Abstract
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism, known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that the theories are not compatible as they currently stand, in view of what I call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I will offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all, and jointly enable significant progress on the mind–body problem.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Consciousness does not require the capacity for, e.g., thought, abstraction or self-awareness. These can be regarded as advanced, complex forms of consciousness and reserved for advanced, complex physical systems. Therefore, panpsychism does not entail that particles think or are self-conscious.
I.e., how much can you know about the previous and next state of the system by looking only at its present state, given that all external influences are fixed (and you know all the relevant causal laws)? The measure also takes into account the number of possible states a system can be in—the greater the number of possible states of a system, the more past and future states can be ruled out by the current state, which in IIT corresponds to higher information.
I.e., how much information would you lose by dividing the system in two, and (unidirectionally) cutting all connections from one half to the other? Computers, of the kind we make today, might in principle have the same quantity of information as human brains—they could have a similar number of possible states and causally constrain their own past and future states to a similar degree. But in today’s computers, the connectivity between transistors and modules is limited and often feed-forward. There will therefore be ways of cutting these systems in two that will not result in significant loss of information, such as a unidirectional cut from the output level to the input level of a feed-forward structure. In the brain, in contrast, especially in (parts of) the cerebrum, there is significant feedback connectivity—neurons mutually constrain a vast number of other neurons. Cutting connections between two parts of the cerebrum in any direction is therefore going to lead to a great loss of information. Hence, the cerebrum has a much higher level of integrated information (Φ). For a more detailed introduction to IIT, see Tononi and Koch (2015). For a full description of the latest version of the theory, see Tononi et al. (2014).
Tononi explicitly acknowledges that IIT comes close to panpsychism (Tononi 2008: p. 236; Tononi and Koch 2015: p. 11). He is careful to distinguish IIT’s panpsychism from the universalist form of panpsychism (to be discussed further below) according to which all things, including artifacts and aggregates, are conscious as individuals, i.e., in the first sense. But IIT still implies that all things are conscious at least in the sense of being made of conscious parts or forming part of greater conscious whole, i.e., in the second or third sense. As Koch notes, “protons and neutrons consist of a triad of quarks that are never observed in isolation. They constitute an infinitesimal integrated system” (Koch 2012: p. 132). If protons and neutrons have some Φ, then these particles will be conscious either individually or as parts of systems with greater Φ (such as atoms or brains). Furthermore, all things that are made of protons and neutrons will at least be conscious in the sense of being made of conscious parts. And if quarks are always part of integrated systems like protons and neutrons, they will necessarily be conscious in the sense of forming part of a greater conscious system.
One might wonder about other fundamental particles, such as electrons, that unlike quarks may be found in isolation. Would they be conscious? This question does not have a straightforward answer, because IIT defines Φ only for systems that can be regarded as composed of discrete elements. Physics is now widely taken to support the view that particles are really excitations in continuous fields, hence, IIT does not directly apply to fundamental physics. Barrett (2014) has given one proposal for how IIT can be extended to fundamental physics, which explicitly entails that isolated electrons will have some Φ, and therefore some consciousness (2014: p. 4), roughly because field excitations are complexly structured events. However, it is not guaranteed that other ways of extending IIT to physics will have the same result. Therefore, IIT can only be said to imply (complete) panpsychism in the sense of strongly suggesting it, it does not strictly entail it. In view of this, the central question of this paper may be more precisely put as: “Is IIT, if extended to fundamental physics in some way that entails (complete) panpsychism, compatible with Russellian panpsychism?”.
The most common objection to panpsychism is probably “the incredulous stare”. The most serious objection is the combination problem.
Dualist panpsychism would be the view that every physical thing is connected with a mental substance (or wholly non-physical mental properties) via fundamental psychophysical laws of nature. Physicalist panpsychism would be the view that consciousness is to be reductively identified with a ubiquitous physical property (such as integrated information understood in a purely functionalist way).
Note that Russell himself ultimately concluded that the intrinsic character of physical structure is not mental but neutral, i.e., neither mental nor physical. The more general view that the intrinsic character of physical structure is either neutral, protomental or mental is known as Russellian monism. Despite its name, central elements of Russellian monism predate Russell. Notable predecessors include Leibniz (see Pereboom 2015), Schopenhauer (see especially 1966a: pp. 119–127 and 1966b: pp. 191–200), James (1890, 1912), Mach (1886, 1894, 1905) and arguably Kant (especially given the reading defended in Langton 1998). Furthermore, the contemporary version of the view may not fully correspond to Russell’s own neutral monism (Stubenberg 2015; but see Wishon 2015 for a different interpretation).
Note that panpsychism does not imply that physical world is fully constituted by phenomenal properties alone. It is also compatible with it being partially constituted by fundamental, non-phenomenal relations, such as spatiotemporal or causal relations. The view that the physical world is constituted by phenomenal properties and fundamental, non-phenomenal relations is known as impure panpsychism. The view that the physical world is constituted by only phenomenal properties is known as pure panpsychism (Strawson 2006b, Chalmers forthcoming).
Perhaps outright epiphenomenal: overdeterminism may not be an option for emergent panpsychism, as it may not be possible for one structural property to have two distinct sufficient realizers (microphenomenal properties plus an emergent macrophenomenal property) as opposed to two distinct sufficient causes.
Some complain that the alleged phenomenological axioms are less than self-evident (e.g., Cerullo 2015). Some argue that the empirical postulates are not adequately supported (e.g., Schwitzgebel 2015: Section 2, concerning Exclusion). There might also be multiple ways of translating the empirical postulates into a mathematical formula (Tegmark 2016). Chalmers (2016) claims that IIT is best seen as a providing a fundamental, a posteriori law of nature specifying when combination occurs, but he does not specify precisely how he thinks Tononi’s a priori justification fails.
What is the argument against universalism about combination? The view is clearly highly counterintuitive, but so is panpsychism itself (at least for many people of a broadly Western cultural background), so this should not count for too much. One more substantive worry with universalism is that it is very hard to imagine what it could be like to be an aggregate such as, say, the combination of my toe and a piece of my shoe, an arbitrary 30% of the brain area that supports my consciousness, or the set of two people fighting. Granted, it is also very hard to imagine what it is like to be a fundamental particle. But it is a different challenge to imagine what it is like to be a simple but unified thing than to imagine what it would be like to be a highly disunified thing. Phenomenological simplicity seems hard to imagine mainly because our power of imagination is limited, whereas phenomenological disunity or incoherence seems hard to imagine because it is hard to even make sense of. The experience of systems such as “my toe and a piece of my shoe” or “an arbitrary 30% of the brain area that supports my consciousness”, and “the set of two people fighting” would have to be deeply incoherent. In the case of “the set of two people fighting”, it would involve being conscious of contradictory thoughts (person 1 is thinking “person 2 is wrong”, person 2 is thinking “person 2 is not wrong”, and the aggregate is having both thoughts). In the case of “30% of a brain area”, it would seem to involve something like thinking 30% of a thought, or having 30% of a feeling, which is not clearly possible. There is nothing similarly paradoxical about the idea of a very simple but still coherent experience. This objection is clearly not definitive—there are probably ways for universalists to respond. But for those who worry whether there could be a fully satisfactory response to this and other objections to universalism, IIT gives a way of avoiding it altogether.
Chalmers notes (2016: Section 6.3) that relations such as those specified by IIT could be the phenomenal bonding relation, but objects that these relations are derivative and not fundamental. He claims that a solution to the combination problem in terms of phenomenal bonding and something like IIT gives rise to a new problem: how do fundamental causal relations (proto-bonding relations) become phenomenal bonding relations when they take on IIT-like character? A phenomenal bonding theorist could perhaps respond by renewed appeal to our ignorance of the intrinsic nature of physical relations: if we knew the intrinsic nature of causal relations, we would see how it works. It could also be suggested that there is a law of nature according to which the intrinsic nature of causal relations will transform into the kind of nature that supports phenomenal bonding when they become included in a system with maximal Φ. This would move the phenomenal bonding view at least partially into the category of emergent panpsychism but, like the fusion view, it would nevertheless seem to avoid epiphenomenalism.
Recall, high integration means that the parts of a system are highly causally interconnected, and thereby bound together as a unit.
Tononi claims that maximal Φ corresponds to maximal causal power. This would give fusions a very strong form of metaphysical priority. But the view that Φ corresponds with causal power depends on a distinctive and controversial metaphysical view about causation (see Hoel et al. 2013).
Theories such as ontic structural realism (Ladyman and Ross 2007) deny that intrinsic properties exist. It also seems coherent to suppose that dispositional properties are ungrounded in the way ontic structural realists claim, while claiming that intrinsic properties such as phenomenal properties exist but are epiphenomenal.
According to one version of the causal powers view, dispositional monism, all properties are purely dispositional, i.e., have no categorical (or qualitative) aspects or grounds. According to another version, the identity view (also known as the powerful qualities view), all properties are both dispositional and categorical (Martin and Heil 1999; Strawson 2008). Russellian panpsychism generally takes phenomenal properties to be categorical and would accordingly be incompatible with dispositional monism, but it would still be fully compatible with the identity view.
Armstrong explicitly holds that laws of nature consist in relations between categorical, i.e., intrinsic, universals.
This is not to say that all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, according to Russellian panpsychism, only the intrinsic properties of individual things. As discussed above, Goff’s phenomenal bonding view says that some relations, namely spatial relations, have their own, non-phenomenal intrinsic properties responsible for combination. If IIT is combined with the phenomenal bonding view, in the way I proposed above, then causal relations also involve this kind of intrinsic properties.
Note that Russellian panpsychism does not require that all physical properties nomologically supervene on phenomenal properties, only that dispositional properties do. Physical structure as a whole may also consist of arguably non-dispositional relations, such as spatial relations (which may be part of how dispositions manifest or the circumstances that trigger their manifestation). As noted above, these relations might be fundamental (see footnote 8), or perhaps supervene on non-phenomenal, intrinsic properties of relations such as those involved in phenomenal bonding.
Given this, one might think the differences between silicon and carbon brains come down to differences in non-phenomenal relations rather than differences in dispositions. However, at the fundamental level, silicon and carbon consists of different numbers and ratios of fundamental particles such as quarks, electrons and so on. Each type of fundamental particle has its own fundamental and unique dispositions. Therefore, silicon and carbon brains must be regarded as having different dispositions.
Tononi and Koch (2015: p. 13) gesture toward such a view.
It could be that consciousness during anesthesia is not painful, or if it is, that it is just very dimly painful and therefore nothing to worry about—but there is no obvious reason to think this would necessarily be the case.
At least in normal circumstances—according to IIT, split brain (severed corpus callosum) patients will have one consciousness in each hemisphere, with almost the same Φ. It is also possible that our consciousness temporarily splits into two in cases such as automatic (absent-minded) driving.
As discussed above, IIT’s coarse-graining principle may by partially justified on the basis of the grain problem, but it also has an independent, theoretical motivation according to which coarse-graining is required for Φ to increase in the right places in the brain.
Proposed solutions to the revelation problem include Strawson (2006b: p. 252), Chalmers (2016: p. 190) and Brogaard (2016: pp. 147–150). For criticism, see Goff (2015) on Strawson, and Brogaard (2016) on Chalmers.
It is also worth noting that Russell seemed to take our acquaintance with phenomenal properties to be compatible with some types of appearance/reality distinctions, as illustrated by phenomenal continua cases in which different phenomenal properties can be falsely judged to be identical (Wishon 2017) (thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out). One might think acquaintance could therefore also be compatible with the kind of appearance/reality distinction implied by this proposal.
According to Russellian panpsychism, there is a sense in which the mental realizes the physical. But there is also realization within the physical, in another sense of the term. To say that macro-consciousness is multiply microphysically realizable given Russellian panpsychism is to say that the macrophysical structure realized by macro-consciousness in the metaphysical sense is multiply realizable in the physical sense.
Note that IIT as it stands makes no distinction between structural and qualitative aspects of the content of consciousness. IIT distinguishes between the overall level, or amount, of consciousness (which corresponds to the overall Φ of a system) and the content of consciousness (which corresponds to the precise causal structure of a system, in IIT called conceptual structure). My proposal is to make a further distinction, within content, between structural and qualitative aspects. This does not involve any change to the way coarse-graining affects overall Φ.
References
Alter, T., & Nagasawa, Y. (2012). What is Russellian Monism? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(9–10), 67–95.
Armstrong, D. M. (1978). A theory of universals. Universals and scientific realism volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barrett, A. B. (2014). An integration of integrated information theory with fundamental physics. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 63.
Bird, A. (2007). Nature’s metaphysics: Laws and properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Brogaard, B. (2016). In search of Mentons. In G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cerullo, M. A. (2015). The problem with phi: A critique of integrated information theory. PLoS Computational Biology, 11(9), e1004286.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature. In S. P. Stich & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Chalmers, D. J. (2009). The two-dimensional argument against materialism. In B. P. McLaughlin & S. Walter (Eds.), Oxford handbook to the philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2015). Panpsychism and panprotopsychism. In T. Alter & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world: Essays on Russellian Monism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2016). The combination problem for panpsychism. In G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (forthcoming). Idealism and the mind-body problem. In W. Seager (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
Dretske, F. I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science, 44(2), 248–268.
Ellis, B. D. (2001). Scientific essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goff, P. (2006). Experiences don’t sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 53–61.
Goff, P. (2009). Why panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness. Dialectica, 63(3), 289–311.
Goff, P. (2015). Against constitutive Russellian monism. In T. Alter & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goff, P. (2016). The phenomenal bonding solution to the combination problem. In G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoel, E. P., Albantakis, L., Marshall, W., & Tononi, G. (2016). Can the macro beat the micro? Integrated information across spatiotemporal scales. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2016(1), niw012.
Hoel, E. P., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2013). Quantifying causal emergence shows that macro can beat micro. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(49), 19790–19795.
Hume, D. (1739-40/2000). A treatise of human nature. In J. Cottingham (Ed.), Oxford Philosophical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32(April), 127–136.
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(5), 291–295.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). London: Macmillan.
James, W. (1912). Essays in radical empiricism. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.
Kim, J. (1988). Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12(1), 225–239.
Koch, C. (2012). Consciousness: Confessions of a romantic reductionist. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Langton, R. (1998). Kantian humility: Our ignorance of things in themselves. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy, 70(17), 556–567.
Lockwood, M. (1993). The grain problem. In H. M. Robinson (Ed.), Objections to physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mach, E. (1886). Beiträge Zur Analyse Der Empfindungen. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.
Mach, E. (1894). Populärwisschenschaftliche Vorlesungen (p. 1923). Vienna: Böhlau Verlag (reprint of the fifth edition).
Mach, E. (1905). Erkenntnis Und Irrtum (5th ed., p. 1976). Dordrecht: Reidel (translated as Knowledge and error).
Martin, C. B., & Heil, J. (1999). The ontological turn. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23(1), 34–60.
Mørch, H. H. (2014). Panpsychism and causation: A new argument and a solution to the combination problem. Doctoral Dissertation. Departement of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo, Oslo.
Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, D. (2001). The rise of physicalism. In C. Gillett & B. Loewer (Eds.), Physicalism and its discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2015). Consciousness, physicalism, and absolutely intrinsic properties. In T. Alter & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (1927). The analysis of matter. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
Schopenhauer, A. (1966a). The world as will and representation (E. F. J. Payne, Trans) (Vol. 1). New York: Dover.
Schopenhauer, A. (1966b). The world as will and representation (E. F. J. Payne, Trans) (Vol. 2). New York: Dover.
Schwitzgebel, E. (2015). If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious. Philosophical Studies, 172(7), 1697–1721.
Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, information and panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 272–288.
Seager, W. (2006). The ‘intrinsic nature’ argument for panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 129–145.
Seager, W. (2010). Panpsychism, aggregation and combinatorial infusion. Mind and Matter, 8(2), 167–184.
Seager, W. (2016). Panpsychist infusion. In G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. R. (2013). Can information theory explain consciousness? New York Review of Books, 60(1), 30–41.
Sellars, W. S. (1965). The identity approach to the mind–body problem. Review of Metaphysics, 18(March), 430–451.
Sellars, W. S. (1971). Seeing, sense impressions, and sensa: A reply to Cornman. Review of Metaphysics, 24(March), 391–447.
Shoemaker, S. (1980). Causality and properties. In P. van Inwagen (Ed.), Time and cause: Essays presented to Richard Taylor. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Strawson, G. (2006a). Realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 3–31.
Strawson, G. (2006b). Panpsychism? Reply to commentators with a celebration of descartes. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 184–280.
Strawson, G. (2008). The identity of the categorical and the dispositional. Analysis, 68(4), 271–282.
Stubenberg, L. (2015). Russell, Russellian monism and panpsychism. In T. Alter & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tegmark, M. (2016). Improved measures of integrated information. PLoS Computational Biology, 12(11), e1005123.
Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC Neuroscience, 5(1), 42.
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto. The Biological Bulletin, 215(3), 216–242.
Tononi, G. (2011). Integrated information theory of consciousness: An updated account. Archives Italiennes de Biologie, 150(2–3), 56–90.
Tononi, G., Albantakis, L., & Oizumi, M. (2014). From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated information theory 3.0. PLoS Computational Biology, 10(5), 1003588.
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016). Integrated information theory: From consciousness to its physical substrate. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 17(7), 450–461.
Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2015). Consciousness: Here, there and everywhere? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 370(1668), 20140167.
Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(4), 667–698.
Wishon, D. (2015). Russell on Russellian Monism. In T. Alter & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wishon, D. (2017). Russellian acquaintance and Frege’s puzzle. Mind, 126(502), 321–370.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Giulio Tononi, Erik Hoel, David Chalmers, Torin Alter, Luke Roelofs, Neil Mehta, Kelvin McQueen and participants and referees at the conferences “IIT: Foundational Issues” (NYU 2015), “Non-physicalist Views of Consciousness” (Cambridge University 2016), “The Science of Consciousness” (Tucson, Arizona 2016) and “Minds Online” (2016) for helpful comments on this paper. This work has been funded by The Research Council of Norway through a FRIPRO Mobility Grant, Contract No. 240328/F10. The FRIPRO Mobility Grant scheme (FRICON) is co-funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under Marie Curie Grant Agreement No. 608695.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Mørch, H.H. Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?. Erkenn 84, 1065–1085 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9995-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9995-6