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Epistemic Slurs: A Novel Explicandum and Adequacy Constraint for Slur Theories

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Abstract

I argue that there are slurs that are distinctly derogatory insofar as they only derogate their target’s epistemic faculties or capacities qua group member. I call these slurs epistemic slurs. Given that slur theories should explain the derogatory nature of all slurs, any comprehensive slur theory should be able to explain the derogatory nature of the epistemic slurs. I argue, however, that two particular expressivist theories of slurs cannot explain their distinctive derogatory nature. The epistemic slurs thus constitute a novel explanatory problem for these expressivist slur theories. Yet I argue that a semantic theory of slurs, combinatorial externalism, can explain the distinctive derogatory nature of the epistemic slurs in which case these slurs constitute a novel explanatory advantage for combinatorial externalism. Whether the epistemic slurs constitute a novel explanatory problem or advantage for any other slur theories remains to be seen.

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Notes

  1. Thanks to Tim Sundell, Clare Batty, James Lincoln, Colin Smith, Luvell Anderson, Michael Rieppel, Kevan Edwards, Byron Simmons, and Evelyn Hudson for repeated, helpful feedback and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 

  2. This shorthand is Whiting’s (2013).

  3. This slur was featured in the movies Platoon and, more recently, Gran Torino.

  4. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify the distinction between epistemic slurs and epistemic insults.

  5. Given footnote 34 in Copp (2001), both Copp and Bach would plausibly endorse this distinction.

  6. I say ‘purported’ because Hom and May (2013) argue that slurs have empty extensions. Henceforth when I say ‘extension’ I mean ‘purported extension’.

  7. That some slurs can have an extension that is the subset of the extension of another slur is familiar. To illustrate, consider the outdated slur for African American children ‘pickaninny’ and the slur ‘nigger’. The extension of the former (the set of African-American children) is a subset of the extension of the latter (the set of African-Americans). Thanks to Luvell Anderson for these examples.

  8. They also plausibly exhibit others features that are exhibited by slurs in general—e.g., what Hom (2008, pp. 426–427) calls meaningfulness, linguistic appropriation, and derogatory autonomy. Moreover, like slurs in general the epistemic slurs exhibit neither infixation nor syntactic variability (cf. Hom 2010).

  9. The same holds for other epistemic slurs like ‘retard’.

  10. For more information, see “Suspended Teacher: Students call themselves idiot, retarded,” The Seattle Times (April 28, 2016).

  11. For arguments to the contrary, see Ashwell (2016) and Croom (2015).

  12. To illustrate, consider again ‘pickaninny’ and ‘nigger’. Both have different extensions. The extension of the former is a subset of the latter’s extension. Nevertheless, one can still use the neutral expression ‘African-American’ as a non-pejorative correlate to pick out without thereby derogating any African American person, regardless of their age. Thanks to Luvell Anderson for this point.

  13. Thanks to an anonymous referree for this example.

  14. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this objection.

  15. These are not necessary conditions for when a pejorative term is an epistemic slur. These are merely features of the even-numbered slurs above, which are all instances of a type of group-based, aspectual, racial slur—epistemic slurs.

  16. This concession does not undercut the significance of what I am trying to point out. Even granting this concession the even-numbered slurs that I identify are still undiscussed and derogatory in a way that sets their derogatory nature apart from generic, racial (or gendered) group-based slurs in which case any adequate theory of slurs should explain them. It would be interesting to see how (and whether) the sundry slur theories can accommodate epistemic slurs.

  17. The pure expressivist theory clearly cannot explain why epistemic slurs are distinctively derogatory. The reason is that on this theory slurs have no descriptive content whatsoever. Yet to felicitously use one of the epistemic slurs (or any slur) is to minimally communicate that the target belongs to some group. So, I will not discuss this view further. For further critique of the view, see Croom (2014).

  18. I borrow this label from Camp (2013) and Bach (2014).

  19. I adapt this formulation from Hom (2010).

  20. I adapt this from Camp (2013, p. 332).

  21. Ashwell (2016, p. 231) might call this a ‘simple hybrid expressivism’.

  22. This is Hom’s (2010) label.

  23. Which gesture at issue with any given slur use is unclear. Moreover, Hom (2010, p. 171) is also correct that the distinction between (GE) and (HE) is murky. In fact, one might thus think that gesturalist expressivism is a just a kind of hybrid expressivist view. However, my only taxonomic claim here is this: (PE), (HE), and (GE) are all expressivist theories of slurs. I make no claim about how these theories related to each other beyond that.

  24. I borrow talk of ‘lobbing content’ from Camp (2013, p. 323).

  25. Note that (HE) is a characterization of a particular, simple hybrid expressivist view—not a characterization of the core commitment of all hybrid expressivist views. The same will hold for the combinatorial externalist (CE) theory, which will be introduced in Sect. 4. (CE) is not expressive of the core commitment of all semantic theories of slurs. So, my arguments that the (HE) and (CE) views cannot explain epistemic slurs is not to say that no hybrid expressivist or combinatorial externalist view can explain the epistemic slurs. Whether more nuanced and sophisticated views can explain the epistemic slurs above remains to be seen. Moreover, if other such views can then this should be shown. For if other views can explain the distinctive derogatory nature of epistemic slurs, these views will have an explanatory advantage over the (CE), (GE), and (HE) views.

  26. They disagree only about how this content is characterized.

  27. Here the analysis involves an epistemically-loaded gesture. Thanks to James Lincoln and Colin Smith for this example.

  28. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this example.

  29. That these arguments apply to both of these theories should come as no surprise: for, as I mentioned in footnote 25 above, it seems plausible to think of gesturalist expressivism as a variant of hybrid expressivism.

  30. As Sennet and Copp (2015, p. 1084) rightly notice, this is what distinguishes (CE) from Hom’s later attempt of a semantic theory of slurs (Hom and May 2013).

  31. Thanks to Tim Sundell for this suggestion.

  32. This is dubious, though. On Hom’s (2008) view, the meaning slur ‘zip’ is schematized as complex predicate that minimally involves deontic prescriptions. Yet the meaning of ‘zip’ lacks any such prescriptions because ‘zip’ just means ‘zero intelligence potential’. For ‘zip’ is an acronym for ‘zero intelligence potential’. So, Hom’s view cannot accurately represent the meaning of the slur ‘zip’. Nor can the view accurately represent the meaning of any other slur that is an acronym.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse, NY, 13244, USA

    Adam Patterson

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Patterson, A. Epistemic Slurs: A Novel Explicandum and Adequacy Constraint for Slur Theories. Erkenn 87, 2029–2046 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00288-3

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