Abstract
In this paper, I provide a new solution to the “gamer’s dilemma” (Luck in Ethics Inf Technol 11(1):31–36, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9168-4, 2009) which is an open problem at the intersection of ethics and aesthetics: the problem consists in reconciling two widespread moral intuitions about virtual actions, i.e. that virtual murder is morally permissible whereas virtual paedophilia is not. To solve the problem, I apply a well-known notion coming from the philosophy of fiction, viz. imaginative resistance, which I adapt as ludic resistance. Connecting the two bodies of literature (the philosophy of fiction and the philosophy of video games) is original and, I argue, helpful: first, it solves the problem under discussion; second, it provides a way of looking back at imaginative resistance in an interesting new light. In (video) games, as opposed to traditional, non-ludic fictions, ”resistance” is interpreted against an implicit notion of agency.
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Notes
For simplicity, I follow Luck’s original setting where the wrongdoer is a PC whereas the victim is a non-PC. For the record, I think the intuitions generalise to PC victims, see for instance (Reeves, 2018) for an anthropological study of “ageplay” in Second Life. As for cases where the wrongdoer is a non-PC, given my argument that ludic resistance is tied up to a notion of agency, I expect our moral intuitions to diverge.
In GTA5 PCs are gangsters from Los Santos, a fictional city based on Los Angeles. The gameplay is non-linear, letting players freely roam the city and open countryside when they do not take up a quest.
Two excellent reviews of the rapidly growing literature can be found in the beginnings of Ostritsch (2017) and Montefiore and Formosa (2022). The distinction between “expressivist”: and “consequentialist” solutions is from Ostritsch (2017); that between “intrinsic” and “instrumental” is from Montefiore and Formosa (2022). These distinctions are almost identical: I ignore more subtle distinctions for simplicity here.
As will be seen, imaginative resistance is itself a phenomenon at the intersection of aesthetics and ethics, so this distinguishing of norms will not end up as crystal clear as one might wish them to be.
Walton takes Hume (1757) to be the first philosopher to comment on the phenomenon. Hume, however, does not talk of rejecting some fictional content based on which proposition are to be imagined, but rather suggests that whenever a fiction invites us to imagine some “morally perverse” content, its aesthetic value is greatly diminished. In Hume (1757), one thus find what has later been distinguished as the “aesthetic puzzle” of imaginative resistance in Weatherson (2004). For a useful explanation (and argument for) Hume’s claim, see Eaton (2003).
See especially (Weatherson, 2004) for useful distinctions and examples, and Gendler and Shen-yi (2016) for an opinionated review of problems and possible solutions. See also Tuna’s SEP entry for a comprehensive introduction to the literature. I need not do into the details for the purpose of this paper, though.
As shown in the Montefiore and Formosa (2022)’s thought experiment How low will you go? and Ali (2022)’s distinction between virtual reproduction, simulation and representation, the gamer’s dilemma has something to do with agency, perspective taking and realism and so the games to consider need have these features, that non-fictional games like Tetris typically lack.
“Ludic” is the adjectival form of “game”, not associated with any positive (or negative) connotation, as opposed to, e.g., “playful”.
I owe Nathan Wildman for thinking about these different cases.
The reproduction of this painting can be seen here: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/41/Tizian_085.jpg.
A good part of Nguyen (2020) is about the thesis that games are medium for the communication of agencies and Nguyen explores in part III the way in which games create social patterns for better or worse. I note that, interestingly, Nguyen mentions the gamer’s paradox (only) once in this part III (p. 190), only to dismiss it as a peripheral problem. I think he could have said a lot more constructive things, along the lines I am trying to push here.
For a recent, comprehensive introduction to feminist aesthetics, see: Korsmeyer, Carolyn and Peg Brand Weiser, “Feminist Aesthetics” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/feminism-aesthetics/.
One anonymous reviewer suggested that my position entails that I reduce the moral intuitions on which the gamer’s paradox are based to an internalisation of feminist theory on the wrongness of subordination; they continue by noting that it cannot be right, for many gaming communities never heard of such theories (or even predate them) and still experience ludic resistance; as an example, they cite the infamous 1982 Custer Revenge which rewards players by letting them rape a Native American woman. I do not think one internalises the theory: I presuppose that the phenomenon of subordination that the feminists theorise about provides the underlying cutting point, whether people know about it or not. That being said, it seems plain to me that the theory (aims at) explain(ing) what is wrong about this fact, which clearly predates feminist theories. I take it though that personal ludic resistance could be strengthen by familiarity with some feminist theories. Just like reading feminist theories enhances our perception of social discrimination (and feeling of injustice), but does not create social discrimination.
See for instance the reviews from CVG, Eurogamer, Gaminformer, or Joystiq.
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Acknowledgements
I discovered the gamer’s dilemma thanks to a very insightful informal discussion with Hannah Kim who invited me to inquire into virtual pornography during the British Society of Aesthetics annual conference in September 2022. Shortly afterward, Alexandre Declos gave me an opportunity to present sketchy ideas in a session of the Metaphysics Group of the collège de France, under the title “Is virtual sex sex?”: thanks to all the participants for the questions and suggestions made. In parallel, I shared the sames ideas informally at the Bobigny feminist house-share in a long, heated, and decisive discussion: special thanks to Elvina Le Poul and the housemates on this one. Thanks to Bruno Leclercq, Nathan Wildman, Merel Semeijn, Enrico Terrone (and the Genoa reading group), and Manuel Rebuschi for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I thank two anonymous reviewers for this journal for sending long and challenging reviews. Finally, many thanks to my partner Marion Renauld who never thought I am an appalling father and often wonders about how the next civilisation will look at us.
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Rouillé, L. Ludic resistance: a new solution to the gamer’s paradox. Ethics Inf Technol 26, 32 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09772-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09772-8