Abstract
Traditionally, incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism claim that we cannot be morally responsible unless we could have done otherwise and that we cannot do otherwise if we are determined. The Direct Argument for incompatibilism supposedly offers its defenders a dialectical advantage over this traditional approach insofar as it does not appear to rely on either of these controversial claims. Recently, though, David Widerker has argued against this supposition and urged that it is time to say farewell to the Direct Argument. I examine two of Widerker’s criticisms and argue that, while they are not compelling, a revised version of one does show that supporters of the Direct Argument will very likely need to deny that an agent could do otherwise if determinism is true. I conclude that, nevertheless, the Direct Argument may still have considerable dialectical appeal and that neither of Widerker’s criticisms should lead us to say goodbye to it just yet.
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Notes
I have modified both premises from Widerker’s originals, which only imply that determinism is incompatible with an agent being morally responsible for his actions. Also, while Widerker labeled his first premise IVD, I have adopted the name NAP instead, to remind us that, according to this premise, there are no alternative possibilities if determinism is true. PAP is an abbreviation for Principle of Alternative Possibilities, a common name in the literature for such a claim.
There is some potential for controversy over DA-1, as I discuss below.
The Traditional Argument does offer one apparent dialectical advantage over the Direct Argument. While the validity of the Traditional Argument is not in doubt, a number of counterexamples have been offered against Transfer NR. This potential advantage is undermined, though, by the fact that the validity of the arguments in favor of NAP is also in doubt. Interestingly, the debate over Transfer NR appears to have reached a stalemate, but it is not clear what conclusions we can draw from this impasse. For discussions of the current state of the debate over Transfer NR and the implications of the apparent stalemate, see Byrd (2010), Fischer and Ravizza (2000), and McKenna (2008).
Beyond the arguments I address here, Widerker offers two further criticisms of the Direct Argument. First, Widerker (2002): 319 provides a counterexample to the validity of Transfer NR. Second, Widerker (2008): 230 presents an apparent counterexample to both PAP and Transfer NR, designed to show that, if we have a compelling reason to reject the former, then we also have a compelling reason to reject the latter. Ginet (2003): 607 has shown that the first criticism can be met with a revision to Transfer NR. While I do not believe that Widerker’s second criticism has been adequately addressed, I will not attempt to remedy that here. Campbell (2006) offers a similar criticism, though the argument differs, and I believe that the issues involved are complex enough that a response to both Widerker and Campbell deserves a separate discussion. For a response to Campbell, though, see Yang (2012). A rejoinder is offered in Campbell and Hermes (2012).
An anonymous reviewer has pointed out to me that this might appear to beg the question against source incompatibilism, according to which determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility because, in a deterministic world, an agent would not be the appropriate source of his actions, his omissions, or their consequences. Even if there is such a sourcehood condition for moral responsibility, though, this does not seem to provide a compelling reason to reject M*. While an incompatibilist might reject PAP and hold that an agent can still be the source of his action even when he could not have done otherwise, it does not seem plausible that an agent could have knowingly acted in a morally wrong way, believed correctly that he could have avoided acting as he did, and satisfied every other compatibilist-friendly necessary condition for moral responsibility without being the appropriate source of his action. At the very least, if the Direct Argument is supposed to offer a dialectical advantage over the Traditional Argument insofar as it allows direct incompatibilists to avoid the controversies surrounding NAP, rejecting M* by appeal to such a sourcehood condition would significantly diminish this advantage.
An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that omissions and their consequences might be the only cases where we can be morally responsible for something we did not cause. If so and if we assume that the laws of nature are not a consequence of our omissions, then perhaps we could still explain our lack of moral responsibility for the laws by appeal to our lack of causal responsibility. As we shall see, though, compatibilists who reject NAP need not grant the assumption that the laws are not a consequence of our choices. Therefore, it seems that this response, like Clarke’s below, would benefit from a successful defense of NAP. Further, I am not sure that omissions and their consequences are the only cases where moral responsibility does not imply causal responsibility. For example, I might be at least partially morally responsible for the consequences of another agent’s immoral action when I coerce or tempt him to do something immoral. It is not obvious to me that such coercing or tempting implies that I would be causally responsible for these consequences. To assume that coercing or tempting an agent implies causal responsibility for the consequences that follow would appear to beg the question against certain libertarian theories of agency.
Clarke (2007): 4 n. 3 discusses this possibility as well.
This condition may not apply to certain relational facts about the state of the world at two or more times. For example, perhaps I can be at least partially morally responsible for the fact that Socrates lived in a world in which I fail to help someone in need today.
An anonymous reviewer has suggested to me that a more basic explanation for our non-responsibility for the pre-human past and the laws of nature might be the fact that neither is the result of our choices. Given that lack of causal responsibility does not imply lack of moral responsibility, I do not believe that this explanation would be sufficient on its own.
Critics of the Direct Argument could attempt to show that, even if we cannot do otherwise in a deterministic world, we might still be morally responsible for the remote past or the laws, but this would appear to be an extraordinarily daunting task.
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Byrd, J. The Dialectical Advantage of the Direct Argument. Erkenn 79, 431–444 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9503-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9503-y