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Private Solidarity

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Abstract

It’s natural to think of acts of solidarity as being public acts that aim at good outcomes, particularly at social change. I argue that not all acts of solidarity fit this mold - acts of what I call ‘private solidarity’ are not public and do not aim at producing social change. After describing paradigmatic cases of private solidarity, I defend an account of why such acts are themselves morally virtuous and what role they can have in moral development.

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Notes

  1. See Gray (2001, 8) and Yourgrau (2011, 114).

  2. The case may veer into fiction here. Though some accounts describe young Simone’s solidarity this way, others suggest external aims. For example, Mario von der Ruhr says, “… she made a point of giving up all her sugar and chocolate, so that these could be sent to needy soldiers on the front.” (2006, 5). A similar description can also be found in Perrin and Thibon (2003, 47). Such aims are not mentioned in other descriptions so it is difficult to tell what Simone’s aims were. What is important for my purposes is that such actions would still reflect well on her even if she lacked such aims.

  3. Of course, in the real case they are not just any soldiers but those fighting for a shared country. (After all, Simone did not give up sugar in solidarity with German soldiers or even all soldiers). We can, however, imagine a similar case where the connection is not one of nationality but a deeper, human connection.

  4. I thank Chelsea Rosenthal for helpful discussion on this point.

  5. Cureton (2012), for example, takes solidarity to be valuable in relation to the success of social groups and of democracy. Rippe calls solidarity “target-oriented” (1998, 357).

  6. See Driver (2001) for a well-developed theory defending virtues as states that tend to produce good effects.

  7. Derpmann (2009), for example, emphasizes the role of our obligations to particular groups in solidarity.

  8. I thank an anonymous reviewer for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice both for raising this issue and for suggesting this example.

  9. Thanks to Neil Williams for suggesting this example to me. See also Hill (1979), which argues that the value of symbolic protest lies in disassociating oneself from evil.

  10. One might wonder here what is so important about this particular way of manifesting concern for others. The answer, I think, is nothing; acts of private solidarity are virtuous by embodying one’s concern for others but are not more virtuous than other ways of embodying such concern. Though I’ll discuss ways in which private solidarity can help to develop and strengthen such concern, such benefits can also be cultivated in other ways. It is, I think, important in theorizing about virtues to allow space for different people to have different ways of being virtuous.

  11. Thanks to Julia Driver for raising this objection.

  12. Emphasis is mine in both cases.

  13. My comments here are in tension with Aristotelian views of virtue, which take practical rationality to be at the heart of the very concept of virtue (see Nicomachean Ethics II.7). I will not argue against this conception of virtue here, but merely point out that it is natural to think that a person’s poor time-management or planning skills do not automatically make her morally worse. It is far from obvious that calling someone foolish or imprudent is always a moral criticism. Those sympathetic with Aristotle can read my comments as claiming that Simone Weil’s solidarity can be virtuous, though she falls short of being fully virtuous, all things considered.

  14. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals IX.1. For more on Hume’s (1751/2003) monkish virtues, see Davie (1999).

  15. It is important to note here that being useful or agreeable is not itself enough to make a moral virtue. Being able to add large numbers in one’s head or discuss the intricacies of classic novels or internal combustion engines can be very useful, and often are also very agreeable. Such things, however, do not make one a morally better person.

  16. See Harvey (2007) for an insightful discussion of the relationship between solidarity and empathy.

  17. For more on how one-off actions can still be virtuous, see Hurka (2006).

  18. One can draw a comparison here with the Catholic practice of giving things up for Lent – This practice is often explained as having the dual benefit of connecting the practitioner with God and of turning one away from worldly things and towards spiritual ones. In secular cases, a similar practice would connect one with others and turn one away from focusing on their own problems.

  19. See Williams (1981).

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Acknowledgments

This paper was written while under the support of a Bersoff Fellowship at New York University. A draft of it was presented as a lunchtime talk at the NYU Philosophy Department and benefitted from many helpful comments there. Special thanks to Julia Driver, Chelsea Rosenthal, Neil Williams, and Alex King for discussing these ideas with me. Thanks also to Anna Bialek for introducing me to the life and work of Simone Weil. Finally, I also received very helpful comments from two anonymous referees for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

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  1. New York University, New York, NY, USA

    Nicolas Bommarito

  2. University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA

    Nicolas Bommarito

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  1. Nicolas Bommarito
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Correspondence to Nicolas Bommarito.

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Bommarito, N. Private Solidarity. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 445–455 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9640-2

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