Doxing: a conceptual analysis

The term ‘doxing’ comes from the phrase ‘dropping documents’ or ‘dropping dox’ on someone, which was a form of revenge in 1990s outlaw hacker culture that involved uncovering and revealing the identity of people who fostered anonymity (Honan 2014). The term is already prominent enough to be included in formal dictionaries. For instance, the Oxford British and World English Dictionary defines doxing as to “[s]earch for and publish private or identifying information about (a particular individual) on the Internet, typically with malicious intent” (Oxford Dictionaries 2015). As the Oxford definition suggests, doxing does not necessarily have to be motivated by malice. Several high-profile incidents of so-called ‘doxing’ involved journalists revealing the identities of formerly pseudonymous Internet identities (Chen 2012a; Goodman 2014). Despite this, doxing is a term with negative connotations: labeling these accounts as ‘doxing’ suggests that the journalists involved have acted wrongly in revealing personal information about a pseudonymous individual (Beaujon 2014). Examining the concept in more detail by considering the different kinds of personal information that may be released will help to determine whether doxing is necessarily or primarily a malicious act.

Being identified by some of these types will be greater threats to anonymity than others. For example, being identified as an adult male in a large European city does little to reduce my anonymity, as it does not easily allow someone to gain other types of identity knowledge about me. However, being identified by name and address makes maintaining my anonymity more difficult as this information can be easily used to establish other types of identity knowledge. Knowing my name allows someone to search public records and databases (to say nothing of the Internet) for further information about me. Knowing my address allows others to encounter me in person and observe my movements, habits, physical appearance and characteristics. In Marx’s classification, these observations establish pattern knowledge and social categorization identity information about me.

Using Marx’s categorization, I suggest that doxing should be understood as releasing publically a type of identity knowledge about an individual (the subject of doxing) that establishes a verifiable connection between it and another type (or types) of identity knowledge about that person. The verifiability of doxing distinguishes it from other forms of exposure and publicity. As the origins of the term ‘doxing’ (‘dropping documents’ or ‘dropping dox’) suggest, it utilizes documentary evidence of identity knowledge.

Different types of identity knowledge are documented in different forms. Identity knowledge relating to personal details used for administrative purposes may be recorded in official records or documents, such as birth certificates, tax returns, employment records, and so on. Such documents may reveal legal name, locatability, and pseudonyms that are connected to an individual’s name or location. Documents that describe unique characteristics possessed by an individual in a pseudonymous record that is unrelated to her name or location may reveal further identity knowledge if it can be cross-referenced with other information. This possibility exists where medical records are not sufficiently anonymized. Symbols of eligibility may document themselves (such as railway tickets) or may be documented through records of such symbols being granted to an individual, such as graduating from a university. Similarly, official documentation will exist for symbols of eligibility being withheld or taken from an individual.

Other types of identity knowledge, such as pattern knowledge and social characterization, are documented in other ways. Frequently updated location information, such as stored by mobile devices that record their location, may reveal an individual’s daily routine, and so establish pattern knowledge about that individual.² Social characterization may be established through photographs and imagery recorded about a person and her behaviour. Such characterization will often be up to the interpretation of the observer, and may be misleading if the images are taken out of context or presented in a biased manner. This is especially the case with activities that are invested with social or symbolic significance, or which challenge entrenched beliefs and expectations. For example, images of a woman wearing revealing clothing or expressing her sexuality may be used to mock or humiliate her for not conforming to traditional notions of female behavior and gender roles (Poole 2013).

Doxing should be distinguished from related concepts such as blackmail, defamation, and gossip. Unlike blackmail, doxing does not involve making a demand to the subject to prevent information being released. A blackmailer only releases information if the victim does not comply with the blackmailer’s demands. While the threat of doxing can serve as blackmail, doxing itself is not blackmail.

Defamation also involves the public release of information with the intention to humiliate, threaten, intimidate, or punish the subject. However, for information to be defamatory it must reveal something damaging to the reputation of the person (or people) described. Doxing does not necessarily have to reveal something questionable or embarrassing about the person involved. As I will describe later, while one form of doxing aims to harm the subject’s reputation, doxing itself does not necessarily involve releasing such information.

Finally, doxing differs from gossip (even malicious gossip) in that it relies on releasing actual (or believed to be actual) identity knowledge rather than suggestion, hearsay and innuendo. Bok (1989:93) defines gossip as “informal personal communication about other people who are absent or treated as absent” (numbering of features omitted). While doxing can be formal or informal (i.e. consist of official documents or records, or accurate informal accounts), it is the difference between communicating information about someone and communicating information of someone. To illustrate this with a benign example, consider the difference between claiming ‘X wore a pink tutu at a funeral’ and releasing a photo of X wearing a pink tutu at a funeral. The first is an instance of gossip, while the second is a form of doxing.³ The photograph serves as documentation of the claim being made about X, and is evidence that can be verified. Under Marx’s classification of identity knowledge, it is social characterization knowledge as it documents X’s apparent disregard for social norms. Merely telling a friend about X’s poor taste in funeral attire does not provide this documentary evidence.

Before examining the different forms of doxing in detail, I will establish the value of what doxing endangers: the subject’s obscurity and anonymity. Doxing undermines what Ruth Gavison calls “our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention” (1980:423). The subject no longer controls some aspect of identity knowledge about her, which reduces her ability to decide what she reveals about herself and to whom she reveals it. This control is an important aspect of a person’s identity. We reveal some aspects of ourselves to some people but not to others. Our relationships with others are shaped by what we choose reveal to them and what they decide to reveal to us. Our identities and the social value attached to them (i.e. reputation and public persona) are difficult to build and easy to lose. Even forfeiting some degree of such control is a way of establishing one’s own identity. Choosing to publicly document one’s experiences and movements are decisions individuals make about how they wish to present themselves to others. Influencing how others perceive you is a vital part of establishing who you are (and crucially, who you are not) as a person.

As Marx’s list suggests, anonymity and obscurity are both forms of protection.⁴ It can disguise attributes that may prejudice how others receive someone’s work and ideas, such as gender, race, ethnicity, or class. It is anonymity’s protective value that makes doxing particularly harmful in Internet communication, as it removes the subject’s anonymity without an equivalent loss of anonymity for the attacker.

Collecting different types of identity knowledge about an individual can be regarded as building a ‘dossier’ on that person.⁵ Dossier building involves the “compilation, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information on individuals” (Reichel 1977: 265). The opportunities created by the Internet for gathering personal information have effectively democratized dossier building. Now almost anyone with the desire and the time to search for another’s personal information has the tools and information sources available for her to do so.

I now describe each category of doxing in further detail.

I now discuss whether any instances of doxing are justifiable. I will argue that deanonymizing doxing may be acceptable depending on the rationale for anonymity and if there is a compelling public interest justification for revealing someone’s identity. I also claim that delegitimizing doxing may be permissible if it exposes evidence of actual wrongdoing of public interest, and that the information revealed must only be sufficient to establish that such wrongdoing has occurred. I will argue that targeting doxing is unjustifiable, as it deliberately increases the risk of physical harm to the subject. In all cases, however, the burden of proof is on whoever wishes to disclose identity knowledge about the subject to justify why her anonymity or obscurity should be removed.

The motivation behind doxing is significant for deciding whether it is defensible or not. Doxing as a form of intimidation is unacceptable as it attempts to silence the subject and prevent her from participating in social, political, and public activity. All three types of doxing may be used for intimidation. Deanonymization intimidates those who adopt a pseudonym or seek anonymity to express unpopular or controversial views that they are otherwise uncomfortable in expressing. Targeting doxing increases the ease with which someone may be physically harassed or harmed. Delegitimization vilifies the subject, inspiring further harassment and reducing the likelihood that her opinions will be given the public respect that they might otherwise receive.

My arguments place considerable weight on the concept of ‘public interest’. My interpretation of the concept is based on two claims by Bok (1989): “[t]he public has a legitimate interest […] in all information about matters that might affect its welfare” (1989:258) and that information reported to the public that only satisfies their curiosity rather than affects their welfare must take into account the privacy of those affected. These two claims reflect the public/private distinction common to liberal political philosophy. Deanonymizing and delegitimizing doxing are acceptable only if they concern matters that affect the welfare of the public. If we accept that individuals should have control over who has access to identity knowledge about herself, the burden of proof should be on whoever attempts to reveal such information to justify why revealing it is in the public interest. If they are to be justified, deanonymizing and delegitimizing doxing cannot be indiscriminate: it must reveal only the identity knowledge that is relevant to establish wrongdoing by a specific individual. Such doxing can be considered analogous to whistle blowing that reveals wrongdoing by or within organizations.

Particular instances of doxing could be justified if there are allegations of legal wrongdoing, or if there is a legitimate public interest reason for establishing someone’s identity. This would seem to rule out most (if not all) cases of targeting doxing, as these cases are intended to intimidate and promote further harassment of the subject. The legitimacy of doxing depends on the motivations behind publically releasing some of the subject’s identity knowledge and the foreseeable risks of harm to the subject from doing so. An instance of deanonymizing doxing, therefore, might be justified on a consequentialist basis if the benefits to the public of exposing wrongdoing or deception outweigh the foreseeable harms to the subject due to her loss of obscurity.

An author using a pen name, for instance, does not seem to be a compelling target for deanonymization on public interest grounds if the pen name is not used to deceive readers and is merely a way for a writer to adopt different personas for different styles and genres of writing. Revealing that Charles Dodgson was Lewis Carroll does not seem to be particularly compelling from a public interest standpoint as there is nothing inherent deceptive in the claims made by the two personas. The rationales of play and promoting experimentation are frequently the motivations for adopting these personas (rationales 12 and 13 from Marx’s list), rather than any attempt to deceive. Pen names for authors and stage names for performing artists are often little more than designations of public personas, and offer little in the way of anonymity or obscurity. Revealing that the musician Bono was born Paul Hewson does little (if anything) to affect the meaning of his music or his political and social activism. While deanonymization does not seem particularly troubling in these cases, there also seems to be little reason for doing so other than satisfying curiosity.

So-called ‘cross-penning’, where an author adopts a pen name of a different gender, is slightly more problematic as it may be intended to mislead the reader. However, here the pseudonym is often adopted to lend the work credibility and allow it to be judged on its own merits rather than unfairly influenced by gender bias. This is the rationale of wishing to keep attention to the work itself rather than to its creator (rationale 3 from Marx’s list). George Sand, the pen name of Armandine Dudevant, is just one example (Levmore 1996). Given the disproportionate chances of women receiving misogynistic hate speech for their writings on the Internet, female authors sometimes adopt masculine names as a means of avoiding becoming targets for online abuse (including doxing) (Citron 2014). Cross-penning in these cases is both an attempt to have their work judged fairly and as a means of protection against harassment. However, this does not extend to literary hoaxes where the author falsely claims to have personal experiences or attributes that lend unjustified credibility to her work. Autobiographies that feature elaborate false accounts of the author’s circumstances and experiences are one example (Manning 2012). It is more plausible to argue in such cases that the author is being deceptive in these cases, as they are not motivated by a desire to focus attention on the work itself but on how the falsely claimed characteristics of the author lend credibility to the work.

Ghostwriting is an interesting case where the problem is reversed: the actual author is not the attributed author. Ghostwriters are often an ‘open secret’: it is assumed that many public figures use ghostwriters to produce works published in their name (Goldacre 2012). At best, employing a ghostwriter allows for the attributed ‘author’ to better express her own ideas. At worst, the ‘author’ is misrepresenting her abilities to the readers of ‘her’ work. If ghostwriting is used to obscure the source or interests of the actual author, then there is a public interest justification for revealing this. For example, such justifications exist in the case of medical research, where the information published may be used to decide on medical treatment and to direct future research (Ngai et al. 2005). The names of seemingly independent researchers are sometimes attached (with their permission) to pharmaceutical studies to obscure the fact that were primarily designed and conducted by pharmaceutical company researchers (Goldacre 2012). Revealing the use of ghostwriters to gain unwarranted credibility for published works would be delegitimizing doxing with a public interest justification.

I now return to the two specific instances of deanonymizing doxing described earlier: Satoshi Nakamoto and Violentacrez. Is there a public interest justification for deanonymizing Satoshi Nakamoto? It depends on whether identifying Nakamoto is merely satisfying public curiosity or establishing information that benefits the public. There is certainly historical interest in establishing the identity of the creator (or creators) of such an influential technology. The anonymity of Bitcoin’s creator may also raise suspicions about the intent behind creating it. However, given that both the theory behind Bitcoin and the source code of the software implementing it are open to public review and revision, it seems unlikely that there is anything malicious within the design and implementation of Bitcoin itself. The pseudonym is unlikely to have been adopted to deceive others for Nakamoto’s benefit, and the adopting the pseudonym offers Nakamoto protection against unwanted interference and outside interest. Discovering Satoshi Nakamoto’s identity would certainly be interesting given Bitcoin’s influence and technical merit, but there seems little public benefit (in the sense that it would better inform the public in matters that affect it) in revealing this information beyond satisfying this curiosity. There does not appear to be a strong reason for removing the actual creator (or creators) of Bitcoin from self-imposed obscurity.

The case of Satoshi Nakamoto raises another important point: does doxing in any form have to be accurate to be harmful? I suggest that the credibility that releasing documentary evidence has is important for what makes doxing particularly harmful, as it cannot be simply dismissed as gossip or hearsay. Through no fault of his own, Dorian Satoshi Nakamoto lost his obscurity after the allegations that he was ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ were published. Inaccurate or out-of-date personal information released as targeting doxing could lead to unconnected individuals being harassed. Inaccurate or false doxing may not be as harmful to the subject as accurate doxing, but it is still an attempt to remove the subject’s anonymity or obscurity, and may harm others who are wrongly identified as the subject individual.

Is there a public interest in revealing the identity of Violentacrez? Again, it is not straightforward that disclosing Violentacrez’s identity is in the public’s interest or just something to satisfy the public’s curiosity. Unlike Dorian Satoshi Nakamoto, Michael Brutsch acknowledged that he was ‘Violentacrez’, and so his own actions under that pseudonym led to his loss of obscurity. Violentacrez’s actions were certainly (and deliberately) offensive to many people, and the deanonymizing doxing forced him to stop. Distinguishing between offensive speech and hate speech offers a potential justification for this deanonymization. Hate speech expresses claims that those with certain characteristics (such as gender, race, or sexual preference) are inferior in moral worth and little more than objects to be used and exploited (Citron 2014). There is a public interest in resisting such expression as it promotes harmful divisions within society. Hate speech damages the perception (and if left unaddressed, eventually the treatment) of such people as moral agents equal to ourselves that we have duties toward and with rights of their own (Waldron 2010). In the case of Violentacrez, many of the sub-reddits that he created or moderated (such as ‘chokeabitch’ and ‘rapebait’) may be classified as ‘hate speech’ or objectification. Deanonymization might be justified as a means of limiting or stopping such hate speech by increasing the speaker’s accountability.

A strong objection to this conclusion is that such deanonymizing doxing risks of turning into the private enforcement of public laws and moral standards, and has the potential to further develop into vigilantism. Trottier suggests the term ‘digital vigilantism’ for “a process where citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity, and respond through coordinated retaliation on digital media” (2016:2). The identity knowledge revealed through deanonymization makes it considerably easier to perform targeting and delegitimizing doxing of the subject. While it may appear to be ‘just desserts’ for a hate speaker to be harassed, it should be rejected on the same grounds that the intimidation promoted by targeting doxing is rejected.

Another objection is the concern that the costs and harms of deanonymization to the individual concerned outweigh the social benefits of making her accountability for offensive behavior. Consider a situation where someone uses a pseudonym to express controversial views that could be portrayed as harmful to the public interest, such as seditious comments or questioning strongly held religious or social beliefs in ways that are not hate speech. Those who object to such views might justify deanonymizing this person on public interest grounds. This would return deanonymizing doxing to being a tool for intimidating those with unpopular views rather than as a means of making those who cause harm through their anonymous or pseudonymous actions accountable.

The Violentacrez case is a good illustration of this second objection. The deanonymization was used to shame Michael Brutsch and harm him materially, as he lost his job through being deanonymized.¹² Had he not been protected by his pseudonym, it is likely he would have acted differently. If we accept that at least some of Violentacrez’s postings were hate speech and objectification, that there is a public interest in controlling expressions of such speech. However, given the material harms that he would foreseeably suffer as a result of anonymization, it is worth considering what alternatives were available for stopping the hate speech from taking place. In this instance, there is a clear alternative: the site operators should have removed his deliberately offensive postings and sub-forums from Reddit. This alternative may be challenged by claims that it limits freedom of expression, but it may be defended if freedom of expression is not considered to be an absolute right that cannot be limited by other rights (Waldron 2010).

Another response is to emphasize that accountability should go both ways in deanonymizing someone: whoever performs the deanonymization should not be anonymous or pseudonymous herself. In both the ‘Nakamoto’ and Violentacrez examples is that the persons revealing identity knowledge about the subjects were not themselves anonymous. The journalists involved did not use anonymity as a means of avoiding responsibility for their actions. Journalists also have editors and their own professional judgment about what is in the public interest to reveal in news stories. Revealing information under a legal name makes it easier to be held accountable for doing so. This accountability does not in itself legitimize doxing, as there are other protections that those revealing information may enjoy that are unavailable to the subject. Private individuals are unlikely to be able to afford costly legal disputes with media enterprises that reveal their personal information. Nonetheless, this offers a potential solution for difficult cases where it is not clear whether there is a public interest in revealing someone’s identity or not.

Finally, I will briefly consider the possibility of targeting and delegitimizing doxing that is claimed to be the public interest. Exposing corruption is often used to justify doxing or Internet campaigns that feature doxing. An example is the so-called ‘Gamergate’ controversy, which its defenders claim is an attempt to expose corruption in computer games journalism.¹³ Quinn’s relationship with the journalist Nathan Grayson had no effect on how her game was reviewed, as Grayson’s published work only mentioned her game in passing and did not actually review it (Mantilla 2015). The ‘exposing corruption’ justification is further weakened by the forms of doxing used on Quinn (particularly targeting doxing) and Gjoni’s apparent motivation behind releasing delegitimizing information, which appears to be a desire to punish his former girlfriend (Mantilla 2015). The public interest should not justify any instance of doxing that objectifies the subject, as objectification portrays the target as unworthy of personhood, without legitimate interests of her own that should also be recognized (Nussbaum 2010).