Abstract
Some subjectivist views of practical reasons entail that some people, in some cases, lack sufficient reasons to act as morality requires of them. This is often thought to form the basis of an objection to these subjectivist views: ‘the amoralism objection’. This objection has been developed at length by Julia Markovits in her recent book Moral Reason. But Markovits—alongside many other proponents of this objection—does not explicitly consider that her objection is premised on a claim that her opponents deny on first-order grounds, often as part of a socially and politically motivated revisionism about the assessment of agents and their actions. As such, the amoralism objection as she presents it misses its dialectical mark. This has interesting consequences for subjectivism—and the methodology behind it—more generally.
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Notes
Cited with permission of the author.
See Markovits (2014), 21.
See especially Harman (1985), 27–28.
And arguably Markovits does consider—and reject—the views of those who simply hold different intuitions on these cases. See in particular her discussion of the special kind of focused blame appropriate for Hitler (Markovits 2014, 22) and compare with Harman’s treatment of a very similar case (Harman 1996, 60).
Manne (2014, 110).
Finlay also considers rejecting the connection between blameworthiness and reasons (Ibid., 365).
It has been suggested to me (by an anonymous reviewer for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice) that John Doris is another who should be thought of in the same camp as (e.g.,) Williams, Harman and Foot. I think that this is an interesting case: there are reasons to think of Doris in this way. Consider two such reasons. Firstly, Doris’s arguments do suggest that moral hard-cases may be more prevalent than the examples of Williams and others might suggest: Doris applies his situationist critique of ‘virtue ethics’ to responsibility, arguing that “circumstances [in which] normal adults have something importantly in common with the legally insane; they are unable to properly appreciate normatively relevant considerations… may be pervasive.” (Doris 2002, 138). Secondly, Doris argues that this should shift our focus in ethics. He says: “I’m urging a certain redirection of our ethical attention. Rather than striving to develop characters that will determine our behaviour in ways substantially independent of circumstance, we should invest more of our energies in attending to the features of our environment that influence behavioural outcomes.” (Ibid., 142) These two considerations do make it natural to place Doris in the came camp as (e.g.,) Williams. But I am hesitant to do so as (a) Dors neither much discusses subjectivism about reasons or the amoralism objection explicitly and (b) insofar as he does come close to this he is explicitly sceptical toward some members of the subjectivist tradition whom I have suggested are naturally thought of as revisionist in response to the amoralism objection - e.g., Harman (Cf. Doris 2002, 109). Even allowing for this however Doris’s work has a further interesting consequence for the subjectivist response to the amoralism objection. It is to draw attention to the extent to which this response can engage with experimental work: if Doris is correct, then ‘hard cases’ may be both more pervasive and more ‘local’ than we had expected. Whether this is will ultimately prove an advantage for the subjectivist—by, for example, highlighting the degree to which non-subjectivist views that, as Williams puts it, “allocate blame on the ultimately fair basis of an agent’s contribution, no more, no less” (Williams 1985: 194) are over-demanding—or a disadvantage - by, for example showing that subjectivism would, properly interpreted, over-generate unacceptable clashes with our intuitions about blame in ordinary cases—remains to be seen. To this extent, the kind of subjectivist response to the amoralism objection that I have attributed to (e.g.,) Williams may—as another anonymous reviewer has suggested—be in part a hostage to empirical fortune.
See, for example, Shafer-Landau (2003, 187); Van Roojen (2015, 108). I should note that there are also critics of subjectivism who have discussed the amoralism objection to Williams and others within the broader revisionary context—notable examples here include (but are not limited to) Skorupski (2007), Taylor (1995). Skorupski is a particularly interesting case here. Skorupski discusses at some length the relation between Williams’s internalism about reasons and his views about morality (especially blame). He is clearly sensitive to the fact that Williams regards his internalism about reasons as having revisionary moral (and political) consequences and that these consequences are not, for Williams, merely a bullet to be bitten. Here, Skorupski focuses on the sense in which Williams, following Nietzsche, regards external reasons claims as having a “dark side”: they can be used to legitimise the desire to punish wrong-doers, or to demand atonement. Nevertheless, he (Skorupski) argues that external reasons claims serve an ultimately positive social and political function that Williams may have recognised, namely “the democratic desire to give everyone equal respect.” (Skorupski 2007, 100). This is the case insofar as “the kind of respect which is most worth having, or even the only kind that is really worth having, is respect for one’s capacity to recognise the moral law.” (Ibid.) I am sceptical of whether this is the kind of respect most worth having, or the only kind worth having. But this is an important point nonetheless and highlights that it is possible to engage with the political revisionary aspirations of some subjectivist responses to the amoralism objection.
Most clearly Kramer (2009, 23–85).
Again, this is clearest in Kramer Ibid.
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Acknowledgments
I am especially grateful to Giles Howdle for illuminating and encouraging discussion of all of the arguments presented in this paper. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
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Cowie, C. Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 711–723 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9680-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9680-7