Abstract
In an earlier paper, I claimed that one version of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism turned on a subtle, but philosophically significant, mathematical mistake. Recently, Luca Bellotti has criticized my argument for this claim. This paper responds to Bellotti's criticisms.
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An erratum to this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9152-8.
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Bays, T. More on Putnam’s models: a reply to Belloti. Erkenntnis 67, 119–135 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9025-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9025-y