Abstract
Larry Temkin has shown that Derek Parfit’s well-known Mere Addition Paradox suggests a powerful argument for the intransitivity of the relation “better than.” The crux of the argument is the view that equality is essentially comparative, according to which the same inequality can be evaluated differently depending on what it is being compared to. The comparative view of equality should be rejected, I argue, and hence so too this argument for intransitivity.
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Notes
Alastair Norcross suggests that failures of transitivity might in one respect actually be good for teleological approaches because then such theories can account for moral dilemmas (Norcross 1999). It should be noted, also, that intransitivity should be a concern for non-teleological approaches as well, since, as Rawls suggests, “[a]ll ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One that did not would simply be irrational, crazy” (Rawls 1971, p. 30).
Temkin admits (in conversation) that for rhetorical reasons that he now regrets he did not make his own distance from the arguments sufficiently clear.
Some prefer the name “welfarism” to “Person-Affecting Principle” for this principle because “affecting” suggests causation, while the principle has nothing to do with causation. This is a good point, though I will continue to refer to the principle as the Person-Affecting Principle because of the varied uses of the term “welfare” and “welfarism,” and to remain consistent with Temkin’s own usage.
Temkin (in conversation) resolves this by holding that while PAP is false, sometimes person-affecting reasoning is nonetheless persuasive.
Rachels argues one can accept that B is better than A and nonetheless avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by denying transitivity (Rachels 2004). He thinks, then, that we should not be so quick as to accept that A is better than B because of fears of the Repugnant Conclusion. It is, he notes, especially odd for Temkin to adopt this argument given his (ultimate) rejection of transitivity. My central concern, however, is with claim (c) above, and therefore will not address this matter further.
“Natural” inequality is inequality that is not the product of injustice. Since mere addition requires that the inequality is not the product of injustice, all inequality in cases of mere addition is natural. See Parfit 1986, p. 422.
Temkin suggests the same argument for the view that maximim is comparative (MC):
“...while usually it is morally regrettable if the worst-off fare worse in one situation than another, this is not always so, and, in particular, is not if it results from mere addition” (Temkin 1987, p. 151). Insofar as the argument for MC is the same, the criticisms of EC I offer in the following sections apply equally to the argument for MC. Temkin does provide additional grounds for MC (Temkin 1987, pp. 173–179). I cannot address those arguments here, however.
This is not to say that the other claims that make up the Mere Addition Paradox cannot also be disputed. As noted, Rachels doubts whether we should accept that A is better than B because of fear of the Repugnant Conclusion (Rachels 2004). Also, as he notes, it is just not obvious that B is worse than A if the level of well-being in B were only a tiny fraction lower than the level of well-being in A. As for the claim that B is better than A+, some think it not obvious because perfectionist considerations that favor A+ might outweigh the egalitarian and utilitarian considerations that favor B (Temkin 1987, p. 155).
Whether they are better off or simply not worse off depends on whether one thinks that causing someone to exist can benefit him.
I have James Woodbridge to thank for help with this example.
Of course one might not follow Parfit, and maintain that additional lives worth living always do make the outcome better. This requires, however, finding a solution to the Repugnant Conclusion, or learning to live with it, however repugnant it may seem.
On the assumption, shared by Parfit and Temkin, that equality is a basic value, that our egalitarian concerns are genuine and can’t be, e.g., reduced to concerns for utility.
Some will find this counterintuitive, because it violates PAP. I will address this matter in the following section.
It is useful to consider here Parfit’s distinction between personal value and the value of an outcome as a whole (Parfit 1986, p. 412). He notes that while after the population of people living lives (well) worth living is large, additional lives worth living do not make the outcome as a whole better, such additional lives have “personal value.”
There may be any number of reasons to think this. One is suggested by Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that the point of equality is that we live and relate as equals (Anderson 1999).
This is not without its problems, however, since it might lead to an inter-galactic Repugnant Conclusion, or something very close to it. It is not feasible to address this possibility here.
The arguments of the previous section surely undermine PAP, as the examples there suggest that one situation can be more objectionable than another due to, e.g., discrimination, even if there is no one for whom it is worse. This section builds the case, and shows, in addition, that there is no reason to think that PAP has force in cases where equality is the issue even if it is allowed that it doesn’t when racism, or slavery, is the issue. This is important if we accept Temkin’s view (see footnote 4) that while PAP is false, person-affecting considerations are sometimes persuasive.
As suggested earlier, Temkin himself has more recently explicitly adopted this view.
Andrew Mason’s Conditional Egalitarianism is an example of just such a view (Mason 2000).
Imagine, if you must, that the children are twins or triplets, and are thus the same age, and are by other general criteria “deserving” of equal largesse from grandparents.
Temkin elsewhere argues explicitly that lowering the level of the best-off group can improve things in terms of equality, even if no one is made better off (Temkin 1993a, Chap. 2 and 3, especially section 3.3, and pp. 80, 86–87).
I am assuming that we would not allow that while it is not worse overall, it is nonetheless worse for the children treated unequally. If it is worse for them, in other words, I am assuming that it must be to that extent worse overall.
These are points I have emphasized elsewhere (Weber 1998, forthcoming).
Temkin ultimately adopts this kind of approach (Temkin 1993b, p. 315).
Temkin suggests a similar example in which a small aristocracy is denied special privileges that it once enjoyed (Temkin 1993b, p. 316).
Ingmar Persson suggests a similar view, though he sets a lower standard, according to which equality has no value only if people are leading lives that are not worth living – lives in which what is intrinsically bad outweighs what is intrinsically good (Persson 2001, p. 31). On this view, the equality created by blinding the sighted would be good or valuable, since blind people can surely live lives worth living. It seems to me, then, that the higher standard I set is preferable.
Albert O. Hirschman argues that private parallel systems typically reduce the quality of public systems, because, among other reasons, unsatisfied participants in the public system are able exit the system rather than voice objections that might lead to an improvement in the public system (Hirschman 1970).
What this suggests, I think, is that equality is not a forceful concern when people do not generally enjoy the basic necessities of life (though people will disagree agree about what constitutes the basic necessities). Equality becomes a concern only when people are doing fairly well. This parallels Rawls’ view that his principles of justice, in particular the difference principle, do not apply to impoverished societies.
As Temkin puts it, PAP implies “that one’s theory of outcomes must be a direct function of (perhaps, in a sense, supervenient upon) one’s theory of self-interest” (Temkin 1993b, p. 302).
This is a simplified version of an example from Temkin (1987, pp. 172–173).
Sen explains why this cannot be a completely satisfactory account (Sen 1973, p. 25).
The Gini coefficient is based on this thought (Sen 1973, p. 29–31).
I am assuming, drawing from Jan Narveson, that making people better off is better than making better-off people. Narveson (1973) goes further, arguing that only the former is of any value.
Typically, Nozickeans think that justice is primary, and that whatever unfortunateness there might be in inequality that is the result of just acquisition and transfer does not provide adequate grounds for reducing the inequality.
To be exact, I have argued for an internal aspect, non-historical view of equality, but against a comprehensive internal aspect, non-historical view.
Nozick describes such views as having “current time-slice principles” (Nozick 1974, p. 153).
Temkin would likely reject it as a version of the intrinsic aspect view because he thinks that historical considerations are not part of the “internal structure” of an outcome (Temkin 1987, p. 161).
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Weber, M. Is Equality Essentially Comparative?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 209–226 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9051-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9051-5