Abstract
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not. My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I use the book edited by Roderick Chisholm, translated by R. Chisholm and E. Schneewind (New York: Humanities Press, 1969). Note: References are made to both page and section numbers.
Kaufmann’s translations of Nietzsche’s works are used when available.
See the fourth chapter of Mill’s Utilitarianism.
Only causal genealogical theories are suspect. A non-causal origin of ethics is what Brentano seeks. As noted, his main work is The Origins [Ursprung] of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. It was preceded by several years by this lecture, “On the Origins [Entstehung] of the Sense of Justice.”
Evolutionists would not look to the genes for every moral claim. The case is analogous to Chomsky’s thesis that we humans possess a universal grammar which has a biological basis, while conceding the differences in various languages.
For its greater terseness, I choose the name “Genetic Fallacy Argument,” rather than “Genealogical Fallacy Argument,” in spite of there being a small risk of confounding it with a very different meaning, were “genetic” here so interpreted (mistakenly) as to mean “something involving genes” (as in “genetic engineering”). However, I reverse my strategy by using “genealogical explanations” instead of “genetic explanations,” because in this case the latter could imply that I am referring primarily to explanations involving genes (which I am not).
For a different kind of critique, namely from Moore’s point of view, of naturalistic theories of ethics, see P. Woolcock’s “The Case against Evolutionary Ethics Today” (1999). Woolcock’s thesis that the ought-claims are irreducible to the is-claims, that there is a chasm between facts and values, is not so obvious given that it is normal to account for many a value-term by means of value-neutral ones. For example, “healthy” is a value-loaded term (since it connotes something positive and good), yet biologists can at least in principle define human health in a factual, value-neutral manner. Brentano’s critique has the advantage of not resting on such a problematic assumption.
T. Srzednicki (1965, p. 88.) writes, “Now Brentano maintains that to say that a judgment is true is to mean either that it is evident itself or that it is reducible to an evident judgment.”
Note: It is not because a mathematical claim like (A) correctly describes the external reality that makes it a true claim, because after all there just may not be a single real, existing perfect Euclidean triangle out there. It is an objective truth, however, that all rational beings must recognize and acknowledge.
Chisholm only mentions this second difference, and not the first. Another point: Whether only analytic claims have absolute necessity, will not be decided here.
Nietzsche rejects apodicity of logical principles. Rather rules of logic are evolved patterns of thinking that have proven useful for coping with life. His odd views on logic have no bearing on his ethics. My refutation of Brentano’s NA will disregard Nietzsche’s views on logic. Rather, I assume logical rules are apodictic.
And P. Ehrlich (2000, p. 40) claims that altruists could predominate “if the groups in question are small; if the rates of turnover (extinction and reestablishment of groups) are high, limiting the time in which selection can operate among individuals within the group; if there is a fluctuating environment...”
Flagrant self-servingness is entirely appropriate among the few; for the rest it is contemptible. “Self-interest is worth as much as the person who has it: It can be worth a great deal, and it can be unworthy and contemptible” (Nietzche 1888, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” 33).
The same argument is also found in his book Taking Darwin Seriously (1986), pp. 253–256.
About genuine virtues, Zarathustra proclaims: “That your virtue is your self and not something foreign... is the truth... you who are virtuous.” “You love your virtue as a mother her child....” (Nietzsche 1885 II, “On the Virtuous).
Also, he believes that “higher men” cannot dispense with practicing hypocrisy and “wearing a mask.”
This extraordinary fragment is ferreted from Nietzsche’s Nachlass and translated by J. Stambaugh (1994, p. 59).
The highest states would be standard to measure other states: “When the Greek body and soul ‘bloomed’... there arose the mysterious symbol of the highest world-affirmation and transformation of existence.... Here we have a standard by which everything that has grown up since is too short....” (Nietzsche 1968, 1051).
Not only is fragility sometimes lauded, expressions of will to power is often despised. “The lust to rule before whose glances man crawls and ducks and slaves and becomes lower than snake and swine, until finally the great contempt cries out of him.” (Nietzsche 1885 III, “On the Three Evils”). We see here how independent is his concrete value apprehensions from his overall theory of will to power.
References
Alexander RD (1987) The biology of moral systems. De Gruyter, New York
Brentano F (1889) 1969. The origin of our knowledge of right and wrong, trans. Chisholm and Schneewind. Humanities Press, New York (original title: Von Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis)
Brentano F (1916) 1976. Letter of March 21, 1916, to O. Kraus. An excerpt is translated by R. Chisholm in his paper, “Brentano’s theory of correct and incorrect emotions”. In: McAlister L (ed) The philosophy of Brentano. Humanities Press, New Jersey
Brentano F (1952) 1973. The foundation and construction of ethics. Trans. by Schneewind. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (the book is a compilation of Brentano’s lectures on practical philosophy by Fransica Mayer-Hildebrand)
Chisholm R (1960) Realism and the background of phenomenology. Free Press, New York
Collier J, Stingl M (1993) 1995 Evolutionary naturalism and the objectivity of morals. In: Thompson P (ed) Issues in evolutionary ethics. SUNY, Albany, pp111–156. Originally in Biology and Philosophy 8.
Crisp R (2002) Sidgwick and the boundaries of intuitionism. In: Stratton-Lake P (ed) Ethical intuitionism: re-evaluations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp 56–75
Cronin H (1991) The ant and the peacock: altruism and sexual selection from Darwin to today. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Ehrlich P (2000) Human natures: genes, cultures, and the human prospect. Island Press, Washington, DC
Hunt L (1991) Nietzsche and the origin of virtue. Routledge, London & New York
Leiter B (2002) Nietzsche on morality. Routledge, London
Martinsen D, Rottshaefer W (1990) 1995. Really taking Darwin seriously: an alternative to Michael Ruse’s Darwinian metaethics. In issues in evolutionary ethics. pp375–408. Originally in Biology and Philosophy 5.
Moore GE (1903) Principia ethica. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Morgan GA (1941) What Nietzsche means. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Murphy JG (1982) Evolution, morality and the meaning of life. Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey
Nietzsche F (1881) 1982. Daybreak, trans. Hollingdale RJ. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Nietzsche F (1882) 1974. The gay science, trans. Kaufmann W. Vintage Books, New York
Nietzsche F (1885) 1954 Thus spoke Zarathustra, trans. Kaufmann W in The portable Nietzsche. Viking Press, New York
Nietzsche F (1886) 1966 Beyond good and evil, trans Kaufmann W. Vintage Books, New York
Nietzsche F (1887) 1966 On the genealogy of morals, trans. Kaufmann W and Hollingdale RJ. Vintage Books, New York
Nietzsche F (1888) 1954 Twilight of idols. In: The portable Nietzsche. Viking Press, New York
Nietzsche F (1895) 1954 Antichrist. In The portable Nietzsche. Viking Press, New York
Nietzsche F (1968) Will to power, trans. Kaufmann W and Hollingdale RJ. Vintage Books, New York
Nietzsche F (2003) Writings from late notebooks, edited by Bittner R, translated by Sturge K. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
Richardson J (2004) Nietzche’s new Darwinism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
Ross D (1939) Foundations of ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
Ruse M (1986) Taking Darwin seriously. Blackwell, London, UK
Ruse M (1990) Evolutionary ethics and the search for predecessors: Kant, Hume and all the way back to Aristotle? Soc Philos Policy 8:59–85
Sober E, Wilson DS (1998) Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Srzednicki JT (1965) Franz Brentano’s analysis of truth. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, The Netherlands
Stambaugh J (1994) The other Nietzsche. SUNY, New York
Velarde-Mayol V (2000) On Brentano. Wadsworth, Belmont, CA
Wilson EO (1978) Human nature. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Woolcock PG (1999) The case against evolutionary ethics today. In: Maienschein J, Ruse M (eds) Biology and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge University Press, pp276–306
Zahavi A, Zahavi A (1997) The handicap principle: a missing piece of Darwinian puzzle. Oxford University Press, New York
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Moosa, I. Naturalistic Explanations of Apodictic Moral Claims: Brentano’s Ethical Intuitionism and Nietzsche’s Naturalism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 159–182 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9055-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9055-1