Abstract
This paper proposes an account of natural analogy in scientific theorizing via Mary Hesse’s original understanding of analogical reasoning. Starting with discussing Hesse’s examples and her symbolic scheme, I argue that the traditional distinction between the type of formal analogy and the type of material analogy should be abandoned. All analogies in theorizing, that are both formal and material, contain a set of pretheoretic associations and a theoretic structure between two analogues. I thus provide a new interpretation of Hesse’s symbolic scheme to reveal the pretheoretical and the structural dimensions of analogy and further illustrate the account of natural analogy by applying it to the history of the construction of Coulomb’s law, which is traditionally seen as a typical case of formal analogy, arguing that pretheoretic associations as well as a theoretic structure play a necessary role in this case. In the final part of this paper, I argue that the account of natural analogy is preferable to Dedre Gentner’s structural mapping theory.
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Notes
Regarding Hesse’s account, Bartha comments: “Even though I reject Hesse's assumption about similarity and her requirement of material analogy, I think that much is right about her ‘commonsense’ theory. I have suggested replacing her causal condition with a more general requirement that the vertical relations in the source domain may be causal, logical, statistical, or other relations that reflect a ‘tendency to co-occurrence’” (Bartha 2010, p. 44). It is worth discussing Bartha’s account, but I leave it for another occasion because of the limited space.
In Chapter One of Models and Analogies in Science, Hesse simulates a dialogue between a Duhemist and a Campbellian. The Duhemist argues that two analogues in an analogy can be reduced to two instances that are deduced from a formal theory. By contrast, the Campbellian argues that analogy cannot be reduced to a deduction of instances from a formal theory. The key element is the very pretheoretic relations.
Heilbron (1979, p. 464) gives such comments on Priestley’s experiment: “it is not a demonstration, or even a proper enunciation, of the law of squares. For one, Priestley gives us no warrant for equating the ‘attraction of electricity’ with the force of a particle of electrical matter. Apart from that, he requires not Newton’s theorem—that a uniform gravitating shell exerts no force on a mass point anywhere inside it—but the converse, which he certainly could not prove. Again, a bucket is not a spherical shell. The force of gravity does not vanish within a uniform can; that of electricity does, except near the mouth, because the mobile electrical matter arranges itself on the external surface so as to nullify its action within… Finally, it appears from Priestley’s explanation of the electrification of corks grounded while hanging in the charged can that he did not fully understand his parallel. His sketchy argument did help solidify opinion, and it pointed further”.
Robison describes the instrument and the experiment in Section 85 of Volume 4 (Robison 1822, pp. 69–73). Regarding the figure of the electrometer, see Appendix, Plate I, Figures 15 and 16. Robison’s law of electricity is not yet a complete form of “Coulomb’s law,” so I won’t discuss his experiment in details in this paper.
The original: “que l’action répulsive que les deux balles électrifées de la même nature d’électricité exercent l’une sur l’autre, suit la raison inverse du carré des distances”.
The original: “que la force attractive des deux balles électrifées,……, étoit en raison inverse du carré des distances du centre de ces deux balles, même rapport déjà trouvé pour la force répulsive”.
It is noteworthy that there are many ensuing developments and applications of SMT in the journal, Cognitive Science. However, the comparison will be limited to Gentner’s (1983) paper, because it is relevant to the case discussed in this paper.
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Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their very valuable comments that substantively help improve this article. I thank Otávio Bueno, Alexandre Guay, Jonathon Hricko, Jean-Sebástien Bolduc for their very helpful comments and suggestions on the draft or on the revised version. I also thank all of the audience who attended the conferences where I presented the draft of this paper.
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Chen, RL. Natural Analogy: A Hessean Approach to Analogical Reasoning in Theorizing. Erkenn 87, 2285–2306 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00302-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00302-8