Abstract
Recent discussion on the ethics of killer robots has focused on the supposed lack of respect their deployment would show to combatants targeted, thereby causing their undignified deaths. I present two rebuttals of this argument. The weak rebuttal maintains that while deploying killer robots is an affront to the dignity of combatants, their use should nevertheless be thought of as a pro tanto wrong, making deployment permissible if the affront is outweighed by some right-making feature. This rebuttal is, however, vulnerable (but not insurmountably so) to the charge that killer robots would cause unnecessary suffering. The strong rebuttal, in contrast, argues that the use of killer robots would not disrespect the dignity of combatants, for reasons discussed. I also argue that, irrespective of whether killer robots disrespect the dignity of combatants, they would not necessarily bring about their undignified deaths: for one can maintain dignity in the face of indignity.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The responsibility gap concerns who is ultimately responsible for the actions of killer robots given that, by design, they are able to make autonomous decisions about who lives and who dies.
The essence of the argument is this: If one has a choice between using a killer robot (incapable of acting for the right reason) and a human combatant (capable of acting for the right reason), even where the outcome is the same (e.g., justifiably killing an enemy combatant), deploying the human combatant is the morally superior choice.
I thank the anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this point.
The concept of an inherent, inalienable dignity, synonymous with or constitutive of humanity’s innate capacity for autonomy, is metaphysically problematic. As Coghlan (2018) asks: How can dignity, so constituted, be inalienable given that autonomy, and rationality are not inalienable? After all, autonomy and rationality may be absent in certain members of humanity (those with severe learning difficulties or in a permanent vegetative state, for example). This issue need not concern us, however, given that our interest is in the dignity of combatants who, by their very nature, possess the aforementioned capacity for autonomous rational thought and action, and are therefore held to be moral agents. Even if we side-step this issue, Macklin (2003) and Pinker (2008) complain that dignity is a subjective and imprecise term used to describe what we already think of as respect for a person’s autonomy (see also Alpinar-Şencan et al., 2017). For the purpose of this paper, I am happy to continue using the term ‘dignity’ for convenience, even though I take respecting one’s dignity to be synonymous with respecting one’s rational autonomy.
Webster (2016) likewise distinguishes between dignity that is intrinsic and dignity that is variable.
Purves et al. (2015) briefly suggest something similar.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996.
IHL Volume II, Chapter 20, Section A, Rule 70.
The Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effect (CCW), 2003.
Of course, there is a risk that in order to retaliate effectively against killer robots the combatants would need to construct more powerful weapons which, in turn, would lead to more advanced killer robots to counter the retaliatory prowess of the combatants’ arsenal, possibly leading to a killer-robot induced arms race. This could then defeat any humanitarian advantage (in terms of saving lives) first envisaged by those seeking to deploy killer robots. Leveringhaus (2016) makes a similar point. I thank the anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this.
References
Allmark, P. (2002). Death with dignity. Journal of Medical Ethics, 28(4), 255–257.
Alpinar-Şencan, Z., Baumann, H., & Biller-Andorno, N. (2017). Does organ selling violate human dignity? Monash Bioethics Review, 34(3–4), 189–205.
Amoroso, D. (2017). Jus in bello and jus ad bellum arguments against autonomy in weapons systems: A re-appraisal. Questions of International Law: Zoom-in, 43, 5–31.
Arrington, R. L. (1978). On respect. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 12(1), 1–12.
Asaro, P. (2012). On banning autonomous lethal systems: Human rights, automation and the dehumanizing of lethal decision-making, special issue on new technologies and warfare. International Review of the Red Cross, 94(886), 687–709.
Bagnoli, C. (2007). Respect and membership in the moral community. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10(2), 113–128.
Benditt, T. M. (2008). Why respect matters. The Journal of value Inquiry, 42(4), 487–496.
Birnbacher, d. (2016). Are autonomous weapons systems a threat to human dignity? In N. Bhuta, S. Beck, R. Geib, H. Liu, & C. Kreb (Eds.), Autonomous weapons systems: Law, ethics, policy. (pp. 105–121). Cambridge University Press.
Bonnemains, V., Saurel, C., & Tessier, C. (2018). Embedded ethics: Some technical and ethical challenges. Ethics and Information Technology, 20(1), 41–58.
Burri, S. (2018). What is the moral problem with killer robots? In B. J. Strawser, R. Jenkins, & M. Robillard (Eds.), Who should die: The ethics of killing in war. (pp. 163–185). Oxford University Press.
Buss, S. (1999). Respect for persons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29(4), 517–550.
Camus, A. (1991). The myth of Sisyphus and other essays. Vintage (trans. J. O’Brien) (Originally published in French 1942).
Carter, I. (2013). Are toleration and respect compatible? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(3), 195–208.
Coghlan, S. (2018). The moral depth of human dignity. Philosophical Investigations, 41(1), 70–93.
Cranor, C. F. (1983). On respecting human beings as persons. Journal of Value Inquiry, 17(2), 103–117.
Darwall, S. L. (1977). Two kinds of respect. Ethics, 88(1), 36–49.
Dawkins, R. (1995). River out of Eden: A Darwinian view of life. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Dean, R. (2014). Respect for the unworthy. Pacific Philosophy Quarterly, 95(3), 293–313.
Frankena, W. K. (1986). The ethics of respect for persons. Philosophical Topics, 14(2), 149–167.
Garcia, D. (2015). Killer robots: Why the US should lead the ban. Global Policy, 6(1), 57–63.
Gilbert, P. (2005). Proportionality in the conduct of war. Journal of Military Ethics, 4(2), 100–107.
Gluchman, V. (2017). Nature of dignity and human dignity. Human Affairs, 27(2), 131–144.
Green, L. (2010). Two worries about respect for persons. Ethics, 120(2), 212–231.
Grinbaum, A., Chatila, R., Devillers, L., Ganascia, J. G., Tessier, C., & Dauchet, M. (2017). Ethics in robotics research: CERNA recommendations. IEEE Robotics and Automation Magazine. https://doi.org/10.1109/MRA.2016.2611586.
Heyns, C. (2017). Autonomous weapons in armed conflict and the right to a dignified life: An African perspective. South African Journal on Human Rights, 33(1), 46–71.
Hudson, S. D. (1980). The nature of respect. Social Theory and Practice, 6(1), 69–90.
Human Rights Watch. (2016). Making the case: The dangers of killer robots and the need for a preemptive ban. Retrieved June 15, 2020, from https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/09/making-case/dangers-killer-robots-and-need-preemptive-ban
Jenkins, R., & Purves, D. (2016). Robots and respect: A response to Robert Sparrow. Ethics and International Affairs, 30(3), 391–400.
Johnson, A. M., & Axinn, S. (2013). The morality of autonomous robots. Journal of Military Ethics, 12(2), 129141.
Kant, I. (2011). Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge University Press (Originally published 1785).
Killmister, S. (2017). Dignity: Personal, social, human. Philosophical Studies, 174(8), 2063–2082.
Leveringhaus, A. (2016). Ethics and autonomous weapons. Palgrave Macmillan.
Leveringhaus, A. (2018). What’s so bad about killer robots? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 35(2), 341–358.
Lim, D. (2019). Killer robots and human dignity. In: AIES ’19: Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 171–176. Retrieved July 13, 2020, from https://doi.org/10.1145/3306618.3314291
Macklin, R. (2003). Dignity is a useless concept: It means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy. British Medical Journal, 327(7429), 1149–1420.
Njoya, W. (2017). Dignity as non-discrimination: Existential protests and legal claim-making for reproductive rights. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 43(1), 51–82.
Nordenfelt, L. (2004). The varieties of dignity. Health Care Analysis, 12(2), 69–81.
Pinker, S. (2008). The stupidity of dignity: Conservative bioethics latest, most dangerous ploy. The New Republic, 238, 28–31.
Pop, A. (2018). Autonomous weapons systems: A threat to human dignity? Humanitarian Law and Policy, ICRC blog. Retrieved June 17, 2018, from https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/04/10/autonomous-weapon-systems-a-threat-to-human-dignity/
Purves, D., Jenkins, R., & Strawser, B. J. (2015). Autonomous machines, moral judgment, and acting for the right reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(4), 851–872.
Rawls, J. (1972). A theory of justice. Oxford University Press.
Robbins, B. D. (2016). The heart of humanistic psychology: Human dignity disclosed through a hermeneutic of love. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 56(3), 223–237.
Robillard, M. (2018). No such thing as killer robots. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 35(4), 705–717.
Rosert, E., & Sauer, F. (2019). Prohibiting autonomous weapons: Put human dignity first. Global Policy, 10(3), 370–375.
Saxton, A. (2016). (Un)dignified killer robots? The problem with the human dignity argument. Lawfare blog. Retrieved June 17, 2020, from https://www.lawfareblog.com/undignified-killer-robots-problem-human-dignity-argument
Sharkey, A. (2019). Autonomous weapons systems, killer robots and human dignity. Ethics and Information Technology, 21(2), 75–87.
Sharkey, N. (2010). Saying ‘No!’ to lethal autonomous targeting. Journal of Military Ethics, 9(4), 369–383.
Singer, P. (1986). All animals are equal. In P. Singer (Ed.), Applied ethics (pp. 215–228). Oxford University Press.
Skerker, M., Purves, D., & Jenkins, R. (2020). Autonomous weapons systems and the moral equality of combatants. Ethics and Information Technology, 22(886), 1–13.
Sparrow, R. (2007). Killer robots. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24(1), 62–77.
Sparrow, R. (2016). Robots and respect: Assessing the case against autonomous weapons systems. Ethics and International Affairs, 30(1), 93–116.
Sullins, J. P. (2010). RoboWarfare: Can robots be more ethical than humans on the battlefield? Ethics and Information Technology, 12(3), 263–275.
Sulmasy, D. P. (2009). Dignity and bioethics: History, theory, and selected applications. In E. D. Pellegrino, A. Schulman, & T. W. Merrill (Eds.), Human dignity and bioethics (pp. 469–501). University of Notre Dame Press.
Sussman, D. (2005). What’s wrong with torture? Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33(1), 1–33.
Ulgen, O. (2016). Human dignity in an age of autonomous weapons: Are we in danger of losing an ‘elementary consideration of humanity’? SSRN Electronic journal, 8(9), 1–19 ESSIL conference paper series.
Waldron, J. (2012). Dignity, rank, and rights. Oxford University Press.
Webster, E. (2016). Interpretation of the prohibition of torture: Making sense of ‘dignity’ talk. Human Rights Review, 17, 371–390.
Zylberman, A. (2016). Human dignity. Philosophy Compass, 11(4), 201–210.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Young, G. On the indignity of killer robots. Ethics Inf Technol 23, 473–482 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-021-09590-2
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-021-09590-2