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Erkenntnis

pp 1–15 | Cite as

Exclusion Criteria in Experimental Philosophy

  • Carsten Bergenholtz
  • Jacob BuschEmail author
  • Sara Kier Praëm
Original Research

Abstract

When experimental philosophers carry out studies on thought experiments, some participants are excluded based on certain exclusion criteria, mirroring standard social science vignette methodology. This involves excluding people that do not pay attention or who miscomprehend the scenario presented in thought experiments. However, experimental philosophy studies sometimes exclude an alarmingly high number of participants. We argue that this threatens the external and internal validity of the conclusions being drawn and we show how a simple visualization of thought experiments can reduce exclusion rates significantly. Furthermore, we argue that focus should not merely be on how many are excluded, but also why they are excluded, and we highlight the role of comprehension questions in this regard. Philosophical thought experiments often rely on the acceptance of certain key premises that may be regarded contestable, and asking comprehension questions involving such key assumptions could be problematic as that may result in some participants being inadvertently excluded from the study, potentially creating a selection bias.

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Vilius Dranseika, Oana Vuculescu and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions. Research for this publication was supported by grants from the Carlsberg Foundation (CF15-0943) and the Independent Research Fund Denmark (DFF-4180-00071).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of ManagementAarhus UniversityAarhus VDenmark
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyAarhus UniversityAarhus CDenmark
  3. 3.Department of Mathematics (Centre for Science Studies)Aarhus UniversityAarhus CDenmark

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