Abstract
For some time now, Jaegwon Kim has argued that irreducible mental properties face the threat of causal inefficacy. The primary weapon he deploys to sustain this charge is the supervenience/exclusion argument. This argument, in a nutshell, states that any mental property that irreducibly supervenes on a physical property is excluded from causal efficacy because the underlying physical property takes care of all of the causal work itself. Originally intended for mental properties alone, it did not take long for his critics to suggest the argument generalizes across all of the special science properties as well. Kim responds in two different ways to the generalization problem. The first response, which I call the higher-level solution, is ably dismissed by numerous critics. The second response, which I call the identity solution, has not faced comparable scrutiny. In this paper I argue that the identity solution faces numerous problems of its own.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Gillett and Rives argue that Kim and Noordhof are talking past each other on this point, since Kim seems to have identity in mind, while Noordhof assumes Kim does not (Gillett et al. 2001, p. 91). This interpretation, however, does not give proper weight to the fact that the identity solution does not appear in the earlier text, a fact which Gillett and Rives acknowledge (Gillett et al. 2001, p. 91). This interpretation does not account for Kim’s acknowledgement of a forthcoming addition either. If Kim had identity in mind all along, he would not need to clarify or add to his earlier works. Finally, this interpretation does not take into account the aforementioned considerations that specifically barred Kim from making this identity.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the relationship that this argument bears to my argument that individual micro properties exclude micro-based properties from the causal story.
This point is similar to the argument that Thomas Bontly makes. Bontly argues that the indiscernibility of identicals prevents us from identifying properties if they are not instantiated by the same objects at the same time (Bontly 2002, p. 88). If there is only one property, then surely wherever it is, it will also be. However, according to Kim’s model, the micro-based property is a property of a different object than the micro properties are. This being the case, the micro-based property cannot be identical to the micro properties. Kim, for his own part, argues that micro-based properties cannot stand in a determination relation with the micro properties, for the micro properties are properties of the parts of the object, not the object itself (Kim 1999, p. 117). If micro-based properties cannot be determined by micro properties since they are properties of different objects, then for the same reason micro-based properties cannot be identical to micro properties either.
Importantly, there is reason to suppose that Kim would not endorse Baxter’s model. Baxter argues that we can count something as many, or we can count it as one. The one-many identity, therefore, is simply a matter of choosing to count something in one way or another. The way we choose to count something is relative to human interests (Baxter 1988, p. 210). Kim, on the contrary, thinks that micro-based properties are genuine natural kinds. Nature itself cuts things up into pluralities or singularities, and it is our job to count these properly. Baxter rarely uses natural kinds in his examples, preferring instead to talk about such things as boxes of juice and the legal parceling of land (Baxter 1988, p. 199; p. 200; p. 210). In these examples, there is no natural kind that is really a singularity or a plurality, which needs to be counted as such. Rather, the way these objects are counted depend on human interest. Beyond this, Baxter is clear that within one way of counting, we still cannot identify a singularity with a plurality (Baxter 1988, p. 193; p. 201; p. 209).
There is further reason to think Kim endorses the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. First of all, he makes the following general statement regarding identities: “Distinct properties are just distinct, and we cannot pretend they are the same. I do not think it is good philosophy to say, as some materialists used to say, ‘But why cannot we just say that they are one and the same? Give me good reasons why we should not say that!’ I think that we must try to provide positive reasons for saying that things that appear to be distinct are in fact one and the same” (Kim 1998, p. 98). Beyond this, we have seen Kim’s hesitancy to identify macro properties with micro properties, possibly on account of the fact that they simply seem discernibly different. Kim also doubts that we can identify first-order properties with second order properties at times (Kim 1998, p. 103). Finally, a common objection to the composition as identity thesis is that it entails mereological essentialism (Merricks 1999, p. 193). If a whole is identical to certain parts at a time, then it cannot be identical to certain other parts at a later time. As soon as the parts change, the whole changes. A response that those who reject the indiscernibility of identical can give is that the same whole can have discernibly different parts. This is not the response that Jaegwon Kim gives, however. Kim considers the problem that an object which is identical to its bundle of properties has those properties essentially (Kim 1993, p. 129). He does not solve this problem by rejecting the indiscernibility of identical, rather he gestures at using the concept of supervenience to get around this problem. Or course, he offered this solution at a time when emphasized supervenience rather than identity, so this solution may not be available now. The point is, however, Kim did not argue that identical are discernibly different when he had the opportunity to. For these reasons, it seems as though Kim adheres to the indiscernibility of identicals. This being the case, he will not choose to identify a singularity with a plurality, and will instead have to opt for a different route.
Although Armstrong marks out this division, Kim does not. Rather, Kim simply places both of these types of structural properties under the more generic category of being a micro-based property—a fact that has troubled at least one critic (Schroder 2002, pp. 323–324).
I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
References
Armstrong, D. (1978). A theory of universals (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baker, L. (1993). Metaphysics and mental causation. In J. Heil & A. Mele (Eds.), Mental causation (pp. 75–95). Oxford: Clarendon.
Baker, L. (2009). Nonreductive materialism. In B. McLaughlin, S. Walter, & A. Beckermann (Eds.), The oxford handbook for the philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baxter, D. (1988). Many-one identity. Philosophical Papers, 17, 193–216.
Block, N. (2003). Do causal powers drain away? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67, 133–150. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00029.x.
Bontly, T. (2002). The supervenience argument generalizes. Philosophical Studies, 109, 75–96. doi:10.1023/A:1015786809364.
Burge, T. (1993). Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In J. Heil & A. Mele (Eds.), Mental causation (pp. 97–120). Oxford: Clarendon.
Gillett, C., et al. (2001). Does the argument from realization generalize? The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39, 79–98.
Harte, V. (2002). Plato on parts and wholes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kim, J. (1984). Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9, 257–270. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00063.x.
Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kim, J. (1995). Reduction and properties: Response to Merricks. Philosophical Books, 36, 161–164. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1995.tb02480.x.
Kim, J. (1997). Does the problem of mental causation generalize? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 87, 281–297. doi:10.1111/1467-9264.00017.
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a physical world. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Kim, J. (1999). Supervenient properties and micro-based properties: A reply to Noordhof. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 115–118. doi:10.1111/1467-9264.00049.
Kim, J. (2002). The layered model: Metaphysical considerations. Philosophical Explorations, 5, 2–20. doi:10.1080/10002002018538719.
Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism or something near enough. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lewis, D. (1991). Parts of classes. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.
MacDonald, C. (2005). Varieties of things. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Marras, A. (2000). Critical notice of mind in a physical world. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30, 137–160.
Marras, A., & Yli-Vakuri, J. (2008). The supervenience argument. In S. Gozzano & F. Orilia (Eds.), Tropes, universals and the philosophy of mind (pp. 101–134). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
McDaniel, K. (2008). Against composition as identity. Analysis, 68, 128–133. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00727.x.
McGivern, P. (2008). Reductive levels and multi scale structure. Synthese, 165, 53–75. doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9232-3.
Merricks, T. (1999). Composition as identity, mereological essentialism, and counterpart theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77, 192–195. doi:10.1080/00048409912348931.
Noordhof, P. (1999). Micro-based properties and the supervenience argument: A response to Kim. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 109–114. doi:10.1111/1467-9264.00048.
Schroder, J. (2002). The supervenience argument and the generalization problem. Erkenntnis, 56, 319–328. doi:10.1023/A:1016335332339.
Sider, T. (2007). Parthood. The Philosophical Review, 116, 51–91. doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-022.
Van Gulick, R. (1992). Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis, 36, 311–332.
Van Inwagen, P. (1994). Composition as identity. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 207–220. doi:10.2307/2214171.
Walter, S. (2008). The supervenience argument, overdetermination, and causal drainage. Philosophical Psychology, 21, 673–696. doi:10.1080/09515080802415985.
Yi, B. (1999). Is mereology ontologically innocent? Philosophical Studies, 93, 141–160. doi:10.1023/A:1004274912342.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Moore, D. The Generalization Problem and the Identity Solution. Erkenn 72, 57–72 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9177-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9177-7