Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp 379–384 | Cite as

When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi

  • Kyle G. FritzEmail author
  • Daniel J. Miller
We aim to offer an argument justifying the Nonhypocrisy Condition on the standing to blame:

NH:R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some [moral] norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to violations of N (Fritz and Miller 2018: 119).

We maintain that the hypocritical blamer has an unfair differential blaming disposition, or DBD: he is unfairly disposed to blame others, but not himself, for violations of some norm N (122). In virtue of this, he implicitly rejects the equality of persons with respect to N, which grounds the right to blame for violations of N. By implicitly rejecting that which grounds this right, the hypocritical blamer forfeits his right to blame for violations of N (125–127).

Benjamin Rossi (2018) has recently offered several criticisms of this view. We defend our account from Rossi’s criticisms and emphasize our account’s unique advantage: explaining why hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame.

Criticisms and...



We are grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper by Steve McFarlane, Justin Capes, and Maggie O’Brien.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Public Policy LeadershipUniversity of MississippiUniversityUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyWest Virginia UniversityMorgantownUSA

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