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Scientific Theory Eliminativism

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Abstract

The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories. These disagreements are at least partly responsible for disagreements in many of the debates in the discipline which put weight on the concept scientific theory. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of theory are ineffectual options for addressing this difficulty: they do not move debates forward in a significant way. Directing my attention to debates about the properties of particular, named theories, I introduce ‘theory eliminativism’ as a certain type of debate-reformulation. As a methodological tool it has the potential to be a highly effective way to make progress in the face of the noted problem: post-reformulation disagreements about theory cannot compromise the debate, and the questions that really matter can still be asked and answered. In addition the reformulation process demands that philosophers engage with science and the history of science in a more serious way than is usual in order to answer important questions about the justification for targeting a particular set of propositions (say) in a given context. All things considered, we should expect the benefits of a theory-eliminating debate-reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type.

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Notes

  1. For a flavour of the range of opinions, see Suppes (1967), Van Fraassen (1980), Giere (1988, Ch.3), Suppe (1989), Churchland (1989), Mahner and Bunge (1997, §9.3), Da Costa and French (2003), Wilson (2006), Henderson et al. (2010), and Muller (2011).

  2. Gould (2002), Morrison (2007), and Lakatos (1970).

  3. Bokulich (2006), Craver (2002), and Darrigol (2008).

  4. The (in)consistency of classical electrodynamics is considered in greater detail in Vickers (2013, Ch.4).

  5. In the first camp we find Earman (1986), Hutchison (1993), and Norton (2008). Amongst those who think the theory is deterministic we find Arnold (1977), Korolev (2007), and Zinkernagel (2010).

  6. The term ‘analysanda’ covers assumptions, equations, models, axioms, propositions, or whatever set of things the philosopher wishes to consider together as a unit of analysis. There need be no restriction here, since the justification for targeting that set of things will be given in the third set of square brackets.

  7. In Vickers (2013) I apply theory eliminativism to a number of debates concerning the (in)consistency of particular ‘theories’. The fullest argument for theory eliminativism combines the more general considerations in this paper with the concrete applications found in Vickers (2013).

  8. For more on the (in)consistency of Bohr’s theory of the atom, see Vickers (2013, Ch.3).

  9. Similarly with many of the other properties and relations in many of the other debates I have mentioned.

  10. There is also the question of why all the different theory-concepts get to be unified as theory-concepts, as opposed to being just a number of concepts.

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Acknowledgments

This paper was (re)written during my year spent as a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. I am most grateful to John Norton and the 2010–2011 Center fellows for invaluable and extensive feedback.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50/51 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HN, UK

    Peter Vickers

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Vickers, P. Scientific Theory Eliminativism. Erkenn 79, 111–126 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9471-2

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