Abstract
A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.
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Notes
“Requirement” here should be understood strictly descriptively – a failure results in a cannot, not an ought not.
Elsewhere, in support of this claim, Streumer argues that “A person believes that p only if this person understands p” (2015: 8).
Inspired by Burge (1979).
We thank a (somewhat) anonymous referee for pressing us to address this response.
See, for example, Streumer (2015: 11fn20).
For ease of exposition, from here on we will not make the occurrent/dispositional distinction explicit.
We again thank a (somewhat) anonymous referee for pressing us to address this response.
Moreover, a powerful demon could keep me from believing q, while allowing me to fully believe that p and fully believe p implies q.
Addressing a related matter, Terence Cuneo puts the point nicely: “A person’s accepting the claim that there is no reason to believe epistemic nihilism cannot undercut her justification for accepting epistemic nihilism. [For such a person] a claim such as [‘epistemic nihilism is true, but there is no reason to believe it’] cannot even rise to the level of paradox” (2007: 118).
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Streumer, B. (2015) Manuscript. “Why Jonas Olson cannot believe the error theory either.”
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Luke Semrau and Winnie Sung for helpful comments on previous drafts.
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Forcehimes, A.T., Talisse, R.B. Belief and the Error Theory. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 849–856 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9707-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9707-8