Abstract
The article sets forth Ronald Dworkin’s efforts to avert the slavery of the talented within his theory of equality, so that they are not forced to work full-time at one type of job, but then criticises Dworkin for failing to apply similar concerns to not so talented workers. It argues that he overlooks the problem of the slavery of the not so talented that results from the tough rules he proposes for dealing with insurance payouts. Finally, it tries to show how this unfairness can be avoided with a better interpretation of the likely outcome of his hypothetical insurance experiment given a better understanding of the motivations of parties operating within that experiment.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Dworkin implies that under the fixed rate system enslavement will only affect those who gamble on the highest level of coverage. But Daniel Markovits has calculated that purchasing insurance coverage even at the mean level of income in the projected range will carry the risk of enslavement. See Markovits (2003) pp. 2308–9. For an interesting discussion of Markovits, see Vincent (2006).
Drawing on similar reasons Dworkin also rejects Robert van der Veen’s proposal of a 100% flat rate tax (van der Veen 2002; Dworkin 2002, pp. 128–9).
Faced with the problem of people whose lives would be ruined by these sorts of unwise insurance bets, Dworkin concedes that we may have ‘special reasons for forbidding certain forms of gambles’ (Dworkin 1981, p. 295).
It might be thought that even if John is stuck, so to speak, working at his maximum earning potential, he nevertheless enjoys a greater variety of types of jobs at this lower level of income than at a higher level (cf. Dworkin 1981, p. 322). But this is far from obvious. Although John may have a choice of jobs, he could still lack any real choice in the type of occupation since at this level most jobs are likely to involve the same high degree of routine, non-complex, restricted-autonomy labour.
I assume that if the insurance premiums associated with these policies are higher at lower levels of income, say, 30% of income for those earning in the first to the thirtieth income percentiles, then people will have to insure at a higher level of coverage in order to maintain a decent standard of living. Alternatively, insurance companies could leave band A at 25% but adjust band C to capture people earning in the fiftieth income percentile and/or introduce a new band, D, say, 90% of income for earners in the eightieth income percentile and above.
Indeed, this is precisely the response made by Dworkin to my examples during an exchange at the University of London School of Advanced Study symposium on Dworkin’s theory of equality held at Senate House, London in March 2001.
According to Michael Otsuka, for example, Dworkin is unable to reconcile the demands of equality and liberty in the case of inheritance and gift-giving. Dworkin cannot allow ascetics, family members or altruists to give their equal share of clamshells to others before the auction begins, since such nonmarket transfers would frustrate the goal of achieving an envy-free distribution. Yet to prevent such persons from giving their clamshells to others is to restrict liberty. See Otsuka (2002), pp. 52–3. For Dworkin’s reply, see his (2002).
References
Armstrong C (2005) Equality, risk and responsibility: Dworkin on the insurance market. Econ Soc 34:451–473
Berlin I (1969) Four essays on liberty. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Berlin I (1978) The hedgehog and the fox: an essay on Tolstoy’s view of history. In: Hardy H (ed) Russian thinkers. Hogarth, London
Bou-Habib P, Olsaretti S (2004) Liberal egalitarianism and workfare. J Appl Philos 21:257–270
Brown A (2009a) Personal responsibility: why it matters. Continuum, London
Brown A (2009b) Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality: domestic and global perspectives. PalgraveMacmillan, Basingstoke
Cohen Christofidis M (2004) Talent, slavery, and envy. In: Burley J (ed) Dworkin and his critics. Blackwell, Malden
Dworkin R (1977) Taking rights seriously. Duckworth, London
Dworkin R (1981) What is equality? Part 2: equality of resources. Philos Public Aff 10:283–345
Dworkin R (1983) Comment on Narveson: in defense of equality. Social Philosophy and Policy 1:24–40
Dworkin R (1985) A matter of principle. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Dworkin R (1986) Law’s Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Dworkin R (1987) What is equality? Part 3: the place of liberty. Iowa Law Rev 73:1–54
Dworkin R (2000) Sovereign virtue. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Dworkin R (2001) Do values conflict? A Hedgehog’s approach. Ariz Law Rev 43:251–259
Dworkin R (2002) Sovereign virtue revisited. Ethics 113:106–143
Dworkin R (2003) Equality, luck and hierarchy. Philos Public Aff 31:190–198
Dworkin R (2004) Ronald Dworkin replies. In: Burley J (ed) Dworkin and his critics. Blackwell, Malden
Dworkin R (2006) Is democracy possible here? Princeton University Press, Princeton
Fleurbaey M (2002) Equality of resources revisited. Ethics 113, 82−105
Hinton T (2001) Must egalitarians choose between fairness and respect? Philos Public Aff 30:72–87
Levine A (1998) Rethinking liberal equality. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Markovits D (2003) How much redistribution should there be? Yale Law J 112:2291–2330
Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, state, and utopia. Blackwell, Oxford
Otsuka M (2002) Luck, insurance, and equality. Ethics 113:40–54
van Parijs P (1995) Real freedom for all: what (if anything) can justify capitalism? Clarendon, Oxford
van der Veen R (2002) Equality of talent resources: procedures or outcomes? Ethics 113:55–81
Stark A (2002) Beyond choice: rethinking the post-Rawlsian debate over egalitarian justice. Polit Theory 30:36–67
Vincent N (2006) Equality, responsibility and talent slavery. Imprints 9:118–39
White S (2003) The civic minimum: on the rights and obligations of economic citizenship. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Wolff J (1998) Fairness, respect, and the egalitarian ethos. Philos Public Aff 27:97–122
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Brown, A. The Slavery of the Not So Talented. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 185–196 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9236-9
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9236-9