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Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents

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Abstract

Orthodox Bayesianism is a highly idealized theory of how we ought to live our epistemic lives. One of the most widely discussed idealizations is that of logical omniscience: the assumption that an agent’s degrees of belief must be probabilistically coherent to be rational. It is widely agreed that this assumption is problematic if we want to reason about bounded rationality, logical learning, or other aspects of non-ideal epistemic agency. Yet, we still lack a satisfying way to avoid logical omniscience within a Bayesian framework. Some proposals merely replace logical omniscience with a different logical idealization; others sacrifice all traits of logical competence on the altar of logical non-omniscience. We think a better strategy is available: by enriching the Bayesian framework with tools that allow us to capture what agents can and cannot infer given their limited cognitive resources, we can avoid logical omniscience while retaining the idea that rational degrees of belief are in an important way constrained by the laws of probability. In this paper, we offer a formal implementation of this strategy, show how the resulting framework solves the problem of logical omniscience, and compare it to orthodox Bayesianism as we know it.

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Notes

  1. Although it is a matter of contention whether probabilistic coherence is indeed a rational ideal. For more on this point, see Christensen (2007), Smithies (2015) and Titelbaum (2015).

  2. Cf. Easwaran (2011) and Talbott (2016). See also Fagin et al. (1995) for a discussion of logical omniscience as it arises in epistemic and doxastic logic.

  3. Both principles follow from the Kolmogorov axioms; see Earman (1992) and Titelbaum (forthcoming) for relevant background.

  4. In a broader perspective, Garber’s approach to logical omniscience forms part of an attempt to solve the so-called ‘problem of old evidence’ introduced by Glymour (1980). Related approaches to this problem can be found in Gaifman (2004), Good (1968) and Jeffrey (1983). See also Fitelson and Hartmann (2015) and Sprenger (2015) for more recent developments in this direction.

  5. Hintikka (1962). See also von Wright (1951) for an early precursor to Hintikka.

  6. For other early discussions of impossible worlds, see Cresswell (1973) and Rantala (1982). See also Berto and Jago (2018, 2019) for relevant background.

  7. See, e.g., Fagin et al. (1995), Levesque (1984) and Lakemeyer (1987).

  8. See, e.g., Nolan (1997).

  9. For related discussions of similar collapse results that arise in the contexts of epistemic logic, decision theory, and formal semantics, see Bjerring (2013), Bjerring and Skipper (forthcoming), Bjerring and Schwarz (2017), Elga and Rayo (ms.), Jago (2013) and Rasmussen (2015).

  10. Bjerring and Skipper (forthcoming). The step-based model was initially inspired by work in active logic; see Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis (1990) for background.

  11. Slightly abusing notation, we will use ‘L’ both as the name of our object language and as a variable that ranges over all sentences of that language.

  12. For background on dynamic epistemic logic, see Ditmarsch et al. (2008) and Baltag and Renne (2016).

  13. A notable exception is Hájek (2003).

  14. Here is a sketch of a proof of the first part of n-conjunction: suppose \(w \in |A \wedge B|^n\), for any \(w \in W\). Assuming that R contains standard introduction and elimination rules for conjunction, \(|A \wedge B|^n \subseteq |A|^{n+1}\) and \(|A \wedge B|^n \subseteq |B|^{n+1}\). Hence, \(w \in |A|^{n+1} \cap |B|^{n+1}\). The other subset relations can be established in similar ways.

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Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Normative Notions Formalized” Workshop in Munich. Many thanks to the audience on that occasion. Thanks also to two anonymous referees from Erkenntnis for very detailed and helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Mattias Skipper.

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Appendix

Appendix

This appendix contains proofs of three main results of the paper. All definitions can be found in §3. The results are repeated here for convenience.

Theorem 1

(n-preservation) If \(A \vdash _R^n B\), then \(Cr(A) = x \models \langle n \rangle (Cr(B) \ge x)\).

Proof

Suppose that \(A \vdash _R^n B\) and consider any pointed model, (Mw), such that \(M,w \models Cr(A) = x\), where \(M = (W^P,W^I,f,V)\) and \(w \in W^P\). We must show that \(M,w \models \langle n \rangle (Cr(B) \ge x)\). We proceed by defining a suitable n-accessible pointed model from (Mw). Let \(M' = (W'^P,W'^I,f',V')\) be a model such that \(W'^P = W^P\), \(W'^I = W^I\), and \(V' = V\). Since \(A \vdash _R^n B\), we can let \(f'\) be an n-variation of (Mw) for which it holds that \(f'(w) = (c,Pr_c)\), where \(M',v \models B\), for all \(v \in \{v' \in c: M',v' \models A\}\). By the definition of n-accessibility, then, \((M,w) {\mathop {\sim }\limits ^{n}} (M',w)\). Since \(M,w \models Cr(A) = x\), (P4) tells us that \(\sum _Q Pr(Q) = x\), where \(Q = \{v \in S: M,v \models A\}\). Hence, \(\sum _{Q'} Pr_c(Q') \ge x\), where \(Q' = \{v \in c: M',v \models B\}\). By another application of (P4), \(M',w \models Cr(B) \ge x\). So, by (P5), it follows that \(M,w \models \langle n \rangle (Cr(B) \ge x)\). \(\square \)

Theorem 2

(n-certainty) If \(\vdash _R^n A\), then \(\models \langle n \rangle (Cr(A) = 1)\).

Proof

Suppose that \(\vdash _R^n A\) and let (Mw) be any pointed model such that \(M = (W^P,W^I,f,V)\) and \(w \in W^P\). We must show that \(M,w \models \langle n \rangle (Cr(A) =1)\). We proceed by defining a suitable n-accessible pointed model from (Mw). Let \(M' = (W'^P,W'^I,f',V')\) be a model such that \(W'^P = W^P\), \(W'^I = W^I\), and \(V' = V\). Since \(\vdash _R^n A\), we can let \(f'\) be an n-variation of (Mw) such that \(f'(w) = (c,Pr_c)\), where \(M',v \models A\), for all \(v \in c\). Hence, \(\sum _{Q'} Pr_c(Q') = 1\), where \(Q' = \{v \in c: M',v \models A\}\). By (P4), \(M',w' \models Cr(A) = 1\). By the definition of n-accessibility, \((M,w) {\mathop {\sim }\limits ^{n}} (M',w)\). So, by (P5), it follows that \(M,w \models \langle n \rangle (Cr(A) = 1)\). \(\square \)

Theorem 3

(n-conditionality) If \(A \vdash _R^n B\), then \(\models \langle n \rangle (Cr(B \, | \, A) = 1)\).

Proof

Suppose that \(A \vdash _R^n B\) and let (Mw) be any pointed model such that \(M = (W^P,W^I,f,V)\) and \(w \in W^P\). We must show that \(M,w \models \langle n \rangle (Cr(B \,|\, A) = 1)\). Let \(M' = (W'^P,W'^I,f',V')\) be a model such that \(W'^P = W^P\), \(W'^I = W^I\), and \(V' = V\). Since \(A \vdash _R^n B\), we can let \(f'\) be an n-variation of (Mw) such that \(f'(w) = (c,Pr_c)\), where \(M',v \models B\), for all \(v \in \{v' \in c: M',v' \models A\}\). Hence, \(\sum _{Q} Pr_c(Q) = \sum _{Q'} Pr_c(Q')\), where \(Q = \{v \in c: M',v \models A\,\text {and}\,M',v \models B\}\) and \(Q' = \{v' \in c: M',v' \models q\}\). By (P8), \(M',w \models Cr(B \,|\, A) = 1\). By the definition of n-accessibility, \((M,w) {\mathop {\sim }\limits ^{n}} (M',w)\). So, by (P5), it follows that \(M,w \models \langle n \rangle (Cr(B \,|\, A) = 1)\). \(\square \)

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Skipper, M., Bjerring, J.C. Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents. Erkenn 87, 93–115 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00186-3

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