Abstract
Credit theorists claim to explain the incompatibility of luck and knowledge and also what makes knowledge valuable. If the theory works as well as they think, it accomplishes a lot. Unsurprisingly, however, some epistemologists remain unsure. Jennifer Lackey, for instance, proposes a dilemma that suggests credit theories are either too strong or too weak. Her criticism has been hard to overcome. This paper suggests a modified account of knowledge as credit for true belief that allows credit theorists to better counter Lackey’s criticism. I call my version of credit theory Risk Sensitive Credit. Under my account, an agent deserves credit just in case she believes truly on account of her reasonably accurate epistemic risk assessment. This assessment need not include higher order beliefs or even enter into conscious thought. Recent work in cognitive science, for instance, suggests that our visual faculties, in the absence of our direct awareness, work in accordance with a risk sensitive framework. This research will be referenced to help explain the dynamics of barn facade Gettier cases.
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Notes
Another term that has been used is “creditable.” However, as Greco has noted, “‘[C]reditable’ is ambiguous between ‘praiseworthy’ and ‘attributable’” (2012: 5). Credit for true belief need not imply praiseworthiness for true belief.
“The new picture retains the idea that S’s abilities are important in the causal story regarding how S comes to have a true belief, but it makes ‘importance’ qualitative rather than quantitative. Rather than saying that S’s abilities must be ‘important enough’ in the causal story, we will say that they must be ‘important in the right way’” (Greco 2012: 13).
At another point Lackey again puts her dilemma in terms of the “minimal work” being done by the testimony recipient, “As should be clear, either horn of this dilemma undermines the Credit View of Knowledge at its core. For, on the first horn, credit may be adequately blocked in Gettier-type cases, but only at the expense of also blocking credit in countless cases where testimonial knowledge is intuitively present despite minimal work being done on the part of the hearer. And, on the second horn, credit is secured in cases of testimonial knowledge where such minimal work is done by the recipient, but only at the expense of also securing credit in Gettier-type cases. Either way, the Credit View not only fails to shed light on what is absent in Gettier-type cases, but it also fails to explain the additional value that knowledge has over merely accidentally true belief” (2009: 34) (my emphasis).
I believe there is enough textual evidence to claim that Lackey was indeed thinking of credit in terms of excellence. However, I admit that although work and effort are often connected they are not always. So it is possible that Lackey’s references to minimal work were not meant to capture an effort conception of credit. In the end, it seems nonetheless important to clarify what kind of credit we are working with for the purpose of resolving Lackey’s dilemma.
In “Knowledge and Credit,” Lackey seems doubtful of this reasoning. In her own words, “[W]hat does an honest, competent passerby look like that would enable Morris to reliably distinguish her from a dishonest or directionally- challenged one… on any plausible reading of CHICAGO VISITOR, Morris could have just as easily approached a competent-looking liar or a directionally challenged speaker as he did an honest, knowledgeable, Chicago resident when asking for assistance in finding the Sears Tower” (2009: 31–32). If by ‘”just as easily,” Lackey means to imply “just as likely,” I think this at least needs more argument. My experience with asking for directions suggests otherwise. And it seems plausible that our intuition that we can gain knowledge by asking for directions is linked to our experience of this being a fairly reliable way of finding a desired location. On the other hand, if by “just as easily,” Lackey means something other than likelihood, I will argue (in Sect. 5) that likelihood is what matters.
Some might argue that Morris could acquire knowledge even if he was unaware of the practice of requesting directions and did ask on a whim. A case like this would be harder, although perhaps not impossible, for credit theorists to explain. I do not think, however, that credit theorists would need to account for this unusual interpretation. The force of Lackey’s point is grounded in the ordinary intuition that Morris can attain knowledge by asking a stranger. The ordinary background story of such an occurrence is one in which Morris is familiar with the practice of asking for directions. The intuitive pull of her counterexample then, is linked to an ordinary construal of the case.
This example is based off of one credited to Carl Ginet and cited by Goldman (1976).
Butts (2014) discusses many issues related to Greco’s construal of abilities. Butts argues that Greco is better off defining abilities in the same way as Sosa, Kallestrup, and Pritchard. I am arguing that there is an inconsistency with the way Greco uses his own conception of abilities. The inconsistency is argued for clearly in Sect. 4.3.
Greco (2012) credits the original example to Joe Salerno.
Perception can be understood to encompass a much wider range of faculties than just vision. However, for my purposes here, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
Consider the following from Greco, “[W]e can solve this (generality) problem by making use of an idea that we invoked above: that the concept of knowledge serves the purposes of practical reasoning. Specifically, that the concept of knowledge is used to flag good information and good sources of information for use in practical reasoning. If this is right, then we have an answer to the generality problem: relevant parameters should be specified according to the interests and purposes of relevant practical reasoning” (2010: 78).
Alternatively, she might believe p when there is a low risk of falsity, but she will still lack credit if her own abilities do not assess this risk. In other words, she will lack credit if her epistemic success is not due to her risk assessment abilities.
In Sosa’s own words, “We can now see that knowing something full well requires that one have animal and reflective knowledge of it, but also that one know it with full aptness. It requires, that is to say, that the correctness of one’s first- order belief manifest not only the animal, first-order competences that reliably enough yield the correctness of the beliefs that they produce. One’s first-order belief falls short if it is not appropriately guided by one’s relevant meta-competence.”(Sosa 2009: 16) (original emphasis).
See Armstrong (1974, 152–153).
See Goldman (1976).
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Priest, M. Risk Sensitive Credit. Erkenn 84, 703–726 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9978-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9978-7