kyle G. Fritz.

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Fritz, K.G., Miller, D.J. When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 22, 379–384 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-09997-3

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