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Contraction in Interrogative Belief Revision

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Abstract

In the paper “On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change”, Olsson and Westlund have suggested that the notion of epistemic state employed in the standard framework of belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985; Gärdenfors 1988) should be extended to include a representation of the agent’s research agenda (Olsson and Westlund 2006). The resulting framework will here be referred to as interrogative belief revision. In this paper, I attempt to deal with the problem of how research agendas should change in contraction, a problem largely left open by Olsson and Westlund. Two desiderata of an appropriate solution are suggested: one is a principle of continuity, stating that changes in the research agenda should somehow reflect that certain long term research interests are kept fixed. The other desideratum, which is based on part of Olsson and Westlund’s motivation for adding research agendas to the epistemic states, is that we should be able to account for how contraction may serve to open up new, fruitful hypotheses for investigation. In order to achieve these desiderata, I base my solution on a revised version of Olsson and Westlund’s notion of epistemic state.

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Notes

  1. Several authors have defended contraction functions that do not fall under the partial meet contraction functions of the standard AGM theory. One important example is Isaac Levi’s mild contraction functions (Levi 2004), which are formally equivalent to the severe withdrawal functions of Rott and Pagnucco (1999).

  2. The reader will probably recognize that this example is inspired by the case of the Mercury anomaly in nineteenth century astronomy (see, for instance, Gähde 2002), but I will treat is as an entirely fictive example since the actual historical details are not important here.

  3. One may perhaps object to this if, as for instance Isaac Levi does, one thinks that the propositions held true in one’s current theory should be regarded as believed with full conviction, so that their negations are not regarded as “serious possibilities” (Levi 1967, 1991, 2004). In that case, if we believe that X and Y are equivalent, it may not make sense to say that some investigation or evidence is more relevant to one than to the other. If we do not regard the propositions entailed by a theory to be believed with certainty, then it does make sense to say that some evidence is more relevant to one proposition than another, even if the background theory entails that they are equivalent. For instance, consider the question {H1,H2} from our example. Since this is a T 1-question, the background theory T 1 entails that not-H1 and H2 are equivalent. But generally, in order to view any evidence against H1—say, a calculation of the mass of the planet X that shows it to be too small to cause the anomaly—as equally strong evidence in favor of H2 as it is in favor of not-H1, we would have to be very strongly convinced that not-H1 implies H2.

    I am prepared to commit myself to the view that the propositions entailed by a theory should not generally be considered as “full beliefs” in Levi’s sense. There is not sufficient space here to defend this view in more detail, though it is hardly an uncommon view. As an example from the probabilistic camp, Richard Jeffrey is well-known for advocating the view that beliefs are normally accepted with probability less than 1 (Jeffrey 1965). An advocate of the view that most of our beliefs should not be regarded as full convictions, more closely related to the AGM paradigm, is Wolfgang Spohn (Spohn 1988. See also Levi 2004, p.19).

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Acknowledgments

First, I wish to acknowledge the contributions of Erik J. Olsson to the making of this paper. Olsson co-authored an earlier draft of the paper with me, and has provided much helpful discussion on the present version. In particular it should be mentioned that the “combination strategy” described in the paper was originally suggested by Olsson. I would also like to acknowledge the contributions of two anonymous referees who gave detailed and very helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The paper owes much of its present form to the referees’ advice.

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Proofs of Some Observations

Proof of observation 2.1: in order to show that DF(Q) is a T1-question and T1-equivalent to Q, it is sufficient to note that for each \( i \in \left\{ {1, \ldots ,n} \right\} \), we have \( T_{1} \cap X_{i} = T_{1} \cap Q/X_{i} \). To see this, since Q is a T1-question, for each \( i,j \in \left\{ {1, \ldots ,n} \right\} \) such that i ≠ j we have \( T_{1} \cap X_{\text{i}} \cap X_{\text{j}} = \varnothing \), hence \( T_{1} \cap X_{\text{i}} \subseteq - X_{\text{j}} \). From this follows that \( T_{ 1} \cap \, X_{\text{i}} \, \subseteq \, \cap \bigcap \{ - X_{\text{j}} | i \ne j, j \in \, \left\{ { 1, \ldots , n} \right\}\} \), hence \( T_{ 1} \cap X_{\text{i}} = T_{ 1} \cap X_{\text{i}} cap \bigcap \{ - X_{\text{j}} | i \ne j,j \in \left\{ { 1, \ldots ,n} \right\}\} = T_{ 1} \cap Q /X_{\text{i}} \). DF(Q) is clearly exclusive w.r.t T2 since its members are pairwise disjoint. Finally, suppose that DF(Q) was exhaustive w.r.t T2. Then we would have \( T_{ 2} \subseteq \bigcup {\text{DF}}(Q) \). A moments reflection shows that, for each \( i,j \in \, \left\{ {1, \ldots ,n} \right\} \) such that ij, we have \( \bigcup \,{\text{DF}}(Q) \cap \, X_{\text{i}} \cap \, X_{\text{j}} = \, \varnothing \), and so by elementary set theory we have \( T_{2} \cap X_{\text{i}} \cap X_{\text{j}} = \varnothing \). But this means that Q is exclusive w.r.t T2, contradiction.□

Proof of observation 2.2: in order to show that NEX(Q) is a T1-question and T1-equivalent to Q, it is sufficient to note that for each \( i \in \left\{ {1, \ldots ,n} \right\} \), we have \( T_{1} \cap X_{\text{i}} = T_{1} \cap Q//X_{\text{i}} \). To see this, since Q is a T1-question, for each \( i,j \in \left\{ {1, \ldots ,n} \right\} \) such that ij we have \( T_{1} \cap X_{\text{i}} \cap X_{\text{j}} = \varnothing \), hence \( T_{1} \cap X_{\text{i}} \subseteq T_{1} \cap - X_{\text{j}} \). From this follows that \( T_{ 1} \cap X_{\text{i}} \subseteq T_{ 1} \cap \, \bigcap \{ - X_{\text{j}} | i \ne j, j \in \left\{ { 1, \ldots ,n} \right\}\} \). Conversely, from the exhaustiveness of Q w.r.t T1 one can easily show that \( T_{ 1} \cap \, \bigcap \left\{ { - X_{\text{j}} | i \ne j, j \in \{ 1, \ldots ,n\} } \right\} \subseteq T_{ 1} \cap X_{\text{i}} \), hence \( T_{ 1} \cap X_{\text{i}} = T_{ 1} \cap \bigcap \left\{ { - X_{\text{j}} | i \ne j, j \in {\text{\{ 1}}, \ldots ,n\} } \right\} = T_{ 1} \cap Q //X_{\text{i}} \) as desired. Finally, suppose that NEX(Q) were exclusive w.r.t T2. Then we would have \( T_{2} \cap Q //X_{1} \cap \ldots \cap Q //X_{\text{n}} = \varnothing \). But a moments reflection shows that \( Q //X_{1} \cap \ldots \cap Q //X_{n} = - X_{1} \cap \ldots \cap - X_{\text{n}} = - (X_{1} \cup \ldots \cup X_{\text{n}} ) \), so it follows that \( T_{2} \cap - (X_{1} \cup \ldots \cup X_{n} ) = \varnothing {,}\, {\text{i}} . {\text{e }}T_{2} \subseteq X_{1} \cup \ldots \cup X_{n} \). This violates our assumption that Q is not exhaustive w.r.t T2.□

Proof of observation 2.3: left to right is easy. For right to left: suppose all members of Q = {X1,…,Xn} are pairwise disjoint. Then for each member Xi, we have \( X_{i} \subseteq - X_{j} \) for each ji, and so it follows that \( X_{\text{i}} \subseteq - X_{1} \cap \ldots \cap - X_{{{\text{i}} - 1}} \cap - X_{{{\text{i}} + 1}} \cap \ldots \cap - X_{\text{n}} \), hence \( X_{\text{i}} \cap - X_{1} \cap \ldots \cap - X_{{{\text{i}} - 1}} \cap - X_{{{\text{i}} + 1}} \cap \ldots \cap - X_{\text{n}} = X_{\text{i}} \). From this observation it clearly follows that DF(Q) = Q.□

Proof of observation 3.6: clearly COM(Q,T) is a finite set of propositions. That the exclusiveness precondition holds w.r.t T is clear since the members of COM(Q,T) are pairwise disjoint, and the consistency precondition holds as an immediate consequence of the definition of COM(Q,T). The exhaustiveness condition follows easily since the union of all combinations of Q equals W, and from this also follows that if T is non-empty, COM(Q,T) is non-empty. As we have already noticed that the members of COM(Q,T) are pairwise disjoint, it follows by observation 2.3 that it is in disjoint form.□

Proof of observation 5.2: (i) → (ii) is trivial. (ii) → (iii): let M be a T-topic for Q. Clearly, the members of COM(M,T) are disjoint, and so by observation 2.3, COM(M,T) = Q is in disjoint form. (iii) → (i): suppose Q is in disjoint form, i.e. Q = DF(Q). But since Q is a T-question, by observation 3.7 we have COM(Q,T) = DF(Q). Hence Q = COM(Q,T), i.e. Q is a topic for itself.□

Proof of observation 5.8: the first part of the observation is trivial to prove. The second part is proved by applying observation 5.2.□

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Enqvist, S. Contraction in Interrogative Belief Revision. Erkenn 72, 315–335 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9217-3

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