Abstract
This article explores two consequences of intentionalism. My first line of argument focuses on the impact of intentionalism on the ‚hard problem’ of phenomenal character. If intentionalism is true, the phenomenal supervenes on the intentional. Furthermore, if physicalism about the intentional is also true, the intentional supervenes on the physical. Therefore, if intentionalism and physicalism are both true, then, by transitivity of supervenience, physicalism about the phenomenal is true. I argue that this transitivity argument is not persuasive, because on any interpretation of its central terms, at least one of its premises is as controversial as its conclusion already is. My second line of argument is about the consequences of intentionalism for the error theory of color perception. I suggest that if intentionalism is true, projectivism must be true also, because under this condition there is no single concept of color that can be used for the qualification of objects as well as for the characterization of experiences.
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Acknowledgments
I delivered previous versions of this talk to audiences at the Australian National University and the NEH Summer Seminar on Consciousness at Santa Cruz. I am indebted to all who took part in the ensuing discussion. For further comments and suggestions I am particularly indebted to: Karen Bennett, David Chalmers, Martin Davies, Frank Jackson, Brian Garrett, Aaron Zimmerman, Ralph Shumacher, and Laura Schroeter.
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Stoljar, D. The Consequences Of Intentionalism. Erkenntnis 66, 247–270 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9038-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9038-6